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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis argues that three successive generations of prosecutors—each of whom at some moment in 
time belong to a major institution designed specifically to enforce international criminal law—are best 
understood as agents of the law, politics and war.  By examining the relevant institutional 
arrangements, including formal prosecutorial mandates, the thesis recognises that these prosecutors 
play vital roles in the enforcement of international criminal law.  By critically examining prosecutorial 
performance during the pre-trial and trial phases this thesis contends, firstly, that these prosecutors are 
also political actors serving, unwittingly or otherwise, in the interests of economic liberalisation, 
expressed as neo-capitalism during the middle of the twentieth century or as neoliberalism in the late 
twentieth century.  By foregrounding the material and ideational conditions giving rise to those major 
enforcement institutions this thesis contends, secondly, that international prosecutors also help wage a 
mostly silent and largely unacknowledged war fought by proponents of various utopian movements.  
In order to support these two main contentions the thesis situates the development of international 
criminal law and its major institutions as a significant temporality of a discourse against politico-
cruelty, a term used here to refer to cruel acts committed as a means of achieving some substantive 
end.  It also contextualises the collective prosecutorial efforts within the project of modernity and, 
more specifically, what is described here as a politico-cultural civil war fought for control over that 
project.  Using international criminal law as a means of confronting humanity’s worst excesses and 
curbing modernity’s most violent pathologies, international prosecutors of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, crimes of genocide and crimes of aggression might represent the vanguard in the quest for 
international criminal justice and be regarded by many as featuring among humanity’s better angels.  
Indeed, they might well be characterised in world affairs as chief amongst the angels.  But, at the same 
time, these politico-legal actors, whose mandates are derived from, and re-inscribe, particular 
configurations of power emerging in the aftermath of global conflict, need to be recognised as the 
auxiliary combatants of those seeking to maintain their control over the modernist project.  
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“And Devils to adore for Deities” 
 
John Milton Paradise Lost (1667) Book 1, 373 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
 
Given the origins, complexity and significance of their mandates, international 
prosecutors of the most serious international crimes—namely war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, crimes of genocide and crimes of aggression—deserve sustained 
and in-depth examination.  Although these formal mandates are articulated in legal 
instruments establishing institutions designed specifically to enforce international 
criminal law (ICL), prosecutors have, through their own ideas and actions, breathed 
life into these at times ambiguous instructions.  During the pre-trial phase of their 
work international prosecutors are authorised to prepare indictments, warrants of 
arrest or summonses to appear, choosing sets of particular details concerning alleged 
crimes committed by certain individuals at specific times and places.  The content of 
these indictments, warrants or summonses is usually based upon extensive 
investigations, various analyses of information and close examination of available 
evidence.  These legal documents hold the essence of the prosecution’s case, serve as 
the primary means of transforming a suspect into an accused and tend to commence 
formal proceedings leading to trial.  At trial prosecutors are expected to build on the 
content of those indictments when making opening statements outlining their cases 
against the accused. These statements provide international prosecutors with an 
opportunity to showcase the legal character of their role and can be the apex of 
prosecutorial performance, deploying forceful rhetoric on the courtroom’s stage to 
deliver a theatre-like experience for an appreciative, though not altogether 
disinterested, audience-at-large.  As part of trial proceedings prosecutors also select 
evidence to present in support of their cases, as well as rebut defence counsels’ 
arguments, cross-examine witnesses and make closing statements.  Their performance 
at trial has a direct bearing on both the enforcement of ICL within particular 
institutions and, by contributing to case law, the ongoing development of this 
evolving set of rules prohibiting the commission of the most serious international 
crimes. 
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In addition to performing these and other trial-related functions international 
prosecutors manage relatively large and dynamic organisations, the associated 
administrative duties of which can occupy a considerable amount of their time and 
energy.1  As strategists these prosecutors can shape aspects of their respective ICL 
institutions while informing the justice delivered through their prosecutorial effort.  
These prosecutors can also produce, or contribute to, formal accountability 
documents, such as the annual reports of the tribunal or court to which they belong.2  
They can also release press statements and make public remarks with a view to 
providing some degree of accountability for their own decisions and actions in their 
quest for international criminal justice.3  For some perpetrators of serious 
                                                          
1
  Gregory Townsend “Structure and Management” in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric 
Ryngaert (eds) International Prosecutors (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 171 at 173. 
2
  International Conference on Military Trials Report of Robert H Jackson, United States 
Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials (International Organization 
and Conference Series II, European and British Commonwealth 1, Department of State 
Publication 2090, Washington DC, 1949); United Nations Annual Report of the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (A/49/342; 
S/1994/1007, 29 August 1994); United Nations Report of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 (A/51/399; S/1996/778, 24 
September 1996); International Criminal Court Report of the International Criminal Court for 
2004 (A/60/177, 1 August 2005). 
3
  Robert H Jackson “The Trials of War Criminals: An Experiment in International Legal 
Understanding” (1946) 32 ABAJ 319; Richard J Goldstone “World Peace Through Justice 
Award Lecture” (2009) 8(4) Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 619; Louise Arbour “The 
Prosecution of International Crimes: Prospects and Pitfalls” (1999) 1(13) Wash. U. J. L. & 
Pol’y 13; Serge Brammertz “The Impact of Criminal Prosecutions on Compliance with IHL: 
Challenges and Perspectives on the Way Forward” (2015) 39(1) UWA Law Review 4;  Hassan B 
Jallow “Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal Justice” (2005) 3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 145; Carla Del Ponte “The Role of International Criminal 
Prosecutions in Reconstructing Divided Communities” Public lecture given at the Centre for the 
Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, 20 October 2003, available at 
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international crime, international prosecutors represent an appreciable risk to be 
avoided; for many victims of these crimes they represent hope that justice will be 
done.4   
Beyond the courtroom international prosecutors are often “the public face of 
international criminal justice,”5 generating appreciable impacts in specific locales.  
The naming of a particular individual as a suspect can, for example, curtail that 
individual’s ability to engage in local, domestic or international politics; this is even 
more acute when the list of those indicted includes state leaders.  Prosecutors can 
foster outreach relationships with domestic justice sectors and their related 
institutions.  These prosecutors deal with, and seek support from, government 
officials and officials of intergovernmental organisations, though this kind of 
diplomacy is not necessarily open diplomacy as prosecutors may, in fact, choose to 
deal with diplomats behind closed doors.6  As the personification of international 
criminal justice within the wider international community, international prosecutors 
are living objects around which others, such as those belonging to a nongovernmental 
organisation (NGO), social movement or mainstream media organisation, can cohere 
and at times mobilise into action.  This occurs even though some policymakers, 
diplomats, journalists and academics are intimidated by international prosecutors 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/23448/; Luis Moreno-Ocampo “The International Criminal Court: 
Seeking Global Justice” (2015) 40 Case W. Res J. Int’l L Rev 215; and Fatou Bensouda 
“Looking Back, Looking Ahead—Reflections from the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC” 
(2012) 11(2) Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev 437. 
4  Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert “Introduction” in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters 
and Cedric Ryngaert (eds) International Prosecutors (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 1 
at 2. 
5
  At 2. 
6
  Richard J Goldstone For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator (Yale University 
Press, New Haven & London, 2000) at 91; and Carla Del Ponte in collaboration with Chuck 
Sudetic Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst Criminals and the Culture 
of Impunity (Other Press, New York, 2009) at 10, 43-44 & 101-102. 
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when they make “self-assured comments about the imperatives of customary 
international law, often couched in confident resort to mysterious Latin maxims.”7 
The pool of these prosecutors continues to grow as successive generations of 
lawyers cut their professional teeth within various ICL institutions.  As Mark Drumbl 
explains:8 
These lawyers have become specialists, whose expertise in 
international criminal law and procedure is no longer just of academic 
value—it is marketable and the market values it.  These lawyers now 
have an interest in maintaining the value of their expertise.  Within the 
college of international law, an energetic, transnational and networked 
epistemic community of international criminal lawyers has arisen. 
These prosecutors share a deep repugnance for the internationalised culture of 
impunity that Carla Del Ponte describes as muro di gomma.9  This so-called rubber 
wall is constructed not so much by the criminals themselves, but more by those in 
positions of power who, for various reasons, wish to shield particular individuals and 
the groups they represent from the full glare of international criminal justice.  This 
culture of impunity, prosecutors routinely maintain, warrants instant redress by those 
holders of positions of power and influence in contemporary world affairs, from 
international leaders and policymakers to domestic law-makers, advocacy groups and 
researchers alike.  Forming part of “an industry of international criminal law practice 
populated by judges, lawyers and administrators who move from tribunal to 
tribunal,”10 some prosecutors emerge from, or go on to obtain, employment in the 
senior ranks of the public service or international organisations.  After moving among 
the courtrooms of various institutions others contribute to the production of scholarly 
                                                          
7
  William Schabas Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes 
Tribunals (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 3. 
8
  Mark Drumbl “International Criminal Law: Taking Stock of a Busy Decade” (2009) 10(1) 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 1 at 4. 
9
  Del Ponte with Sedutic, above n 6, at 18. 
10
  Sara Kendall “Critical orientations: A critique of international criminal court practice” in 
Christine Schwöbel (ed) Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction 
(Routledge, New York, 2014) 54 at 55-56. 
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knowledge through research and university teaching, “generating ever more students 
of mass atrocity jurisprudence for a legal market incapable of absorbing them.”11  As 
a burgeoning cadre of professional litigators, these prosecutors are a growing force to 
be reckoned with in local, international and global settings, having impact far beyond 
the courtroom.  For these reasons alone, then, international prosecutors of serious 
international crime deserve critical scholarly treatment. 
This thesis explores the efforts of prosecutors ahead of the defence counsel and 
members of the bench because, as legal actors, prosecutors do more to assert that 
evolving body of rules seeking to end the culture of impunity enjoyed by perpetrators 
of serious international crime, searching out the limits of ICL’s enforceability.  As 
Marieke Wierda and Anthony Triolo point out the prosecutor’s mandate is “the raison 
d’être of the tribunal.”12  More specifically, the thesis concerns those prosecutors 
belonging to major international institutions of ICL; namely those established by the 
order of an occupying power, through a United Nations (UN) Security Council 
resolution or through a treaty or an international agreement among states.13  These 
international institutions are prioritised here ahead of domestic and special national 
courts, or hybrid and internationalised tribunals, because the former are the most 
forceful and, almost certainly, most consequential expression of the international 
community’s collective will to punish those responsible for serious international 
crimes through the rule of ICL.  Prosecutors who belong to these international 
institutions derive their authority from those state-makers that design and establish 
these courts.  When these prosecutors perform various law-related functions and 
confront, in an adversarial manner, those accused of committing serious international 
crimes, their efforts echo the intentions of the executives on whose behalf they 
prosecute.  In many instances, the prosecutors articulate and reproduce reigning 
official versions of events before those versions encounter opposition from the 
defence and mediation from the bench.    
                                                          
11
  At 56. 
12
  Marieke Wierda and Anthony Triolo “Resources” in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric 
Ryngaert (eds) International Prosecutors (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 113 at 114. 
13
  Reydams, Wouters and Ryngaert, above n 4, at 2. 
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This is not to suggest, however, that the bench or the defence are undeserving 
topics of inquiry in their own right, or to imply that domestic and hybrid courts are 
unimportant to ICL enforcement.  Rather, it merely acknowledges that any conceptual 
mapping of the ICL field would be incomplete without featuring the prosecutors 
belonging to the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German War 
Criminals (IMT), the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the 
Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 (ICTR) 
and the International Criminal Court (ICC).  It is these landmark institutions—or, 
more specifically, the three successive generations of prosecutors who belong to these 
five major ICL institutions—which are the primary focus of this thesis. 
 
I  Central Argument 
By examining the relevant institutional arrangements, including formal prosecutorial 
mandates, this thesis recognises that three successive generations of international 
prosecutors play vital roles in the enforcement of ICL from the immediate aftermath 
of the Second World War up until the present day.  There is, however, very little that 
is new or particularly unique in recognising international prosecutors as agents of the 
law.  Indeed, recent scholarship gives a great deal of attention to such legal agency in 
terms of, inter alia, prosecutors’ formal mandates, independence, discretion and trial 
functions.14  This recent work forms part of a burgeoning field of legal scholarship 
                                                          
14
  Luc Reydams and Jed Odermatt “Mandates” in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric 
Ryngaert (eds) International Prosecutors (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 81; Luc 
Côté “Independence and Impartiality” in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert (eds) 
International Prosecutors (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 319; Frederiek de Vlaming 
“Selection of Defendants” in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert (eds) 
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which, while acknowledging the politico-strategic circumstances that, in part, give 
rise to this law and its key enforcement institutions, tends to view the law as an 
apolitical set of rules proscribing the commission of serious international crime.15  
Much of that scholarship is informed by an assumption that a dichotomy exists 
between politics and law; that is, while one informs and shapes the other, politics and 
law are, in effect, two very separate domains.  That dichotomy underpins the view 
held by Del Ponte, the well-known former prosecutor at the ICTY and the ICTR, who 
thinks that although diplomacy all-too-often disabled and all-too-seldom enabled the 
arrest of those who stood accused of serious international crime, the law itself is not a 
form of international politics.16  As we shall see, this is a view shared by most, if not 
all, the prosecutors considered in this thesis. 
Separating politics and law into two distinct domains serves obvious academic, 
professional and material interests.  Yet the sharp focus given to the legal aspects of 
enforcing ICL tends to blur significant political dimensions, offering only a highly 
provisional and fragmentary comprehension of the field of international criminal 
justice.  While appreciating that the complexities of trial advocacy remains important 
                                                                                                                                                                     
International Prosecutors (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 542; Hiroto Fujiwara and 
Stephan Parmentier “Investigations” in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert (eds) 
International Prosecutors (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 572; Jeffrey Locke 
“Indictments” in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert (eds) International 
Prosecutors (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 604; and Sergey Vasiliev “Trial” in Luc 
Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert (eds) International Prosecutors (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012) 700. 
15
  Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2
nd
 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008); 
Antonio Cassese Cassese’s International Criminal Law revised by Antonio Cassese, Paola 
Gaeta, Laurel Baig, Mary Fan, Christopher Gosnell and Alex Whiting (3
rd
 ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2013); Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson and Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Practice (3
nd
 ed, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2014); Richard J Goldstone and Adam M Smith International 
Judicial Institutions: The Architecture of International Justice at Home and Abroad (Routledge, 
London and New York, 2009); and Ronald C Slye and Beth Van Shaack International Criminal 
Law: The Essentials (Aspen Publishers, New York, 2009). 
16
  See Del Ponte with Sedutic, above n 6. 
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to understanding the pursuit of international criminal justice, much relevant 
mainstream scholarship does not fully account for the injustices endemic to most 
circumstances in which serious international crime occur.  As Immi Tallgren 
explains:17  
Focusing on the idea of international criminal justice helps us forget 
that an overwhelming majority of the crucial problems of the societies 
concerned are not adequately addressed by criminal law.  The ideology 
of a disciplined, mathematical structure of international criminal 
responsibility serves as a soothing strategy to measure the 
immeasurable.  The seemingly unambiguous notions of innocence and 
guilt create consoling patterns of causality in the chaos of intertwined 
problems of social, political, and economic deprivation.  
The notion that we are all equal before the law, a dogma central to the quest for 
international criminal justice, frequently obfuscates the inequalities prevailing within 
any society, among societies and within the international society of states.18   
By critically examining the prosecutorial performance during the pre-trial and 
trial phases this thesis contends, firstly, that the three generations of international 
prosecutors which have thus far emerged are, in fact, also political actors.  There are 
many definitions of politics and defining politics is, of course, something of a 
political act in itself because it determines what is—and, by corollary, what is not—
relevant to particular forms of inquiry and analysis.  Some scholars define politics as 
the art of government, whereas others define politics as occurring within public 
affairs, or as the practice of compromise and consensus, or, more simply, as the 
exercise of power.19  The definition used in this thesis is taken from Ralph Pettman, 
who suggested that politics refers to “all those things we do, individually and in 
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concert, to get and use power over others for non-trivial purposes.  Politics is always 
about trying to get our way to some substantive end. It is always a verb.”20   
Pettman’s definition is preferred here over all others because it is inclusive yet 
limited.  It is inclusive because it can be applied to any situation where power, 
broadly conceived, is used over others, yet it is limited too because that power must 
be used in relation to some discernible ends that matter.  Moreover, Pettman’s 
definition is not necessarily fixated on official forms of power exercised by 
governments or other institutions and organisations.  This helps to signal the inter-
relationships among and across the important politico-strategic, politico-economic, 
and politico-social dimensions of local and international affairs.  This is important 
because the politico-strategic dimension is fundamental to explaining the 
establishment and design of major ICL enforcement institutions, just as the politico-
economic dimension is fundamental to explaining post-conflict reconstruction 
transformations.  Similarly, the politico-social dimension is fundamental to explaining 
the construction of certain groups and the targeted destruction of others through mass 
atrocity, as well as the ways in which cosmopolitanism saturates ICL’s development 
and enforcement.  This also brings into focus the definition’s use of we, which is used 
here to speak, in the general sense, on behalf of all of us who act politically at certain 
moments and, in the specific context of this thesis, all of us who seek to better 
understand the various roles played by three successive generations of international 
prosecutors.  We is not meant in the sense that Tallgren means when she discuss we in 
terms of either the international community or humanity and the collective pursuit of 
international criminal justice because this usage excludes critical ICL scholars.21         
But, perhaps even more importantly, Pettman’s definition enables the thesis to 
bring into focus the broader and more profound politico-cultural context of modernity 
and the rivalry among its ancillary, or subsidiary, utopia movements.  In other words, 
this definition of politics—which is, at once, inclusive yet limited—enables a 
bifurcated analysis of the prosecutors’ collective efforts, signalling moments of 
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consonance and longer periods of dissonance between their more immediate, specific 
politico-strategic circumstances and the broader material and ideational conditions 
prevailing within the politico-cultural project of modernity.  Other definitions of the 
political preclude this kind of analysis and eschew explanations that suggest that there 
is more to atrocity crime trials than the performance of justice or the exercise of state-
centric power.     
Since prosecutors make political choices,22 obtaining various degrees of power 
over the accused, their defence, the bench and other prosecutors, the concept of an 
international prosecutor as a juridical actor who is above all political considerations is 
a fiction.  Even though prosecutors may couch their decisions in terms of objectivity 
and universality and then “simply pretend that politics is alien to the pursuit of 
justice, dismissing it as a vile taint to be shunned rather than one that is to be 
mastered and understood,”23 these decisions are always partial and subjective, helping 
to create or sustain certain types of political communities.24  This is not to suggest 
that international prosecutors who identify themselves primarily or exclusively as 
agents of the law are deliberately dissembling, but rather, to acknowledge, as Tor 
Krever does, that:25  
[I]t is at the ideological level that law, trial, and text operate to 
constrain consciousness—to create, in other words, a social consensus 
that can persuade people to accept the legitimacy but also the apparent 
inevitability of the status quo, with its existing hierarchical 
arrangements.  The ideological function of legal text and discourse is 
thus not so much to ‘enforce’ existing social relations as it is to 
legitimatise them.   
 
This first contention challenges mainstream ICL scholars to reconsider the 
relationship between politics and law by recognising that politics need not only 
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animate and saturate the law, but that the law, particularly ICL enforcement, 
constitutes a kind of international politics in and of itself.  As Gerry Simpson puts it, 
ICL becomes a kind of “juridified diplomacy” which “involves the translation of 
political conflict into legal doctrine, and, occasionally, the resolution of these 
conflicts in legal instruments.”26  This contention also challenges critical ICL 
scholars, of which there is a small but vibrant community,27 to broaden their notion of 
the political.  Too often politics is conceptualised, unduly narrowly, as only cohering 
around the state-maker and his or her prerogatives.  When this happens, law—
especially its enforcement—is routinely seen as a by-product of state-based politics.  
While states are undoubtedly important to the conduct of contemporary world affairs, 
including as makers of international law as well as its subject and object, states are 
not the only entities through which people, acting as individuals or in concert, seek to 
obtain and use power over others for substantive ends.  Focusing on the state as the 
primary entity of contemporary world affairs neglects the importance of economic 
and social actors.  It can blind analysts and scholars to the ways in which 
international prosecutors of serious international crime express their preferences not 
only for democracies, but also for markets without fetters and individuals as 
sovereigns unto themselves.  These expressions are important because enemies, rivals 
and opponents who do not share these preferences can find themselves transformed 
initially into suspects and then into the accused standing in the dock at ICL trials. 
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As this thesis will demonstrate, international prosecutors of serious 
international crime are, by and large, political actors serving in the interests of 
economic liberalisation.  The political movement of economic liberalisation emerges 
from the nineteenth century, as John Gray explains:28   
Mid-nineteenth century England was the subject of a far-reaching 
experiment in social engineering.  Its objective was to free economic life 
from social and political control and it did so by constructing a new 
institution, the free market, and by breaking up the more socially rooted 
markets that had existed in England for centuries.  The free market created 
a new type of economy in which prices of all goods, including labour, 
changed without regard to their effects on society.  In the past, economic 
life had been constrained by the need to maintain social cohesion.  It was 
conducted in social markets—markets that were embedded in society and 
subject to many kinds of regulation and restraint.  The goal of the 
experiment that was attempted in mid-Victorian England was to demolish 
these social markets, and replace them by deregulated markets that 
operated independently of social needs.  The rupture in England’s 
economic life produced by the creation of the free market has been called 
the Great Transformation.  
In the middle of the twentieth century, economic liberalisation found favour in 
Northern America and parts of Western Europe and was expressed as a form of neo-
capitalism, which, as Franco Archibugi explains, is “characterised by mass 
production and, therefore, mass consumption” and has witnessed a dramatic 
expansion of the state’s provision not only of health and educational services, but also 
of public housing and transportation goods, particularly where private firms have 
been reluctant to operate.29  (The prefix neo acknowledges the changes occurring 
within capitalism from its nineteenth-century origins.30)  Within the US, it is more 
commonly referred to as New Deal-ism, named after US President Franklin D 
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Roosevelt’s policy response to the Great Depression where his administration used 
counter-cyclical spending to disrupt boom-and-bust patterns seen in the economy.  
Neo-capitalism and its concomitant Keynesian policy prescriptions had its “heyday”31 
in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War before giving way to the rise of 
neoliberalism in the 1970s.  By neoliberalism, I mean here a set of ideas, practices 
and policy preferences which are based on an assumption, drawn from classical 
political liberalism, that adult individuals possess an inalienable right to make choices 
about how to pursue their welfare, regardless of whether or not those choices are 
poor.32  More specifically, these ideas, practices and policy preferences seek to apply 
so-called market mechanisms into areas of social life hitherto organised, governed 
and conducted in other ways.33  By displacing traditional social paradigms with a set 
of reified market relations neoliberalism privileges individual economic imperatives 
ahead of collective human wellbeing.34  As variations of economic liberalisation both 
neo-capitalism and neoliberalism fall within what John Gray describes as the “faith in 
a global free market” which is “as damagingly utopian as any earlier grand design for 
humanity.”35  These various expressions of economic liberalisation reflect important 
historical shifts in the material and ideational conditions underlying modernist word 
politics. 
The politico-strategic, politico-economic and politico-social preferences shared 
among state-makers who establish, resource and defend institutions designed 
specifically to enforce ICL partly explain why these prosecutors are, unwittingly or 
otherwise, agents of economic liberalisation.  The actions undertaken by prosecutors, 
and the work of those legal scholars that offers uncritical treatments of those actions, 
could play a role in limiting the politico-legal consciousness of many participants in, 
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and observers of, atrocity crime trials.  This is because the values informing 
prosecutorial action are reflected and re-inscribed through a Gramscian process of 
cultural hegemony whereby the interests of the powerful became the values inherited 
by the weak.  Another, less overt, reason lies in international law’s origins.  Martti 
Koskenniemi has done much, firstly, to “trace the emergence of a sensibility about 
matters international in the late nineteenth century as an inextricable part of the 
liberal and cosmopolitan movements of the day”36 and, secondly, to deconstruct the 
liberal theory of politics that informs international law, thereby undermining legal 
practitioners’ claims to objectivity and impartiality.37  The growth of international 
law, including ICL, occurs as part of a liberal movement which, emerging during the 
nineteenth century,38 is still evident today even if other factors, such as nationalism, 
are at play too.39  In other words, ICL institutions not only help form part of a 
particular utopian movement,40 but they also help transform the world order from one 
where states are considered co-equal to one where states are distinguished by their 
conformity and allegiance to a particular utopian movement.41  Although all trials of 
serious international crimes are political trials to the degree that they reflect, re-
inscribe and extend existing power relations in any society, including the society of 
states, they are also show trials which “implicate larger political transformations and 
are efforts to influence and dictate these transformations.  Not merely political or 
legal proceedings, they are world-historical trials.”42  ICL enforcement thus becomes 
a particular form of modernist world politics, which, concerning the ongoing rivalry 
among various utopian movements, is understood here more broadly than the 
diplomacy of state-makers, though such diplomacy remains important.   
                                                          
36
  Martti Koskenniemi The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 
1870-1960 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001) at 2. 
37
  Martti Koskenniemi From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) at 600. 
38
  Koskenniemi, above n 36, at 2. 
39
  Simpson, above n 26, at 24. 
40
  At 20. 
41
  At 142. 
42
  At 113. 
16 
 
Modernist world politics involves contests played out among proponents of 
contending utopian movements, which are not necessarily aligned with particular 
states, though “[e]conomists, environmentalists, and human rights experts are just as 
divided among themselves as Finns, Frenchmen, or Fijians about how to understand 
the world and what to do with it.”43  While the forces of economic liberalisation have 
dominated modernist world politics since at least the end of the Second World War, 
these forces have been routinely and, at times, fiercely contested by various rival 
utopian movements: these include Nazism; Shinto-Imperialism; Soviet-styled 
Communism; Christoslavism; Hutu supremacy; and Islamic fundamentalism; each of 
which is a by-product of the European Enlightenment in particular44 and of the 
politico-cultural project of modernity more generally.45  Each of these utopian 
movements, elaborated in more detail in subsequent chapters, is an amalgam of 
nationalism and either race, ethnicity, class or religion, or some combination thereof.  
Each of these movements, moreover, seeks to use organised violence, usually through 
the state and its machinery of government, as a means of radically transforming 
society in terms of some hierarchy of sorts.  These utopias can never be achieved in 
practice, but are hugely costly for the human species when examined in terms of 
those killed by them, those who die for them and the enormity of human potential 
never realised; as described by Gray “[u]topias are dreams of collective deliverance 
that in waking life are found to be nightmares.”46  Here, then, the specific sets of 
politico-strategic circumstances within which certain institutions designed to enforce 
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ICL are established are distinguished from the more general material and ideational 
conditions prevailing within the politico-cultural project of modernity.  This 
bifurcation is important because atrocity crime trials are explicable not only in terms 
of politico-strategic calculations, but also in terms of rival utopian movements 
fighting for control over the governance architecture used to manage modernist world 
affairs. 
By foregrounding the material and ideational conditions giving rise to those 
institutions designed specifically to enforce ICL the thesis contends, secondly, that 
successive generations of international prosecutors help wage a mostly silent and 
largely unacknowledged war.  This second contention challenges critical ICL scholars 
to reconsider the relationship between law (as a type of politics) and war.  Yet the 
character of war is understood here in a very different way to the description of war 
offered by the nineteenth-century Prussian soldier, Carl von Clausewitz.  For 
Clausewitz, war is politics by other means and is a clash of arms, or a series of 
clashes of arms, which result from the failure of politics.47  According to Michel 
Foucault, however, modernist politics itself is a continuation of war by other means 
because relationships of politicised power emerge from relationships of armed force 
established through conflicts occurring at particular places and times.  These new 
power relationships help transform a condition of conflict into a condition of peace, 
preserving the result of conflict in “a sort of silent war” that enshrines (uneven) 
relationships of force, re-inscribing that relationship in institutions, economic 
inequalities, social relations’ language and, in some cases, individual’s bodies.  Such 
a peace masks the ongoing political rivalries over access to power which are best 
understood “as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself.  
We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the 
history of peace and its institutions.”48   Although Foucault did not fully explore the 
consequences of his inversion of Clausewitz’s dictum, instead moving on quickly into 
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his investigations of biopower, biopolitics and governmentality, the implications of 
his inversion remain profound.  As Julian Reid puts it:49  
War figures ultimately for Foucault not as a primitive state of being 
against which modern societies and their power relations can be 
differentiated, nor simply as a utile instrument for the pursuit of the 
grand strategies of state in paradoxical compromise of the civil 
condition of modern societies, but, rather, as a ‘condition of 
possibility’ for the constitution of modern power relations in which the 
aleatory condition of species life is variably recruited, set free, 
manipulated, and put to work in the development of modern social 
arrangements.   
 
In this important sense, war is a phenomenon larger than armed conflict, 
extending beyond the clash of arms or series of clashes of arms.  Hence, modernist 
world politics represents a transformation of war’s routine conduct as the formal 
cessation of hostilities becomes less meaningful when configurations of power 
transcend battle.  In this sense, too, modernist world politics thus represents an 
enlargement of war’s province as the battleground is no longer to be understood as 
some geographically-bound territory, but rather, as the entire politico-cultural project 
of modernity.  More specifically, it is fought for control over the key institutional 
architecture governing the politico-strategic, politico-economic and politico-social 
dimensions of international life and by policing international society’s norms and 
related rules of behaviour.  And, this war is also waged, in part, through the 
reconstruction of local politico-strategic and politico-economic institutions in the 
aftermath of armed conflict and, in part, through the enforcement of ICL in the 
aftermath of mass atrocity.  Law (as a type of politics) thus becomes war’s means; the 
old maxim silent enim leges inter arma (law is silent in war
50
) needs to be revised so 
that war is now a silent spectre in law.   
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By placing representatives of discredited utopian movements in the dock of five 
ICL enforcement institutions, trials of those accused of committing serious 
international crimes occur as an internal frontline in this silent war, which I call 
hereafter politico-cultural civil war.  Politico-cultural civil war is more than a 
militarised politico-strategic affair; these wars are fought among proponents of larger 
and more complex utopian movements, which are articulated through, but never 
constrained by, politico-strategic policy.  Since each utopian movement pursues its 
own path towards a perfected humanity—but which is, at the same time, an 
inconclusive path—at stake in politico-cultural civil war is nothing less than the 
determination of what it means to be human.  This notion of politico-cultural civil 
war, then, is more than a form of politics for it seeks to obtain and maintain control 
over modernity by delegitimising, degrading and destroying its perceived enemies, 
rivals and opponents by any available means.   The violence accompanying economic 
liberalisation can only be described as extreme and brutal.  Under the conditions of 
economic liberalisation, over 1 billion people—that is, over 1/6 of humanity—live in 
poverty, experience the brunt of armed conflict, disease and ignorance reminiscent of 
the fourteenth century, and have access only to US$1 per day or less.
51
  For Zygmunt 
Bauman, this widespread misery and systemic squalor is the “collateral damage” 
flowing from social and economic inequality.
52
  As Paul Rogers explains too “the real 
drivers of current global insecurity are […] deepening socio-economic division, 
which lead to the relative marginalization of most people across the world, and the 
prospect of profound and lasting environmental constraints, caused by climate 
change.”53 
Politico-cultural civil war differs markedly from those more well-known 
understanding of civil war as internal armed conflict fought over the institutions of 
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government and the authority to rule over a particular territory, such as the English, 
US and Spanish Civil Wars: for Eve La Haye, for instance, internal armed conflict 
lies somewhere between internal disturbances and full-blown international armed 
conflict.54  It differs too from the type of European civil war “in which religious 
belief and ‘godless’ secularism are understood as irreconcilable opponents, an 
understanding that was long fed by memories of the burning of Protestant ‘martyrs’ in 
sixteenth-century England, by the legend of the Spanish Inquisition and by a ‘holy 
alliance’ between churches (especially the Roman Catholic Church) and socially 
conservative forces in reaction to the French Revolution.”55  Nor is it a global civil 
war understood by Carl Schmitt as occurring over the self-enclosing structures of the 
states-based system, which he refers to as the second nomos of the earth, with its land 
“divided into states, colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence.”56   
The selective enforcement of ICL is a form of lawfare, but not in the sense 
meant by Laurie R Blank when he seeks to delegitimise the Palestinian cause by 
criticising the Goldstone Report’s “misapplication of international humanitarian law” 
when examining Israel’s use of armed force against civilians.57  Rather, it is lawfare 
in the sense that David Luban means when he writes that it “is the use of law as a 
weapon of war against a military adversary.  Law can be weaponized in many ways, 
but easiest is accusing the adversary of war crimes, thereby subjecting him to 
harassment through litigation and bad publicity.”58  It is a tactic of war available for 
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use by the strong against their perceived enemies, rivals and opponents, rather than by 
the weak that almost always lack the material power required to establish, operate and 
defend viable enforcement institutions.  Those individuals who find themselves 
transformed into the accused are not necessarily the ‘enemy target’; they are merely 
representatives of a movement comprising a group, state, or alliance of states that 
pursue a rival utopian vision of modernity.    
Arguing that prosecutors of serious international crime enforce law, conduct 
politics and help wage politico-cultural civil war is not to suggest that they always 
have their way in non-trivial matters.  While trials can serve to legitimise a particular 
collective, group or state leading a prosecution, or endorse the underlying rule of 
international law, such trials can also create the interstices required to express views 
unauthorised by that collective, group or state.59  “The trial,” Simpson explains, “also 
can be a trial of the accusers and their political projects.”60  In other words, ICL’s 
substantive and procedural dimensions have created spaces inviting resistance not just 
to the evolving law itself, but also to the politics of enforcing that law.   
Contempt towards prosecutorial authority is, perhaps, best exemplified by 
Hermann Göering’s initial advice to his co-accused at Nuremberg: that is, to “confine 
their evidence to three words, ‘Lick my arse.’”61  Soon after proffering that advice, 
however, Göering participated in the trial in accordance with the terms laid out for 
him as a defendant.  Former President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, refused to 
recognise the authority of the ICTY before publicly criticising the tribunal as being an 
extension of the politico-strategic circumstances that overwhelmed him.  Milošević 
argued that his trial was, in fact, a trial of the Serbian people since his actions were 
merely an episode of the Serbian nation’s contemporary history.  In this way 
Milošević demonstrated that his trial was underpinned by an interpretation of a set of 
politico-strategic circumstances, which were themselves at the very heart of his 
actions, and he “aimed to avoid conducting his defence under conditions laid down 
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by his adversaries.”62  Agreeing to either Milošević’s or the prosecutor’s 
interpretation is to privilege the interpretation of one of those among which the initial 
political struggle was conducted.63  For one particularly astute scholar, the defence 
team chosen by Milošević—which included Jacques Vergès, former defence counsel 
for Klaus Barbie and Ilich Ramirez Sanchez—signalled a defence strategy which, 
cohering around the trials of rupture theory, attacks the political system upon which 
the prosecutor’s case in particular, and the prevailing regime of law in general, is 
based.64  Other defensive ploys include refusing defence counsel and asserting the 
right to self-representation throughout trial proceedings, a tactic used not only by 
Milošević but also by former President of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić, 
during his trial at the ICTY.65   
Resistance to ICL enforcement efforts have also taken place beyond the major 
enforcement institutions as alternative forms of justice, such as the Gacaca courts in 
Rwanda or the Achillio courts in Nigeria.  Legal scholarship, particularly critical ICL 
scholarship, is another site where resistance has taken shape. Such resistance might 
be part of an “insurrection of subjugated knowledges,” which are, according to 
Foucault:66   
blocks of historical knowledges that were present in the functional and 
systematic ensembles, but which were masked, and the critique was 
able to reveal their existence by using, obviously enough, the tools of 
scholarship… When I say “subjugated knowledges” I am also referring 
to a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as 
nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: 
naive knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that 
are below the required level of erudition or scientifity… it is the 
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reappearance of what people know at the local level, of these 
disqualified knowledges, that the critique is made possible.  
“Whether or not such counterhegemonic discourses stand any chance of destabilizing 
the dominant ideology is, of course, another matter,” Krever acknowledges.67  These 
forms of resistance do not locate themselves beyond the politico-strategic, politico-
economic and politico-social dimensions of modernist world affairs, nor beyond 
modernity’s epistemological biases and ontological preferences.  At trial the accused 
and their defence counsel seldom, if ever, draw upon contending versions of 
modernity as a means of countering the prosecutorial effort.  Unsurprisingly, even 
when they play the role of technical policy advisors serving hegemonic interests by 
naturalising a particular economic system, international prosecutors can, but almost 
never do, embrace an ethical commitment that helps them to reimagine international 
law as a means of resistance where “the inner anxieties of the Prince is less a problem 
to resolve than an objective to achieve.”68 
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II  Research Method and Analytic Approach 
The research undertaken for this thesis was fairly unremarkable, relying upon 
documents and other materials gathered from publicly available sources.  No 
interviews with international prosecutors were sought nor were any conducted; I did 
not meet or converse with any prosecutor or even observe a prosecutor at work.  For 
the most part primary source material—namely statutes and charters founding the 
enforcement institutions, as well as various indictments, warrants of arrest, 
summonses to appear and prosecutorial opening statements—was obtained from 
academic journals, official websites or online archives.
69
  Much of the secondary 
source material was found in mainstream legal scholarship, as either peer-reviewed 
articles published in learned journals or book-length studies issued by reputable 
publishing presses offering general treatments of ICL and specific treatments of its 
important aspects.
70
  Those same types of publications offered alternative 
perspectives on international law too.
71
  As the research progressed, a body of critical 
ICL scholarship began to emerge: firstly, at the inaugural Critical Approaches to 
International Criminal Law (CAICL) Conference in Liverpool in December 2012 
(which I did not attend); secondly, on a website which, following that Conference, 
offers a working bibliography of critical ICL scholarship; and more recently as a 
publication, edited by Christine Schwöbel, suitably entitled Critical Approaches to 
International Criminal Law: An Introduction.
72
  Other critical works were consulted, 
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some of which were only very recently published.
73
  In order to buttress these 
mainstream and critical pools of scholarly literature the research for this thesis also 
drew on works from disciplinary International Relations, political philosophy, 
sociology, anthropology, literary criticism and history.
74
  Useful insights were also 
cautiously drawn from the memoirs produced by some of the prosecutors 
themselves.
75
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If the thesis’s research method was quite ordinary and simple, then its analytic 
approach was more unique and sophisticated.  Firstly, the argument situates the 
development of ICL as a significant temporality of a discourse against politico-
cruelty, a term used here to refer to cruel acts committed as a means of achieving 
some non-trivial end.76  Put another way, the modernist discourse against politico-
cruelty is a significant driving force behind the codification of substantive ICL and 
the politics of enforcing that law as propitious politico-strategic circumstances are, in 
and of themselves, insufficient to account for the establishment of ICL institutions.  
The relationship between the immediate politico-strategic circumstances in which the 
tribunals were established and the discourse against politico-cruelty (that is, the 
material and ideational conditions rooted in nineteenth-century liberalism) is complex 
and dynamic, shifting from brief moments of consonance to longer periods of 
dissonance.  The discourse against politico-cruelty encourages an expansion of the 
law, but in practice this expansion occurs only insofar as the prevailing politico-
strategic circumstances permit.  This interpretation helps account for ICL’s uneven 
development and its even more selective enforcement. 
Secondly, the argument assumes a wide lens and contextualises the 
prosecutorial efforts, which occur inside those enforcement institutions, within the 
politico-cultural project of modernity and what has already been described as a 
politico-cultural civil war fought for control over that project.  The thesis differs from 
the work of critical ICL scholars through its bifurcation of the discourse against 
politico-cruelty and the politico-cultural civil war, both of which are a novelty to 
critical ICL scholarship.  In other words, this thesis makes a modest contribution to 
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the small but growing pool of critical ICL scholarship through its synthesis of 
existing knowledge and, more importantly, its specific analytic treatment of the 
international prosecutor.  It differs from much mainstream scholarship that offers 
criticism of ICL, which is “pragmatic, instrumental, and policy-oriented” with a view 
to “making institutions of international criminal justice ‘the best they can be.’”77  
That is the kind of scholarship which Krever correctly sees as largely “focused on 
doctrinal exegesis and self-affirming genealogies.”78   
The thesis is critical, then, not in the sense of being negative or hostile towards 
the prosecutor for negativity’s or hostility’s sake.  Nor is it critical for a constructive 
and pragmatic purpose, either to ensure the smoother enforcement of ICL or to 
facilitate a more expeditious pursuit of international criminal justice; but rather, it is 
critical for it illustrates that this law and its major enforcement institutions do not just 
spontaneously appear without cause.  It recognises, to rephrase Robert W Cox, these 
ICL institutions as existing in order to serve someone’s, or some groups’, purpose; it 
is critical “in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world [to 
the extent possible] and asks how that order came about… [and] does not take 
institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by 
concerning itself with their origins.”79  This thesis thereby offers a unique analysis of 
an important vanguard actor in the quest for international criminal justice.  Its 
analysis goes beyond the narrow focus of many state-based paradigms of mainstream 
legal scholarship to offer its reader a more complex, nuanced and profound 
understanding of the interrelationships between the development and enforcement of 
ICL and the conduct of modernist world affairs.  In so doing, the thesis uncovers “the 
political economies that undergird violence and [brings] to the fore both the 
conditions that sustain violence and those that enable change.”80  By using an 
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expansive definition of politics the thesis offers its reader a fresh way of 
understanding ICL and, more specifically, a more sophisticated comprehension of the 
conduct of those whose job it is to prosecute the most serious of international crimes.  
Yet the thesis pretends to be neither an exhaustive treatment of the topic at hand, nor 
a call to arms, nor a roadmap for change; I leave the latter in particular to others with 
more vision, pragmatism and material resources.  My essential purpose here is to 
better understand and more fully explain the conduct of an important politico-legal 
actor in contemporary world affairs.  My particular aim was to undertake research 
into, and conduct analysis of, the efforts of three generations of international 
prosecutors of serious international crime in a way constituting a critical investigation 
of a significant topic, demonstrating expertise in the methods of research and 
scholarship, displaying intellectual independence while making an original 
contribution to the study of law, particularly the subfield of ICL.
81
  
Notwithstanding its benefits, this critical approach reveals an unresolvable 
problematique which, lying at the heart of this thesis, warrants explicit 
acknowledgement here.  In particular, the research method and related analytic 
techniques used in this thesis are predominantly distal, reifying the conduct of 
international prosecutors.  Yet such a rationalist epistemology is a limited, and 
limiting, way of knowing, as Ralph Pettman explains:82 
Standing back to look at world affairs in an objectifying, analytic 
fashion is certainly the preferred approach in these post-Enlightenment 
times.  It is part of our Enlightenment heritage.  It is what rationalism 
is supposed to allow us to do.   Looking from a mental distance with 
the light of the mind can certainly illuminate the subject.  The point to 
note here, however, is that it can also blind us to what is going on.  It 
can set limits to what we otherwise might know. 
A rationalist epistemology cannot, for example, help me to feel, to understand and 
then to explain what it is like to be a victim of the most serious of all international 
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crimes, to be on trial as an accused or to carry out the responsibilities associated with 
being a prosecutor or a member of the bench.  Even though some prosecutors—such 
as Telford Taylor, Richard Goldstone, Louise Arbour and Carla Del Ponte—have 
constructed first-hand book-length accounts of their experiences as prosecutors,83 
these accounts are artefacts to be objectified, looked at and considered from a mental 
distance.   
As a by-product of the modernist world affairs that I, myself, seek to 
interrogate, I reify not only criminal acts, but also prosecutorial actions articulated 
through indictments, warrants, summonses and opening statements, as well as the 
related scholarship attending to these matters.  By critically analysing one aspect of 
ICL, this thesis forms part of the broader episteme underpinning the liberal utopian 
movement and shares the rationalising habits of the modernist mind that I have 
attempted to critique here.  Much of the academic literature informing this thesis is, 
moreover, produced in western universities, particularly within the Anglo and 
American traditions and almost certainly carries with it various euro-centric, liberal 
biases.  Put simply, as the author of this thesis I too am captured and weighed down 
by my preferred epistemologies, ontologies, theories and concepts.  Unless I become 
a mystic “endowed with divine luminous wisdom”84 I must remain a prisoner of 
certain metaphysics, entrenched in the mundane thought world defining and 
dominating modernist world affairs.  My understanding of this social reality derives, 
to a large extent, from what Jürgen Habermas would likely describe as my proximal 
participation in the social world that I seek to describe, analyse and interpret.85  Since 
it relies heavily upon a rationalist epistemology deeply entrenched within the 
modernist project—and, more specifically, within the subsidiary utopian movement 
that this thesis seeks to critique—the critical approach here places itself in something 
of a conceptual bind.  While on the one hand this conceptual bind is unresolvable, on 
the other hand it represents at least some of the tension animating the conduct of 
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contemporary world affairs.  This seems to me to be more problematic than any 
subsequent (and specious) accusations—made, potentially, by those who form part of 
that industry of ICL practice already mentioned—that such a critique endorses the 
initiation of armed conflict or the commission of mass atrocities.86  As this thesis 
demonstrates, it is possible and meaningful to simultaneously critique the 
perpetration and the prosecution of serious international crimes, as well as those 
involved in the production of scholarly knowledge that, as an unquestionable matter 
of routine, demonise those perpetrators and valorise those prosecutors.  Without these 
kinds of tensions, debates and negotiations a further Dark Age looms with what 
Charles Freeman might describe as another “closing of the Western mind.”87 
 
III Thesis Structure 
The thesis’s first chapter begins by suggesting mass atrocities represent a serious and 
urgent politico-social problem for victims, their local communities and those at the 
helm of contemporary world affairs.  The chapter then situates the origins of a 
discourse against politico-cruelty as part of the rise, spread and entrenchment of 
liberal regimes within the broader politico-cultural project of modernity.  It argues 
that this discourse, characterised by a compulsive denouncing of those who commit 
cruel acts in the service of some substantive end, coheres around its preoccupation 
with the conceptual figure of hostis humani generis.  This trope is used as a means of 
excommunicating certain individuals from humanity’s ranks.  The chapter notes ICL’s 
substantive elements and introduces key enforcement institutions before suggesting 
the discourse gives rise to a demotic concept of atrocity crime.  Subjecting this 
discourse to analysis helps to “explain how power is constituted and how its premises 
and givens are replicated at all levels of society and to reveal its exclusionary 
practices in order to create space for critical thought and action.”88  This is especially 
important because knowing the ways in which discourse influences norm creation and 
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interpretation is central to understanding the development of ICL, but is something 
which few professional lawyers (especially with civil law backgrounds) appear 
inclined to reflect upon.89   
The remainder of this thesis comprises three main parts, each of which explores 
the quest for international criminal justice arising from within particular politico-
historical settings.  Whereas Part I concerns the period immediately following the 
Second World War, Part II concerns the aftermath of the Cold War.  Part III concerns 
our contemporary moment marked by the ongoing War on Terror.  The first chapter of 
each part gives focus to the relationship between the discourse against politico-cruelty 
and a particular set of politico-strategic circumstances which together give rise to ICL 
institutions.  As mentioned, this evolving relationship is characterised by moments of 
consonance and periods of dissonance.  While the discourse against politico-cruelty 
encourages an expansion of the law, this expansion occurs only insofar as the 
prevailing politico-strategic circumstances permit.  These first chapters also 
illuminate the interplay between that discourse and the evolution of substantive ICL 
as well as situating the courtrooms among broader post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts.  The subsequent chapters of each part critically examine the ways in which 
generations of international prosecutors strut and fret their hour upon the courtroom’s 
stage by preparing indictments, warrants or summonses, as well as by making 
opening statements.  These chapters highlight important linkages between the 
ongoing evolution of substantive international criminal law, the indictments used by 
prosecutors to commence proceedings towards trial and the self-consciously legal 
rhetoric finding expression in their opening statements.  Highlighted too are linkages 
between the politics of enforcing ICL through holding trials and the prosecutors’ 
selection of suspects and expression of their own political preferences.  The 
relationship between global conflicts shaping politico-strategic circumstances that 
gave rise both to trials and efforts to reconstruct economies in the aftermath of armed 
conflict and the war rhetoric articulated in five opening statements also receives 
attention here.  By examining the multiple registers in which prosecutors speak 
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within their relevant institutional settings as well as within their specific politico-
strategic and politico-economic circumstances, these chapters reveal a new, and more 
profound, interpretation of what is actually taking place in these trials.  These latter 
chapters demonstrate that prosecutorial silences can, at times, speak louder than 
flamboyant rhetorical flourishes.  These utterances and omissions need to be 
understood within a deeper politico-cultural context.  Taken together, the three parts 
of this thesis demonstrate a large degree of inter-generational conformity in the 
interplay among law, politics and war.  While Krever is correct to suggest that “by 
foregrounding individual acts abstracted from their social context, legal discourse 
naturalizes and legitimizes the political-economic social structures in which the crime 
is rooted,”90 it is possible not only to uncover those politico-economic structures, but 
also—as Chapters 3, 6 and 9 demonstrate—to reveal the political preferences of 
prosecutors and to signal the utopian movement they serve. 
Of particular salience to the shifting politico-strategic circumstances that 
underpin the various ICL enforcement institutions are the United States (US) strategic 
thinkers and foreign policymakers who played, and continue to play, crucial roles in 
maintaining the current world order.  The US took the lead in establishing both 
international military tribunals in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, as the 
most powerful member of the UN Security Council, both ad-hoc tribunals in the 
aftermath of the Cold War by advocating for their establishment and encouraging the 
cooperation of other states, as well as by providing significant funds and staff to these 
institutions.91  The US also supported the idea of establishing the ICC during the early 
days of drafting the Rome Statute, without which the prospects of the ICC would 
have been less bright.92  Although the US initially opposed the ICC’s establishment, it 
now actively supports it in its work.93  In some important respects the evolution of 
ICL can be articulated as a history of US engagement with international criminal 
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justice, though, somewhat quizzically, William Schabas remains sceptical of the 
literature depicting the US playing a dominant role, suggesting it is a product of 
“cultural bias.”94  Notwithstanding such scepticism the US is worthy of our attention 
for, as Michael McKinley explains, the US:95  
has been the prime mover and principal determinant of outcomes in so 
many of the developments under the rubric of economic globalisation, 
as it was, and is in global politics more generally....  Furthermore, quite 
apart from the fact that the United States is capitalist, neo-liberal, and 
the sole superpower, it is the only global actor with the power to 
initiate and implement a revolution of the type which neoliberalism 
demands; conversely, it is the only global actor with the power to 
effect a negative veto on such developments and to ensure that 
whatever regime might emerge without its blessing would be 
ineffective. Thus, although numerous other actors have supported the 
US in the neo-liberal project, and their support undoubtedly 
contributed to its progress, the contours of the neo-liberal world would 
have been questionably global and its regulatory regime virtually 
discretionary without the US as the motor of change. 
As this thesis demonstrates, ICL enforcement is inextricably bound up with US 
foreign policy—especially its use of organised armed force on a global scale and its 
efforts to construct, control and defend the global free market through economic 
liberalisation—which shapes and reshapes the politics of modernist world affairs.96  
When the US desires international criminal justice, it can exercise the power to shape 
the environment for this to occur, thereby signalling a moment of consonance 
between a specific set of politico-strategic circumstances and the more general 
ideational and material conditions that constitute the discourse against politico-
cruelty.     
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Concluding this thesis, Chapter 8 reflects on the implications of the thesis’s two 
major contentions, both of which hold significance for those who study the law, 
particularly those scholars, researchers and analysts interested in better understanding 
the various roles international prosecutors play when confronting the most serious 
international crimes.  Focus is given here to the complicity between prosecutorial 
efforts and the production of related scholarly knowledge within academia. 
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CH. 1: DISCOURSE AGAINST POLITICO-CRUELTY 
 
I Introduction 
This first chapter explores the material and ideational conditions that shape responses 
to the problem of mass atrocity.  The chapter opens by acknowledging that mass 
atrocities generate important politico-social consequences for victims, their local 
communities and those at the helm of contemporary world affairs.  It then argues that 
a discourse, characterised by a compulsive denouncing of those who commit such 
cruel acts in the service of some non-trivial end, coheres around a preoccupation with 
the trope hostis humani generis.97  This trope is used not only to refer to those persons 
who commit mass atrocity, but also as a means of excommunicating those persons 
from humanity’s ranks through a public process of abjection.  The chapter goes on to 
situate the origins of this discourse against politico-cruelty as part of the rise, spread 
and entrenchment of liberal regimes within the broader politico-cultural project of 
modernity.  It also posits that the most powerful and enduring manifestation of this 
discourse is its conceptualisation of mass atrocities as serious international crimes.  
The chapter draws to a close by claiming that this discourse is a prime factor spurring 
on the quest for international criminal justice, a claim resonating throughout the 
ensuing three main parts of this thesis.  While the discourse against politico-cruelty 
encourages an expansion of international criminal law, in practice this expansion 
occurs only insofar as the prevailing politico-strategic circumstances permit. 
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II The Problem of Mass Atrocity 
Mass atrocities feature in the earliest records of human history, reaching back prior to 
the early modern period.98  Mass atrocities committed as part of Europe’s religious 
wars of the seventeenth century helped usher in the state-based system of the 
Westphalian peace.99  Where governments are unable or unwilling to protect their 
people from mass atrocity, and where mass atrocity becomes mundane, endemic and a 
feature of everyday experience, life is rendered in all its grim Hobbesian eloquence to 
be nasty, brutish and exceedingly short for humanity’s most vulnerable members.  
Cultures of injustice and impunity rise and flourish amidst conditions of such 
insecurity.  They invoke fear, inflict injury and cause death among entire populations 
which, in turn, encourage internal displacement and refugees to spill across state 
borders.  Sometimes the mass atrocity itself spills over borders, turning localised 
armed violence into wider, more complex regional armed conflicts, as occurred 
recently in Sub-Saharan Africa.100  In these circumstances state capability to enforce 
the rule of law can be seriously eroded.  However, mass atrocities frequently involve 
the state, whose oft-cited purpose is to offer protection to its citizenry.101  While 
governments have led and conducted mass atrocities on their own citizens, as well as 
on the citizens of other states during situations of international armed conflict, these 
atrocities are worse than armed conflict and “ought to be understood as among our 
time's most pressing and systematically produced political problems.  They should be 
at the centre of security discussion in the United Nations and in other international and 
domestic forums concerned with security, the international order, and justice.”102 
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Notwithstanding these very important politico-strategic dimensions, mass 
atrocity is best characterised as a politico-social problem in the sense that individuals 
and groups struggle against one another in order to establish and maintain a collective 
sense of self.103  Struggles over identity formation inform the commission of mass 
atrocity where perpetrators lead, form part of or foster social groups whose central 
purpose is to antagonise others.  That social relations are torn asunder is almost 
always an objective informing the commission of mass atrocity.  Victims of mass 
atrocity are cast in the reductive and narrow terms of their national, racial, ethnical, 
class, religious or tribal affiliations.  As Simpson points out “[t]he subject is not 
‘man’s inhumanity to man’ but the inhumanity to specific categories of men (Serbs in 
Bosnia but not Americans or Iraqis in Fallujah, Hutus but rarely Tutsis, Sudanese or 
Ugandans but not the Northern Alliance or the Russians in Chechnya.)”104  Thus, 
describing mass atrocities as affecting “humanity as a whole” and suggesting “that 
humanity is a victim” is a step too far.105  Mass atrocities are vehicles by which 
particular social groups are augmented while others are seriously harmed or 
destroyed.  Understanding mass atrocity as a politico-social problem challenges the 
conventional view of politics as something done by states and state-makers, as these 
social groups exist within the state and across its borders; such a perspective opens up 
the empirical field of inquiry beyond the fiction of states as the primary entity 
conducting world affairs. 
The enormity of human suffering generated by mass atrocity is intensified by 
the knowledge that these problems are man-made and are, therefore, all-too-often 
avoidable; there is nothing attractive about mass atrocity nor is there anything 
particularly dignified or heroic in committing these acts.  The persistence of mass 
atrocities affecting hundreds of thousands of individuals and their immediate families 
and communities must surely rank among the most serious and urgent of 
contemporary world affairs' myriad problems.  By almost any reckoning, the trauma 
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experienced by victims of mass atrocity must surely be the closest one can come to 
experiencing the depths of hell though, as Michael Walzer reminds us, “in hell, 
presumably, only those people suffer who deserve to suffer, who have chosen 
activities for which this punishment is the appropriate divine response, knowing that 
this is so.”106  Moreover, explaining experiences of mass atrocity as trauma and 
through the language of medical-psychiatric science tends to render them less 
disturbing and, in some ways, naturalised.107  As Roberto Beneduce explains “[f]or 
many societies, for many minorities, the notion of ‘trauma’ itself, of an event 
(dramatic but singular), does not fit well with the collective experience of regular, 
chronic conditions of violence, death, exploitation, uncertainty and poverty in which 
individuals and groups are forced to survive.”108  These experiences and the ways in 
which they are described can serve political interests, especially in terms of 
delineating the boundaries of international criminal jurisdiction while simultaneously 
imposing the powerful distinction between the civilised and the barbarian.109  Such 
descriptions have also prompted and shaped a plethora of responses from the 
international community.110 
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III Hostis humani generis 
Many legal scholars, political analysts and policymakers concerned with mass 
atrocity proclaim that acts, such as those conveyed above, shock the conscience of 
humanity because these acts embody humanity’s most intense inhumanity towards 
itself and are understood “with a peculiar horror deriving from the fact that fellow 
human beings are capable of conceiving and committing [them], thereby diminishing 
us all.”111  The extent to which these kinds of acts do in practice shock humanity’s 
conscience might be somewhat overstated, however.  For starters it would be 
extremely difficult to measure, empirically, the extent of this collective shock in any 
meaningful way; and, as Schabas points out, “a single murder or a single rape also 
shocks the conscience.”112   The frequency with which these acts occur throughout 
recorded time helps erode any moral restraints which may curb at least some of those 
persons intending to commit these acts or, worse, enjoy such “festivals of cruelty.”113  
Moreover, the velocity at which images of these acts circulate within contemporary 
world affairs probably helps to engender a shock fatigue now widespread among 
many of those with the power to respond.  The law of diminishing returns, it seems, 
applies to the CNN effect; these kinds of acts would be more shocking if more rarely 
discussed and, perhaps, unimaginable if images of them were not so prevalent in the 
twenty-four hour news cycles managed by contemporary media corporations.114  
For others of a more sacral, rather than secular, outlook these kinds of acts are 
described as evil.  According to Robert Shnayerson, for instance, the Nazis 
responsible for the Holocaust were “satanic men” and “messengers of evil” whose 
acts were a “road to Armageddon,” “epidemic evils” and “diabolic 
achievement[s].”115  For Hannah Arendt the banality of evil could be seen in the role 
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played by Adolf Eichmann, an ambitious bureaucrat serving within a genocidal 
totalitarian state.116  Arendt understood that evil “need not be committed only by 
demonic monsters but—with disastrous effect—by morons and imbeciles as well, 
especially if, as we see in our own day, their deeds are sanctioned by religious 
authority.”117  More disturbing, however, is the role played by the everyman in the 
commission of evil deeds.  Arendt explains further:118 
The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, 
and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, 
and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal.  From the viewpoint of 
our legal institutions and of our moral standards of judgement, this 
normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together, 
for it implied—as had been said at Nuremberg over and over again by 
the defendants and their counsels—that this new type of criminal, who 
is in actual fact hostis humani generis, commits his crimes under 
circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or 
feel that he is doing wrong. 
The problem here, of course, is that if one is born evil, then he or she is “no more 
responsible for this condition than being born with cystic fibrosis. The condition 
which is supposed to damn them succeeds only in redeeming them.”119  
While the kinds of acts described above are not necessarily evil, “[b]ringing the 
problem of evil down from the heavens into the world of politics and policy offers 
advantages that can help make atrocities we face in the world more intelligible.”120  
For Alan Wolfe political evil “refers to the wilful, malevolent, and gratuitous death, 
destruction, and suffering inflicted upon innocent people by the leaders of movements 
and states in their strategic efforts to achieve realizable objectives.”121  Yet Wolfe is 
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not so much defining acts of political evil as he is describing acts of politico-cruelty.  
Rather than being evil it is the cruel nature of these acts, when undertaken as a means 
to a substantive ends, which renders them unique.  In other words, acts of politico-
cruelty encompass those acts which might be considered evil in and of themselves—
acts referred to by orthodox criminal law theory as malum in se—but only when these 
acts provide those who commit them with some form of utility at another human 
being’s expense.  And by cruelty I mean an indifference to, or gratification derived 
from, suffering deliberately inflicted on others.  The prefix politico is used here 
because politics is understood in this thesis—as mentioned in the Introduction—as all 
those things we do, as individuals or in concert, to obtain and use power over others 
for non-trivial, or substantive, purposes.122  Specifically, then, acts of politico-cruelty 
are acts or omissions which, intentionally causing pain and suffering for others, are 
performed in the pursuit of some non-trivial—that is, substantive—ends.  These acts 
tend to be committed by members of groups against members of other groups and 
tend to be of deep concern to, and denounced by, the international community as 
being committed by hostis humani generis. 
The conceptual figure, or trope, of hostis humani generis is central to, if not the 
defining characteristic of, a discourse against politico-cruelty.  A Latin term, hostis 
humani generis was probably first used by Pliny the Elder to refer to Nero’s tyranny 
in the first century, thereby preceding the advent of modernity by some fifteen 
centuries.  In addition to its Roman usage the term has an important Christian 
heritage where it referred to the devil from about the ninth century onwards.123  
Linking hostis humani generis to the devil, whose diabolical nature posed an 
immediate danger to each and every soul, meant urgent and severe action could be 
taken against anyone categorised as such.124  Christianity’s enemies were not the only 
targets, however, as “this supreme degree of hostility could now be projected onto 
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whoever filled the semantic requirements of the phrase,” including Goth, Vandal and 
Hun barbarian tribes that were seen as enemies of civilisation.125   
This concept of hostis humani generis also found application during the high 
modern period.  The near universal revulsion at the horrifying means used frequently 
by pirates—or “sea brigands”126 as Geoffrey Robertson refers to them—convinced 
many that these acts were “heinous” and, as such, belonged in “the pantheon of 
peremptory norms.”127  The outlaw status ascribed to pirates was due partly to the fact 
that piracy took place beyond the reach of most states, meaning its victims were 
particularly vulnerable.128  It was also partly because piracy was understood during 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as “the scourge of nations, at times 
devastating commerce and exploration.”129  Piracy directly threatened the expanding 
system of states while illuminating the limits of sovereign jurisdiction on the high 
seas.  Consequently, any person with an interest in international commerce was 
entitled to punish a pirate, who was in this sense less an enemy of humanity than an 
enemy of homo economicus.  Ever since the seventeenth century the concept’s 
intrinsic hyperbole has evaded the critical scepticism of those who deploy it as “‘a 
legal fiction’… that demands that we treat the pirate, whether or not there is any such 
thing ‘as if he were the enemy of all mankind,’ even as we recognise that such a 
designation is more literary than literal.”130   
The application of the term hostis humani generis to those who commit acts of 
politico-cruelty certainly matters for those designated within this category since, once 
denounced as enemies of mankind, they are subjected to a process of abjection.  
According to Julia Kristeva:131 
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There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of 
being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an 
exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, 
the tolerable, the thinkable.  It lies there, quite close, but it cannot be 
assimilated.  It beseeches, worries, and fascinates desire, which, 
nevertheless, does not let itself be seduced.  Apprehensive, desire turns 
aside; sickened, it rejects.  A certainty protects it from the shameful—a 
certainty of which it is proud holds on to it.  But simultaneously, just 
the same, that impetus, that spasm, that leap is drawn toward an 
elsewhere as tempting as it is condemned.  Unflaggingly, like an 
inescapable boomerang, a vortex of summons and repulsion places the 
one haunted by it literally beside himself. 
The process of abjection, then, is a process of purification through excising certain 
traits of the human character, albeit dark and deplorable ones, from the human 
community.  Abjection stigmatises that which it expels and, at the level of the group, 
takes the form of an excommunication of sorts.  There is a vision here, in other 
words, of a perfected humanity where certain traits, behaviours or acts have been 
eliminated.  This vision is to be realised not through eugenics or other forms of 
elimination on the grounds of biological determinism.  It is realised by constructing a 
particular category of persons based not upon some perceived or actual identity 
marker specific to an individual, group, community or society, but rather, on their 
choice of violence as a means of achieving a particular substantive end.  Acts of 
politico-cruelty thus provide those who prevail in the conduct of contemporary world 
affairs with an opportunity to identify the behaviours which ought, in their view, to be 
forever denounced while also casting out their opponents, rivals or enemies beyond 
an immediate community, group or society.  Deeming one’s adversary as hostis 
humani generis is tantamount to exiling “the offender from the ranks of men and 
from all the rights and privilege ostensibly and often sanctimoniously attached to 
being human.”132 As Jody Greene puts it:133  
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The phrase had always, by definition, been tied to the status of the 
human and the nonhuman, denoting not only a relationship between 
two groups of beings—those who are humans and those who make war 
on humans—but also a characteristic unique to the latter group, the 
fact that they may not themselves be part of humankind at all. 
Put simply, this discourse engages in opprobrium, imposing strict bounds on what it 
means to belong to the human community. 
The discourse against politico-cruelty is an intensely political discourse because 
its primary purpose is to rid humanity of the will and capability to commit acts of 
politico-cruelty that prove traumatic for those who are victims and intolerable for 
those who, bearing witness, possess the necessary power to detect and deter those 
who commit such acts.  Although the politico-cruelty exhibited by war criminals, 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity and genocidaires is seemingly aloof from the 
daily contest among political, economic and social rivalries, like the pirate, he or she 
is constructed as “the enemy, not of mankind, but of particular men with particular 
political projects.”134  In this sense hostis humani generis is a legal fiction subject to 
those who control legal interpretations and deploy power according to hegemonic 
values and interests.135  It has been reconstituted to suit certain contemporary 
purposes, though as Koskenniemi points out, despite the symbolism of a criminal trial 
providing the prosecuting community with opportunities to affirm its guiding 
principles and develop into a “‘moral’ community,” the conduct of these prosecutors 
affirms only an “elusive and self-congratulatory ‘international community.’”136 
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IV Modernist Origins 
The discourse against politico-cruelty is informed by the principle of 
humanitarianism.  Although Luc Reydams and Jan Wouters suggest that the early 
1990s were “the dawn of the age of human rights, humanitarianism, and global 
governance”137 and Anne Orford suggests that a “new kind of international law and 
internationalist spirit seemed to have been made possible in the changed conditions of 
a world no longer structured around the old certainties of a struggle between 
communism and capitalism,”138 the roots of humanitarianism reach further back than 
the ending of the Cold War.  The willingness to rescue people in desperate need—but 
only in circumstances where the costs of doing so are relatively low—can be traced 
back to The Bible’s parable of the Good Samaritan who, happening across a victim of 
an attack, renders immediate assistance by bandaging his or her wounds, moving him 
or her to a nearby inn and paying for his or her convalescence there.  This 
humanitarian duty applies among distant strangers with nothing in common besides 
their shared humanity.139  While the origins of humanitarianism probably lies 
somewhere between the birth of Christianity and the end of the Cold War, Gary Bass 
points to the late nineteenth century when:140 
[h]umanitarian intervention emerged as a fundamentally liberal 
enterprise, wrapped up with the progress of liberal ideals and 
institutions.  Ideologically, it grew out of the radical ideas of freedom 
and the rights of man, a driving force in world politics since the French 
Revolution in 1789; institutionally, it grew up along with the rise of 
mass media, public opinion, and responsive government.   
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The growth of liberal regimes within Europe and North America tended to be 
supported by institutions, such as the free press and civil society, which could 
stimulate public opinion to the degree that governments faced sustained pressure to 
defend human rights beyond their territories.141  The foreign policies of nineteenth-
century Britain, the US and France, for example, were shaped by the enjoyment of 
home-grown freedoms and a free press willing and able to report on atrocities 
unfolding abroad to an attentive civil society disturbed by such acts and who, in turn, 
were able to apply pressure on politicians seeking to harness their moral outrage.  
According to Bass “governments had to sit up and take notice when their so-called 
atrocitarians demanded heroic rescues of suffering populations, even though the 
mission would be in some obscure part of the world that served no strategic 
purpose—or undermined the government’s realpolitik policy.”142   
Significant here too is the anti-slavery campaign contemporaneously occurring 
in Victorian Britain.  Other key moments similarly manifesting this humanitarian urge 
might include 1859, when Henry Dunant stumbled across the Battle of Solferino’s 
bloody aftermath before helping found the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) as a means of ameliorating the suffering of wounded combatants.  Dunant’s 
contemporaries—Florence Nightingale who served as a nurse tending to wounded 
British soldiers during the Crimean War (1853-56) before helping to professionalise 
nursing, Francis Lieber who drafted the Instructions for Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field (1863) which provided for the conduct of President 
Lincoln’s Union Troops during the US Civil War and Clara Barton who helped found 
the American Red Cross (1881)—were each similarly cognisant that “[a]rmed 
conflict was becoming less and less a chivalrous jousting contest for the few, and 
more and more a mass slaughter.”143  For Michael Barnett such “[h]umanitarianism is 
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nothing less than a revolution in the ethics of care,”144 though it is also a reaction to 
the increasingly destructive power of weapons designed and manufactured in the mid-
nineteenth century.145  The spread of this humane worldview, particularly during the 
nineteenth century when the decline of the Holy Roman Empire had been followed by 
the development of nationalism and the concomitant growth of the nation-state as the 
primary entity of world affairs, gave rise to the laws of armed conflict.146  This was 
“… the same force of modernity that forged a sense of common British political 
identity between impoverished Welsh villagers and London aristocrats, or between 
French citizens in metropolitan Paris and slowly integrating Lorraine, [and] could 
also create a weaker but still politically important sense of solidarity with foreigners 
facing massacre.”147  Central here is the notion of a common humanity worth 
protecting, even from itself.148   
While it is my contention that the origins of the discourse against politico-
cruelty can be situated within the rise, spread and entrenchment of liberal regimes, at 
a deeper level the discourse has its origins firmly rooted in modernity.  And by 
modernity I mean the “modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe 
from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or 
less worldwide in their influence.”149  Richard Tarnas captures the character of 
modernity well when he explains the foundations of its worldview:150 
And so between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, the West saw the 
emergence of a newly self-conscious and autonomous human being—
curious about the world, confident in his own judgements, sceptical of 
orthodoxies, rebellious against authority, responsible for his own beliefs 
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and actions, enamoured of the classical past but even more committed to a 
greater future, proud of his humanity, conscious of his distinctiveness from 
nature, aware of his artistic powers as individual creator, assured of his 
intellectual capacity to comprehend and control nature, and altogether less 
dependent on an omnipotent God.  The emergence of the modern mind, 
rooted in rebellion against the medieval Church and the ancient 
authorities, and yet dependent upon and developing from both these 
matrices, took three distinct and dialectally related forms of the 
Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Scientific Revolution.  These 
collectively ended the cultural hegemony of the Catholic Church in Europe 
and established the more individualistic, sceptical, and secular spirit of the 
modern age.  Out of that profound cultural transformation, science 
emerged as the West’s new faith. 
Notwithstanding many ambiguities surrounding the concept of modernity and various 
contending dates offered for its rise, an underlying consensus exists, resting upon a 
shared assumption concerning the role of rationalism in the development and spread 
of new ways of thinking about nature and human society.151  The impact of using 
rationalism in this way resulted in a Scientific Revolution that gave rise to a 
burgeoning body of reliable knowledge and an Industrial Revolution that gave a few 
European governments advanced military power which they used to build empires of 
global reach.  The legacies of these empires are discernible in the ways sovereign 
statism creates order, global capitalism creates wealth and individualism and 
nationalism constructs forms of civic identity.152  Barry Buzan and George Lawson 
claim the apex of modernity is to be found in material and ideational consequences of 
a “global transformation” that occurred during the nineteenth century, by which they 
mean the practical application of the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions as well as 
the ascendency of ideologies as diverse as liberalism, nationalism, socialism and 
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racism, though each has roots dating back much earlier.153  For the most part the 
politics of modernity are informed by a strong belief in the perfectibility of humanity 
through civilising instruction and the power of knowledge to deliver humanity from 
evil through progress, a belief which stimulated the major political revolutions that 
defined the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.154 
Describing modernity as a project does not imply that modernity was planned, 
organised and controlled from its outset, but merely suggests “that what began as an 
elite movement became over time a recognizable ambition for whole societies and by 
now involves a discrete set of politico-cultural activities and aims… [in] a world in 
which rationalism is the central cultural objective.  This is a world where the use of 
reason as an end in itself en masse is accorded the highest cultural priority.”155  This 
use of reason as an end in itself en masse is a defining feature of modernity, 
distinguishing it from pre-modern modes of living and post-modern practices.   
Modernity has obviously spread beyond Europe: relevant here were Christopher 
Columbus’s and Vasco da Gama’s voyages of discovery at the close of the fifteenth 
century, dramatically expanding Europeans’ reach into the non-European world.156  
Even though those societies subsequently dominated by modern Europeans “broke 
free” through anticolonial revolutions in America, Africa and Asia, they did not shed 
their modernity.  As SN Eisenstadt explains:157 
The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to 
understand the contemporary world—indeed to explain the history of 
modernity—is to see it as a story of continual constitution and 
reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs.  These ongoing 
reconstructions of multiple institutional and ideological patterns are 
carried forward by specific social actors in close connection with 
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social, political, and intellectual activists, and also by social 
movements pursuing different programs of modernity, holding very 
different views on what makes societies modern.  Through the 
engagement of these actors with broader sectors of their respective 
societies, unique expressions of modernity are realized. 
As the politico-cultural project currently prevailing in contemporary world affairs, 
modernity is engaged in “‘deep’ politics on a global scale, since it is about human 
beings getting their way on planet earth.  It is about the human capacity that has made 
us highly successful in Darwinian terms, at least, for the moment.”158  These 
modernist world affairs are so wide ranging that they are almost all encompassing and 
include, inter alia, our need as humans for some kind of nurturing as a way of living, 
examples of our different ways of living and our specific sub-cultures with potential 
to generate civilisations of global proportions.  As human beings seek to obtain power 
over others in order to have their specific conception of culture prevail not only do 
they illuminate the context for modernist world affairs, but they also constitute the 
dynamics of world affairs itself.159  The development and expansion of the modernist 
project was, of course, accompanied by much violence.  More than a recurring feature 
of modernity, atrocities seem to be an intrinsic part of the making and re-making of 
the modernist project.  Notwithstanding promises of enlightened progress, various 
articulations of modernity were violently expressed in armed conflict and mass 
atrocity which, while hardly new historical phenomena, “became radically 
transformed, intensified, generating specifically modern modes of barbarism.”160   
Defined by its penchant for rationalist ways of knowing the modernist project 
arose in opposition to claims of knowledge based on revelation or spiritual belief,161 
evolving “as an antidote to revealed forms of truth” which, given those claims cannot 
be scientifically tested, are deemed unreliable and suspect.162  Yet notwithstanding 
modernity’s enormous material success and its secularising consequences, religion—
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and, by religion, I mean “a system of beliefs and practices relative to the sacred that 
unite those who adhere to them in a moral community”163—continues to play an 
important and, in some cases, fundamental role in people’s lives.164  The modernist 
project has itself emerged from a larger sacral context, “bearing many of the marks of 
its religious origins.”165  For Gray, modernity’s politics are merely “a chapter in the 
history of religion” and radical politics in particular have shaped much of world 
affairs over the past two centuries and are better understood as “episodes in the 
history of faith—moments in the long dissolution of Christianity and the rise of 
modern political religion.”166  The more radical politics of modernity are thus a 
continuation of Judaeo-Christian sacral traditions by other means.167  Saturated with 
traces of Judaeo-Christianity, the politico-cultural project of modernity, then, 
constitutes a set of material and ideational conditions that, shaping responses to the 
problem of mass atrocity, have given rise to a discourse which opposes any and all 
acts of cruelty committed in pursuit of non-trivial matters.  By including that which is 
signalled through writing, speech and other performances at a particular point of time 
and space, and by determining who should be the subject of such signals, a discourse 
“encompasses more than speech, text, and act; it is the very order under which such 
disciplines and exercises are made possible, and institutions established.”168  More 
than just a form of representation, then, discourse is the material and ideational 
conditions which at once enables and constrains thought and action, weaving the two 
together so intensely that the difference between thinking and acting is obscured.
169
  
While the discourse under examination here is obviously larger than conversations 
occurring among international prosecutors, or between those prosecutors and the 
accused or members of the bench, it animates the minds of political leaders, leading 
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to a wide array of responses to the problem of mass atrocity.  The most potent of 
these responses has been the collective effort to criminalise mass atrocity through the 
rule of international law that punishes persons responsible for committing serious 
international crime.  By calling for the prosecution of those who commit such acts, 
this discourse has given rise to the rule of ICL as well as various institutions to 
enforce that rule.   
 
V ICL Enforcement Institutions 
The discourse against politico-cruelty has enabled the enforcement of this evolving 
body of rules through domestic courts which, according to Richard J Goldstone and 
Adam M Smith, “have long been, and continue to be, one of the most vibrant and 
active locations for the furtherance of international justice.”170  Domestic enforcement 
remains attractive due to lower prosecution and sentencing costs, as well as the 
relative ease of gathering evidence and hearing witness testimony.171  Peter von 
Hagenbach's trial in 1474 in Austria is often cited as the first domestic prosecution of 
an individual for war crimes, crimes against the law of God and humanity though 
earlier, in 1305, an English court prosecuted and executed William Wallace, warrior 
and Scottish national hero, for fighting the English and “sparing neither age nor sex, 
monk nor nun.”172  Following the First World War domestic courts were used to try 
suspected German war criminals even though the Treaty of Versailles envisaged a 
court comprising of an Allied bench.  Of the 895 Germans accused by the Allies, only 
45 were selected for prosecution.  Of these only twelve relatively minor suspects 
faced trial before the German Imperial Court of Justice and six of them were 
acquitted.  Contemporaneous attempts to try those persons responsible for mass 
atrocity targeting Armenians also saw only a few minor figures face prosecutions in a 
domestic court.173   
ICL enforcement following the Second World War occurred through significant 
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trials in domestic courts, though much of the evidence for these trials was gathered by 
the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), itself comprising of 
seventeen Allied Governments.  In the five years following the end of the Second 
World War, a quarter of the suspected 36,529 persons and 281 groups were brought to 
trial in domestic courts.  As Goldstone and Smith observe, “few countries involved in 
the war failed to have any trials.”174  Other high-profile cases prosecuted under ICL in 
domestic courts include Adolf Eichmann, kidnapped in Argentina by Israeli 
Government agents and tried in Jerusalem in 1961, who stood accused of four counts 
of crimes against the Jewish people, eight counts of crimes against humanity and one 
count of war crimes.175  Arrested in Bolivia and extradited to France in 1983, Klaus 
Barbie, known as the Butcher of Lyon, was put on trial in May 1987 for crimes 
against humanity and was found guilty.176  More recently Saddam Hussein, arrested 
in Tikrit, was tried by the Iraqi High Tribunal in 2005 for crimes against humanity 
committed after 1982 in the town of al-Dujail.  Found guilty of wilful killing, forcible 
deportation and torture, Hussein was sentenced to death and hanged on 30 December 
2006.177  The decision to proceed to national trials often emerges as a result of 
debates within the relevant society about the most appropriate response to acts of 
politico-cruelty.   
A few domestic criminal justice systems, which were seriously weakened if not 
destroyed by armed conflict, have been bolstered with international expertise and 
experience.   Established in 2000 by the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
East Timor, the Special Panels in East Timor operated from within the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals in Dili as a means of prosecuting serious international 
crimes, including the crime of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity as 
well as murder, sexual offences, and torture committed between 1 January and 28 
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October 1999.
178
  This internationalisation of a domestic judiciary also occurred in 
Kosovo during 2000, though the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo did not specify which offences were to be the prosecutors’ priorities.179  A 
Special Department for War Crimes also began functioning within the court system 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the generis of which was a 2003 joint proposal by the 
internationally-appointed High Representative and the ICTY, which was endorsed in 
UN Security Council Resolution 1503.
180
   
The discourse against politico-cruelty has also enabled the rise of a specific 
type of domestic justice, known as transitional justice.  By transitional justice, I mean 
what Pierre Hazan means when he explains that it is a concept that takes “account of 
the multiple and heterogeneous processes by which, practically simultaneously, states 
as different as Mauritania, Mongolia and El Salvador were experiencing political 
liberalization and some hundred countries seemed to be ‘in transition’ towards 
democracy.”181  These states are transitioning towards democracy from situations of 
armed conflict, authoritarian regimes or socialist control.  The transition is usually 
signified by the introduction or resumption of free-and-fair elections.  Here, ICL 
enforcement serves very clear domestic political objectives, though, as Pádraig 
McAulifee warns, focusing on high-profile cases in transitional justice while 
neglecting justice sector reform can be short-sighted and may invite a reversal of 
democratic processes, a slide into armed conflict or the resumption of despotic 
rule.182    
The discourse has enabled the establishment of ICL institutions within a host 
state and staffed by a mix of international and domestic personnel.  Whereas some of 
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these so-called hybrid tribunals—such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone,183 the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia184 and the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon185—are creatures of consent by virtue of agreement between the UN and the 
certain sovereign states as host government, others—such as the abovementioned 
Special Panels in East Timor and Kosovo—are creatures of coercion, imposed in 
those instances on locals by UN transitional authorities.186  International these 
institutions may be; they exist, however, only as a result of politico-strategic policy at 
the hands of state-makers, acting either individually or in concert through 
intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN Security Council.187   
The discourse has, moreover, enabled the establishment of international 
institutions designed specifically to enforce ICL, though the law does not require 
these institutions just as public international law in general does not require a world 
court; the rule of international law far precedes the rise of its enforcing institutions.188  
Gustave Moynier, ICRC co-founder, was among the first to propose an international 
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court back in 1872.189  A similar court was proposed in 1920 by an Advisory 
Committee of Jurists to the Assembly of the League of Nations who subsequently 
rejected the idea.  While NGOs, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the 
International Law Association, drafted statutes for an international criminal court in 
1915 and 1916 respectively, none gained the traction among states needed to sign and 
ratify them.190  During the First World War a concept of an international court, which 
would judge state-makers and other leaders who stood accused of trespassing 
international law, began to take hold in the minds of persons and organisations 
seeking a more peaceful world; the concept did not materialise as a world court at that 
time, however.191  Since the First World War was the first major international armed 
conflict in which all participants actively documented their enemies' crimes, it is not 
surprising that the victors would use these records against those enemies in the 
aftermath of conflict.192  Having documented serious international crimes committed 
by German forces, the Allies convened a Commission on the Responsibility of the 
Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties in 1919 as a means of 
ascertaining the extent of the Central Powers' culpability.  Chaired by US Secretary of 
State, Robert Lansing, that Commission presented its final report to the Paris Peace 
Conference in March 1919, concluding that outrages committed on land, at sea and in 
the air by the Central Powers against the laws and customs of armed conflict should 
be prosecuted before an international tribunal comprising representatives of the Allied 
and Associated Powers, or before national tribunals; acts of aggression, however, 
should not be the subject of such prosecution.193   
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According to the Lansing Commission, no pre-existing international legal 
framework, which could have been used to try the Kaiser for acts of aggression, 
existed at that time.194  Japanese representatives also queried whether or not a penal 
law, which applied to those guilty persons, existed in international law.195  In the 
meantime the Kaiser absconded to The Netherlands, where he remained until his 
death in 1941.  Pointing to its custom of granting political asylum, and that it would 
not extradite the Kaiser in order for him to be prosecuted for acts that were not crimes 
under Dutch law, the Dutch authorities refused to extradite the German leader for 
trial.196  By leaving the Kaiser untried, Articles 227—230 of the Treaty of 
Versailles— which provided the legal basis to arraign the former German Emperor 
and to try him for acts of aggression under a special tribunal comprising judges 
appointed by the US, United Kingdom (UK), France, Italy and Japan—became, for 
all intents and purposes, dead letters and with that “the hopes of Lloyd George and 
other European statesmen to use the victorious peace as an occasion for confirming 
and expanding the international law of war foundered on the rocks of American 
opposition.”197  Nevertheless, this was the moment when international institutions 
capable of enforcing ICL on state leaders first became a realistic possibility.198  While 
the League of Nations did adopt the Convention against Terrorism in 1937, not 
enough states ratified the instrument leaving its Protocol, which contained a Statute 
for an international criminal court, dead in the water.199   
After the IMT and the IMTFE concluded, the UN General Assembly asked the 
International Law Commission (ILC) “to study the desirability and possibility of 
establishing an international juridical organ for the trial of persons charged with 
[grave violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949].”200  While a draft statute for a 
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permanent court was produced in 1950 the issue was postponed by the General 
Assembly until the definition of aggression was fully considered and the draft Code 
of Offences was completed.
201
  Separating the process of drafting a statute for a 
tribunal from the process of drafting the international criminal code over which that 
tribunal would have jurisdiction was an unwise course of action, unless, of course, the 
objective sought was to preclude both a statute and a code.
202
  Cassese suggested that 
the “lack of synchronisation was… the result of a practical will to delay the 
establishment of an international criminal court, due to the fact that the world was 
then sharply divided and frequently at risk of war.”203  At the time France appeared to 
be the only permanent member of the UN Security Council supporting the 
establishment of a permanent court.  While the US, UK and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) each indicated the potential desirability for such a court, 
none was prepared to take the practical steps needed.  Ongoing discussion of the 
prospects of a court occurred in lieu of practical steps, probably because none of the 
five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P-5) wanted to 
suffer the consequences of vetoing the idea.  Given the US, UK and USSR had 
established the IMT and played key roles in holding the IMTFE, their abandonment 
of the court proposal would have called into question their credibility as agents of 
international criminal justice.  It would have given succour to those arguing the 
international military tribunals were little more than examples of what Tojo called 
and Justice Pal considered, and both Richard H Minear and Danilo Zolo, among 
others, subsequently describe as, victor’s justice.204 
In 1979 the Human Rights Commission drafted a statute for the establishment 
of an international jurisdiction as a means of implementing the Apartheid Convention 
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(1972),
205
 Article V of which envisages the creation of an international court.  Of all 
the international criminal conventions applicable to serious international crime, only 
the Genocide Convention anticipates the jurisdiction of an international criminal 
court for the crime of genocide, but it stops short of mandating the establishment of 
such a court.
206
  Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the US and UK 
considered establishing an ad-hoc military tribunal, very much in line with the 
precedents offered by both the IMT and the IMTFE.  Once Kuwait was liberated 
without US-led coalition forces capturing Saddam Hussein, consideration of this 
option ceased, however.  Had that tribunal been established it would have been 
“Nuremberg’s true successor” since the underlying armed conflict began with an 
invasion and annexation of territory, was fought by regular armies and was concluded 
by territorial liberation: a US-led coalition would have again defeated, through sheer 
force of arms, a brutal authoritarian dictator and, in the immediate aftermath of that 
victory, established a tribunal and conducted a trial signalling the rise of a new world 
order dominated by the US.
207
 
Given the common purpose of these domestic, transitional, hybrid and 
international institutions is to enforce ICL, taken together they comprise an 
international criminal justice system which is “a fortress of its own, with its own laws 
and policy.”208  In all of these instances, the discourse against politico-cruelty begs for 
the law to be expanded as far as possible while politico-strategic calculations tend to 
hamper ICLs lopsided and uneven growth.  As already mentioned, the ensuing 
argument gives focus to the prosecutorial efforts occurring within the IMT and the 
IMTFE established in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the ICTY 
and the ICTR established in the aftermath of the Cold War and the ICC established as 
the War on Terror was beginning.   
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VI Conceptualising Atrocity Crime 
The most powerful and enduring manifestation of the discourse against politico-
cruelty lies in its conceptualisation of mass atrocities as serious international crimes. 
As the body of rules prohibiting the commission of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, crimes of genocide and crimes of aggression, ICL has evolved since the 
nineteenth century by drawing from its various sources: primarily treaties, customary 
international law, general principles of law, but also juridical decisions and legal 
scholarship.209  This evolving body of rules is something of a nexus between public 
international law, with its focus on regulating the conduct of states (and state-makers) 
within the international system of states, and domestic criminal law, with its focus on 
regulating the conduct of individuals within particular jurisdictions.210  ICL has 
evolved only recently; since the turn of the twenty-first century it “ripples through the 
imaginative space of post-conflict justice and, thereby, aspires to fill the sullen void 
of impunity.”211 
Re-conceptualising war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of 
genocide—widely understood to be ICL’s core crimes—as atrocity crime 
acknowledges that certain acts of politico-cruelty are common among these crimes.212  
It also signals the need for these acts to reach a significant magnitude to “meet the 
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substantiality test developed by the international and hybrid criminal tribunals.”213  
For Schabas “[s]ounding the alarm every time a few dozen people are massacred in 
the course of a political conflict is like a doctor sending for a battery of sophisticated 
tests every time a patient sneezes.”214  Significantly, Scheffer’s concept of atrocity 
crime provides:215 
terminology that remains faithful to the requirements of international 
criminal law (particularly in the work of international and hybrid 
criminal tribunals and of national criminal courts) and at the same time 
enables timely public discourse (by   governments, activists, the media, 
scholars, and the common man and woman) and that actually stands 
some chance of leading to greater understanding of what is occurring 
and how effective responses might be facilitated.   
For interested scholars, analysts and policymakers this re-conceptualisation helps 
“emphasize that analysis and intervention in these contexts must take into account the 
totality of such acts and their consequences, beyond the actual massacres.... [pointing] 
to a profound crisis of the various institutions that regulate social and political 
interaction.”216  This, in turn, brings into sharper focus the leadership roles played by 
state-makers and leaders of other social groups perpetrating administrative massacres 
organised for achieving some substantive end.217  Yet at the same time, as Mark J 
Osiel explains, “[t]o disaggregate this program into its components, that is, into the 
minutia of specific acts by particular defendants against individual victims, [is] to 
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misconceive the nature of the wrong in a way that diminished its full horror and 
heinousness.”218 
The conflation of these three categories of serious international crime into 
atrocity crime enables some authors to deliberately mislead their readership by 
referring to genocide, with its powerful rhetorical resonance echoing among the 
world community, when they, strictly speaking, should be referring to crimes against 
humanity.  The Report entitled Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for US 
Policymakers uses genocide as a term to encompass other atrocity crimes, for 
example.  For Schabas this:219 
is really a form of deception: the report uses one term, whose 
definition is well recognized and well accepted in international law, to 
replace another.  Both genocide and crimes against humanity began 
their terminological careers as international crimes.  Criminal law 
insists upon rigorous definitions for a number of reasons, not the least 
of which is a requirement of precision that is deeply rooted in fair trial 
standards.  
Moreover, where genocide is determined not to have occurred, as the UN Report of 
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General found 
with respect to the Sudanese Government,220 this may lead policymakers to suppose 
that somehow only lesser international crimes may have occurred.  “The notion that 
this was probably not a ‘genocide’ in the most strict sense of the word,” Prunier 
explains, “seemed to satisfy the Commission that things were really not too bad.”221  
The Commission did, of course, establish that the Sudanese Government and the 
Janjaweed were responsible for indiscriminate attacks, including the killing of 
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civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other 
forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement; that is, particular acts 
that amount to a prima facie case of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
Evidence gathered by the Commission was subsequently handed over to Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo, the first ICC prosecutor, for further investigation, resulting in the 
indictment of Ahmad Muhammad Harun, Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman and 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir as well as a summons to appear for Bahar Idriss Abu 
Garda.222  A second warrant of arrest for Al Bashir, issued by the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber on 12 July 2010, included three counts of the crime of genocide.223  “At the 
practical level,” Schabas explains, “it makes no difference whatsoever whether Al-
Bashir is charged with crimes against humanity or with genocide: one way or another, 
he is threatened with prosecution and, if convicted, will go to jail for a very long 
time.”224  Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan sums it up well when he 
writes:225 
For the suffering of the civilians it did not matter what the situation 
was called, or what motive had led to their desperate situation.  They 
were still dying, and in vast numbers, as a result of a government’s 
decisions and the actions of its armed proxies.  This was a crime—
whatever its form.  What Darfur demonstrated, and hopefully should 
never have to be demonstrated to world leaders ever again, is that the 
‘genocide’ label does not hold a monopoly over the most heinous 
crimes against humanity, and should not be the sole trigger for action.  
The sheer numbers that were made to suffer and die in Darfur is proof 
enough of that.  
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The disingenuous use of the term genocide does, however, signal the crime of 
genocide is seen by many people as the supreme atrocity crime and it has, therefore, 
more denunciatory power than war crimes or crimes against humanity, illustrating the 
affective function of ICL as an opprobrium proscribing no less than what it means to 
belong to the human community.  It also signals the political uses to which the 
discourse against politico-cruelty can be put.   
According to Robertson “declaring and waging aggressive wars in which 
millions of combatants and civilians may be killed” is the “worst war crime of all.”226  
Such crimes of aggression can generate enormous consequences, as Martin Gilbert 
explains with respect to the European theatre:227 
The death tolls of the Second World War were still being calculated as 
1945 came to an end, and were never finally ascertained.  As many as 
fifteen million soldiers, sailors and airmen had been killed in action.  
At least ten million civilians had been murdered in deliberate 
killings—six million of them Jews. Between four and five million 
civilians had been killed in air raids.  Four million prisoners of war had 
been killed or allowed to die in situations of the utmost cruelty after 
capture—three and a half million of them Soviet soldiers in German 
captivity.  Was the total death toll thirty-three million, or even more? 
The consequences of the Asia-Pacific War (1931-1945) were similarly profound; 
more than sixty thousand Western Allied lives, more than 3 million Japanese lives and 
a total approaching twenty million Asian lives were lost.228  However, while it is a 
serious international crime, a crime of aggression is not necessarily, in and of itself, 
considered an atrocity crime within this thesis.  This is because even though the use 
of force in international affairs is usually conducted in the pursuit of some substantive 
ends it is not necessarily a cruel act, though its collateral damage might be.  
Moreover, while crimes of aggression are committed by members of one group 
against members of another, these groups are normally trained as a military group to 
use deadly force as a matter of course, rather than by exception.  Finally, while crimes 
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of aggression are, of course, of concern to the international community, those who 
commission them might receive censure or sanction, but are not denounced by the 
international community as hostis humani generis.  For those who wield power in 
contemporary world affairs this renders the initiation of armed conflict somewhat 
more acceptable than the commission of atrocity crime.  State-makers, it seems, want 
to be war-makers when it suits their purposes. 
Other international crimes—such as arms, drug or human trafficking, or money 
laundering—are often referred to as crimes of international concern or as treaty 
crimes and are best understood as being transnational in character.229  This is because 
the transfer of objects contravenes at least one domestic regulatory regime.  The harm 
caused by these crimes impact negatively upon individuals and the communities to 
which they belong, can retard economic growth, especially in poorer economies 
where combating transnational crime soaks up scarce resources and, in extreme cases, 
can challenge the authority of the state by corrupting its police forces and judiciary 
systems and providing alternative sources of authority.230  Yet as Neil Boister 
explains:231 
Transnational crimes are difficult to classify tidily on the basis of 
harm.  Transnational crimes can be categorized using an orthodox 
criminal law taxonomy based on the values protected.  Harms against 
personal interest might include slavery, human trafficking, piracy, and 
terrorism.  Harms against property interest might include piracy, 
transnational organized crime, corruption, and money laundering.  
Harms against social interests might include terrorism and corruption. 
Considerable overlap in these categories suggest that a more tenable 
division might be made between essentially violent crimes directed at 
human’s bodily integrity, such as terrorism, and essentially non-violent 
crimes based on contraband, such as drug trafficking. 
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While transnational crimes’ consequences are of a disturbing scale and, as collective 
action problems, deserve the immediate and concerted efforts of the international 
community, they are pursued in and of themselves, rather than as a means towards 
some larger substantive end in the way that war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
crimes of genocide are.  As individuals acts, many are essentially trivial and do not 
attract widespread condemnation.  These criminal groups also represent more limited 
political projects, which do not seek to remake the modern world through violence as 
advocates of utopias are wont to do.  The fact that no person responsible for 
trafficking in arms, humans, drugs or for laundering money has yet to be prosecuted 
at an international tribunal or court for their criminal deeds suggests a lesser level of 
repugnance to international criminal justice than that invoked by the impunity 
enjoyed by those who commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of 
genocide.  These transnational crimes differ from atrocity crimes also because, while 
they might be conducted by an organised group, their crimes are not committed 
against members of a particular group and are not denounced by members of the 
international community as hostis humani generis.  Here, then, the concept of atrocity 
crime distinguishes war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide from 
other serious international crimes, such as crimes of aggression and transnational 
treaty crimes, because the former are cruel and this cruelty is performed in the pursuit 
of substantive ends. 
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VII Conclusion: Spurring on the Quest for International Criminal 
Justice  
Emerging from within the modernist project, the discourse against politico-cruelty 
constructs its own reality of what is, and what is not, meaningful in the context of 
confronting the problem of mass atrocity.  It provides for an evolving body of rules, 
which were designed not only to proscribe certain acts of politico-cruelty—such as 
those that help comprise war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of 
genocide—but also to make criminally liable those engaging in this violence.232  This 
body of rules now looks set to cover the crime of aggression.  Significantly, this 
process of criminalisation helps foster the sense of international community and, in 
Michael J Struett’s words, “is constitutive of global society.”233  Since criminalising 
acts of politico-cruelty allows perpetrators of those acts to be prosecuted and 
punished, and enables the expression of intense disproval surrounding the 
“unworthiness” of certain types of violence,234 ICL enforcement is always political.  
Just as this discourse provides a certain degree of legitimacy for enforcing ICL 
through domestic, transitional, hybrid and international trials, it also empowers the 
efforts of three successive generations of international prosecutors.  The discourse is 
at its sharpest when it is manifest as the active will to undertake trials, best 
demonstrated through prosecutorial responses to serious international crimes 
committed in Europe and Asia during the Second World War, in Europe and Africa 
during the aftermath of the Cold War and in Africa during the so-called War on 
Terror.  Yet as Greene notes, “[i]n its self-appointed task of speaking for the civilised 
and the human, international law [including its lawyers] has been unable to move 
beyond categories like hostis humani generis, even though in using them it founded 
what some still want to believe is a genuine legal science on a legal fiction, a fiction 
that nonetheless retains the power to haunt us.”235  This is a radically political 
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enterprise that plays on “the interrelationship between the spectre of justice—the 
victim—and the spectacularization of the law in such a way that produces a 
representational domain in which performances on the world stage are 
institutionalized though the ethical cultivation of human rights principles and the 
crowding out of others.”236  This, in turn, obfuscates the importance of economic 
marginalisation and social dislocation in the initiation of armed conflict and the 
commission of atrocity crime, illuminating instead the role played by “unexceptional 
people often acting under the authority of a state, or, more loosely, in accordance with 
political objectives of a state or other entity.”237  The ensuing three main parts of this 
thesis shifts focus to the various complexities and complicities of this pursuit of 
international criminal justice.  
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PART I 
 
THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
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CH. 2: INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
 
I  Introduction 
Rooted in the material and ideational conditions of nineteenth century liberalism, a 
high point of modernity, the discourse against politico-cruelty offered a useful 
paradigm for state-makers wishing to punish those persons who committed serious 
international crimes during the Second World War.  Nevertheless, a set of propitious 
politico-strategic circumstances was also required to establish the first major 
institutions for enforcing ICL.  This chapter argues, firstly, that while the discourse 
against politico-cruelty informed the consensus for establishing the IMT and the 
IMTFE, that consensus also reflected the US’s new status as primus inter pares (first 
among equals) during the middle of the twentieth century.  This was a rare moment of 
consonance between the underpinning discourse and the prevailing politico-strategic 
circumstances.  The chapter argues, secondly, that these tribunals were never 
envisaged by their designers as durable mechanisms for enforcing all aspects of ICL 
as it stood at that time.  Primarily designed to try and then to punish those persons 
responsible for initiating, and then losing, the Second World War, these tribunals were 
a form of victor’s justice, helping secure the peace by inscribing post-conflict power 
relations among victorious state-makers as the new status quo in international affairs.  
The chapter argues, thirdly, that these tribunals also fostered local attitudes embracing 
individualism ahead of belligerent forms of nationalism based on race.  As US 
foreign policymakers sought to reconstruct German and Japanese states as peace-
loving democracies, and their respective economies as overseas markets for US goods 
and services, they took the first crucial steps towards building a neo-capitalist free 
market of near global proportions.  The design of, and support given to, the 
international military tribunals cannot be fully appreciated without reference to US-
led efforts to reshape the overarching rules governing world affairs in its own 
interests during what Henry R Luce dubbed—prophetically, but far too parochially—
the “American Century.”238  These post-conflict reconstruction efforts, then, are both 
an extension of a global conflict and the beginning of a politico-cultural civil war 
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fought by proponents of economic liberalisation for control over certain national and 
international governance arrangements. 
 
II Politics: Grand Coalition Consensus 
As the first major international attempts to successfully prosecute those persons 
initiating international armed conflict and committing atrocity crime, both the IMT 
and the IMTFE relied heavily upon a consensus forged by the US, UK and the 
USSR—members of the so-called Grand Coalition (or Big Three)—during the heat of 
battle against the German, Italian and Japanese Axis Powers.  The emergence of this 
victorious war-fighting coalition reflects a significant politico-strategic shift in world 
affairs as Japan was no longer allied with the US and the UK against German forces, 
as it had been during the First World War.  Central to this coalition was the US and its 
status as primus inter pares.  Norman Davies explains:239 
[T]he USA alone possessed the space and time to make systemic plans 
for a future world order.  Untouched by the fighting, and daily growing 
in confidence, power, wealth and prestige, the Americans must have 
sensed that the era of their supremacy was fast approaching.  Their 
armies were victorious in the Pacific, as in Western Europe.  Their 
navy and air force could hardly be challenged.  Their nuclear project 
would soon make them the world’s sole atomic power.  Their 
economic clout was in a league of its own.  Above all, their only 
possible rivals were contending with varying degrees of disruption, 
debilitude and devastation.  So there was no reason to hesitate.  In 
1944, before the war was won, and before Roosevelt was re-elected as 
president for a third term, the foundations were laid for the United 
Nations Organization, for the World Bank, for the International 
Monetary Fund and, by extension, for the reconstruction of Europe.  
No one else could have drawn up such proposals. No one else could 
have financed them.  The USA was gearing up for world leadership.  It 
had not made the largest military contribution to the war—at least not 
in Europe.  But it would be the chief beneficiary. 
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A consensus among the Big Three for establishing the IMT was not arrived at 
immediately.  International pressure to act began when nine Governments-in-exile—
namely Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Yugoslavia and the Free French Republic—organised themselves into the 
Inter-Allied Commission on the Punishment of War Crimes.  Meeting at St James’s 
Palace in London, this Commission issued an Inter-Allied Declaration on the 
Punishment of War Crimes (often referred to as the St James Declaration) on 12 June 
1941, explicitly repudiating acts of vengeance by the public and requiring 
governments to place the punishment of war criminals among their principal war 
aims.240  High-level discussions among the Big Three concerning the prospects of 
bringing justice to bear on Germany’s wartime leadership commenced only once an 
Allied military victory appeared highly likely during the final phases of hostilities.  
However in mid-1945 the US President and the British Prime Minister did not see 
eye-to-eye on how to proceed as Truman favoured an international tribunal whereas 
Churchill still sought summary executions.  Churchill’s Foreign Secretary, Anthony 
Eden, claimed the Nazi leadership’s guilt was so black that it fell beyond the scope of 
juridical process.241  “It was a deadlock,” Robertson explains, “broken by the casting 
vote of Joseph Stalin, who loved show trials as long as everyone was shot in the 
end.”242  Stalin, it seems, had moved beyond his earlier musings when the Big Three 
had met at Tehran and he suggested, probably mischievously, shooting 50,000 
Germans without trial.243  As Reydams and Wouters observe “one cannot fail to 
notice the paradoxical situation of the leaders of the liberal nations supporting 
summary executions and Stalin favouring juridical trial.”244  In the end the US 
prevailed as the Big Three and France agreed to meet in London in order to draft a 
Charter for a tribunal. 
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Starting on 26 June 1945 the London Conference spanned 15 sessions and 
concluded on 8 August 1945.245  The consensus arrived at through the Conference 
produced the London Agreement of 8 August 1945—with the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal (hereafter London Charter) annexed to it—which 
authorised the establishment of the IMT “for the just and prompt trial and punishment 
of the major war criminals of the European Axis.”246  “The emphasis” here, Luc 
Reydams and Jed Odermatt explain, “is clearly on punishment, as the term appears no 
less than ten times.  In stark contrast to the Statutes of later international tribunals, 
defendants a priori are labelled criminals—rather than presumed innocent.”247  The 
Charter was drawn up in six weeks and contained only 30 articles.  The Charter’s 
negotiation was built on a fragile consensus as the “Allies stumbled and compromised 
their way into the business of a major trial of war criminals…. There was much talk 
of the need for a trial, together with an admonition about possible hazards, but few 
expected that it would open a Pandora’s Box so wide that the proceedings would 
threaten to pass beyond the control of the governments.”248 
The establishment of the IMTFE was foreshadowed by Roosevelt's warning to 
the Japanese Government shortly after Pearl Harbour was attacked on 7 December 
1941.  Roosevelt warned Japan that it should comply with the laws of armed conflict, 
particularly in relation to US prisoners of war.  The US was not alone in its 
condemnation as, on 13 January 1942, China stated its intention to apply the 
principles designed to punish German wartime leaders to the Japanese occupying 
China.  Compared to its public declarations concerning the IMT, the US 
Government’s public declarations concerning the IMTFE were less frequent and later, 
and were usually accompanied by statements focusing on the Nazis.249  The Allies 
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stated their intention to prosecute Japanese wartime leaders only after the European 
theatre had closed and Japan’s defeat was assured.250  
Accepted by the Japanese Government on 2 September 1945, the Instrument of 
Surrender provided the basis for establishing the IMTFE, which was formally 
established on 19 January 1946 by a special proclamation of General Douglas 
MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), when he approved the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereafter Tokyo 
Charter).251  Whereas the IMT was established by agreement of the Big Three plus 
France, the IMTFE was established by SCAP.252  There was nothing akin to the 
London Conference and, significantly, SCAP received a directive from Washington 
DC on 10 November 1945 ordering him to proceed with the trial irrespective of 
whether or not those Allies who had been approached to participate in the tribunal 
chose not to or delayed unduly.253  Despite 13 fewer Articles it closely resembled the 
London Charter.  For the most part the drafting of the Tokyo Charter followed the 
structure and approach of the London Charter, drew upon the US State, War and 
Navy Departments Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Directive of 6 October254 and 
had been drawn up exclusively by the US through the SCAP legal section.255   
Here, then, the decision taken by members of the Grand Coalition, and their 
allies, to proceed to international trials as a means of punishing vanquished foes from 
Germany and Japan was by no means inevitable.  Rather, the consensus was 
informed, and informed to a large extent, by the discourse against politico-cruelty.  
Salient here is the notion that certain serious international crimes—specifically war 
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crimes and crimes against humanity—are to be renounced as having no place in 
world affairs and that those persons and groups who commit such acts are to be 
excommunicated from the human community via a process of abjection.  The rule of 
ICL is the favoured means of this abjection, requiring the establishment of institutions 
to enforce that evolving body of rules.  Significantly, initiating and then losing the 
international armed conflict separated the accused from the accusers.  While Grand 
Coalition strategic thinking and foreign policymaking was significantly shaped by, 
and gave effect to, the discourse against politico-cruelty, US ascendency in world 
affairs was vital to making both the IMT and the IMTFE possible.  The propitious set 
of politico-strategic circumstances in which the US—by virtue of its force of arms, its 
geographic remove from major theatres of conflict (excepting, of course, Hawaii), its 
industrial capacity and the size of its domestic market—was emerging, if it had not 
already emerged, as primus inter pares, were needed for a consensus for trials to be 
forged in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.  Following a long period 
of dissonance between the underlying discourse and the prevailing politico-strategic 
circumstances, this was a rare moment of consonance.  As Gretje Baars explains, the 
international military tribunals were a fundamental part of the Allies’ policy in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, which not only served to justify the enormous 
sacrifice of human and material resources, but also helped to conceal the failure to act 
sooner in the face of aggressive Nazi expansionism, Jewish refugees and the 
Holocaust.256  The international military tribunals were established as a means of 
providing justice, but that justice was so selective in its reach that it can only be 
understood as a form of victor’s justice. 
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III Law: Victor’s justice   
The consensus to put German and Japanese wartime leaders on trial led to the 
establishment of the IMT and the IMTFE.  The London and Tokyo Charters 
envisaged a tripartite structure—namely the bench, defence and prosecution—for the 
IMT and the IMTFE, respectively.  The third pillar of these tribunals, the prosecution, 
is the most important for this thesis.  The purpose of the Committee for the 
Investigation and Prosecution of Major War Criminals, whose mandate was provided 
for in the London Charter,257 was to agree upon the Chief Prosecutors' work plans, 
finalise the list of major war criminals to be tried and approve and lodge the 
indictment, including any accompanying documents, with the IMT.  The Committee 
was also to draft rules of procedure for the tribunal's approval.  It fell to the Chief 
Prosecutors, acting individually or as a committee, to investigate, collect and produce 
all necessary evidence before or during the trial.  The Chief Prosecutors also prepared 
the above-mentioned indictment for approval by the Committee, conducted 
preliminary examinations of all witnesses and of those who stood accused and, of 
course, argued the case against the accused during the trial itself.  The Tokyo Charter, 
which states that the Chief of Counsel will investigate and prosecute charges against 
war criminals within the IMTFE’s jurisdiction, was slightly narrower that 
Nuremberg’s prosecutorial mandate.258  Whereas the IMT had four Chief Prosecutors 
leading four separate prosecution teams, the IMTFE had a single Chief Prosecutor 
with ten associate prosecutors, together forming a unified prosecution approach 
within a multinational International Prosecutions Service (IPS).259  Despite these 
differences, it is clear that the drafters of both the London and Tokyo Charters 
intended to design institutions with strong prosecutorial functions, meaning the 
prosecutor would be vital to the trial process and, thereby, the enforcement of ICL.  
The discourse against politico-cruelty’s significance is signalled not only by the 
consensus to establish the two international military tribunals, but also by the IMT 
and the IMTFE designers’ recourse to ICL’s substantive elements.  As part of both 
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tribunals’ design phases the definition of war crimes underwent negotiation.  US 
delegates to the London Conference suggested that the IMT’s jurisdiction be focused 
exclusively on crimes against peace, though UK delegates insisted that war crimes 
and crimes against humanity be included.  The resulting text meant an accused must 
first be charged with crimes against peace before the tribunals’ jurisdiction over 
atrocity crimes could be triggered.260  For the IMTFE designers “[w]ar crimes charges 
were almost an afterthought”261 as “the question of definition obviously did not 
concern the Charter’s drafters overmuch.”262 Whereas the Tokyo Charter offers no 
elaboration on the category of war crimes beyond violations of the laws or customs of 
armed conflict, article 6(b) of the London Charter explains such violations as acts 
including “murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other 
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of 
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or 
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages or devastation not 
justified by military necessity.”263  
Nearing the close of the London Conference, US Justice Robert Jackson 
suggested that crimes against humanity be used to refer to “atrocities, persecutions, 
and deprivations.”264  It was a phrase recommended to him by Professor (later Sir) 
Hersch Lauterpacht, an international lawyer of distinction and a member of the 
British War Crimes Executive (BWCE).
265
  At this time crimes against humanity 
meant acts of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population before, or during, the war, or 
persecutions on political or racial (or, in the case of the IMT, religious) grounds in 
execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country perpetrated.  Article 
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5(c) of the Tokyo Charter goes on to state that leaders, organisers, instigators and 
accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts 
performed by any person in execution of such plan.  The Nuremberg definition was 
narrower than it might have been as any acts that could be considered to help form a 
crime against humanity needed to be committed in direct association with the 
initiation of international armed conflict—a deliberate ploy intended to insulate the 
Grand Coalition from the types of charges used to prosecute their vanquished German 
foes.
266
  Whereas the London Charter stated that crimes against humanity were 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, the Tokyo Charter omitted 
reference to civilian populations, impliedly but significantly expanding the scope of 
this category of crime to include any “large-scale killing of military personnel in an 
unlawful war.”267  
For the IMT, genocide was understood to be a crime against humanity, which 
had to be linked to the other charges of crimes against peace.  This meant that the 
scope of these crimes was restricted to those relevant events that occurred after 
German forces had invaded Poland on 1 September, 1939.268  The crime of genocide 
did not feature in the Tokyo Charter. 
Although these atrocity crimes could have been committed anywhere in the 
world—offences with no particular geographical location, as the London Charter puts 
it—the IMT’s jurisdiction did not extend to crimes committed before the 
commencement of armed hostilities on 1 September 1939 or following the conclusion 
of armed hostilities in Europe on 8 May 1945.  The Tokyo Charter is silent on the 
temporal jurisdiction to be enjoyed by the IMTFE, though as we shall see in Chapter 
3 the indictment only covers serious international crimes committed by Japanese 
wartime leaders between 1928 and 1948.  In a strictly literal sense the IMTFE could 
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have focused on atrocity crimes committed by Allied military forces, though the 
politics of enforcing ICL in the aftermath of the Second World War “renders such an 
interpretation absurd.”269  (Strictly speaking, both Charters fail to explicitly specify 
each tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction.270)  Due to the seriousness of these crimes the 
accused remained liable for their actions even though such actions might not be 
crimes in the locations where they were committed.  According to Goldstone and 
Smith “[p]erhaps subconsciously, what the London drafters were doing was speaking 
to the notion of both jus cogens and customary international law, arguing that no 
matter the neglect of a municipal juridical system to criminalize certain wrongs, the 
international system had the power and obligations to do so.”271  However, these 
atrocity crimes—war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide—were very 
much defined in the shadow of crimes against peace.272 
While atrocity crimes were included in their respective Charters, both the IMT 
and the IMTFE gave their main focus to crimes against peace.  Both tribunals were 
designed with an eye firmly fixed on punishing those who were responsible for 
initiating the most deadly international armed conflict in human history.  As Donna E 
Arzt explains “[t]he Nuremberg trial was primarily about the Nazi war machine and 
only secondarily about the Holocaust.”273  Although both the IMT and the IMTFE 
were designed with a remit that included putting on trial those who were responsible 
for committing atrocity crime—and as we have seen the justiciable categories of 
atrocity crimes were, specifically, war crimes and crimes against humanity—these 
tribunals were not designed as enforcement mechanisms for all ICL as it stood in the 
middle of the twentieth century.  The tribunals’ remit had jurisdictional limits as, 
according to their respective Charters, the purpose of both tribunals was, in fact, to try 
and, if possible, punish persons who had helped initiate and/or conduct Germany's 
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wars of aggression in Europe from late 1939 and Japan’s wars of aggression in Asia 
from the early 1930s, respectively. 
The notion that initiating international armed conflict was punishable by ICL 
was raised during various international conferences held between the First and 
Second World Wars.  However, during this time there were no significant formalised 
legal advances towards the criminalisation of aggression.  It was not until the Second 
World War was drawing to a close that serious consideration was given to this 
question by state-makers and jurists.274  Two important works were written by the 
western-trained Soviet professor of criminology, Aron Trainin: The Defense of Peace 
and Criminal Law (1937), which “criticised the League of Nations for failing to make 
provocation of aggressive war a criminal offence and for failing to create an 
international criminal court to punish aggressors,” noting that “hunting rabbits 
unlawfully is punished more severely than organising the military destruction of 
people”; and The Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerities (1944), which argued in 
favour of prosecuting crimes against peace, gave the concept its definitive 
formulation, and would later serve as a basis for the crime as it appeared in the 
London Charter.
275
  Crimes against peace, according to Trainin, included acts of 
aggression, propaganda of aggression, the conclusion of agreements with aggressive 
aims, the violation of treaties which serve the cause of peace, provocation designed to 
disrupt peaceful relations between countries, terrorism and support of armed bands 
(fifth column).  Translated into English, French and German, The Criminal 
Responsibility of the Hitlerities also elaborated the concept of conspiracy in relation 
to the crime against peace, suggesting that the US was not the only proponent of it, 
despite much commentary to the contrary.  This concept of conspiracy was discussed 
at the UNWCC as well as at the US State and War Departments, and was cited by 
Bernays in his already-mentioned memorandum on the topic to the White House.  
Jackson and Fyfe had also read Trainin’s book prior to the London Conference, 
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which Trainin attended, as he did the first Nuremberg trial, as an advisor to the Soviet 
delegation.
276
  
During Conference negotiations the inclusion of crimes against peace within 
the London Charter was openly contested by both the Soviet and French 
representatives, though all delegates did not want the causes of the Second World 
War to be considered and scrutinised by the IMT.
277
  The Soviets sought to restrict 
the application of this crime to only those acts committed by Nazis, thereby avoiding 
scrutiny of their role in initiating international armed conflict.278  Meanwhile the 
French argued that crimes against peace violated the general rule of international law 
against retroactive legislation, nullum crimen sine lege (“no crime without law”), an 
argument used also by the German defence team, as well as by many of the IMT’s 
critics.  The concept of a common plan or conspiracy was foreign to French code-
based jurisprudence too.  According to Bradley F Smith “the Russians and French 
seemed unable to grasp the implications of the concept; when they finally did grasp 
it, they were genuinely shocked… the Soviets seem to have shaken their heads in 
wonderment—a reaction, some cynics may believe, prompted by envy.”279  In the end 
the negotiators agreed that crimes against peace meant planning, preparing, initiating 
or waging a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the above.280  In so doing, as Benjamin Ferencz puts it: 
“Nuremberg made plain that aggressive war was not a national right but an 
international crime.”281 
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Drafters of the Tokyo Charter followed this lead, with only two significant 
deviations.  The varying wording reflects key differences between Germany's and 
Japan's initiation of armed hostilities and the evolving status of international law.  
The inclusion of “declared and undeclared war of aggression” in the Tokyo Charter 
covers Japan's lack of warning for its armed attacks, from its invasion of Manchuria 
in 1931 to its aerial attack on Pearl Harbour a decade later.  The inclusion of 
“international law” within the Tokyo Charter signalled the emerging consensus that 
acts of aggression and initiating international armed conflict were considered criminal 
under international customary law, and not merely by international treaties, 
agreements or assurances which might lack the binding power of law.
282
  The drafting 
of these two Charters was the first time a war of aggression was treated as a serious 
international crime perpetrated by individuals, rather than as a transgression of 
international law involving the state.
283
 
By predicating ICL enforcement on crimes against peace, members of the 
Grand Coalition also found a means of shielding themselves from the atrocity crimes 
they may have committed during the Second World War.  As they did not commence 
armed hostilities such sharpening of jurisdictional focus deliberately excluded a range 
of actions which, in some instances, “was a careful, cynical choice intended to 
insulate the four ‘great’ powers from the criminal liability for the racist, colonialist, 
and repressive policies of their own regimes.”284  As the London Charter was 
proofread in English, French, Russian and German, and then checked for accuracy of 
translation, the Enola Gray dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of 
Hiroshima,285 a few days before Nagasaki was also obliterated by another US atomic 
bomb.  The timeliness of this wanton destruction of a city, strongly argued by Daniel 
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Goldhagen as unjustified by military necessity,286 raises important questions over the 
use of the London Charter as a jurisdictional shield for the Coalition’s own war 
crimes. 
More than gratifying the desire to punish their enemies for creating a situation 
of international armed conflict, which consumed much of their blood and treasure, 
this focus on crimes against peace also reflects the security concerns shared by 
members of the Grand Coalition.  Once their ability to wage armed conflict was 
destroyed and the major wartime leaders were captured or killed, Germany and Japan 
no longer posed a viable military threat to the US, UK or USSR.  The Grand 
Coalition’s military superiority within the politico-strategic dimension of world 
affairs was not to be placed at risk, however, by the potential for other powers 
aspiring to revise (in their own interests) the terms of this new post-conflict 
settlement within international society.  In this sense the consensus to punish those 
responsible for crimes against peace sent a powerful deterrent to any would-be 
revisionists of the power relations determining the new status quo in international 
affairs.  Moreover, the consensus to punish these crimes through the rule of 
international law also helps further insulate the state-based system of international 
affairs from alternative ways of organising world affairs, whether through a return to 
empire, the emergence of a single world government or the birth of a world 
proletariat, to name but a few possibilities.  It does so because states, as subjects of 
international law, entrench their primacy through any application of international law 
even where the objects of that law are individuals and groups.  Thus, as Kirsten 
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Sellars opines, “Nuremberg law on aggression was innovative, but it was innovation 
in the service of the post-war status quo.”287  
Never envisaged as durable mechanisms for enforcing all aspects of ICL as it 
stood at that time, both the IMT and the IMTFE were therefore designed primarily in 
order to try and then punish those persons responsible for initiating, and then losing, 
the Second World War.  In so doing both the IMT and the IMTFE helped inscribe 
post-conflict power relations among state-makers as the new status quo, deterring 
aspiring revisionist powers and insulating the state-based system ahead of other 
possible ways of organising international society.  Establishing institutions to pursue 
the quest for international criminal justice was not the Grand Coalition’s primary end.  
As the Big Three decided to deal with the defeated leaders of Germany and Japan 
through ICL enforcement, they did so in a way that, serving their own national 
interests, would restore order in their respective geographic areas of interests through 
a combination of armed force, maintenance of law and order, and the provision of 
social services.288  However, as Minear argues “[t]he appointment of justices only 
from among the aggrieved and victor nations itself may not have invalidated the 
tribunal’s judgement, but it raises serious questions about the tribunal’s 
impartiality.”289  “Just as the justices at Tokyo came only from aggrieved and victor 
nations,” Minear continues, “so the accused were all Japanese.”290  The victorious 
powers in the Pacific War almost certainly committed certain types of acts for which 
Japanese were prosecuted.291  (Unsurprisingly, the USSR’s declaration of war on 
Japan and the US’ use of atomic bombs against Japan did not feature in the Tokyo 
indictment; probably without wishing to appreciate the irony, the American and 
Russian justices voted to convict the Japanese leaders of waging aggressive war and 
committing war crimes.292)  For some legal analysts this criticism is weak as a matter 
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of law because international law provides for belligerents to prosecute offences 
committed against them as long as the trials comport with the standards applicable at 
the time.293  In corollary, Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and the 
subsequent Instrument of Surrender rendered impotent any challenges to the IMTFE’s 
lawfulness.294  Yet to characterise the victor’s justice critique narrowly in terms only 
of a legal defence is to miss the very point on which this criticism rests; namely that 
the structures, processes and enforcement of the law itself is a form of politics—an 
extension of the politico-strategic circumstances establishing the international 
military tribunals.  As one of the Japanese defendants, Okawa, said during his trial, 
“this trial is not the realization of justice, it is the continuation of war.”295  
Both the IMT and the IMTFE were key features of the Allied war effort, a by-
product of the Grand Coalition’s military victory and resourced by the military.296  
The IMTFE was more military in character than the IMT as, similar to US courts 
martial, the IMTFE's primary actor was the region's commanding officer, authorised 
to convene the court and granted the power to act upon its decisions.297  Although 
some of the tribunal's key components, such as its lawyers and bench, were 
civilian,298 the IMTFE remained military in character.  The IMTFE’s summary 
procedures, which denied the accused the advantages inherent in Anglo-American 
evidential and procedural rules, were based on an American military commission 
established to try non-US citizens.299  The military in international military tribunal 
indicated the legal basis for, as well as the summary procedure of, the tribunals and 
was, therefore, useful in distinguishing these trials from other trials occurring within 
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pre-existing court systems.300  Built upon a consensus that emerged from a set of 
propitious politico-strategic circumstances arising in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the establishment of two tribunals to enforce ICL was, in fact, an 
extension of that clash of arms.  It was, as Reydams and Wouters point out, the 
continuation of war by other means, with Nuremberg, in particular, forming “part of a 
strategy of total war and total victory.”301  If this was not a case of victor’s justice, 
where law is used to serve the political purposes of having one’s way over one’s 
former but defeated enemies, then the term itself is unlikely to ever find use.  Indeed, 
ICL enforcement in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War becomes its 
own form of politics, which, as this chapter’s next section will argue, serves the 
interests not just of certain state-makers, but also of proponents of neo-capitalism. 
 
IV War: Rebuilding After International Armed Conflict 
The decisions on where the IMT and the IMTFE would sit signalled the new local 
reality of occupying forces controlling Germany and Japan.  Although the delegates 
to the London Conference agreed on the final day of negotiations and as the last item 
on their agenda that Berlin was to be the IMT’s permanent seat,302 they also agreed 
that its first trial would be held in Nuremberg, Northern Bavaria.  Providing a 
veritable breeding ground for the Nazi Party and the venue of many Nazi 
propaganda rallies, Nuremberg is also remembered for its imposition of race laws 
targeting Jews, as an industrial centre producing war munitions and for being the 
personal fiefdom of one of the accused, Julius Streicher.  Nuremberg was also, 
during the Middle Ages, the Holy Roman Empire’s de facto capital.303  Yet for Smith 
“the city of Nuremberg would be primarily associated not with Wagner’s opera Die 
Meistersinger Von Nurnberg, nor with Hitler’s massive rallies, but with what all of 
us took to be the trial of War Criminals.”304  MacArthur’s decision to seat the 
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IMTFE in Tokyo, the capital city of Japan and centre of national political power—
and, in particular, at the Ichigaya Court, which was formerly the Japanese military 
academy and, during the war, the home of the Imperial War Ministry and the 
Headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Army—would enable the trial to play a role 
in educating the Japanese public about its leaders’ commission of serious 
international crimes.305 
As occupiers of defeated enemy territory, US military forces assumed 
sovereignty over parts of Germany and all of Japan, seeking to administer and 
enforce international law in these newly-occupied territories.   (This was not an 
extension of US sovereignty, however; but rather, accorded with the laws of 
occupation.306)  Particular zones of post-war Germany and certain sectors of Berlin 
were occupied and administered variously by the military forces belonging to the 
Allies; Nuremberg fell within the US zone of occupation.  Despite eleven states 
being signatories to the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, Japan was almost 
exclusively occupied and administered by the 350,000 US troops that had arrived in 
Japan by the close of 1945.307  Unsurprisingly, the rules and procedures of the 
IMTFE closely resembled the American legal system and, when compared against 
the London Charter, the Tokyo Charter gave SCAP extensive power and authority; in 
practice, however, the preeminent body authorising policies concerning occupied 
Japan was the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) which, based in Washington DC, 
comprised representatives of the Allied powers.  As Neil Boister and Robert Cryer 
explain:308 
As a result of the tangled, time-fractured procedure by which 
MacArthur promulgated the Tokyo IMT's Charter, and the spaghetti-
plate relationship that existed between him, as SCAP and as an 
American military officer, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the FEC, it is 
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perhaps unsurprising that the question of the international, or 
American, status of the Tokyo IMT became a matter of contention.  
“In the end,” Yuma Totani explains, “the Tokyo trial turned out to be one of the rare 
events in occupied Japan that retained little of MacArthur's imprint.”309  
The decision-making around the seats of these two tribunals also reflects 
changing configurations of power within international affairs, particularly its 
important politico-strategic dimension.  As Smith recalls from his experiences at 
Nuremberg, “many of the significant forces that shaped the European and American 
transition from war to peace and then to Cold War appeared in microcosm during that 
trial.  The changes that World War II and its aftermath provided in American values 
and policy show up in striking clarity at Nuremberg.”310 Francine Hirsch explains the 
IMT in particular:311 
functioned as a medium for postwar cooperation among states with 
different visions and goals—and also how it became the battleground 
for an intense political and ideological struggle among those same 
states about the meaning of WWII and the shape of the new 
international order… In Nuremberg we see not just the “intimation of 
the coming Cold War” but in fact one of the Cold War’s first major 
battles, taking place at a critical moment when the postwar relationship 
between the United States and the USSR was still unformed and before 
the USSR had achieved the status of an international superpower.  
Present here too were broader and more profound transformations of world affairs 
illustrated by the decline of European empires and, in particular, the waning influence 
of Britain’s power, the decolonisation of large parts of Africa and South Asia and the 
concomitant emergence of vibrant, emancipatory anti-colonial and pro-nationalist 
movements.  The trans-Atlantic shift in the centre of gravity for global decision-
making, from European capitals such as London, Paris, Berlin, Rome and Moscow to 
Washington and New York is also evident.312 
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Both the IMT and the IMTFE were complemented by other trials held within 
and beyond occupation zones.  Once the first trial of the IMT was completed a 
consensus among the Grand Coalition for further joint trials was not reached, though 
the occupying powers did agree to Control Council Law No 10, the purpose of which 
was to authorise within respective zones of occupation unilateral trials of German war 
criminals.  After Jackson returned to his position at the US Supreme Court, fellow 
American, Brigadier General Telford Taylor, was appointed Chief of Council for a 
series of twelve thematic trials within Germany.313  These thematic trials conducted 
under the auspices of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal (NMT) created 177 
defendants—35 of whom were acquitted—and gave focus to those “medical doctors 
responsible for illegal human experiments, jurists who distorted law to achieve Nazi 
goals, high-ranking military officers responsible for atrocities, Foreign Ministry 
officials who helped plan aggression and industrialists who seized foreign properties 
and worked concentration camp inmates to death.”314  These trials were conducted 
under the US Army’s authority and cannot be understood as international in any 
meaningful sense.315 Significant to these trials was the underlying objective of 
prosecuting German industrialists as a means of disciplining the German economy, 
though the appetite among US policymakers for this shifted in the long aftermath of 
the Second World War.316  However, many culpable Germans not only escaped trial at 
Nuremberg, but were also not extradited to the countries where they had committed 
their crimes.  Thus, justice was never brought to bear on most German war criminals; 
and, even on those occasions when they did go to trial in German courts, they found 
there “the greatest possible ‘understanding.’”317 
Even though MacArthur envisaged the IMTFE holding multiple trials when, in 
1946, he proclaimed its Charter’s Article 14—specifically that the first trial will be 
held at Tokyo and any subsequent trials will be held at such places as the tribunal 
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decides—and the “indictment was marked ‘No. 1’, to signify that other trials were 
[at that stage] likely,”318 only one trial took place.  Even before this trial was 
completed, US Chief Prosecutor Joseph Keenan believed subsequent trials would 
offer very little in the way of additional didactic value, recommending against their 
continuation.319  Unlike the IMT trial, which was followed by other trials, the 
IMTFE trial was followed by the release of other Class A suspects.320  Nevertheless, 
the IMTFE was complemented by about 50 Special War Crimes Courts established 
by Allied Governments under their respective national jurisdictions within the 
former theatres of war in the Asia-Pacific region.321  These were established under 
the respective authorities of the Governments of Australia, Canada, The Netherlands 
and China.322  Taken together, these Allied courts held over 2,000 trials, sentencing 
about 3,000 Japanese to terms of imprisonment and over 900 Japanese to death.323   
The IMT’s and the IMTFE’s significance extends beyond the ambit of 
international criminal law.  Nuremberg’s legacy was inscribed directly onto 
Germany’s Basic Law, specifically Article 25 that subordinates German law to 
international law, creating particular duties for German inhabitants under 
international law, and Article 26 that bans preparations for wars of aggression.324  The 
IMTFE’s was especially important too, marking “the starting point of Japan's 
confrontation with its past, a process that continues to this day,”325 though many 
Japanese people choose not to express their views on the Tokyo trial. 
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Significant impacts of the IMT and the IMTFE included the effects on post-
conflict identity formation produced by the doctrine of individual responsibility.  ICL 
enforcement undertakes a form of social engineering by fostering a commitment to 
individualism, which, by condemning, exalts the individual and his or her personal 
freedoms.  This particular way of articulating one’s identity differs markedly from 
identity articulated in terms of a nationalism, which seeks to compensate for the 
alienation experienced by individuals belonging to modernist societies.  It differs too 
from identities articulated in terms of a collectivism seeking to compensate for that 
alienation by encouraging participation in some kind of global social movement.326  
While Simpson is correct to assert “[t]he history of war crimes law can be 
comprehended as a series of undulations between recourse to the administration of 
local justice and grand gestures towards the international rule of law,”327 there is 
something more insidious going on here, transforming German and Japanese politico-
social affairs.  In point of fact, holding individuals responsible for what had been up 
to that point considered to be state crimes was a “radical premise,” representing a 
major departure in the practice of international law.328  
Concomitant with the Allies’ intention to establish the IMT and the IMTFE 
were plans to reconstruct the German and Japanese militarist states as peace-loving 
democracies.  Referring to the democratic transition of post-war Germany, Arzt 
contends that the IMT:329 
intended to point the way forward as much as could any trial about the 
recent past, was held in the same setting, at the same time, and under 
the same sponsorship, that of the Allied occupation forces, as the 
postwar reconstruction project.  None of these conjunctions were 
compelled, yet all were deemed imperative... The Major War Crimes 
Trial was thus one of a series of object lessons for the onlooking 
people of Germany in how to conduct their public affairs according to 
the rule of law. 
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Conducted from 1945 until about 1949, the de-Nazification policy sought, initially, to 
deny active Nazi supporters access to all important official, and some private, offices, 
thereby causing the demise of the Nazi Party as a force to be reckoned with within 
Germany’s domestic politics.  Along with the policies of de-militarisation, in its later 
phases de-Nazification sought to deny Germany’s capability to again threaten 
international peace by creating a democratic society, free from the domination of 
fascists or military cliques and where politico-strategic power lies on a broad base of 
popular consent.  This policy was nothing short of a “political cleansing” of post-war 
Germany330 which sought “to create a democratic phoenix out of the ashes of 
defeated fascism.”331  While the Allies busied themselves removing thousands of 
Nazis from a rehabilitating German state, they undermined the core proposition of the 
American conspiracy charge that the German war criminals were guilty of a massive 
organised conspiracy while most members of German society were innocent.
332
    
The intention to establish democracy in Japan featured in the Potsdam 
Declaration, which also signalled the Allies' intentions to occupy Japan in order to 
ensure its full de-militarisation, the surrender of its armed forces, the dismantling of 
its military industries and the removal of the militaristic clique responsible for Japan's 
aggression.  The SWNCC initial post-surrender policy for Japan aimed to prevent 
Japan from ever posing a threat to the US and to facilitate the rise of “a peaceful and 
responsible government” which “should conform as closely as may be to the 
principles of democratic self-government.”333  Following the general disarming of 
Japan’s military machine at home and abroad, which included about two million and 
three million combatants respectively, the Allies removed from public life those 
Japanese who were closely connected to the militaristic clique and gave amnesty to 
those Japanese who opposed the pre-war and war governments.  In addition to 
encouraging the rise of political parties the Allies also codified a new Constitution, 
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reformed local government, separated the judiciary from the executive, encouraged 
the rise of unionism and introduced significant land reform.334 
Accompanying the intention to establish these tribunals and reconstruct the 
German and Japanese militarist states as peace-loving democracies were plans to 
reconstruct their wartime economies as bastions of free-market enterprise.  The shift 
in Allied policy—from debilitating the German economy under the guise of the 
Morgenthau Plan to resuscitating and developing that economy—became most 
apparent in the spring of 1947.335  This enormous reconstruction project was not an 
altruistic venture, however; as then US Secretary of State George Marshall himself 
conceded the plan bearing his name “was rooted in US security and economic 
interests.”336  The US, heavily industrialised as the so-called arsenal of democracy, 
desperately needed foreign markets for its goods.  US efforts to support any 
government, anywhere in the world if that government opposed the spread of 
communism (the Truman Doctrine) and its Economic Recovery Program (the 
Marshall Plan) combined to see the US provide Europe with about US$13B in aid.
337
   
According to Michael J Hogan:338 
Through the Marshall Plan, American leaders sought to recast Europe 
in the image of American neo-capitalism.  They envisioned a Western 
European system in which class conflict would give way to corporative 
collaboration, economic self-sufficiency to economic interdependence, 
international rivalry to rapprochement and cooperation, and arbitrary 
national controls to the integrating powers of supranational authorities 
and natural market forces.  One line of their policy aimed at 
liberalizing trade and making currencies convertible, another at forging 
national and transitional networks of private cooperation and public-
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private power sharing, and a third at building central institutions of 
coordination and control.  Through these and related initiatives 
American Marshall planners hoped to create an integrated European 
market—one that could absorb German power, boost productivity, 
raise living standards, lower prices, and thus set the stage for security 
and recovery on the Continent and for a fully multilateral system of 
world trade.  
Although there was no equivalent plan for war-torn Asia, the US provided material 
assistance to Japan in the immediate aftermath of its defeat by delivering large 
shipments of food and other raw materials.  With the subsequent outbreak of the 
Korean War, the US-led UN forces placed large orders for Japanese-made equipment 
and the procurement orders by US troops based in Japan helped boost the national 
economy.
339
  At the same time, however, US administrators either dismantled key 
Japanese businesses or “rendered [them] amenable to the interest of overseas 
capital.”340  
Understood in this context, the primary ends of the IMT and the IMTFE had 
less to do with doing justice—if doing justice involves an effort to disrupt and curtail 
the politics of hate, separation and violence in order to dissolve tensions, violence and 
conflict through legal means
341— and more to do with the politico-social, politico-
economic and politico-strategic transformation of a post-conflict zone in accordance 
with the victor’s preferences.  These two tribunals sought to transform local politico-
social attitudes while local politico-strategic and politico-economic institutions 
underwent reconstruction.  Accordingly, the design of the international military 
tribunals cannot be fully understood in isolation from US-led efforts to reconstruct 
German and Japanese states as peace-loving democracies, as well as to resuscitate 
German and Japanese industrial capacity as overseas markets for US goods and 
services.  In parts of Germany, particularly the Ruhr and the Rhineland, key to 
Europe’s economy and, by extension, American capital interests, nearly all of those 
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government officials purged as part of the de-nazification initiative found themselves 
reappointed.342  In Japan too, government officials removed from public life because 
of their ties to the wartime government, and some of the large industrial 
conglomerates that had been disestablished, were rehabilitated as a means of 
strengthening liberalisation efforts in the face of potential socialist revolution.343  As 
US foreign policymakers began building the foundations for a hub-and-spokes model 
of international trade, with the US economy at its centre, the international military 
tribunals not only “served to simultaneously legitimize and showcase the US’s role as 
the rising hegemon of the ‘free world,’”344 but would also facilitate what Baars 
describes as “international criminal law’s effective deployment in the service of 
capitalism’s victor’s justice.”345  US firms were well placed to benefit from this 
reconstruction, but so too were many other proponents of neo-capitalism. 
In addition to establishing these tribunals alongside their significant post-
conflict reconstruction efforts, the Grand Coalition sought to reshape the international 
system in its own interests.  At the very moment when delegations from the US, UK, 
USSR and France met in London to begin their negotiation of guiding principles for 
prosecuting war criminals the United Nations Charter was signed at the San Francisco 
Conference.346  (That Charter had been drafted by the soon-to-be victorious state-
makers at Dumbarton Oaks, near Washington DC and largely imposed on non-Great 
powers.347)   Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, the general prohibition of the 
coercive use of armed force in international affairs was recognised, though without 
mentioning if any such breaches would attract criminality.348  Germany and Japan 
were both designated as enemy states under Article 53, meaning that the UN’s 
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restriction over the use of force did not apply to military action taken against them.349  
Article 42 of the UN Charter granted to the Security Council primary responsibility 
for authorising the use of force as a means of preventing or punishing acts of 
aggression, though the power of veto given to the P-5—namely the US, UK, USSR, 
China and France—meant these victorious nations of the Second World War could, in 
effect, make frequent recourse to the use of force in international affairs without fear 
of sanction.  In this sense the UN formed a crucial element of the broader effort to 
reshape and legitimise the post-conflict international environment in the interests of 
the Grand Coalition, even though at the same time “the distribution of power and 
wealth [was] as unequal as it could possibly be, even the fundamental principles 
which have regulated international society for centuries—state sovereignty, the legal 
equality of states, non-interference in internal jurisdiction, the regulation of warfare—
tend to become the instruments of the strongest.”350  For the foreseeable future, then, 
the foundations for international peace and security were dependent on two pillars, 
the first of which, the international military tribunals, would punish past crimes of 
aggression while the second, the UN Security Council, would protect future peace.351 
Parallel efforts to refashion international economic systems occurred through 
the establishment of the so-called Bretton Woods Institutions—the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (now the World Bank) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)—though the early years of the Cold War saw the USSR turn 
away from these institutions.
352
  The US was able to ensure international commerce 
took place in ways consistent with its own security and economic needs not only by 
appointing US Treasury’s chief economist, Harry Dexter White, as the IMF’s first 
director, but also by locating the IMF and the World Bank in Washington DC.
353
  As 
McKinley explains “Bretton Woods, as the institutionalisation of postwar American 
ideology, was to early globalisation what the Manhattan Project was to the Western 
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Alliance.  It provided the means for ordering the greater part of the world along lines 
established by the United States.”354  Here, then, the design of, and support provided 
to, the IMT and the IMTFE cannot be fully appreciated without reference to either the 
efforts to reconstruct local politico-strategic and politico-economic institutions or the 
US-led efforts to reshape the overarching international system in its own interests 
during what I have already noted Henry R Luce dubbed as, prophetically in 1941, the 
“American Century.”  According to Luce:355 
Throughout the 17th century and the 18th century and the 19th century, 
this continent teemed with manifold projects and magnificent 
purposes.  Above them all and weaving them all together into the most 
exciting flag of all the world and of all history was the triumphal 
purpose of freedom.  It is in this spirit that all of us are called, each to 
his own measure of capacity, and each in the widest horizon of his 
vision, to create the first great American Century. 
Thus, not only did the IMT and the IMTFE “became one of the first fronts of the 
Cold War,”356  in which the US contested the USSR in order to exercise hegemony 
over international affairs through exerting control over the UN and Bretton Woods 
institutions, but these tribunals also signalled an emerging contest between those who 
benefit most from democratisation, market liberalisation and individualism, and those 
who are put at a serious disadvantage and, in many cases, are exploited by these 
developments.  This contest was far broader than politico-strategic affairs, signalling 
the slipping away of that rare moment of consonance between the underlying material 
and ideational conditions and the prevailing politico-strategic circumstances and the 
dawning of a new period of dissonance.   
Similar developments in international institutions governing the politico-social 
dimension of world affairs did not occur in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War, however.  What was lacking was a permanent court which, 
complementing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with its focus on resolving 
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disputes between and among sovereign states, could focus on prosecuting individuals 
who commit serious international crimes.357  Struett suggests that perhaps there was 
something of “an international fatigue” associated with establishing more institutions 
following the rapid creation of the UN, IMF and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).
358
  No doubt some of that fatigue probably resulted from 
hearing, again and again, the contrary views and dissenting rhetoric of those standing 
in the docks as the accused.  Notwithstanding the dearth of formal institutional 
development, the Genocide Convention (1948), the UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948),
359
 the human rights protections inherent in the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and the Refugee Convention (1951)
360
 collectively helped to 
inscribe the individualist notion of identity in the politico-social dimension of world 
affairs.  The UN Declaration of Human Rights, in particular, articulated the profound 
idea that human rights were universal and must be protected by the international 
community regardless of any state allegiances.
361
  For Schabas, the Declaration 
emanates from the UN Charter, which was originally intended to have its own Bill of 
Rights and, as such, must be understood in light of the Charter’s recognition of the 
general prohibition on the coercive use of armed force in international affairs.362  For 
Pettman, the Declaration is the “most notable example of the discourse of neo-
individualism” and it “represented a significant milestone in the attempt to have the 
human rights doctrine adopted worldwide.”363  This is because it offers a powerful 
articulation of a set of moral claims which any person is entitled to make based on 
nothing more than their humanity and irrespective of any other secondary identity 
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markers such as race, ethnicity, age, gender, class or religious affiliations.  “The 
Declaration is,” Pettman observes, “an important plank in the platform of post-World 
War II international law.  As such its articles are regularly used as international 
standards to pressure regimes that flout the principle the Declaration espouses.”364  
Here, then, the battle to win the peace following the Second World War was not 
only an extension of the power configurations underpinning a new set of politico-
strategic circumstances enabling the establishment of the international military 
tribunals, but was also the beginnings of a new contest in which proponents of neo-
capitalism began to exert control over the reconstruction of politico-strategic and 
politico-economic institutions in newly-occupied territories.  Their aspirations and 
efforts did not stop there, however.  They set about designing and then controlling 
architecture for governing the politico-strategic and politico-economic dimensions of 
international life.  As a new form of politics emerging as a continuation of the Second 
World War by other means, this transition to peace and the ensuing establishment of 
the international military tribunals established in the immediate aftermath of the 
Second World War was also the opening of a new front in a politico-cultural civil war 
fought by proponents of economic liberalisation for control over the modernist 
project. 
 
V Conclusion 
The quest for international criminal justice in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War was informed by the discourse against politico-cruelty, which has its 
origins in nineteenth-century liberalism more specifically and the modernist project 
more generally.  The existence of that discourse was insufficient, however, to spur on 
this quest in the form of concrete action.  Rather, required for that was a set of 
propitious politico-strategic circumstances which, in practical terms, materialised as 
the US’s rise to primus inter pares.  Taken together, the discourse and these 
circumstances delivered a moment that could enable a consensus to undertake trials 
of those responsible for committing serious international crimes instead of resorting 
to the summary execution of the surviving wartime leadership, and shaped the design 
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of the tribunals’ institutional arrangements, including its prosecutorial mandates, 
substantive elements and jurisdictional reach.  Once the IMT’s central design features 
were determined by the London Charter, they were, by and large, incorporated in the 
Tokyo Charter.  This, in turn, fortified the discourse by further developing ICL in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War and by transforming its central ideas 
into practical actions of consequence within post-conflict locales.  As an extension of 
the military victory over Germany and Japan, the international military tribunals were 
established as a form of victor’s justice, targeting only the vanquished and reinforcing 
the underpinning configuration of material power in world politics at that time.  The 
power to establish these tribunals was underscored by the victorious force of arms, 
which was also used to reconstruct German and Japanese states and economies as a 
step towards building a neo-capitalist free market of near global proportions, with the 
US economy at its centre.  This is what Baars was getting at when she wrote that the 
IMT was capitalism’s victor’s justice.365  It is in this context—that is, a transition 
from global conflict to a politico-cultural civil war fought for control over vanquished 
states and their vulnerable economies as well as the international architecture used to 
govern international affairs—that the international military tribunals were established 
and designed as a stage upon which the first generation of international prosecutors 
would perform.  And it is to that performance as agents of law, politics and war, 
which the remaining chapters of Part 1 of this thesis now shifts its focus.      
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CH. 3: IMT AND IMTFE INDICTMENTS 
 
I Introduction 
The discourse against politico-cruelty not only informed the decision to establish the 
international military tribunals and shaped the design of those institutions, but it also 
empowered the pre-trial performance of the first generation of international 
prosecutors of serious international crime.  This chapter begins by introducing 
significant members of this generation before noting the IMT prosecutors were better 
resourced than their IMTFE counterparts.  The US was, of course, disproportionately 
represented in both prosecution teams.  The chapter then critically examines the ways 
in which this generation of prosecutors prepared indictments as their “main 
accusatorial instrument”366 transforming vanquished enemies into the accused before 
the tribunals.  In particular, the selection of charges included in the IMT and IMTFE 
indictments sought to shield any misconduct of the Grand Coalition, the Court’s 
founders, from the glare of international criminal justice.  It effected the victor’s 
justice described in the previous chapter by focusing exclusively on punishing 
defeated enemies and deterring aspiring aggressive revisionists of the new status quo 
of international affairs.  At the same time, the selection of the accused not only drew 
attention to defeated German and Japanese state-makers, but also sharpened focus on 
the politico-economic and politico-social dimensions of the discredited utopian 
movements of Nazism and Shinto-Imperialism.  This chapter concludes that this first 
generation of international prosecutors, who belonged to one of two international 
military tribunals which were established in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War, breathed life into their formal prosecutorial mandates through their ideas 
and actions yet did so in a way envisaged by their politico-strategic masters.  In so 
doing, this generation of prosecutors demonstrate the great extent to which they are 
politico-legal actors at once vital to ICL enforcement while serving in the interests of 
neo-capitalism. 
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II First Generation of International Prosecutors 
Justice Robert H Jackson, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, August Champetier de Ribes and 
Lieutenant-General Roman A Rudenko each appeared before the bar of the IMT as a 
Chief Prosecutor.  First and foremost Jackson, a 53 year old American, took leave 
from his position as Associate Justice on the US Supreme Court to prepare for, and to 
conduct, the IMT’s first trial as Chairman of its prosecutor’s committee.367  While 
Shawcross nominally led the British contribution to the prosecutorial effort, he 
seldom attended the tribunal, delegating his role to his predecessor as Attorney-
General, Maxwell-Fyfe.368  (As the incoming Attorney General, Shawcross had 
replaced Maxwell-Fyfe as Chief Prosecutor-designate, who was Attorney General 
until the UK General Election on 2 August 1946 and had led the British delegation 
for most of the London Conference.369)  Just as Shawcross delegated British 
prosecutorial responsibility to Maxwell-Fyfe, Francois de Menthon delegated French 
prosecutorial responsibility to Champetier de Ribes.  After delivering his opening 
statement, de Menthon was recalled to Paris as Minister of Justice.  De Ribes, a 
devout Catholic, was an experienced politician, serving as junior Minister and then as 
Minister in various French Governments and, in 1947, was runner-up for the French 
Presidency.370  Rudenko, a 28 year old Ukrainian, led the Soviet prosecution effort.  
Like Judge Major-General Iona T Nikitchenko, Assistant Judge Aleksander Volchkov 
and Assistant Prosecutor Lev Sheinin—three key members of the Soviet contribution 
to the IMT who built their careers during Stalin’s Moscow Trials—Rudenko had 
helped enforce Stalin’s justice as Chief Prosecutor of a series of show trials in the 
Ukraine.
371
  
Joseph B Keenan, Arthur Strettell Comyns-Carr, Robert L Oneto, Sergei 
Alexandrovich Golunsky, Justice Alan Mansfield, Brigadier Ronald Henry Quilliam, 
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Brigadier Henry Nolan, Xiang Zhejun, WG Frederick Borgerhoff-Mulder, P Govinda 
Menon and Major Pedro Lopez each belonged to the IPS of the IMTFE.  Keenan was 
appointed Chief Prosecutor of the IPS by SCAP on 7 December 1945.  Comyns-Carr 
was a barrister and former Member of the British Parliament,372 though he almost quit 
the IPS because communication with his family was so limited.373  A former member 
of the French resistance movement who was nearly executed in 1944, Oneto belonged 
to the French Ministry of Justice.  Following France’s liberation from occupied rule, 
Oneto become the Chief Prosecutor of the Special Versailles Court, trying both Nazi 
war criminals and Vichy collaborators.  Fluent in English and having taught at the 
Moscow Institute of Law and the Red Army Military Academy of Law, Golunsky had 
represented the Soviet Unions’ Foreign Ministry at the San Francisco Conference 
which, in 1945, established the UN.374  Unlike the IMT, the IMTFE included 
prosecutors from countries in addition to the US, UK, France and the USSR.  An 
Australian judge who sat on the Supreme Court of Queensland, Mansfield had 
previously investigated Japanese war crimes in New Guinea and was, reputedly, 
brilliant at cross-examining.  Also from the antipodes, Quilliam was a Deputy 
Adjunct-General of the New Zealand Army375 and had experience as an examiner in 
the field of criminal law at the University of New Zealand, though he was to depart 
during proceedings without leaving a replacement.376  Nolan was a Vice Judge 
Advocate in the Canadian Army.  The Chief Prosecutor of the Shanghai High Court 
and former prosecutor before the Supreme Court of China, Zhejun, was well versed in 
international law.377  Borgerhoff-Mulder had relevant experience, serving as judge on 
the Special War Criminals Court established during the previous year in The 
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Hague.378  Menon had Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Laws Degrees, practised both 
civil and criminal law in the Madras High Court before being appointed to the post of 
Crown Prosecutor in December 1940.  The historical record surrounding Lopez is 
weak, but he was a Major, presumably in the Philippines’ army. 
In order to fulfil their pre-trial and trial functions the IMT’s prosecutors’ 
committee was supported by hundreds of staff, requiring Chief Prosecutors to create 
various management structures and to focus a considerable amount of their energy on 
managing staff.379  Of the four Chief Prosecutors, Jackson had access to the largest 
pool of legal resources, drawing on private US firms as well as the US civil and 
armed services.  While only twenty-five US delegates appeared before the tribunal, 
there may have been as many as 1,700 Americans playing various supporting roles.  
So extensive were the resources placed at Jackson’s disposal that his staff performed 
many of the administrative functions normally associated with a registry.380  The 
British Chief Prosecutor was supported by about 170 persons, including “drivers, 
cooks, and bottle washers.”  Considerably smaller than the US delegation, the BWCE 
was larger than the French or Soviet delegations.381  The French delegation included 
twelve trial lawyers whereas the Soviet delegation included only nine.382  The four 
Chief Prosecutors at the IMT were, then, supported by considerable resources, though 
those resources were unevenly spread.  
Compared to its IMT counterpart the IPS at Tokyo was of a much smaller scale 
and was a function of SCAP’s authority, meaning that the ten associate prosecutors 
reported to the US Chief Prosecutor without any independent authority over 
administrative, evidentiary or investigative units.383  When Keenan arrived from 
Washington DC he had with him a 39-member delegation, which included 22 lawyers 
recruited by the US Department of Justice, six of whom Keenan had chosen from 
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among his own friends in private practice and official capacities.384  The IPS grew to 
a staff of about 500, including 277 attorneys, investigators and assistants from the US 
and its allies, and 232 locally-employed staff.  The quality of staff expertise varied 
and US prosecutors conceded that the American staffers were of a lesser quality than 
many of those provided by other Allies,385 a situation that irked some, including 
Quilliam, who thought that “Keenan selected and assigned US attorneys who ‘were 
inexperienced and incompetent’ and prevented ‘British Commonwealth 
representatives from taking a prominent part in the proceedings.’”386  Staff turnover at 
the IPS probably hampered the prosecutorial effort.387  
The US, whose rise in world affairs was central to founding the authorising 
consensus among the Grand Coalition, continued to play the role of first among 
equals at the IMT.  This is evident in Jackson’s appointment as Chairman of the 
prosecutors’ committee.  A small town lawyer from western New York, with a gift for 
language but without holding a law degree, Jackson held several posts in New Deal 
Washington, including as Attorney General under the Roosevelt Administration 
before the President elevated him to the Supreme Court in 1941.388  Roosevelt’s 
successor, President Truman, requested Jackson represent US interests at the London 
Conference before being appointed as the US Chief Prosecutor at the IMT.389  
Jackson shaped the terms of the London Charter and was also involved in selecting 
the judges from his own country that were to be appointed members of the IMT.390  
Jackson proved hugely influential in holding the first trial at Nuremberg, placing 
weight on having infrastructure adequate to the task-at-hand and having informed 
other delegates that the US had already determined the trial would take place at 
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Nuremberg.391  Having selected the courtroom, Jackson also exercised responsibility 
for running the prosecution office and had overall responsibility for the office’s 
personnel recruitment matters.392  According to Overy, Jackson was the driving force 
behind the tribunal and, without him and his American legal team, the IMT might 
never have become a reality.393  Jackson himself later reflected upon his own role's 
importance and uniqueness: “This is the first case I have ever tried when I had first to 
persuade others that a court should be established, help negotiate its establishment, 
and when that was done, not only prepare my case but find myself a courtroom in 
which to try it.”394   
As the prime driver behind the establishment of the IMTFE, the US continued 
to act as primus inter pares.  This is evident in Truman’s appointment of Keenan as 
the Chief Prosecutor395 while all other governments contributing to the tribunal were 
each entitled to appoint only an associate prosecutor.  A graduate from Harvard Law 
School in 1930, Keenan worked his way up to become head of the criminal division 
of the US Department of Justice.  He wrote the so-called Lindbergh kidnapping law 
and led a series of gang-busting law-enforcement operations.396  In February 1939 
Keenan left the public service for private practice in Ohio.397  More than a New Deal 
bureaucrat, Keenan’s lobbying skills on Capitol Hill were valued by Roosevelt, who 
called him Joe the Key.  There was at one time speculation that Keenan’s profile may 
render him “a viable Democratic candidate for the Senate seat then held by Ohio’s 
conservative Robert Taft.”398  Keenan featured among those US officials, including 
other staff belonging to the IPS and to SCAP's legal section, who helped draft the 
Tokyo Charter.399  It was only after the Charter had been signed and issued that the 
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US authorities began to consult its relevant allies.400  The US’s new status as primus 
inter pares was also evident in the way that all of the international prosecutors were 
directly accountable to SCAP,401 which meant, in practice, that the members of the 
IPS were beholden to US prosecutorial designs.402  As head of the IPS, the Chief 
Prosecutor was located at SCAP’s General Headquarters and was designed as a 
subsidiary organ before the IMTFE was established.403  The division of labour is 
significant here as the Chief Prosecutor seized the responsibility for making opening 
and closing statements, while the presentation of the case itself, including introducing 
evidence, was relegated to the associate prosecutors.404  The lack of a deputy Chief 
Prosecutor was a noteworthy absence in this respect.  According to Boister and Cryer 
“[m]ost consider [Keenan] a poor choice.  He has been accused variously of being a 
poor administrator, non-consultative, bad tempered, an alcoholic, absent, unable to 
control national interests, and a poor litigator.”405  If the IMT and the IMTFE were 
seen as equally important, then the US President ought to have given equal care to his 
selection of key staff, ensuring that both tribunals had prosecutors of comparable 
merit.406  The IPS did, however, benefit from being in the shadow of the IMT when 
some of its members travelled to Nuremberg in order to observe proceedings there 
before returning to Tokyo to help complete preparations for the trial held at the 
IMTFE.407  The IMTFE’s prosecutorial resources were, thus, much less in quantity 
and quality than that of the IMT.408   
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III Selecting the Charges   
Preparation of the indictment of Germany’s wartime leaders began before the text of 
the London Charter was agreed and finalised.409  Its preparation was shaped by 
members of the Grand Coalition who, as mentioned in the previous chapter, designed 
the IMT in order to prosecute crimes of which they were victims during a war to 
which they were also a party.410  This preparation also drew on the work of the 
UNWCC which, in December 1944, had published a list of 712 suspects, of which 49 
were considered major war criminals.411  While the British, French and Soviet 
delegations to the London Conference collaborated in order to prepare a draft 
indictment by 18 September 1945, the Americans, and in particular Jackson who had 
by then relocated to Nuremberg, rejected that draft and re-wrote it, giving greater 
focus to its consideration of crimes against peace at the expense of atrocity crimes.412  
Arzt does not overstate the case when she declares that “[d]ue to the powerful 
obsession and early influence of Robert Jackson, the idea that the Nazis' heinous 
political acts and decisions constituted the criminal launching of aggressive war, or 
Crimes Against Peace, became the centrepiece of the trial.”413  Later that month 
Jackson redrafted the conspiracy charge and a consensus began to emerge around the 
content of the indictment.414   
Signed by each of the Chief Prosecutors on 6 October 1945 in Berlin and 
served on the accused on 19 October 1945, the IMT indictment is arranged around 
four counts—namely conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, crimes against 
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity—the latter three reflecting particular 
categories of crimes expressed in the London Charter.415  In addition to the sections 
devoted to each of these four counts the indictment has three appendices.  Entitled 
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“Statements of Individual Responsibility for Crimes set out in Counts One, Two, 
Three, and Four,” Appendix A links each of the individuals accused to the 
abovementioned categories of crime.  Appendix B does for accused organisations 
what Appendix A does for accused individuals.  Appendix C lists the particulars of 
violations of international treaties, agreements and assurances caused by the accused 
in the planning, preparing and initiating of international armed conflict. 
Count One deals with the common plan to commit crimes against peace, 
understood at the time to represent the core of the entire case.416  Leading the effort 
focusing on this count, the American prosecutors dealt with crimes against peace by 
separating that category of crime from the common plan, or conspiracy, to commit 
those crimes.417  Jackson believed that a number of Nazi policies would fall under the 
concept of a master plan, thereby relieving the prosecutors of the burden of defining 
new categories of international crime.418  Count One provided a brief history of the 
political rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party from the early 1920s.  The 
indictment’s narrative covers the Nazi Party's acquisition of domestic power with 
Hitler's rise to Chancellor in January 1933, as well as the consolidation of that power 
by eliminating any and all domestic resistance through purging the German civil 
service, establishing and maintaining concentration camps, the destruction of trade 
unions and subverting churches' authority.  It also covers the Nazi Party's harnessing 
of Germany's industrial capacity for war-making purposes as well as the Nazis' plans 
for, and execution of, foreign aggression against an array of European countries.  
According to the indictment, the purpose of this conspiracy was:419 
(i) to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions 
upon the military armament and activity of Germany; 
(ii) to acquire the territories lost by Germany as the result of the World 
War of 1914-18 and other territories in Europe asserted by the Nazi 
conspirators to be occupied principally by so-called 'racial Germans'; 
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(iii) to acquire still further territories in continental Europe and elsewhere 
claimed by the Nazi conspirators to be required by the 'racial Germans' as 
'Lebensraum,' or living space, all at the expense of neighbouring and other 
countries. 
 
Dealing specifically with crimes against peace, Count Two refers to the 
abovementioned conspiracy charges.  Even though the Nazi war effort violated 
international treaties, agreements and assurances, Jackson lamented that most people 
would be deeply disappointed to learn that war was not regarded as a crime under 
international law as it stood in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.420  The 
inclusion of crimes against peace in the indictment must have raised serious questions 
about the USSR’s initiation of international armed conflict against Poland and 
Finland in 1939.421  Nevertheless, Jackson convinced the other Chief Prosecutors that 
the illegitimacy of aggressive war ought to lie at the centre of the Nuremberg trial 
which, as Sellars notes, reveals that Jackson’s “highly unorthodox legal means served 
deeply orthodox political ends—namely, to underwrite a sovereign-based, state-
centric international framework.”422  The British prosecutors took primary 
responsibility for proving this charge, which was the briefest of the indictment’s four 
counts. 
Count Three covers war crimes allegedly committed by the accused.  Under this 
count the indictment describes several circumstances in which civilians, found in 
territories occupied by Nazis, were incarcerated in concentration camps established 
and maintained at now-infamous places, such as Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau and 
Auschwitz.  These prisoners were murdered by various means, including:423 
shooting, hanging, gassing, starvation, gross overcrowding, systematic 
under-nutrition, systematic imposition of labour tasks beyond the strength 
of those ordered to carry them out, inadequate provision of surgical and 
medical services, kickings, beating, brutality and torture of all kinds, 
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including the use of hot irons and pulling out of fingernails and the 
performance of experiments by means of operations and otherwise on 
living human subjects.  
The allegations of torture revealed intensely cruel treatment, “such as immersion in 
icy water, asphyxiation, torture of the limbs, and the use of instruments of torture, 
such as the iron helmet and electric current” as well as “dis-embowelling and the 
freezing of human beings in tubs of water.”424  Prisoners were used to clear roads 
littered with anti-personnel mines and were “murdered by poison gas in gas vans.”425  
This section of the indictment then goes on to describe a similar litany of gruesome 
scenes where civilians deported for slave labour experienced inhumane over-
crowding, insufficient clothing and little or no food, causing many deaths.  The total 
numbers (including nearly five million Soviet citizens) and the attrition rates were 
staggering, in some cases with about a third of all victims perishing in transit.   
Also covered by Count Three was the killing of civilian hostages, plundering of 
public and private property, the exaction of collective penalties, wanton destruction of 
cities, towns and villages not justified by military necessity, conscription of civilian 
labour, the forcing of civilians in occupied territories to swear allegiance to a hostile 
power and the Germanisation of Occupied Territories.  Rafael Lemkin, who assisted 
Jackson with drafting the indictment, was particularly animated by this third count, 
successfully arguing for his concept of genocide to be included in the indictment 
despite some fairly strenuous objections from the British.426  Lemkin thought that his 
concept—describing the intent to destroy, or cripple in their development, entire 
nations—was inapplicable to the Jews, who were not a nation.  This meant that the 
atrocities committed in Germany by the Nazis before the war began were excluded 
from the indictment under the war crimes count.427  Defendants charged under Count 
Three were nevertheless accused of committing “deliberate and systemic genocide, 
viz., the extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian populations 
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of certain occupied territories to destroy particular races and classes of people and 
national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies, and 
others” and with deportation for slave labour, the murder and ill-treatment of 
prisoners of war, and the plunder of private and public property.
428
  Count Three of 
the IMT indictment also covers the murder (sometimes while combatants were 
surrendering) and the ill-treatment of prisoners of war.  Such ill-treatment included 
the denial of adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care, as well as the forcing 
of prisoners of war to labour in inhumane conditions, torture and forced marches with 
no food, which led to death by exhaustion.  Uncomfortable questions presumably 
remained unasked when the USSR insisted upon charging German defendants for the 
Katyn forest massacre,429 a war crime which they themselves had ordered, executed 
and tried to conceal.  The French and Soviet prosecutors took responsibility for 
prosecuting this category of crime, with the former dealing with war crimes 
committed in Western Europe and the latter with those committed in Eastern 
Europe.430 
Count Four of the IMT indictment gave focus to the Nazi’s crimes against 
humanity, a category of crime which, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was at 
that time a novelty within ICL.  It explains that these crimes occurred within 
Germany, those countries under German occupation, in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy 
and on the High Seas.  Particular mention is given to the Jews, who had been 
systematically persecuted since 1933: “As the Germans retreated before the Soviet 
Army they exterminated Jews rather than allow them to be liberated.  Many 
concentration camps and ghettos were set up in which Jews were incarcerated and 
tortured, starved, subjected to mercilessness atrocities, and finally exterminated.”431  
The World Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Congress made a joint request 
to Jackson that at least one count in the indictment be focused specifically on the 
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Holocaust, a request that he rejected.432  More cynical, however, was the 
establishment of concentration camps by the USSR within their zone of occupation as 
the court heard details of the Nazi death camps.433  The French and Soviet prosecutors 
split responsibility for prosecuting crimes against humanity along the same 
geographic lines as they had done for war crimes.  The French planned to discharge 
their responsibilities by presenting their material in four phases, specifically “forced 
labour,” “economic looting,” “crimes against persons” and “crimes against mankind” 
across France, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg.434  
When compared to Jackson’s role in drafting the IMT indictment, Keenan 
appears to have played a more limited one in preparing the IMTFE indictment.435  
Displaying very little enthusiasm for becoming directly involved in the drafting 
process,436 Keenan delegated that role to an executive committee, which he 
established but which Comyns-Carr chaired.  It first convened on 4 March 1946.437  
Increasingly dissatisfied with the way in which Keenan set about discharging his 
responsibilities as Chief Prosecutor, other members of the IPS began to assert 
themselves in order to hasten the indictment's preparation.  This led not only to the 
emergence of Comyns-Carr and Mansfield as “de facto leaders” of the IPS, but also 
to the timely completion of investigations, identification of a proposed list of 
individuals accused of committing crimes against peace and atrocity crimes, and a 
final draft of the indictment.438   
The arrangement of the IMTFE indictment differs from the IMT’s, though both 
draw upon the same categories of crime comprising substantive ICL.439  Whereas the 
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IMT indictment coheres around four counts, the IMTFE indictment comprises 55 
counts—something of “a byzantine collection of charges”440—categorised into three 
groups: group one (counts 1—36) are 36 counts of crimes against peace; group two 
(counts 37—52) are 16 counts of murder and conspiracy to murder; and group three 
(counts 53—55) are three counts of conventional war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.441  The indictment treats each count separately, linking a particular crime, 
as defined by the Tokyo Charter, to a specific vanquished enemy.  Since the US was 
primarily concerned with prosecuting crimes against peace, the inclusion of atrocity 
crimes can be understood as something of a concession to their allies.442  At one stage 
Keenan pressed for the removal of the war crimes charges, though he was unable to 
overcome the opposition of associate prosecutors.443  Crimes against humanity rarely 
featured during the ensuing trial since, for the most part, the Japanese wartime leaders 
did not tend to abuse their own citizens.444  Instead, charges of murder were used 
against the Japanese, thereby elevating the US military casualties from casualties of 
war to victims of murder.   
The historical narrative of Japanese crimes against peace, supporting counts 
1—36, is provided by Appendix A, rather than in the indictment's main body.445  
Beginning on 1 January 1931 and concluding on 2 September 1945, this narrative 
traces the use of incidents as provocations for Japanese action.  Japanese military 
activities included: blowing up parts of the Manchurian railway; bombing Chapei; 
shelling Nanking; bombing Nanking and Canton; and capturing Nanking, Han Kow, 
Chansha, Hengyang and Kweilin.  The Japanese military then installed, and 
immediately officially recognised as independent and sovereign, puppet governments 
in their occupied territories.  Within these occupied territories the Japanese military 
exploited local resources for their own war purposes (as well as, in some cases, for 
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personal enrichment) by establishing monopolies and weakening local resistance 
through dubious and illicit means, including by supplying opium.  The narrative gives 
focus to the Japanese military establishment's preparation for war at home through its 
belligerent posturing, increasing military strength, militarisation of domestic political 
institutions, propaganda and education systems and mobilising its own civilians.  
These preparations for war abroad included forming alliances with Germany and 
Italy, and organising itself for attacks, particularly on the USSR.  The indictment then 
describes Japan's undeclared attacks on the USSR at Lake Hassan as well as its 
surprise attacks on the US at Pearl Harbour, on the British Commonwealth at 
Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Shanghai, the Philippines and Thailand, and on the 
Portuguese colony on the Island of Timor.  “As each count contained many 
cumulative charges,” Boister and Cryer explain, “a plethora of individual charges 
resulted.  The crimes against peace counts, for example, contained over 750 
individual charges.”446 
Appendix B lists the articles of treaties violated by Japan, supporting the 
charges of crimes against peace (counts 1—36) and murder and conspiracy to murder 
(counts 37—52); Appendix C lists the official assurances violated by Japan, 
supporting the charges of crimes against peace (counts 1—36); Appendix D outlines 
the laws and customs of armed conflict, supporting the charges of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity (counts 53—55); and Appendix E sets out in detail the 
statement of each accused's individual responsibility for crimes identified in the 
indictment.   
Although the IMT indictment gives notice of specific charges, it also signals the 
desire of some members of the Grand Coalition to use the trial as a means of creating 
a historical record.447  Yet the indictment is silent on any reasons explaining why 
Germans might collude and conspire in order to achieve Nazi wartime objectives.  
Absent here, for instance, was any acknowledgment of Germany's experience of the 
shackles of Versailles, draconian reparations generating resentment among Germans 
at the severe economic consequences of the peace, which John Maynard Keynes 
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predicted and publicised in the early 1920s (though Keynes was not alone in saying 
so).448  As we shall see in the following chapter, this was an issue that Jackson would 
signal in his opening statement.  Absent too were charges concerning the Blitz over 
the UK, which would have drawn unwanted attention to the devastating and 
indiscriminate use of air power by the British Royal Air Force against German 
cities.449  The selection of charges for inclusion in the indictment would have 
necessarily been cognisant that the USSR was almost certainly guilty of committing 
crimes that could have fallen under three of the four categories of serious 
international crime.450  
Like the IMT indictment, the IMTFE indictment was used by international 
prosecutors as a vehicle to help establish a historical record; and, like its counterpart, 
the IMTFE indictment remains silent on possible causes of, or triggers for, Japan's 
crime against peace.  There is no mention of Japan's treatment by the US Government 
as a second-class international citizen, including the rejection by the US, the UK and 
Australia of Japan's proposal to the League of Nations for the inclusion of a principle 
of racial equality in the League's Covenant.451  Absent too are references to the 
measures unilaterally undertaken by the US, such as the US Immigration Act of 1924 
targeting Japanese immigrants who were ineligible for US citizenship, the trade 
embargoes on steel and petrol or the relocation of the US Pacific Fleet to Pearl 
Harbour in Hawaii.452  There is nothing that draws attention to the similarities 
between Japan's utopian vision of an Asian empire placing Japan in its rightful place 
in the sun among the British, the French, the Russians, the Dutch, the Chinese and the 
US, each of whom had undertaken large-scale empire-building movements that relied 
upon violence to obtain and secure control over various governmental apparatuses, 
economies, natural resources, societies and communities.  Since the indictment’s 
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narrative in Appendix A did not cover the remaining counts focused upon the conduct 
of armed hostilities, specifically the Japanese' recourse to atrocity crimes, the 
indictment did not devote much of its content to atrocity crimes, perhaps to avoid 
opening the door to a consideration of the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
using atomic bombs, a war crime committed by US President Truman, but left 
untried.453  Excluded here too were those crimes against humanity concerning the 
Japanese military's organised sexual slavery of their colonial subjects, sometimes 
referred to as comfort women.454  Boister and Cryer suspect that this omission might 
have been deliberate since “the prosecution was made aware of [the sexual 
enslavement of Korean women to serve as prostitutes in Japanese military brothels], 
having been informed by Tanaka during his interrogation that Japanese officers had 
suggested setting up such a system in the wake of the multiple rapes which occurred 
in Nanking, as a way of preventing further such behaviour.”455  Japan's other crimes 
against its own colonies of Taiwan and Korea were also notably absent from the 
indictment. 
Here, then, the first generation of international prosecutors’ inclusion of specific 
crimes within the IMT and IMTFE indictments was empowered by the discourse 
against politico-cruelty.  The prosecutors’ selection of charges for inclusion in these 
indictments is one of the sharpest manifestations of the discourse and was vital to ICL 
enforcement.  At the same time, these selections were enabled and constrained by the 
politics of enforcing ICL in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War as the 
prosecutorial effort sought to shield the war conduct of the Grand Coalition—
including the fire bombings of German and Japanese cities as well as the use of 
atomic bombs to obliterate the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—from the 
gaze of international criminal justice.  Enforcing a particular form of victor’s justice 
as a means of ensuring the new status quo in international affairs also featured as a 
motivation here.  If the crimes selected by this first generation of international 
prosecutors for inclusion in the IMT and IMTFE indictments were empowered, in 
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part, by the discourse against politico-cruelty and, in part, by the politico-strategic 
circumstances in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, then their 
selection of the accused not only drew attention to Germany and Japan’s defeated 
state-makers, but also sharpened focus on both Nazism’s and Shinto-Imperialism’s 
politico-economic and politico-social dimensions.   
 
IV Selecting the Accused    
Upon its appointment in May 1945 the US prosecution team at the IMT had yet to 
ascertain which of their vanquished enemies were to become the accused.  Even 
though there was external pressure for the indictment to name names before all of the 
available evidence was considered or those with expertise on Nazi command and 
control arrangements were consulted,456 it was only after months of wrangling that a 
range of potential defendants were identified.  Even then the rationale behind these 
selections was less than self-evident to those directly involved.457  Jackson’s limited 
understanding of Nazi politico-strategic arrangements and his reluctance to consult 
widely left him unable to identify precisely who could, in fact, be charged in 
accordance with the London Charter and, ultimately, no specific criteria for inclusion 
in the indictment were developed, articulated or agreed.458  The preliminary selections 
contained over a hundred individuals, leading Maxwell-Fyfe to advocate for a much 
reduced list of about a half-dozen senior Nazis, though differing interpretations of 
Nazi Germany's structures of power made the task of refining that list a difficult 
one.459  According to Overy “the many arguments over whom to indict betrayed a 
great deal of ignorance and confusion on the Allied side about the nature of the 
system they were to put on trial.”460  In the end the selection of specific individuals 
for inclusion in the IMT indictment was based on various considerations and resulted 
from a series of hard-fought compromises.  The accused were drawn from those 
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individuals who were already in custody—Martin Bormann, tried in absentia but 
probably already dead, is the exception here—while some were chosen for their high-
profile notoriety.  While Hermann Göring, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Frick, 
Robert Ley, Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Alfred Rosenberg were near certainties once the 
British suggested them, other individuals were included as a means of representing 
important features of Nazi rule.  Even though this politics of representation was 
dubious, it fostered consensus among the Allies on the scope and duration of the trial 
itself.461  Held in Soviet custody, both Erich Raeder and Hans Fritsche were 
subsequently included among the accused.  Of the twenty-four defendants agreed to 
by the prosecutors, Bormann was, as mentioned, tried in absentia, Gustav Krupp was 
deemed unfit to stand trial while Robert Ley committed suicide prior to the trial.  This 
left twenty-one men to face prosecution.462  Telford Taylor, then serving under 
Jackson, recalls “[a]ll in all, the task of selecting the defendants was hastily and 
negligently discharged, mainly because no guiding principles of selection had been 
agreed on.”463  The list of persons included on the indictment became, as Simpson 
puts it, “a patchwork of subcategories.”464 
The IMT indictment also identified and charged six organisations—namely Die 
Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet), Das Korps der Politischen Leiter Der 
Nationasozialisttischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi 
Party), Die Schutzstaffeln Der Nationalsocialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterparte 
(commonly known as the SS) including Der Sicherheistsdienst (commonly known as 
the SD), Die Geheime Staatspolizey (Secret State Police, commonly known as the 
Gestapo), Die Sturmabteilungen der nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei 
(commonly known as the SA), and the General Staff and High Command of the 
German Armed Forces—in connection to each of the four categories of crimes 
outlined above.  The purpose here was for those organisations found guilty to be 
declared criminal organisations, members of which could be brought before later 
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courts and be found guilty by virtue of formal association, rather than by the 
commission of particular deeds.  As Taylor recalls, Jackson insisted that no agreement 
should be reached on an indictment that did not include the German General Staff.465 
Notwithstanding the various considerations used in their selection, suspects 
named in the IMT indictment draw attention not only to Germany’s defeated wartime 
leadership, but also, more specifically, to Nazism’s politico-strategic dimension; that 
is, the Nazi regime’s state-making efforts including policy formulation, 
administration, law enforcement and military affairs.  Illustrating this dimension of 
Nazism was the inclusion of the Deputy Fuhrer, Chancellor, and various Ministers 
and military leaders.  Drawing attention to Nazism’s politico-economic dimension, 
were an industrialist, Ministers of Economics, Heads of Reichsbank and the German 
Labour Front, and a General Plenipotentiary for Labour Deployment.  The IMT 
indictment also highlighted the politico-social dimension of Nazism through the 
selection of a Nazi Party Secretary, senior officials, a Head of the Hitler Youth and 
the editor of Der Sturmer, a virulent anti-Semitic newspaper.  Taken together, these 
accused helped reflect the broad range of individuals, from high-level Government 
officials and the military establishment’s top brass to agents of social influence and 
those holding powerful positions within Germany's financial and industrial sectors,466 
involved in committing crimes against peace and atrocity crimes.  They were, for all 
intents and purposes, held up by the prosecutors as the repugnant face of Nazism.  By 
Nazism, I mean the set of ideas and preferences concerning German society that were 
promulgated through the policies and related activities of the Nationalist Socialist 
German Workers Party (NSDAP) in the decades following the First World War.  
Central to these ideas is the view of German society as an organic nation or volk, an 
imagined community bound by blood as a single race of people, though this volkisch 
ultra-nationalism precedes the rise of Nazism, reaching back to the Napoleonic 
Wars.467  Nazism views German society as superior, placing it at the apex of a 
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hierarchy of races constituting the human species.  Within this hierarchy, races were 
ascribed particular characteristics which were immutable and transmitted inter-
generationally.  As Eric D Weitz explains:468 
[t]he lofty accomplishments of human beings, from the architecture of 
the ancient Greeks to the classical music of nineteenth-century 
Germans, were the results not of isolated instances of individual 
creativity, but of a genius bred and sustained by the racial 
characteristics that lay ‘in the bold.’  The Nazis’ terms of identification 
switched effortlessly from ‘German’ to ‘Aryan,’ indicating their 
blending concepts of nation and race.   
At the very bottom of this hierarchy—even below it as a subhuman species—was the 
Jew who, for Hitler, belonged to a race, membership to which was a permanent 
condition: “Jews were the maggots feeding on a rotting corpse, the parasites that had 
to be surgically removed, the sexual predators preying on German women, a spider 
that sucks people’s blood, a plague worse than the Black Death, the sponger who 
spreads like a noxious bacillus and then kills the host.”469  Building on this anti-
Semitism Nazism called for Germany’s biological, spiritual and political regeneration 
as a means of rescinding the shackles of Versailles, defeating the anti-German Jew-
Bolshevik conspiracy and rearming in preparation for a Greater Germany comprising 
all Germans with a single territory extending far into Eastern Europe.470  The politico-
social objective here is to remake the race-based German nation, using armed force 
and other forms of political violence if necessary or expedient, as a utopia on earth. 
As the main occupying force in Japan, the US military held about 100 
suspected war criminals, most of who were detained at Sugamo Prison.  Some of 
these detainees were held in custody because they featured on an arrest warrant issued 
by MacArthur on 11 September 1945.471  Other suspects committed suicide before 
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being arrested.472  As they had done at the IMT, the Grand Coalition held suspects 
before they were indicted by the IMTFE.473  (The arrest of suspects within occupied 
Japan, like within occupied Germany, was relatively easy to effect,474 due, at least in 
part, to a lack of resistance to those arrests by the occupied population facing serious 
economic challenges with little energy with which to contest the authority of 
occupying forces.)475  The IPS undertook their investigations of those whom the US 
military had already identified as Class A suspects though, in some instances, they 
exercised their own initiative, adding other individuals to the indictment.476  A short-
list of 26 accused were selected from a list of about 260 persons, over a period of 
about ten weeks and behind closed doors, by an executive committee of the IPS, 
comprising all the associate prosecutors and some US staffers.477  This process was 
fraught with difficulties because the IPS had not yet developed a viable theory 
concerning each of the accused’s guilt, nor gathered sufficient evidence proving the 
accused planned and initiated a war of aggression.  This was largely because the IPS 
remained in the dark when it came to both criteria for selecting the accused and 
Keenan’s trial scheme.  In order to fulfil that leadership vacuum Comyns-Carr argued 
that “[t]he final selection should be a balanced one, containing representatives of each 
period and phase, roughly in proportion to the importance attached to each period and 
phase.  Individuals who represented more than one period and phase should be 
chosen over those who only represented one.”478  Keenan submitted a recommended 
list of the accused to MacArthur on 10 April 1946, though following Golunsky’s 
arrival from the USSR a few days later and at his prompting, two additional 
suspects—Mamoru Shigemitsu and Yoshijiro Umezu—were included in the 
indictment based upon Golunsky’s promise to provide sufficient evidence to convict 
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them.479  The total number of accused could not exceed the twenty-eight seats, which 
had been built into the dock.480  The indictment, which accused twenty-eight Japanese 
of crimes against the peace and atrocity crimes, was lodged with the IMTFE on 29 
April 1946.481  As Boister and Cryer lament:482 
The selection of individuals to stand trial was a process plagued by 
poor organisation and consultation, and little information, knowledge, 
and time.  What emerged was a spread of twenty-eight accused chosen 
mostly on the basis of position, rather than direct evidence of 
culpability.  As a result, the omissions of individuals of similar and 
greater authority, in particular the emperor, remained extremely 
questionable from the point of view of fairness. In this regard Tokyo 
provides a far stronger example of selectivity undermining the 
legitimacy in international criminal process than Nuremberg… It 
should nonetheless occasion no surprise that at the outset of its 
judgement the majority of the Tribunal dismissed forty five of the fifty 
five charges on the grounds of redundancy, lack of jurisdiction, the 
merging of one count into another or because a charge was stated 
obscurely. 
 
Focusing exclusively on individuals the IMTFE indictment accused no groups 
or organisations of committing crimes against peace and atrocity crimes.  At Tokyo 
the IPS, confronted with “the rise and fall of some seventeen cabinets, representing a 
variety of political interests, many opposed to each other, operating through highly 
diffuse lines of responsibility,” necessarily departed from the experience at 
Nuremberg where the prosecution could give focus to “a single and seemingly 
monolithic Nazi-run regime, led throughout the relevant period by the same 
individuals, and which devolved responsibility through a hierarchical party 
system.”483 Absent from Japan was anything resembling the unified and highly-
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coordinated Nazi Party or a Hitler-type leadership.484  Most of the accused featuring 
in the indictment emerged from within the elite of Japanese policy-making organs—
specifically the Cabinet, diplomatic corps and military—drawing attention not only to 
the defeated Japanese wartime leadership, but also to Shinto-Imperialism’s politico-
strategic dimension.  Featuring in the indictment was the Lord Keeper of the Privy 
Seal, Chief Cabinet Secretary, and various Prime Ministers, Ministers, and 
Ambassadors as well as those who were more intimately involved in leading the 
military machine. As Totani explains “[b]eyond representing major organs of the 
wartime Japanese government, the same group of individuals represented the key 
phases of the Japanese war as well.... As was the case with the representation of key 
government organs, all defendants represented more than one key phase of the 
war.”485   
The inclusion of Okinori Kaya as Finance Minister, Shūmei Ōkawa, theorist 
and philosopher and Kingorō Hashimoto as founder of Sakurakai (an ultra-nationalist 
secret society mostly among military men) draws attention to the politico-economic 
and politico-social dimension of Shinto-Imperialism, though to a far more limited 
extent than its politico-strategic dimension.  Unlike at the IMT there were no 
industrialists (or Zaibatsu) on trial at the IMTFE, despite Soviet pressure to prosecute 
some.  This may have been because Japanese industry, unlike the German 
conglomerates, was thought at the time to not have used slave labour in a widespread 
and systemic manner.486  It may also have been due to a lack of compelling evidence 
linking industry to crimes against peace.487  (The risk of an acquittal here too could be 
taken to vindicate the role the Zaibatsu and other Japanese business leaders played in 
fuelling Shinto-Imperial ambitions.488)  This under-representation of the politico-
economic dimension, especially when compared to the IMT indictment, relates 
directly to the domestic situation in Japan, in which the military came to dominate 
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public life, particularly from 1936 when Hirota’s Cabinet restored a dormant process 
whereby potential War and Navy Ministers must be selected from active service.489  It 
also relates to the shifting politico-strategic circumstances of the post-World War II 
era in which the US initially described the Pacific War as a “joint military-industrial 
war for markets and resources” before curtailing its prosecutorial efforts and 
employing the industrial elites as a bulwark against communist expansion in North 
East Asia.490  In the final analysis many Japanese were familiar with only a select few 
of the individuals accused by the IMTFE indictment.491 
Just as the IMT indictment depicted the repugnant face of Nazism, so too the 
Tokyo indictment gave focus to the multiple dimensions of Shinto Imperialism and its 
destructive utopian vision.  By Shinto-Imperialism, I mean the ideas and preferences 
concerning Japanese society that were designed and pursued by the military cliques 
controlling executive government from the 1930s onwards.  As Boister and Cryer 
astutely observe:492 
The ‘imperial way’ was a motivating political theology sprung from 
the idea of the emperor as the literally living embodiment of Japan past 
and present, a paradigm of moral excellence all should follow.  The 
term denoted a kind of ideological warfare but also, on the other hand, 
an action plan.  It was designed to make Japan free of all externally 
derived isms, such as Western democracy, liberalism, individualism, 
and communism.  Free to be itself only, the nation would regain self-
esteem and be able to wage a ‘holy’ war of ideas against Western 
political doctrines.  Although the roots of kodo went back to the crisis 
of the mid-nineteenth century, its revival at the end of the 1920s, and 
its actual application in real-life Japanese diplomacy during the 1930s, 
helped Japan break with its immediate past—and also greatly 
narrowed the nation’s range of possible choices. 
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This race-based hyper-nationalism was authorised by the divine Emperor, whose 
ancestor had opened up Japan to modernity’s powerful military and economic as well 
as ideational forces.493  Koreans, Chinese, Taiwanese, and other Asian nations 
conquered by the Japanese war machine were all seen as subordinate to the Shinto-
Imperialism, a natural ‘master race’ of Asia using mass murder to deliver a utopia to 
earth.    
There were notable exclusions from both indictments.  Excluded from among 
those who served in official positions were former SS Minister of the Interior, Otto 
Thierack, and the former SS General and head of the Order Police, Kurt Dabuege, 
both of whom would have been justifiable inclusions in the IMT indictment and were 
held in custody at that time.494  Jackson fervently argued for the inclusion of Krupp, a 
well-known industrialist who had supported the Nazi war machine.  When Krupp was 
considered to be too old and too ill to attend trial Jackson refocused his efforts on 
Krupp's son, Alfred.  Jackson, however, was unable to persuade the other prosecutors 
and the trial proceeded without a Prussian iron baron.495  Even though a consensus 
emerged among the US, UK and USSR prosecutors that there was nothing unjust in 
selecting captains of industry for inclusion in the IMT indictment, that consensus was 
not universal as there were some who sought to understand business activities as 
being somehow independent of politics and irrelevant to the Nazi war machine.496  
The dawning of the Cold War also precluded non-German nationals from featuring in 
the indictment; while suspects' nationality was at first considered irrelevant, the US 
soon rejected for inclusion in the indictment any members of the Black Shirt brigade 
in order to shield their prospective Italians allies, just as the USSR rejected the 
inclusion of any members belonging to the Nazi Arrow Cross party as a means of 
shielding their prospective Hungarians allies.497 
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There were several possible omissions in the selection of the accused within the 
IMTFE indictment too.  First and foremost, as the sovereign of Japan, its head of state 
and the Supreme Commander of all Japanese armed forces since ascending the throne 
in 1926, Emperor Hirohito is the most obvious candidate.498  Japan had waged war 
from the early 1930s in his name and under his authority and had ceased armed 
hostilities under his direct orders, surrendering to the Allied powers in the summer of 
1945.499  However non-juridical factors, such as maintaining law and order within 
Japan, and avoiding further intensifying hostility towards the US,500 played a role in 
Hirohito's non-indictment.  According to de Vlaming:501 
The Americans, hoping the Japanese Emperor would play a central role in 
the political reconstruction process, instructed the committee that the 
supreme leader should not be prosecuted, despite his responsibility for 
waging aggressive war.  This decision, made by General MacArthur and 
supported by US President Truman, went against the Chief Prosecutor’s 
wishes, who felt there were ample grounds to prosecute the Emperor.  The 
instructions also went against the wishes of the Dutch, Russian, and 
Philippine delegations—although in the end the latter voted with the 
Americans because they were on their payroll… [i]t soon became clear 
that, as the Cold War was heating up, the Allies’ search for a stable Japan 
and a speedy restoration of its political and economic institutions 
influenced the proceedings. 
In other words, SCAP believed that Japanese support for the US occupation would 
only be forthcoming if the Japanese people remained united under Hirohito's imperial 
household.  Significantly, while Hirohito was never put on trial neither was he 
granted immunity.502  In addition to SCAP's refusal to force Hirohito's abdication or 
to include him in the indictment, the international prosecutors helped shield the 
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Emperor while prosecuting the twenty-eight accused.503  Hirohito's own recorded 
recollection of the international armed conflict was used, firstly, as his defence 
against inclusion in the indictment and, secondly, as a means of providing 
information with which to prosecute his indicted subordinates.504  The Emperor’s 
absence in the dock posed a dual challenge to the prosecutors: they sought to prove a 
conspiracy resting largely on constitutional structures without the constitutional 
leader while, at the same time, seeking to avoid incriminating the Emperor as they 
indicted his closest advisors.505  For all intents and purposes, the question over 
Hirohito's indictment for crimes against peace closed with the ending of the US 
occupation of Japan, following the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951.506  Thus, de 
Vlaming is correct to observe that “[p]olitical circumstances and the founding 
governments’ views came to influence the Tribunal’s proceedings…. The Americans 
had the final say.”507  Not all participating representatives were happy with that 
situation. 
Some of those involved in the selection process criticised the “decision not to 
prosecute a number of prominent politicians and businessmen who initially featured 
on the list of suspects on the grounds that they were projected to play potentially 
useful role in the country’s reconstruction efforts.”508  The dawning of the Cold War 
also informed the exclusion of the so-called Unit 731, which conducted biological 
(bacteriological) weapons research through experiments on humans; the unit tested 
conventional arms as well as germ and other biological weapons on live human 
subjects, and undertook vivisection.509  Excluded here too was Unit 1644 of the 
Central China Expeditionary Army, which also conducted grotesque experiments on 
human beings taken as prisoners of war.510  Research material and results were 
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provided by members of these units in exchange for immunity, a trade-off SCAP and 
other US officials were prepared to make in order to deprive the USSR of this 
expertise.511  For Totani this was, simply put, an American cover-up.512  Overall, 
Boister and Cryer are correct to maintain “the indictment process was badly managed, 
inexpertly undertaken, politically influenced, and overambitious. The ideas behind 
the indictment of a single, overarching conspiracy were unnuanced and based around 
an uninterrogated presumption that all the members of the Axis were governed in the 
same way and had the same basic policies.”513 
 
IV Conclusion 
The preparation of the IMT and IMTFE indictments by the first generation of 
international prosecutors represents one of the sharpest manifestations of the 
discourse against politico-cruelty, pointing out particular acts of politico-cruelty 
which cannot be tolerated while signalling the best remedy for such acts.  As a 
fundamental component of the pre-trial process, the preparation of these documents is 
vital to ICL enforcement at the international military tribunals.  While the selection of 
specific charges for inclusion within the indictments sought to shield the war conduct 
of the Grand Coalition—the founders of the tribunals—and secure the new status quo 
in international affairs, the selection of suspects draws attention to the politico-
strategic, politico-economic and politico-social dimensions of two discredited utopian 
movements; namely, Nazism and Shinto-Imperialism.  There is more than ICL 
enforcement at work here.  Notwithstanding the fact that politics saturates the 
enforcement of this law, the prosecutorial performance itself is constitutive of politics 
because these prosecutors seek to have their way over others—whether these others 
are the wartime leaders of Germany or Japan, the formal and informal members of the 
Nazi or Shinto-Imperial utopian movements, or their fellow prosecutors—for non-
trivial purposes.  This politics is not only an extension of the politico-strategic 
circumstances that established the international military tribunals and a continuation 
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of the war by other means, but is also part of a contest between proponents of neo-
capitalism and non-liberal utopian movements seeking control over post-conflict 
states, economies and societies.  And this is a contest, also clearly visible in Jackson’s 
and Keenan’s opening statements delivered respectively at the IMT and the IMTFE, 
which is the topic of this thesis’s next chapter. 
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CH. 4: JACKSON’S AND KEENAN’S OPENING 
STATEMENTS 
 
I Introduction  
Just as the discourse against politico-cruelty empowered the first generation of 
international prosecutors’ preparation of indictments, it also animated the opening 
statements made by Robert H Jackson at the IMT and by Joseph B Keenan at the 
IMTFE.  Building on the content of the indictments examined in the preceding 
chapter, both opening statements announced serious international crimes, 
foreshadowed the evidence of those crimes and sought to preclude foreseeable 
defences.  These statements were vital ingredients in the trial process and, therefore, 
crucial to early ICL enforcement efforts.  A close reading of these statements reveals 
the use of legal rhetoric that self-consciously distinguishes itself from the politico-
strategic calculations of state-makers as much as it deliberately distances itself from 
the ugly realities of international armed conflict.  Yet these opening statements vilify 
Nazism and Shinto-Imperialism as two discredited utopian movements while 
explicitly extolling the virtues of neo-capitalism, including both prosecutors’ 
preferences for democracies and individualism.  More than ICL enforcement, such 
prosecutorial conduct is modernist world politics in action.  However, when these 
prosecutors denounce the defendants and call for them to be cast out from the ranks 
of the human community, they invoke a belligerent rhetoric of war.  And when that 
belligerent rhetoric is placed alongside the concerted and sustained efforts to 
reconstruct the German and Japanese states and economies, and to build an 
architecture governing the politico-strategic and politico-economic dimensions of 
international life, then those prosecutors become transformed into auxiliary 
combatants supporting those who seek to maintain their control over the modernist 
project through politico-cultural civil war.  Part I draws to a close by concluding that 
this first generation of international prosecutors, belonging to international military 
tribunals established in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, are agents 
not only of ICL, but also of the politics of neo-capitalism, which, as mentioned, was 
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the expression of economic liberalisation favoured in the middle of the twentieth 
century.  
 
II Rhetoric of Law 
The first and only trial held at the IMT began in the morning of 20 November 1945, 
soon after which the indictment of Germany’s wartime leadership was read in 
successive phases by each prosecutor taking a turn and all twenty-one of the accused 
entered pleas of not guilty to various charges of crimes against peace, conspiracy to 
commit crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.  The stage 
was set for Jackson to deliver his opening statement the following day, “an oration,” 
according to Gregory Townsend, “that represented the pinnacle of his performance in 
Nuremberg.”514  In that statement Jackson described the way in which the accused 
came to power (“The Lawless Road to Power” and “The Consolidation of Nazi 
Power”) and then used that power domestically (“The Battle against the Working 
Class,” “The Battle against the Churches,” and “Crimes against the Jews”) before 
engaging in a war of aggression (“Terrorism and Preparation for War,” “Experiments 
in Aggression,” “War of Aggression,” “Conspiracy with Japan,” and “Crimes in the 
Conduct of War”).  He concluded his oration by giving focus to “The Law of the 
Case,” “The Crime against Peace,” “The Law of Individual Responsibility” and “The 
Responsibility of the Tribunal.”515  It was a statement that would take Jackson the 
best part of the day to deliver.   
The first and only trial of the IMTFE began on 3 May 1946 when “[f]or a 
fleeting moment… the attention of a distraught world was focused on Tokyo.”516  
Justice William Webb, as president of the tribunal, made some introductory remarks 
before a court clerk read aloud (in both English and Japanese) the indictment over a 
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number of days.517  On 6 May 1946 all twenty-eight Japanese defendants pleaded not 
guilty to various charges of crimes against peace, murder, conspiracy to commit 
murder, war crimes and crimes against humanity.518  It was not until 4 June 1946, 
however, that Keenan addressed the tribunal in order to deliver his 20,000 word 
opening statement,519 he would depart Tokyo immediately after, leaving other 
members of the IPS, much to their chagrin, to manage the early stages of the trial.520  
Following some preliminary remarks, Keenan’s opening statement gave focus to the 
Tokyo Charter and the IMTFE’s authority and jurisdiction before defining the crimes 
with which the accused were charged.  Keenan recounted the details of the 
indictment, expounded the law upon which the indictment draws and “considers the 
facts” as a means of outlining the alleged actions of the accused which constitute 
crimes against peace and atrocity crime.  He went on to signal the evidence which the 
IPS would produce during the trial, to reiterate the need to punish those guilty of 
serious international crime through the international rule of law and to recommend 
that the accused are worthy of punishment.521  
Crimes against peace lay at the heart of both opening statements, evident in 
the priority afforded to these crimes by the prosecutors and the amount of time spent 
focusing on these relative to other crimes.  Never mind that Nazi Germany did not 
contravene a peace treaty with the US, Jackson seemed to say, the crimes against 
peace were an attack upon the peace enjoyed by the society of states.522  Aggressive 
war was “the greatest menace of our times.”523  “It was aggressive war, which the 
nations of the world had renounced.  It was war in violation of treaties, by which the 
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peace of the world was sought to be safe-guarded,” Jackson emphasised.524  Jackson 
is unequivocal when he states:525   
The Nazi policy embraced ends recognized as attainable only by a renewal 
and a more successful outcome of war, in Europe.  The conspirators' 
answer to Germany's problem was nothing less than to plot the regaining 
of territories lost in the First World War and the acquisition of other fertile 
lands of Central Europe by dispossessing or exterminating those who 
inhabited them.  They also contemplated destroying or permanently 
weakening all other neighbouring peoples so as to win virtual domination 
over Europe and probably of the world.  The precise limits of their 
ambition we need not define for it was and is as illegal to wage aggressive 
war for small stakes as for large ones.  
In addition to the charges of conspiracy to initiate international armed conflict, 
Jackson announced the commission of two groups of crimes against humanity, “one 
within Germany before and during the war, the other in occupied territory during the 
war.”526  Of these crimes against humanity the “most savage and numerous… were 
those against the Jews.”527  Jackson also announced war crimes, including “a long 
series of outrages against inhabitants of occupied territory.”528 
Keenan was equally emphatic on the central importance of international armed 
conflict when he stated that “our specific purpose is to contribute all we soundly can 
towards the end—the prevention of the scourge of aggressive war,”529 “[o]ur purpose 
is one of prevention or deterrence” and “[w]hat can we do with the powers conferred 
upon us here in this courtroom to contribute in a just and efficient manner to the 
prevention of future wars?”530  He proclaimed, moreover, that:531 
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the accused participated in the formulation or execution of a common plan 
or conspiracy to wage declared or undeclared war or wars of aggression 
and war or wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and 
assurances against any country or countries which might oppose them, 
with the object of ensuring military, naval, political and economic 
domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and all the 
countries bordering thereon and island therein and ultimately the 
domination of the world. 
Keenan also announced and defined conventional war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, but did so under the following caveat: “The allegations contained in this 
indictment are necessarily so extensive, the period covered so long, the area involved 
so great, the accused so numerous, and the power they wielded so far-reaching, that 
an opening statement attempting to cover in detail every phase of the case would be 
unduly long and burdensome.”532  
Jackson cited a range of official documents captured by the Grand Coalition 
during its march on Berlin, foreshadowing the evidence of crimes against peace and 
atrocity crimes that the prosecution would provide to the IMT.  Some of these 
documents were the German High Command’s various invasion plans for Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and England, including “Keitel’s top secret mobilization 
order for 1939-40 prescribing secret steps to be taken during a ‘period of tension’ 
during which ‘no state of war’ will be publically declared even if open war measures 
against the foreign enemy will be taken.”  Other documents cited by Jackson as 
evidence were Hitler’s direct orders, such as his Barbarossa Directive which, bearing 
Keitel’s and Jodl’s initials, outlines the offensive against Russia, as well as minutes 
taken from meetings between Hitler and his senior advisors.  Referenced here too is a 
letter, dated 25 August 1939, from Funk to Hitler that outlines the economic 
preparations made for war in Europe, and a diary kept by Jodl.533  These documents 
include an order from Hitler, dated 9 October 1942, for captured commandos “to be 
slaughtered to the last man” and a military order denying captured airmen prisoner-
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of-war status.  Also useful to the prosecution in proving these charges was a letter, 
dated 28 February 1942, written by Rosenberg to Keitel regarding the deliberate 
starving of Soviet prisoners of war, a speech, given on 25 January 1944 by Frank, 
describing the deportation of slave labour to Germany, and correspondence between 
Rosenberg and Sauckel describing the conditions of depravity in which those 
prisoners of war were placed.  Alluding to the treatment of defeated enemies, Jackson 
said “[t]he German organized plundering, planned it, disciplined it, and made it 
official just as he organized everything else, and then he compiled the most 
meticulous records to show that he had done the best job of looting that was possible 
under the circumstance.  And we have those records.”534   
During his opening statement Keenan made frequent reference to what the 
evidence of Japanese crimes against peace and atrocity crimes would show, but more 
often than not refrained from signalling what the evidence would actually be, except 
for a mention or two of “direct orders” and other evidence “concerning atrocities 
already known to the world.”535  He did, however, introduce a piece of evidence in his 
opening statement by citing a document compiled by the Army Information Section 
of the Imperial Headquarters of the Japanese Army, entitled “Comprehensive Results 
of the Japanese Military Operations in China during July 1937—June 1941.”  
Nevertheless, “[e]vidence will be introduced,” he assured the bench, “to prove each 
of the accused guilty”536 and had the temerity to claim a few moment later that 
“[e]vidence to be offered under Charter Article 5a, Crimes against Peace, and 5b, 
Conventional War Crimes, has now been outlined”537 when no such evidence had 
been signalled.  
Both opening statements sought to preclude major defences based upon the 
legal principle of nulla peona sine lege (no penalty without law) by outlining the 
applicable law.  “It may be said that this is new law, not authoritatively declared at the 
time they did the acts it condemns, and that this declaration of the law has taken them 
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by surprise,” Jackson suggested before somewhat snidely remarking that the 
defendants “really are surprised that there is any such thing as law.”538  Jackson traced 
the evolution of international law criminalising aggressive war from the end of the 
First World War, the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), Geneva Protocol for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes (1924), Resolutions of the Eighth Assembly of 
the Leagues of Nations (1927) and the Sixth Pan-American Conference (1928).  
Jackson was at his most authoritative when he said:539 
It is true of course, that we have no juridical precedent for the Charter.  
But international law is more than a scholarly collection of abstract and 
immutable principles.  It is an outgrowth of treaties and agreements 
between nations and of accepted customs.  Yet every custom has its origin 
in some single act, and every agreement has to be initiated by the action of 
some state.  Unless we are prepared to abandon every principle of growth 
for international law, we cannot deny that our own day has the right to 
institute customs and to conclude agreements that will themselves become 
sources of a newer and strengthened international law.  International law is 
not capable of development by the normal processes of legislation, for 
there is no continuing international legislative authority.  Innovations and 
revisions in inter-national law are brought about by the action of 
governments such as those I have cited, designed to meet a change in 
circumstances.  It grows, as did common law, though decisions reached 
from time to time in adapting settled principles to new situations.  The fact 
is that when the law evolves by the case method, as did common law and 
as international must do if it is to advance at all, it advances at the expense 
of those who wrongly guessed the law and learned too late their error.  The 
law, so far as international law can be decreed, had been clearly 
pronounced when these acts took place.  Hence, I am not disturbed by the 
lack of judicial precedent for the inquiry it is proposed to conduct. 
Keenan traced much the same developments in international law and, like Jackson, 
remained unperturbed by the lack of legal precedent.  He said:540 
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[t]o those who demand precise, well-established precedents for action, we 
would point out that this is far from a novel idea.  From the time of the 
prehistoric and primeval ages, and continuing through the medieval period 
right up to the present day, there has always been some process or other for 
the punishment of the originators of aggressive wars.  This method of 
constituting an international legal tribunal and permitting such war 
criminals the privilege of defending themselves and asserting their 
innocence is but the culmination of the modern and civilised ideals of 
culture and tolerance which have become crystalized in concrete form.  
And, furthermore:541 
All of these offences [listed in the indictment] bring about the unlawful 
and intentional taking of human life so that, as we shall later point out at 
some length, this section of the Charter creates no new law.  Quite to the 
contrary, it defines criminal offences of the gravest nature which have long 
been recognized as illegal in the mind and public conscience of the world.  
Some of the offences have been recognized in assemblies participated in 
by large groups of nations.  Others have been outlawed by treaties, 
declarations and resolutions.  Some of them have been in effect designated 
as criminal acts by assurances.  However, by whatever form this state of 
international law was established or however it became crystallized, it was 
the full realization that the dictate of humanity and the requirements of 
civilisation demanded that these offences be recognized as such and placed 
beyond the pale of civilized conduct.  Indeed, as we believe it quite 
obvious, all during the period of time wherein the crimes charged in this 
indictment occurred, it was well recognized by all nations that the 
continued existence of civilization required that they come to an end. 
 
Both prosecutors also used their opening statements to try to preclude legal 
defences relating to superior orders and claims of immunity as state-makers.  Jackson 
explained that the London Charter neither allowed the accused to “take refuge in 
superior orders nor in the doctrine that his crimes were acts of state” because all of 
the accused, in high or low ranks, would remain immune to the reach of the law.  It 
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could not have been the Charter’s drafters’ intent to establish a court to try Germany’s 
wartime leadership and then provide them with an escape clause.  “Modern 
civilisation puts unlimited weapons of destruction in the hands of men,” he said, and 
“[i]t cannot tolerate so vast an area of legal irresponsibility.”542  For Keenan, the rank 
of the accused “is no bar to their being considered as ordinary criminals and felons if 
the evidence presented to this Tribunal proves beyond reasonable doubt that they 
have been parties to crimes for which they should be punished.”543   
Here, then, building upon the indictments’ details of alleged crimes against 
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by certain individuals at 
specific times and places, opening statements made by these international prosecutors 
constitute vital ingredients of the trial process.  These statements sought to persuade 
the bench of the accused’s guilt by announcing serious international crimes, 
foreshadowing evidence of those crimes and outlining relevant applicable law before 
attempting to preclude foreseeable defences, a disposition deliberately designed for 
the bench’s benefit and a forensic style condemning as criminal the actions of the 
accused.  Taken together, this constitutes a self-consciously legal rhetoric.  
Prosecutors distinguished their legal rhetoric from the Machiavellian world of power 
politics by claiming trial processes rise above victor’s justice and the desire for 
vengeance, as much as they deliberately distance ICL enforcement from the ugly 
realities of international armed conflict, which are reduced to the subject material 
justiciable by the trial itself.  This legal rhetoric was couched in language which 
reflects the contents of the indictments, both of which in turn reflect the legal 
instruments used to establish the international military tribunals.  There is a ‘legal’ 
thread here linking back to the discourse against politico-cruelty, which gave rise to 
ICL’s substantive elements. 
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III  Rhetoric of Politics 
Despite this self-consciously legal rhetoric, Jackson’s and Keenan’s opening 
statements vilify the utopian movements of the accused, giving focus to both 
movements’ politico-strategic, politico-economic and politico-social dimensions.  For 
Jackson, Nazism was a “despotism equalled only by the dynasties of the ancient 
East.”544  He abhorred both its “violent interference with elections”545 and its 
“authoritarian and totalitarian program.”  He pointed to the burning of the Reichstag 
building, as the “symbol of free parliamentary government,” as a likely Nazi-led 
arson.546  Jackson described “…the forces which these defendants represent, the 
forces that would advantage and delight in their acquittal, [as] the darkest and most 
sinister forces in society—dictatorship and oppression, malevolence and passion, 
militarism and lawlessness.”547  He lamented the inadequate support given to 
Germany’s democratic elements “which were trying to govern Germany through the 
new and feeble machinery of the Weimar Republic.”548  Jackson also despised the 
“[f]inanciers, economists, industrialists [who] joined in the plan and promoted 
elaborate alterations in industry and finance to support an unprecedented 
concentration of resources and energies upon preparations for war.”549  Jackson 
pointed to the Nazis as “symbols of fierce nationalism and of militarism, of intrigue 
and war-making which have embroiled Europe generation after generations”550 and as 
a means of asserting the German nation as a “master race,” the advancement of which 
included an “anti-Semitic program,” “hostilities to civil liberties and freedom of the 
press” and the Hitler-Hindenburg decree suspending certain liberties and rights 
hitherto enjoyed by German individuals.551  Membership to the Nazi party required 
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an oath “which in effect amounted to an abdication of personal intelligence and moral 
responsibility.”552  
For Keenan, the Shinto-Imperialists “were determined to destroy democracy 
and its essential basics—freedom and respect of human personality; they were 
determined that the system of government of and by and for the people should be 
eradicated and what they called a “New Order” established instead.”553  Their alliance 
with the Nazis was “another stage in their plot against democratic countries”554 and 
underscoring the New World Order was an objective of “extinguishing democracy 
throughout the world.”555 According to Keenan, the invasion of Manchuria was 
driven by Japanese proprietary interests.556  Keenan declared that the Japanese 
Government was held hostage by “militaristic cliques and ultra-nationalistic secret 
societies [that] resorted to rule by assassination and thereby exercised great influence 
in favour of military aggression.”557  This militaristic nationalism would likely have 
an intergenerational influence as “for years prior to 1 January 1928 the military in 
Japan had sponsored, organized and put into effect in the public school system of 
Japan a program designed to instil a militaristic spirit in the youth of Japan and to 
cultivate the ultra-nationalistic concept that the future progress of Japan was 
dependent upon wars of conquest.”558  
By using their opening statements to vilify discredited utopian movements, the 
prosecutors also extolled the virtues of neo-capitalism.  For Jackson, in particular, the 
economy should be as free as possible from military, if not political and social, 
control, though the government plays an important role in maintaining the rule of 
law.  Jackson prized the “American dream of a peace-and-plenty economy,”559 
offering his own country as a model:  “In the United States, we have tried to build an 
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economy without armament, a system of government without militarism, and a 
society where men are not regimented for war.”560  Kennan saw the invasion of China 
as being driven by Japanese mercantile priority interests.561  Both Jackson and 
Keenan signal their preference for democracy ahead of dictatorship as a means of 
managing politico-strategic affairs. Early in his speech, Jackson scorns the Nazis for 
robbing “from the German people all those dignities and freedoms that we hold 
natural and inalienable rights in every human being.”562  The modus operandi of the 
Nazi party was inconsistent with democracy in that it “was not organized to take over 
power in the German State by winning support of a majority of the German people; it 
was organized to seize power in defiance of the will of the people.”563  The 
destruction of democracy is, for Keenan, an anathema to truly civilised persons.564  
Japan and Germany were linked in “their plot against democratic countries,” which, 
in his view, deserve protection.565  Kennan concludes his oration by proclaiming that 
“[a] great American four score years ago made a plea on a battlefield to his own 
people that government of and for and by the people should not perish from the 
earth.”566 
The opening statements signal, too, the preference of Jackson and Keenan for 
individualism ahead of race-based nationalism as a means of managing politico-social 
affairs. “Of course, the idea that a state, any more than a corporation, commits crimes, 
is a fiction,” Jackson averred, as “[c]rimes always are committed only by persons.”567  
While race-based nationalism may have fuelled war and duly receives Keenan’s 
opprobrium, Keenan was at pains to emphasise the importance of individuals and, 
indeed, individual responsibility.  For example, Keenan declared the “threat of 
destruction comes not from the forces of nature, but from the deliberate planned 
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effort of individuals, as such and as members of groups, who seem willing to bring 
the world to a premature end.”568  Since humans run governments, all state-based 
crimes are committed by humans and a “man’s official position cannot rob him of his 
identity as an individual nor relieve him from responsibility for his individual 
offenses.”569  Keenan sums it up best by proclaiming “that the life of a single 
individual is of the gravest moment and deserving of all reasonable efforts for its 
protection.  The life of an individual is a matter of sanctity and can never be lawfully 
sacrificed for immoral purposes.”570  
Jackson’s and Keenan’s opening statements also characterised themselves as 
erstwhile defenders of civilisation using the rule of law.  “The wrongs which we seek 
to condemn and punish,” Jackson maintained, “have been so calculated, so malignant, 
and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it 
cannot survive their being repeated.”571  “The attack on the peace of the world is the 
crime against international society” Jackson announced, “which brings into 
international cognizance crimes in its aid and preparation which otherwise might be 
only internal concerns.”  For Jackson, his prosecutorial effort “represents mankind’s 
desperate effort to apply the discipline of the law to statesmen who have used their 
powers of state to attack the foundations of the world’s peace and to commit 
aggressions against the rights of their neighbours.”572  Perhaps Jackson put it most 
eloquently when he said: 573 
Civilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to deal 
with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this order of importance. It 
does not expect that you can make war impossible. It does expect that your 
juridical action will put the forces of international law, its precepts, its 
prohibitions and, most of all, its sanctions, on the side of peace, so that 
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men and women of good will, in all countries, may have “leave to live by 
no man's leave, underneath the law.” 
Similarly, Keenan's trial is “part of the determined battle for civilisation to preserve 
the entire world from destruction.”574  He declared that a refusal to wage this battle 
would be an “unpardonable crime”575 in and of itself because civilisation cannot 
“stand idly by and permit these outrages without an attempt to deter such efforts.”576  
Keenan remarked that the prosecution’s “broad aim is the orderly administration of 
justice” for “with the opening of the present century, the civilized world began to 
place restraints upon the waging of war.”577   
A critical examination of these opening statements unmasks this first generation 
of international prosecutors as agents not merely of ICL, but also of modernist world 
politics.  As Simpson argues “particular forms of politics are on trial.  Most 
obviously, the trial is an investigation of, and accusation directed against, the political 
project of the accused.  Accordingly, at Nuremberg fascism (from the Soviet 
Perspective) and Nazism (from the Anglo-American perspective) were on trial.”578  
More than ICL enforcement, these statements rely upon a disposition deliberately 
designed for the consumption of the audience-at-large and a deliberative style 
approving of the utopian economic liberalisation movement.  These statements sought 
to persuade the bench, trial observers and the public to vilify the discredited utopian 
movements of Nazism and Shinto-Imperialism while extolling neo-capitalism.  
Considered in light of these complexities, these two opening statements are not so 
much informed and shaped by the pressures of modern politics as they constitute a 
form of modernist world politics.  The distinction between legal and political registers 
of these opening statements dissolves as soon as ICL enforcement is understood as a 
form of modernist world politics.  The political preferences of Jackson and Keenan 
take precedence over those of their fellow prosecutors by virtue of their status as 
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Chief Prosecutors derived from being US representatives.  The political rhetoric 
contained in these opening statements reflects the politics of establishing the 
tribunals, which, as mentioned, was the propitious set of politico-strategic 
circumstances and the discourse against politico-cruelty.  There is, then, a political 
thread running from nineteenth-century liberalism up until the rise of the US as 
primus inter pares, the selection of the accused and the opening statements marking 
the beginning of the trial phase of ICL enforcement. 
 
IV  Rhetoric of War 
Whereas the drafters of the London and Tokyo Charters used crimes against peace as 
a means of differentiating the German and Japanese aggressors from the Grand 
Coalition, the prosecutors used atrocity crimes as a means of contrasting the savagery 
of the accused against the civility of the accusers.  To this end, Jackson characterised 
Nazi crimes as “abnormal and inhuman conduct,”579 “a campaign of arrogance, 
brutality, and annihilation”580 that passed “in magnitude and savagery any limits of 
what is tolerable by modern civilization.”581  “[O]f the 9,600,000 Jews who lived in 
Nazi-dominated Europe,” Jackson lamented, “60 per cent are authoritatively 
estimated to have perished.... History does not record a crime ever perpetuated 
against so many victims or one ever carried out with such calculated cruelty,”582 
“Germany became one vast gas chamber”583 and “[e]ven the most warlike of peoples 
have recognized in the name of humanity some limitations on the savagery of 
warfare.”584  For his part, Keenan emphasised that the Shinto-Imperialist’s “atrocities 
[were] of almost unbelievable severity, both as to their character and extent” and this 
“wanton and reckless disregard for life and property”585 was an “inhumane type of 
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warfare” conducted with “ruthlessness and savage brutality.”586  “[T]he complete 
recitation of these cruelties on a mass scale would require more time than this 
Tribunal and these proceedings would permit,” Keenan conceded.587  This belligerent 
rhetoric is clearly empowered by the discourse against politico-cruelty because it 
appears axiomatic to both prosecutors that the savagery of these acts of politico-
cruelty renders those who commit them hostis humani generis, thereby disqualifying 
them from the ranks of humanity.  As a result, the authors of this savage violence 
must be punished through the rule of international law and are to be subjected to a 
process of abjection. 
Even though both prosecutors described the acts of politico-cruelty committed 
by their vanquished enemies as savage and thus having no place within civilised 
society, they could not have escaped the conclusion that international armed conflict 
and mass atrocity are part of the modern experience.  As Zygmunt Bauman puts it 
“[t]he Holocaust was born and executed in our modern rational society; at the high 
stage of our civilization and at the peak of human cultural achievement.”588  The 
disturbing lesson here is that acts of politico-cruelty could be committed by almost 
everyone, including the armed forces of the Grand Coalition.  Significantly, the fact 
the Allies committed atrocities but were not held accountable was due less to the fact 
they won the armed conflict and more to the fact they did not start it.  The French 
prosecutor, François de Menthon, appeared to understand this well when he opined 
that Hitler’s truly diabolic achievement was to revive “all the instincts of barbarism, 
repressed by centuries of civilisation, but always present in men’s innermost 
nature.”589 
These acts of politico-cruelty were depicted by the prosecutors not merely as 
savage, but also as non-Christian and evil in the case of the Nazis and as non-rational 
and insane in the case of the Shinto-Imperialists.  Jackson characterised the Nazis as 
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“a ring of evil men,”590 “without whose evil architecture the world would not have 
been for so long scourged with the violence and lawlessness, and wracked with the 
agonies and convulsions, of this terrible war.”591  Nazism is “anti-Christian in its 
ideology”592 and its dire consequences are of a kind that “the world has not witnessed 
since the pre-Christian ages.”593  Keenan, on the other hand, characterised the Shinto-
Imperialists as insane and “willing to bring the world to a premature end in their mad 
ambition for domination”594 for “they declared war on civilization” and this was a 
“mad scheme for domination and control of Eastern Asia, and as they advanced, 
ultimately the entire world.”595  These acts are deemed repugnant because they 
function as the antithesis of a rational modernity born from a Judaea-Christian sacral 
tradition.  Those who commit these deeds are to be understood as nothing more than 
evildoers and madmen who have no place in the human community.  
Yet characterising those who committed atrocity crimes as evil or insane also 
posed something of a dilemma for the first generation of international prosecutors.  
The problem here is, of course, that both Nazism and Shinto-Imperialism are part and 
parcel of the modernist project.  The Nazis and Shinto-Imperialists emerged from two 
highly-developed states, economies and societies, representing the zenith of 
modernity and civilised notions of progress.  As Bauman explains “[i]t is common 
knowledge by now that the initial attempts to interpret the Holocaust as an outrage 
committed by born criminals, sadists, madmen, social miscreants, or otherwise 
morally defective individuals failed to find any confirmation in the facts of case.  
Their refutation by historical research is today all but final.”596  Despite claims to the 
contrary Nazism is very much a modern phenomenon, a product of the Enlightenment 
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and “a child of our age.”597  Many of its modernist beliefs were in circulation across 
Europe for centuries.598  As Gray expounds:599 
The peculiar achievement of Enlightenment racism was to give 
genocide the blessing of science and civilization. Mass murder could 
be justified by faux-Darwinian ideas of survival of the fittest, and the 
destruction of entire peoples could be welcomed as part of the advance 
of the species. 
Nazi policies of extermination did not come from nowhere.  They 
drew on powerful currents in the Enlightenment and used as models 
policies in operation in many countries, including the world’s leading 
democracy.  Programmes aiming to sterilize the unfit were underway 
in the United States. Hitler admired these programmes and also 
admired America’s genocidal treatment of indigenous peoples: he 
‘often praised to his inner circles the efficiency of America’s 
extermination—by starvation and uneven combat—of the red savages 
who could not be tamed by captivity.’  
The same can be said of Shinto-Imperialism too because its roots lie in Japan’s 
confrontation with modernity during the post-Meiji Restoration period in which Japan 
was recognised (albeit partially and provisionally) as a civilised nation-state only 
after it had proven its destructive capacity by fighting and winning a modern war 
against Russia in the early twentieth century. “Becoming a ‘civilized’ member of 
international society” Buzan and Lawson explain, “meant not just abiding by 
European frameworks, diplomatic rules and norms; it also meant becoming an 
imperial power.”600  But rather than acknowledge these atrocity crimes as by-products 
of modernity, the prosecutors imply those crimes are “a wound or a malady of our 
civilization,” an implication which not only results in “the moral comfort of self-
exculpation” and endorses “the innocence and sanity of the way of life of which we 
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are so proud” but also demands action in light of “the dire threat of moral and 
political disarmament.”601  
Such denunciations serve no obvious legal purpose within international 
criminal trial processes, focusing as they do on the character of the accused and the 
nature of the alleged act, rather than the guilt of the accused.  The explicit 
condemnation of the accused does, however, sharpen the focus on the threatening 
nature of their utopian movements and underscores the need for those movements to 
be destroyed.  Nazis and Shinto-Imperialists were not only an anathema to the 
modern civilised world, but also represented a practical threat to it—as borne out by 
the destruction wrought by the Second World War.  The stakes of this contest are 
raised to the level of the existential for all concerned, becoming a war waged by 
proponents of neo-capitalism on all others. 
Significant here is the way in which the responsibility of the leaders accused of 
serious international crimes was separated from the responsibility of the societies of 
which the accused were an important part.  This separation is illustrated in the 
following comments by Jackson:602 “These defendants were men of a station and rank 
which does not soil its own hands with blood.  They were men who knew how to use 
lesser folk as tools.  We want to reach the planners and designers, the inciters and 
leaders.”  Moreover: “[t]he membership took the Party Oath which in effect 
amounted to an abdication of personal intelligence and moral responsibility... The 
membership in daily practice followed its leader with an idolatry and self-surrender 
more Oriental than Western”603; and “[t]he German people were in the hands of the 
police, the police were in the hands of the Nazi Party.”604  The attempt at separation is 
visible too in the following comments made by Keenan:605 
Through the express provisions of the Japanese Constitution, there has 
been a sharp distinction made between matters of general affairs of state 
and matters pertaining to the supreme command under the Army and 
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Navy.  Through the life of this conspiracy, the evidence will show, there 
was a constant tendency to enlarge the scope of matters contained within 
the concept of supreme command at the expense of matters belonging to 
general affairs of state.  
Furthermore: “[w]e must reach the conclusion that the Japanese people themselves 
were utterly within the power and force of these accused, and to such extent were its 
victims.”606  This was tactically important because, firstly, it would have been 
logistically impossible to try all German and Japanese nationals and, secondly, 
because the Allies desired to exert control over their enemies’ resources, including the 
labour force. 
Jackson appreciated that the fate of those “twenty-odd broken men” sitting in 
the IMT’s dock “is of little consequence to the world” as “their personal capacity for 
evil is forever past.”607  Their importance was symbolic. The accused become 
emblematic of the discredited utopia.  Such an approach coheres with the underlying 
strategy of the London and Tokyo Charters’ drafters in that the Grand Coalition could 
neither prosecute entire societies, nor wanted to deny themselves the benefits of 
reconstructed states, economies and societies.  Accusing only the Nazi and Shinto-
Imperialist wartime leaders leaves German and Japanese societies guiltless so that 
they can be rehabilitated and then incorporated into the spreading configurations of 
neo-capitalism.  International prosecutors, so vital to ICL enforcement, were not only 
part of a larger and ongoing political contestation, but were also helping to wage 
politico-cultural civil war for control over the states, economies and societies of their 
defeated enemies.  Underpinning these efforts was an ideological goal of convincing 
the occupied population that the victor’s preferred model was the correct one.  
While Keenan’s prosecutorial capabilities and performance are often seen as 
lesser than Jackson’s, Keenan expressed something profound which Jackson never 
really focused upon in the preparation of the IMT indictment and in the delivery of 
his opening statement.  In particular, Keenan understood that the total nature of 
modern war means future wars will “have no limit of space or territory… This 
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problem of peace, which has ever been the desire of the human race, has now reached 
a position of the crossroad.”608  He sensed the alliance between Germany and Japan, a 
means of advancing the utopian visions of Nazism in Europe and Shinto-Imperialism 
and Asia respectively, was a “confederacy,”609 akin to those southern slave states 
declaring succession in the early 1860s, triggering the US Civil War.  Keenan’s 
allusion to the US Civil War was strengthened when he concluded his opening 
statement by declaring:610 
Today, we of the prosecution voice to this Tribunal a like sentiment, but 
the development of our times require that we request this Tribunal to take 
such actions, within the confines of justice, toward those individuals as 
will establish a principle which may in some degree serve to prevent not 
only government but civilization itself from perishing. 
Civil war, no longer confined within the continental territory of the US or within its 
sphere of influence following the Monroe doctrine, was global in its aspirations and 
was to be fought for control over modernity.  And this war was waged by utopian 
movements; significantly, while rival movements were destroyed the German and 
Japanese State remain intact.   
More than fulfilling an important legal function within the international military 
tribunals and advancing the politics of the Grand Coalition, prosecutors denounced 
the defendants as representatives of the discredited utopian movements of Nazism 
and Shinto-Imperialism, calling for them to be cast out beyond the ranks of the 
human community.  When this belligerent rhetoric is considered alongside the 
concerted and sustained efforts to reconstruct German and Japanese states and 
economies and to build architecture governing the conduct of international affairs, 
including constructing a neo-capitalist free market of global proportions, then those 
prosecutors are no longer merely juridical actors but are, rather, auxiliary combatants 
supporting those seeking to obtain control over the emerging world order, nascent 
architecture of global governance, and, beyond that, the modernist project.  In other 
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words, the trials themselves form an important element of the peace following victory 
by force of arms, suggesting that this form of modernist world politics is nothing 
more, or less, than a politico-cultural civil war. 
 
V Conclusion 
As speech acts containing at least three distinct registers, the opening statements 
made by the first generation of international prosecutors represent another sharp 
manifestation of the discourse against politico-cruelty.  Commencing the trial proper, 
these statements are vital to ICL enforcement at the international military tribunals. 
By critically examining the ways in which both statements announced serious 
international crimes, foreshadowed evidence of those crimes, signalled relevant 
applicable law and attempted to preclude foreseeable defences, this chapter found a 
legal rhetoric that self-consciously distinguishes itself from the politico-strategic 
calculations of powerful state-makers as much as it deliberately distances itself from 
the ugly realities of international armed conflict.  It also found that these statements, 
particularly the explicit preferences for democracies, free markets and individualism 
by these self-declared defenders of civilisation and the international rule of law, help 
unmask the fiction of international prosecutors as juridical actors remaining above all 
political considerations, revealing a political rhetoric deployed in the service of neo-
capitalism, albeit one dressed up in the majesty of law’s robes.  When these opening 
statements denounce representatives of discredited utopian movements and call for 
their abjection from international life, international prosecutors invoke a belligerent 
war rhetoric, helping wage a politico-cultural civil war fought for control over 
vanquished states, economies and societies as well as the politico-strategic and 
politico-economic institutions governing international life.  Even though the rhetoric 
of these opening statements operates within three distinct registers of law, politics and 
war, the distinctiveness of these registers dissolves as soon as the enforcement of ICL 
is understood as a form of modernist world politics and that politics is understood as 
a form of politico-cultural civil war.   
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CONCLUSION TO PART I 
 
Part I of this thesis recognises that this first generation of international prosecutors 
played vital roles in ICL enforcement in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War by preparing indictments and making opening statements as well as by 
conducting investigations, presenting evidence, cross-examining witnesses and 
supporting the bench with administrative assistance. Some members of this 
generation sought to convict twenty-one individuals and six organisations in a trial 
that took place under the auspices of the IMT at the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg, 
Germany between 20 November 1945 and 1 October 1946.  The trial lasted 403 open 
sessions.611  As was shown in the preceding chapters, while crimes against peace 
were the prosecutors’ primary focus here, atrocity crime—namely war crimes and 
crimes against humanity—also featured.  Significantly, the persons accused of 
committing serious international crimes at that trial were German nationals of high 
standing in, or closely associated with, Adolf Hitler's Third Reich.  Lasting less than 
eleven months, the trial considered oral evidence from 116 witnesses and from 19 of 
the accused, affidavits from a further 143 witnesses and several thousand 
documents.612  The tribunal's 166-page judgment resulted in twelve of those accused 
being found guilty and sentenced to death by hanging, three of those accused being 
found guilty and sentenced to terms of life imprisonment, and two of the accused 
being found guilty and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment.  Three of the six 
organisations were declared criminal.  Two of the individuals accused were found not 
guilty and immediately released.  The Soviet Judge, Nikitchenko, dissented from the 
judgement, signalling he would have found all defendants and organisations guilty.613  
Of those who were sentenced to death, only Goering eluded the hangman only by 
committing suicide merely hours before his scheduled execution.  The remaining 
eleven men who were condemned to hang in the early hours of 16 October 1946 did 
so in the courthouse’s gymnasium, though these executions were botched as several 
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of the condemned were left choking for up to thirty minutes.614  The first executions 
carried out as punishment for contravening ICL were as draconian as they were 
macabre.  For some of those who eluded the gallows at the IMT and the Allied 
Control Council trials which followed soon after, particularly the industrialists, 
reinstatement in their former posts awaited them when altered politico-strategic 
circumstances allowed.615  Those convicted, seemingly, needed only to switch their 
allegiance to the newly-dominant movement of neo-capitalism.  When politico-
strategic circumstances shifted to the extent that the German industrialist no longer 
needed to be disciplined, the utopian movement of economic liberalisation remained 
a powerful force in modernist world politics. 
Other members of this first generation accused twenty-eight individuals, each 
of whom were Japanese nationals directly involved in organising their country's war 
effort, of committing serious international crimes at a trial held before the IMTFE at 
Ichigaya in Tokyo.  These crimes included crimes against peace as well as atrocity 
crime in the form of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  Beginning on 3 May 
1946, while the IMT was in session, this trial concluded on 12 November 1948.616  
The prosecution's case involved 15 separate phases and was heard between 4 June 
1946 and 21 January 1947, before the defence case, taking longer, was heard between 
24 February 1947 and 12 January 1948.  Having heard the rebuttal, sur-rebuttal and 
summation of both parties, the tribunal adjourned on 16 April 1948, re-opening on 4 
November to deliver its judgement and handing down sentences on 12 November of 
that year.  The IMTFE promptly dissolved that day, without marking its conclusion in 
any noteworthy manner.
617
  The trial lasted two-and-a-half years, much longer than 
its European predecessor.  This was probably due to the unfamiliar legal systems, the 
breadth and detail of history addressed by the indictment, the destruction of important 
documents and the sheer volume not only of circumstantial evidence tendered by the 
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prosecution but also of irrelevant evidence tendered by the defence.618  Over 400 
witnesses provided testimony for the trial, which posed greater translation 
complexities than did the IMT as witnesses made statements in Chinese, Mongolian, 
Russian, French and German, each of which then had to be translated into English 
and Japanese.619  There was close to fifty thousand pages of trial manuscript and over 
five thousand court exhibits.620  The 1,781 page judgment delivered in this trial took 
six months to reach and convicted 25 individuals: five judges—Sir William Webb, 
Delfin Jarnellia, Henri Bernard, Bert Rôling and Radhabinod Pal—each issued 
separate opinions, the most controversial of which was Pal’s 1,235 page critique of 
the trial as an exemplar of victor’s justice.  Unlike the dissenting Nikitchenko at 
Nuremberg, Pal would have acquitted all of the accused.  Instead, apart from two 
accused who died while in custody and one who was released from custody following 
a diagnosis of mental illness, they were all convicted by a majority of the Court.  
Seven of the convicted men received the death penalty and were hanged on 23 
December 1948.  The remaining penalties were prison sentences ranging from seven 
years of imprisonment to life imprisonment, though when Japan’s Liberal Democratic 
Party assumed office in 1954 these prisoners were freed on parole.  A quick embrace 
of neo-capitalism also underscored the rehabilitation of these convicts, signalling the 
enduring power of economic liberalisation within modernist world politics. 
Part I of this thesis goes further, however, by contending that members of this 
first generation of prosecutors were more than agents of ICL; they were also political 
actors serving in the interests of neo-capitalism.  Part I described the politico-strategic 
circumstances enabling the establishment of the international military tribunals and 
placed those circumstances within a set of material and ideational conditions that 
were present in the rise, spread and entrenchment of liberal regimes in the nineteenth 
century in particular and the modernist project more generally.  It then traced a 
political thread from those material and ideational conditions, through the design and 
establishment of the tribunals, to the prosecutors’ pre-trial and trial efforts.  It 
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illustrated that the IMT and IMTFE indictments signal important politico-strategic, 
politico-economic and politico-social dimensions of Nazism and Shinto-Imperialism, 
respectively, while the rhetoric of the prosecutors’ opening statement vilify those two 
discredited utopian movements.  Despite proclaiming themselves as erstwhile 
defenders of modern civilisation, the opening statements also reveal the international 
prosecutors’ politico-strategic, politico-economic and politico-social preferences for 
neo-capitalism as well as for democracies ahead of dictatorships and for 
individualism ahead of race-based nationalism.  The rhetoric used in these opening 
statements unmasks the first generation of prosecutors as agents of economic 
liberalisation following the lead of those state-makers who, establishing both 
tribunals, were busying themselves with reconstructing the German and Japanese 
economies as the first steps towards building a neo-capitalist free market on a global 
scale.  This is not to suggest that there was a monolithic and undifferentiated allied 
programme, but rather, to signal that this fragile consensus was built upon the new 
status of primus inter pares enjoyed by the US.  Rather than repulse the barbarian 
hordes massing along civilisation’s frontiers, these agents of economic liberalisation 
used ICL, particularly their indictments and opening statements, as a means of getting 
their way, including scoring another highly-symbolic victory, over their civilised and 
technologically-advanced rivals.  These rivals, the modern barbarians advancing the 
causes of German National Socialism and Japanese Shinto-Imperialism respectively, 
were prosecuted in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War by the victors.  
Having won the bloodiest international armed conflict in human history, the Grand 
Coalition were intent on not losing the resulting peace.      
Part I goes further still by contending that these prosecutors helped wage a 
politico-cultural civil war fought over the institutions governing international affairs 
within the broader and deeper politico-cultural project of modernity.  Despite 
prosecutors’ politico-legal claims to the contrary, the institutions designed specifically 
to enforce ICL in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War were much less 
concerned with pursuing justice than they were with ensuring peace, stability and 
security for those at the helm of modernist world affairs.  More than fulfilling an 
important politico-legal function within the international military tribunals, the first 
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generation of international prosecutors used their opening statements as a means of 
denouncing, as hostis humani generis, the discredited utopian movements of Nazism 
and Shinto-Imperialism, by describing the accused as either non-Christian and evil or 
non-rational and insane before urging the bench to expel them from the human 
community.  In so doing, this first generation of international prosecutors relied 
heavily on the widespread and deeply-held collective will to prosecute those 
individuals who commit acts of cruelty for some substantive ends.  Put simply, the 
discourse against politico-cruelty, rooted in nineteenth-century liberalism, was crucial 
to these prosecutorial efforts.  Furthering the interests of the executives who 
appointed them, these prosecutors animated two separate trials, both of which 
purported to adjudicate from a position of neutrality.  This neutrality was more 
apparent than real, however.  In practice, the trials were used to strengthen the 
position of one modernist utopian movement ahead of two rival movements, taking 
the form of Nazism and Shinto-Imperialism respectively.  This rivalry is more than a 
strong contention of ideas, though the ideas of race and nationalism are undoubtedly 
important.  These utopian movements had catastrophic real world consequences, 
evident not only in the control exerted over the German and Japanese government, 
economy and society, but also in those countries’ aggressive and expansive foreign 
policies, which resulted in an international armed conflict causing untold death, 
misery and destruction.  Far from being neutral, the two atrocity crime trials explored 
in Part 1 were an extension of the Second World War and form part of what Foucault 
would describe as silent war, waged after the noise of battle had ceased, but 
underpinned by the force of arms nonetheless.  By seeking to eliminate the leaders of 
rival utopian movements while rebuilding the war-torn machinery of government, 
markets, and communities, international prosecutors help wage a politico-cultural 
civil war, firstly, by demonising the accused while extoling the virtues of neo-
capitalism, secondly, by normalising the new territorial status quo arrangement while 
deflecting attention away from the motives informing post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts, and, thirdly, by prioritising aspects of the historical record while maintaining 
the fraught distinction between law, politics and war. 
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When the abovementioned opening statements in particular are understood as 
concomitant to the reconstruction of post-war German and Japanese economies as 
building blocks for a global free market, with the US economy at its centre, and to the 
founding of an international architecture for securing future peace among states, with 
Washington DC at its centre, then the prosecutorial effort is revealed as an extension 
of capitalism’s victor’s justice, with the prosecutors themselves functioning as 
auxiliary combatants of those seeking control over the modernist project.  Speaking 
from among ruins resulting from a war of devastation, the prosecutors’ rhetoric 
remained belligerent while also seeking to persuade and convert those who had 
followed the discredited utopian movements through a mix of grandiose statements 
and courtroom theatrics.  There were, no doubt, also audiences at home who needed 
their own vision of utopia affirmed time and time again.  Forming important elements 
of the peace established by victorious force of arms, the prosecutorial effort driving 
these two trials and the pursuit of international criminal justice in the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War is nothing more, or less, than politico-cultural 
civil war.  This thesis now shifts its attention towards the second generation of 
international prosecutors who, belonging to the ICTY and ICTR established by the 
UN Security Council, are also agents of the law, politics and war, but encountered a 
different set of politico-strategic circumstances in the aftermath of the Cold War.  
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PART II 
 
THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR 
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CH. 5: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS  
 
I  Introduction 
While the discourse against politico-cruelty continued to offer a durable paradigm for 
state-makers wishing to punish certain individuals who committed serious 
international crimes in the aftermath of the Cold War, another set of propitious 
politico-strategic circumstances was required before a second pair of major ICL 
institutions would be established.  This chapter argues, firstly, that the consensus 
within the UN Security Council to establish ad-hoc international criminal tribunals to 
try individuals suspected of committing atrocity crimes within either the former 
Yugoslavia or Rwanda not only reveals the large extent to which the Council’s 
deliberations were shaped by the discourse against politico-cruelty, but also reflects 
the rise of US global hegemony following the USSR’s dissolution.  The chapter 
argues, secondly, that while these tribunals developed ICL from its earlier 
codifications at the international military tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR were not 
established primarily to punish those responsible for initiating internal armed 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, though war-makers were punished.  
Rather, these tribunals sought to restore international peace and security in certain 
trouble spots in a way that asserted the UN Security Council’s primacy in world 
affairs, particularly in matters of peace, security and justice.  The chapter argues, 
thirdly, that the design of these tribunals had the effect of encouraging local attitudes 
towards individualism ahead of various ethno-nationalisms while other related peace-
making efforts sought to exploit opportunities to entrench democratic-liberal models 
of governance in accordance with the so-called Washington Consensus.  Hence, the 
establishment of the ad-hoc tribunals cannot be fully understood in isolation of the 
US-led efforts to widen and deepen the spread of neoliberalism from the 1970s up 
until the 1990s and are thus a continuation of the politico-cultural civil war for 
modernity. 
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II Politics: UN Security Council Consensus 
From the ending of the Second World War up until the early 1990s, politico-strategic 
affairs underwent an array of significant developments.  As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the UN was established and its Charter created a Security Council 
comprising five permanent members—namely China, France, USSR, UK and the 
US—and six non-permanent members (which changed to ten in 1965), each serving 
two-year terms.  (The China seat passed from the Republic of China to the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 and the USSR seat was assumed by the Russian 
Federation in 1991.)  Under Article 24 of the UN Charter, the Security Council was 
given the primary, but not exclusive, responsibility for the maintenance and 
restoration of international peace and security.  With that responsibility the Council 
was granted powers to authorise measures that included sanctions and peacekeeping 
operations.  The significance of these powers lies in the Charter’s general prohibition 
of the use of force to settle disputes in international affairs, articulated in Article 2(4). 
Since 1945 politico-strategic affairs had been profoundly affected by the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and their capability to annihilate the entire human 
species, leading, in part, to the Cold War and a concomitant chilling effect on the 
work of the UN Security Council.  Although it was not an international armed 
conflict, the Cold War was an ongoing global conflict underpinned by the threat of 
armed force.  The Cold War represented one of, if not the primary, major changes in 
the politico-strategic circumstances since the ending of the Second World War.  
According to Richard Crockatt:
621
 
For fifty years relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union were the deciding factor in international affairs.  War against 
Germany brought them together in 1941 in an alliance which was 
decisive in securing Germany’s defeat, but victory ultimately drove 
them apart, giving rise to the state of continuous, if fluctuating, 
antagonism which we know as cold war.  No open hostilities took 
place between the United States and the Soviet Union, yet for the bulk 
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of the period each armed against the other as if for war.  Even their 
brief alliance against Germany was plagued by mistrust and 
misgivings.  Since these loomed ever large as the hot war against 
Germany gave way to cold war, and since the US-Soviet relationship 
was the determining factor in both the anti-axis alliance and the 
shaping of the post-war world, it seems appropriate to view both 
within the same frame. In short, the upheaval of the Second World 
War set the geopolitical scene for the cold war. 
It was this Cold War that paralysed the UN Security Council’s efforts to fulfil its 
responsibilities
622
 as “serial vetoes by the superpowers transformed the body into 
little more than a debating society.”623   
The ending of the Cold War prompted a declining recourse to veto use among 
the P-5.
624
  In addition to breaking the deadlock in the UN Security Council, the 
ending of the Cold War heralded “a new spirit of relative optimism” underpinned by 
an increasing level of trust between the Western and Eastern blocs and a greater 
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commitment to the rule of international law by the USSR’s successor states.625  Even 
the late Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then-Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
proclaimed early in 1992 that member-states recognised the historic opportunity to 
fulfil the UN’s original objectives of maintaining international peace and security, 
securing justice and human rights for all and promoting “social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom.”626  In a speech to the US Congress on 6 March 
1991, US President George WH Bush also heralded this post-Cold War era, emerging 
with the US-led invasion of Kuwait, as a potential new world order.  In particular, he 
said:
627
 
[T]he world we’ve known has been a world divided—a world of barbed 
wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war.  Now, we can see a new 
world coming into view.  A world in which there is the very real prospect 
of a new world order.  In the words of Winston Churchill, a "world order" 
in which "the principles of justice and fair play... protect the weak against 
the strong...."  A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war 
stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders.  A world in 
which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all 
nations. 
The US President had good reason for his triumphal appraisal of world affairs given 
the US remained at the heart of politico-strategic affairs.  Although the US rose to 
primus inter pares in the years leading up to the Second World War, and played a key 
role in designing the UN, IMF, and World Bank, the Cold War circumscribed this 
ascendency.  But with the ending of the Cold War, US ascendency reached an 
unprecedented height as global hegemon and, according to Goldstone and Smith, the 
“rise of Pax Americana and the ‘end of history’ opened new possibilities to return to 
the international notions of justice that had seemed to permeate, even if ephemerally, 
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in the years after World War II.”628  Given the Cold War’s chilling effect extended to 
the UN’s considerations of establishing ICL institutions,629 the prospects for pursuing 
international criminal justice looked at this time somewhat brighter than it had during 
the previous half century.  It was, thus, under a more active phase of the UN Security 
Council’s work in which a consensus was forged to establish two major international 
institutions for enforcing ICL in the aftermath of the Cold War.  “The end of the Cold 
War,” Schabas enthuses, “provided a fertile environment for the renaissance of 
international criminal justice.”630 
It is important, however, not to overstate the immediate impact of these 
changing politico-strategic circumstances.  While the Cold War may have at crucial 
times paralysed the UN Security Council, it did not halt the superpowers from 
pursuing their own interests through the coercive use of force.  Both superpowers 
undertook “lengthy wars of aggression—the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan—or in single interventions, the former in Guatemala, Lebanon, 
Cuba, Santa Domingo, Grenada, Libya and Panama between 1954 and 1986, and the 
latter in Eastern Europe in 1956 and 1968.”631  And significant as these changes were, 
the reinvigorated pursuit of international criminal justice was not immediately 
prompted by the fall of the Berlin Wall or the disintegration of the USSR.
632
  
Moreover, although the US reached an unprecedented ascendency, as McKinley 
explains:
633
 
[t]he success of Bretton Woods collapsed on its principal architect.  In the 
US itself the wealth created in this period encouraged domestic 
competition to the US corporations, which, when accompanied by a 
distrust of big business and corresponding effective antitrust activity, 
resulted in an overall decline in corporate profitability.  More 
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significantly, as a result of the overvaluing of the dollar which Bretton 
Woods encouraged, the effect of the economic reconstruction of Western 
Europe and Japan (which also brought with it increasing challenges to US 
corporations from abroad), but also developments such as American 
foreign investment, a surge in imports (and consequent damage to 
exports), and currency speculation, was to create foreign holdings of 
dollars which exceeded US reserves of gold, resulting in Nixon’s 
abandonment of the convertibility pledge.  Thus, in the space of 30 years 
in military terms, and 27 years in economic-financial terms, the US 
designs for a post-World War global order incorporating what was, in 
essence, the first phase of contemporary grand-strategic, and thus 
economic globalisation, had come seriously undone. 
Nevertheless, a set of propitious politico-strategic circumstances emerged in the 
aftermath of the Cold War which re-ignited the pursuit of international criminal 
justice.  This, in turn, constituted another rare moment of consonance between the 
prevailing politico-strategic circumstances and the underpinning discourse against 
politico-cruelty.   
The UN Security Council first considered the deteriorating Yugoslav situation 
in September 1991, reaffirming sovereign rights over non-interference in its 
Resolution 713 (1991).
634
  By 1992 the Security Council determined that this 
situation constituted a threat to international peace and security and, in February of 
that year, established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which, 
beginning as a force to protect Serbs in Croatia, expanded into a more far-reaching, 
multi-dimensional peacekeeping force.
635
  In an action that Reydams and Wouters 
suggest saw the Security Council crossing a Rubicon,
636
 the Council called for, and 
received, a number of reports to inform its considerations: namely, the Report of the 
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European Community investigative mission into the treatment of Muslim women in 
the former Yugoslavia; the Report of the Steering Committee in the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia; and an Interim Report of the Commission of 
Experts established by Resolution 780 (1992).
637
  According to Daphna Shraga and 
Ralph Zacklan “[t]he unspoken understanding was that this Commission [of Experts] 
would be a step towards the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute 
individuals if the parties did not conform to Security Council Resolutions.”638  The 
Commission of Experts, however, did not obtain much in the way of governmental 
support and its first chairman, Fritz Kalshoven, resigned.  Cherif Bassiouni, its 
second chairman, obtained the necessary financing from private sources, undertook 
significant evidence-gathering activities in the former Yugoslavia and reported back 
to the Security Council in 1994.
639
  On 18 December 1992 the UN General Assembly 
had not yet received any formal report from the Commission but, nevertheless, urged 
the UN Security Council “to consider recommending the establishment of an ad hoc 
international war crimes tribunal to try and punish those who have committed war 
crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina when sufficient information has 
been provided by the Commission of Experts.”640  When the Commission of Experts 
finally delivered its Interim Report in February 1993, it concluded that atrocity crimes 
had been committed.
641
  Images of these contemporary horrors drew frequent 
comparison to the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis in the lead up to, and during, the 
Second World War.
642
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On 22 February 1993 the Security Council, through Resolution 808 (1993), 
decided that:643  
[A]n international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991… 
[and] [r]equest[ed] the Secretary-General to submit for consideration by 
the Council… a report on all the aspects of the matter, including specific 
proposals and, where appropriate, options for the effective and expeditious 
implementation of the decision. 
This broke new ground.  Unlike the international military tribunals, the ICTY was 
established while the underlying armed conflict was raging and it was unclear which 
forces would be victorious and which territories would be occupied by the contending 
forces.  An understanding of the scale of atrocities, while emerging, was also still far 
from complete.
644
  The conflict’s end would occur only at the close of 1995 with the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace 
Agreement), which obliged all former Yugoslav states to cooperate with the ICTY.
645
  
Moreover, never before had the UN Security Council used its powers to establish an 
international criminal tribunal, which many believed ought to have been created by 
way of treaty rather than by way of binding UN Security Council Resolution.
646
  
(Although establishing a tribunal by way of treaty was considered, this pathway was 
rejected on the grounds of the need both for expediency and for the relevant states in 
the former Yugoslavia to ratify such a treaty.
647
)  The establishment of the ICTY was 
authorised on 25 May 1993 by UN Security Council Resolution 827, which approved 
the Report of the Secretary-General to which the Statute of the International Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter the “ICTY Statute”) was appended.648  Since the 
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tribunal was established by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, all UN member-states were obliged to cooperate.
649
  It remains contentious, 
however, whether or not the Council determined in its Resolution that the threat to 
the peace resulted from the armed conflict or from the atrocities committed in the 
context of that conflict.
650
 
The UN Security Council has been criticised for establishing the ICTY instead 
of taking decisive action to protect civilians through authorising the use of armed 
force.  According to Cassese “[t]he response of the international community to the 
conflict in Yugoslavia had been tardy and lukewarm, due to impotence at the military 
and political levels.  The establishment of a Tribunal was thus seized upon during the 
conflict not only as a belated face-saving measure but also in the pious hope that it 
would serve as a deterrent to further crimes.”651  For Makau Mutua establishing the 
ICTY “let powerful states ‘off the hook’… as they could no longer be accused of 
inaction.”652  Matua goes on to suggest that the P-5 would have acted sooner, and 
more decisively, had the victims been of Western European origins or followers of 
Christianity and Judaism, rather than Muslim.
653
 
Responding to Rwanda’s most recent internal armed conflict, which followed 
an invasion by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) from neighbouring Uganda on 1 
October 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 812 (1993) calling for 
both parties to the conflict to observe a ceasefire from 9 March 1993 and to permit 
humanitarian supplies to be delivered and displaced persons to return to their homes.  
On 22 June 1993 the Council adopted Resolution 846 authorising the establishment 
of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) in order to 
monitor weapons transfers across the Uganda-Rwanda border.  Following the 
conclusion of the Arusha Agreement on 5 October 1993, the UN Security Council 
issued Resolution 872 authorising the establishment of the United Nations Assistance 
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Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) until national elections were held and a new 
government installed.
654
  As the genocide began to unfold in April 1994 the Security 
Council’s discussions did not focus on genocide even though there was a steady 
stream of evidence signalling a widespread, systemic, and deliberate effort to destroy 
Rwandese Tutsi.  Avoiding the use of the term genocide may have relieved some 
Council members of the burden of their obligations under the Genocide 
Convention.
655
  On 1 July 1994 the Security Council established a Commission of 
Experts very much in accordance with the one established two years earlier in relation 
to the Yugoslav situation.  Once that Commission had provided its Interim Report 
detailing violations of IHL in Rwanda, the Council adopted, on 8 November 1994, 
Resolution 995, thereby authorising the establishment of the ICTR.
656
  The process by 
which the Security Council reached its consensus to establish an international 
criminal tribunal for the atrocity crimes committed within Rwanda—starting with its 
statements condemning the atrocities and then establishing a Commission of Experts 
before taking the decision to establish the ICTR before that Commission had issued 
its final report
657—was very similar to that behind the consensus around establishing 
the ICTY. 
Notwithstanding these procedural similarities, the situation on the ground in 
Rwanda differed significantly from that in the former Yugoslavia.  Both parties to the 
conflict in Rwanda, for example, had at some point called for international trials.
658
  
Unlike the Yugoslav situation, the fighting in Rwanda had ceased (or at least 
appeared to have come to an end at the time) and the institutions of government had 
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been vacated by the defeated forces that fled into exile in nearby states.  The 
victorious RPF forces were readily identifiable.
659
 
The role played by the US in establishing the ICTR was far less active than its 
efforts to establish the IMT, the IMTFE and the ICTY.  The US saw very little cost in 
taking no significant action over the atrocities unfolding in Rwanda during April 
1994 given the absence of strong domestic concern and the persistent memories of 
US Rangers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu as the armed intervention in 
Somalia failed.
660
  US officials were fearful that a multilateral armed humanitarian 
intervention into Rwanda would fail as those in Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti had failed 
and become “like quagmires in the making.”661  In any case, Rwanda did not feature 
highly among the priorities of US foreign policymakers,
662
 though that is not to say 
that the Central Intelligence Agency was not involved in aiding and abetting the 
RPF’s 1990 invasion of Rwanda.663  The US had suggested amending the ICTY’s 
mandate, extending its jurisdiction to cover Rwanda.  This was rejected “because of 
the misgivings of some Council members who feared that the expansion of an 
existing ad hoc jurisdiction would lead to a single tribunal that would gradually take 
on the characteristics of a permanent juridical institution.”664  The most significant 
action taken by the US in relation to the establishment of the ICTR was to refrain 
from exercising its right to veto.    
Rwanda had, however, remained an important focus of French foreign policy in 
the aftermath of the Cold War.  While the Congo-Zaire region was the subject of a 
long-standing rivalry between France and the UK, contemporary French Anglophobia 
in the African continent is fuelled more by fears of the increasing influence of US 
foreign policy.
665
  French armed forces played important roles in assisting the 
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Government of Rwanda to repulse the RPF’s 1990 invasion666 and in supporting the 
genocide by “supplying arms and military equipment, military training and 
dissemination of racialised ideologies to the [Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR)] and 
Hutu militia organisations.”667  As Hazel Cameron explains:668 
Once the genocide in Rwanda commenced in April 1994, France 
knowingly persisted in its collusive, participatory role by continuing to 
deliver arms and military training to the genocidaires throughout the 
period of Operation Turquoise in breach of a UN embargo…. Despite 
having knowledge of the daily suffering of the Tutsi people on the hills of 
Bisesero, the French soldiers arrived there accompanied by militia and 
unequipped to rescue desperate survivors. These soldiers then left the area, 
knowing that the wounded and starving Tutsi were in fact the true victims 
of genocide, not the perpetrators as they had been led to believe by their 
leaders. 
France also played something of a spoiling role during the UN Security Council’s 
discussions of the Rwandan situation by deliberately withholding information and 
intelligence, presumably as a means of keeping other Council members uninformed.  
This was a situation that then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali did little 
to remedy, given his direct involvement in transferring arms from Egypt to Rwanda 
four years earlier when he was Egypt’s Foreign Minister.669 
Like France, the UK was also involved in the internal armed conflict, playing a 
less than constructive role during relevant Security Council negotiations.  The UK 
provided support to the RPF, including military training for their invasion of 
Rwanda.
670
  Moreover, since the 1990s British intelligence officers, based in Uganda, 
worked actively with the RPF and benefited from the RPF’s “excellent and very 
strong intelligence machine inside Rwanda.”671  The strength of the relationship was 
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such that a former British official suggested “both the Government of Uganda and the 
RPF were the cat’s paw of the British Government with the RPF being groomed to 
overthrow the Francophone Government of Juvénal Habyarimana in Rwanda.”672  
Within the UN Security Council, the UK Government actively discouraged the 
strengthening of UNAMIR’s mandate.  A Resolution strengthening UNAMIR was, 
for instance, not even tabled for consideration given the strong opposition from both 
the UK and the US.
673
  The UK, along with the US and the Russian Federation, 
sought a partial withdrawal of UNAMIR whereas most of the non-permanent 
members sought to strengthen UNAMIR’s mandate and bolster peacekeeping troop 
numbers.
674
  This led to Resolution 912, agreed on 21 April 1994, which reduced the 
mission’s troop strength from 2,700 to 270.675  When an informal meeting of the 
Council was called on 29 April 1994 to discuss the opportunity to establish an 
international criminal tribunal, a draft presidential statement prepared by the then 
New Zealand Chair of the Council, Colin Keating, was rejected by the UK, as well as 
by the PRC and the US.
676
  Notwithstanding this French and British intransigence, the 
Security Council decided to establish the ICTR with 13 votes in favour.  The PRC 
abstained while, as mentioned, the Rwandan Government voted against the 
Resolution.   
The UN Security Council’s establishment of the ICTR eighteen months after 
the ICTY has been the subject of criticism.  According to Akhavan:
677
 
[T]here was ample opportunity, but little willingness, to take preventive 
action or to intervene against what is perhaps the worst genocide since the 
Second World War.  At least one year before the massacres of April 1994, 
which according to some estimates took the lives of as many as five 
hundred thousand to one million people in just three months, United 
Nations human rights experts and nongovernment organizations had 
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forewarned of an impending calamity, but to no avail… On the basis of 
international responses to other situations [Nuremberg, Tokyo, 
Yugoslavia], it has been suggested that the plight of African victims would 
not generate the same outcry as the suffering of European.  In other words, 
the Rwanda Tribunal was established because of the precedential effect of 
the Yugoslav Tribunal.  In view of this harsh reality, there is little room for 
celebration, and even less for triumphalism.  
Elsewhere Akhavan suggests that the muted media interest around the arrest of 
Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, a leading figure in planning and executing the 
genocide, signals a lesser concern for Rwandans compared to the attention given to 
Radovan Karadžić who, when indicted by the ICTY prosecutor, became something of 
a media celebrity.
678
  Matua is equally terse in his assessment, arguing the world 
remained asleep as horrors unfolded in Rwanda and, although the ICTR was possible 
only because of the precedent provided by the ICTY, the ICTR “was an afterthought” 
and “a sideshow to the Yugoslav Tribunal.”679  Yet in so doing both Akhavan and 
Matua miss a deeper, more striking politico-strategic issue at play here.  As Cameron 
explains: 680  
[This h]istorical and contemporary rivalry is rooted in not only economic 
and geopolitical disputes over Africa, but also in mutual paranoia and a 
deep ideological and cultural division.  That the behaviour of France and 
Britain in Rwanda in the period of the civil war from 1990 and throughout 
the genocide constituted an undeclared war between France and America, 
with Britain’s foreign policy being driven by Washington, is a matter 
worthy of consideration… Rwanda’s instability post-independence 
ensured that opportunities manifested themselves for powerful 
governments of the West to gain political control in the Great Lakes region 
of Africa, thereby providing an opportunity to manipulate the economic 
markets of Central Africa.  
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In other words, powerful modern Western states were acting as rivals in a new 
scramble for African resources. This reveals contending politico-strategic priorities 
among former Second World War allies.  Such rivalry did not, however, preclude 
cooperation among the P-5 when it came to taking some action in this unruly trouble-
spot.     
The consensus within the UN Security Council to establish ad-hoc international 
criminal tribunals as a means of punishing those who committed atrocity crimes in 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda was shaped by the discourse against politico-cruelty, which 
includes the legacy of the international military tribunals.  The UNSC, especially the 
P-5, shared not only abhorrence towards specific acts of politico-cruelty, but also a 
desire to abject those who commit those acts through ICL enforcement.  Even though 
Akhavan notes that UN Security Council action was triggered not by the “the massive 
and systemic scale of the human rights violations,” but rather by “the determination 
that such violations, in particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, constituted a ‘threat to international peace and security’ as required by the 
Charter,”681 this does not mean the P-5 were unaffected by the discourse.  It only 
means that the Security Council could justify its actions in terms consistent with its 
responsibilities under the UN Charter.  While the discourse against politico-cruelty 
shaped the strategic thinking of the Security Council, the politico-strategic 
circumstances brought about by the end of the Cold War, including the 
preponderance of US power following the USSR’s dissolution and the concomitant 
diminished recourse to veto, were vital to founding these ad-hoc tribunals.  This 
represented another rare moment of consonance between that underlying discourse 
and the more immediate circumstances.  Having emerged as primus inter pares at the 
end of the Second World War, the US had emerged as a global hegemon at the 
conclusion of the Cold War.  The ad-hoc tribunals of the 1990s were experiments in 
justice to see if institutions could be developed that served particular, and very 
limited, goals. As we shall now see, these tribunals represent an important chapter in 
the history of the pursuit of international criminal justice, but the justice delivered 
                                                          
681
  Akhavan, above n 626, at 327. 
175 
 
was so narrow in its scope that it can only be understood as a form of highly selective 
hegemon’s justice.  
 
III Law: Hegemon’s Justice  
The discourse against politico-cruelty not only informed the consensus to establish 
the ad-hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but also shaped the 
design of these institutions, as it had the international military tribunals fifty years 
earlier.  Drafters of the ICTY Statute drew heavily, though not exclusively, on the 
London and Tokyo Charters for the design of the tribunal’s structure.  The ICTY 
Statute provided for a structure based upon three pillars, the first of which was the 
Registry that managed the tribunal’s administrative work, including victim and 
witness programmes, transportation and detention of the accused and public 
relations.
682
  The second pillar was the bench but, for the purposes of this thesis, the 
final pillar of the ICTY, the prosecution, is the most important.  According to Article 
16 of the ICTY Statute, prosecutors were responsible for investigating crimes 
outlined in the tribunal’s Statute; that is, serious violations of IHL committed in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since January 1991 (including Kosovo in 1999, 
though this could not have been anticipated at the time).  These investigations could 
be initiated either ex-officio or on the basis of information obtained from any source, 
particularly from governments, UN organs, intergovernmental organisations or 
NGOs.  In order to collect evidence the prosecutor had the power to question 
suspects, victims and witnesses as well as to conduct on-site inspections.  The 
discretion to proceed with an investigation, or to proceed from an investigation to a 
prosecution, rested exclusively with the prosecutor.  If a determination was reached 
that a prima facie case existed, then the prosecutor was empowered to prepare an 
indictment for the approval of a judge of the Trial Chamber.  The prosecutor would 
also bring a case against those persons named in the indictment.  In discharging those 
responsibilities the prosecutor was to act independently and could not seek or receive 
instruction from any source, including governments.  While the ICTY was 
established on 25 May 1993, a year and a half lapsed before a prosecutor was 
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appointed, precisely the amount of time the Grand Coalition took to establish the 
IMT, run its first and only trial, issue a judgement and determine related penalties 
before executing the sentences.
683
  (However, to be fair, before the first ICTY 
prosecutor could begin his legal work suitable premises had to be arranged and 
qualified staff had to be employed.
684
)  Generally speaking, the mandate for the 
ICTR’s prosecutors was identical to that of ICTY’s. Significantly, Article 15(3) of the 
ICTR Statute states that the: 
Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia shall 
also serve as the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. He 
or she shall have additional staff, including an additional Deputy 
Prosecutor, to assist with prosecution before the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda. Such staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General on the 
recommendation of the Prosecutor.    
This was the situation until UN Security Council Resolution 1503 spilt the roles in 
August 2003.  The key difference in mandates concern the tribunals’ jurisdiction, 
with the ICTR prosecutor being “responsible for the investigation and prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such 
violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states, between 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 1994.”685  Following the lead of the drafters of the London and 
Tokyo Charters, the designers of the ad-hoc tribunals created a strong prosecutorial 
mandate, meaning the international prosecutor would be vital to the trial process in 
particular and the enforcement of ICL more generally.  
While the discourse against politico-cruelty informed the structural design of 
the ad-hoc tribunals, it also played a role in developing ICL’s substantive elements in 
the aftermath of the Cold War.  The Statutes establishing these ad-hoc tribunals have 
much in common, particularly when it comes to defining the serious international 
crimes under their respective jurisdictions.  Neither Statute includes the crime of 
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aggression, for instance.  Reydams and Odermatt observe that “crimes against peace, 
the overarching crime at the IMT and IMTFE and the first cause of many atrocities, 
are not included in the Statute.”686  Like the international military tribunals, the ad-
hoc tribunals were designed as selective mechanisms of enforcing ICL but, unlike the 
international military tribunals, punishing those responsible for initiating armed 
conflict was not the key driving force behind these post-Cold War tribunals, though 
war-makers were put on trial.  This was, in part, because, unlike the Second World 
War, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were wars of dissolution 
characterised as internal armed conflicts (albeit with very important international 
dimensions).  Without an underlying situation of international armed conflict, neither 
of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes included crimes against peace or the crime of 
aggression, meaning “no one would be prosecuted for starting the Balkan wars.”687  
Instead of crimes against peace, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes give focus to atrocity 
crimes following the determination of the UN Security Council that reports of mass 
killings, detentions, rape and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia constituted a 
threat to international peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.   
Both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes claim jurisdiction over war crimes.  Article 4 
of the ICTR Statute represents a key difference between the two Statutes because it 
includes, within the ICTR’s subject-matter jurisdiction, both violations of Article 3 
common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1977 Additional Protocol II.  
Not applicable here are the grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, as the underlying armed conflict in Rwanda was deemed non-
international in character.
688
  The Statutes for both tribunals define crimes against 
humanity in exactly the same way—that is, as murder; extermination; enslavement; 
deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecution on political, racial, and religious 
grounds; or other inhumane acts.  Whereas the ICTY Statute requires the acts 
comprising crimes against humanity to be committed in armed conflict, whether 
international or non-international in character, and directed against any civilian 
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population, the ICTR Statute requires no such nexus with armed conflict, though the 
proscribed inhumane acts must be connected to discriminatory grounds.
689
  Both 
Statutes cite, verbatim, the definition of genocide contained in the Genocide 
Convention.
690
  
Under both Statutes the following acts were deemed punishable: genocide; 
conspiracy to commit acts of genocide; direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide; attempt to commit acts of genocide; and complicity in genocide.691  This 
definition was not available to the drafters of the London and Tokyo Charters, though 
as mentioned in Chapter 2 the trials held at the IMT and the IMTFE informed the UN 
General Assembly’s consideration of the Genocide Convention.  Although there was 
little evidence of genocide occurring in Bosnia, the crime was included in the ICTY 
Statute at the prompting of the UN Commission of Human Rights and some member-
states because the crime of genocide would underscore the gravity of the ICTY’s 
mission and augment its legal foundations as Yugoslavia was a party to the Genocide 
Convention which, as mentioned, envisaged the establishment of an international 
court.
692
  The inclusion of the crime of genocide alongside war crimes left many with 
an impression that the ICTR had two objectives, the first of which was to prosecute 
members of the defeated regime for committing genocide, the second to prosecute 
members of the victorious RPF for war crimes.
693
 
Although both ad-hoc tribunals could render judgements only against natural 
persons and (unlike the IMT) did not have jurisdiction over organisations, political 
parties, administrative agencies or other legal entities, key differences exist between 
their respective jurisdictions.  While the ICTY’s geographic jurisdiction covered 
serious violations of IHL committed within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the 
ICTR covered the territory of Rwanda, including its land surface and airspace, as well 
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as the territory of neighbouring states in respect of serious violations of IHL 
committed by Rwandan citizens.  The geographic coverage of the ad-hoc tribunals’ 
jurisdiction was much more focused compared to that of the continental-wide scope 
of their earlier military counterparts.  Whereas the ICTY’s temporal jurisdiction 
begun in 1991 and was open ended, covering conflicts in Kosovo,
694
 the ICTR’s 
temporal jurisdiction was more limited, focusing exclusively on the period 1 January 
1994 to 31 December 1994.  Some members of the Security Council were unsure if 
their authority to act in accordance with Chapter VII extended to crimes committed 
before the April 1994 genocide began to unfold.
695
  A compromise was reached 
whereby 31 December 1994 was selected as an end date, demonstrating the ICTR’s 
temporal jurisdiction was “an artificial and politically convenient timeframe.”696  
This development of ICL’s substantive elements demonstrates the UN Security 
Council’s desire to reinforce its primacy in determining whether or not threats to 
international peace and security exist and in authorising any appropriate responses.  
The ICTY and ICTR Statutes did not feature crimes against peace because the 
hostilities in question were internal armed conflicts, which, in the view of the UN 
Security Council, did not threaten to destabilise the entire state-based system of 
international affairs.  That the tribunals’ nomenclature included the word criminal 
rather than military is significant in this respect too for it shows the institutions’ 
designers perceived themselves less as victors and occupiers and more as hegemons 
designing and enforcing rules for international affairs: none of the P-5 were major 
belligerents in these two conflicts, though as mentioned both France and the UK 
played roles supporting parties to the Rwandan conflict.  The situations in the former 
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda represent what Michael Pugh would describe as 
opportunities for “modern versions of peacekeeping” to function “as forms of riot 
control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace.”697   
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In other words, these two unruly “trouble spots” of the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda represented an opportunity for the most powerful governments in the world, 
acting in concert under the auspices of the UN Security Council, to project their 
authority, legitimacy and power.  Moreover, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes did not 
presume the guilt of the accused, although as Reydams and Odermatt point out “the 
presumption of innocence is immediately somewhat undone by stating that persons to 
be prosecuted are ‘responsible’ for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.”698  This underscores a key difference between the international military 
tribunals and these ad-hoc tribunals; the former focused on punishment whereas the 
latter focused on prosecution.  However, the focus on prosecution was never intended 
as an end in itself, but rather, as a means of contributing to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace.
699
  Yet the exact impact of particular prosecutions on 
international peace and security remains difficult to determine, particularly as “[t]he 
worst incident of violence in Bosnia, the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, took place 
after Serb nationalist leaders involved in the attack had already been indicted by the 
ICTY.”700 
At stake for the P-5 here, in the aftermath of the Cold War, was not the pursuit 
of international criminal justice in and of itself, but rather, the use of ICL as a means 
of securing the primacy of the UN Security Council in international affairs.  The US 
in particular, as sole remaining superpower, played the role of hegemon not only by 
helping set some of the rules for the conduct of international affairs, but also by 
helping enforce those rules through UN Security Council action.  From securing, as 
victors, a new peace in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the Grand 
Coalition—transformed into the P-5—enforced another new peace following the 
dissolution of the USSR.  Zolo sums up the matter well when he writes:
701
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In practice, a dual-standard system of international criminal justice has 
come about in which a justice ‘made to measure’ for major world powers 
and their victorious leaders operates alongside a separate justice for the 
defeated and downtrodden.  In particular, international crimes of jus in 
bello, which are normally considered less serious than the crime of 
aggression, have been prosecuted relentlessly and in some cases punished 
with great harshness, in  particular by the Hague Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia.  At the same time, aggressive war, a crime predominantly 
committed by the political and military authorities of the major powers, 
has been systemically ignored.  Even though it was described at the 
Nuremberg Tribunal as the ‘supreme international crime’, those 
responsible for such crimes retain impunity, occupying the summit of the 
pyramid of international power. 
Here, then, the victor’s justice of the immediate aftermath of the Second World War 
had given way to a form of hegemon’s justice in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
 
IV War: Rebuilding after Internal Armed Conflict 
Unlike the international military tribunals, the seats of the ad-hoc tribunals were 
established outside the locus delicti, that is, beyond the immediate conflict zones 
where the atrocity crimes occurred.
702
  The chronically poor security situation in the 
conflict-affected former Yugoslavia shaped, in part, the decision to locate the ICTY 
outside the country, though issues relating to holding a trial in The Hague far from 
the relevant local communities—such as the ability of some local actors to freely 
distort perceptions of trial proceedings in their favour—was somewhat belatedly 
addressed through the ICTY’s outreach efforts.703  Most of the tribunals’ official 
documents were not translated into local languages.
704
  Nor was the Statute translated 
into local languages for some time.  The geographic distance between the ICTY seat 
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and the locations where atrocity crimes were committed partly reflects, and partly 
reinforces, the new centres of global power in New York, as neo-liberalism’s 
financial hub—and, by extension, Washington, London, Paris, Moscow and 
Beijing—and partly reflects the status of The Hague as the symbolic centre from 
which international justice emanates.  The seat of the ICTR was located in Tanzania, 
which is, of course, a state neighbouring Rwanda but which was also “metaphorically 
too distant from the people of Rwanda, who remain for the most part uninformed 
about and unaffected by the tribunal.”705   
The establishment of the two ad-hoc tribunals impacted on the national 
judiciaries in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively.  Both tribunals had 
primacy over national courts, which could concomitantly hear cases falling within the 
tribunals’ respective jurisdictions.  These tribunals could claim superior jurisdiction 
in any such case, conduct investigations and try cases if it found the national court 
had acted improperly or in a way which did not serve the best interests of 
international justice.
706
  The ICTR, for example, was never intended to replace the 
Rwandese justice system—which, after the genocide, comprised of only about 40 
magistrates,
707
 14 prosecutors and 25 police inspectors across the entire country (out 
of a pre-genocide complement of 300 judges and lawyers in appellate courts and 500 
in provincial courts
708
)—but rather, to focus on prosecuting the most senior of those 
accused.
709
  The primacy enjoyed by the ad-hoc tribunals over the domestic courts 
illuminates the UN Security Council’s relative neglect of rule-of-law reconstruction 
projects in the aftermath of internal armed conflict; whereas the ICTR’s operating 
budget was about US$90m per year, the international community provided only about 
$US10m per annum over the first five years following the genocide to assist with 
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reconstructing the Rwandan justice sector.
710
  The tribunals’ primacy comes partly at 
the expense of post-conflict states’ legal systems, which suffer from unnecessary and 
often counter-productive neglect.
711
  Moreover, the crimes lying at the heart of 
international trials are oftentimes removed from many citizens’ experiences and are 
not the crimes which national courts will seek to pass judgement on in the future, 
providing uncertain grounds for normative developments around the rule of law.
712
  
As Padraig McAuliffe laments “[a]t a time when the peace-building community was 
trying to reconstruct national institutions in Rwanda and the Balkan states, the 
international community was very publicly de-legitimizing the national judiciary, 
regardless of the extent to which it was reforming or restructuring, by denying them 
the chance to try local war criminals under the primacy model.”713 
While the primacy of ad-hoc tribunals had some deleterious impacts on national 
judiciaries, in Rwanda weak national institutions were buttressed by local traditional 
practices.  The ICTR’s narrow focus on selected individuals set the scene for what 
Lars Waldorf describes as “the most ambitious experiment in transitional justice ever 
attempted: mass justice for mass atrocity.”714   Rwanda resurrected a local dispute 
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resolution practice known as the Gacaca as a formal nation-wide system of 
community courts covering the large-scale participation of lower–level perpetrators.  
Notwithstanding the clamour surrounding the indigenous character of these courts, 
they bore little resemblance to Rwanda’s customary dispute resolution practices.  
Instead, the Gacaca system was a state-based institution for prosecuting and 
imprisoning suspects under codified, rather than customary, law.  It judged and 
provided sentences for serious international crimes even though these traditional 
practices sought only to remedy minor civil disputes.  Its judges, over one third of 
whom were women, were elected and comparatively young compared to the 
traditional male elders.  Unlike traditional hearings held before the entire community, 
these Gacaca proceedings were closed, involving only the parties and the 
inyangamunga (trusted persons who function as the Judges at Gacaca).  The 
differences between traditional practices and this new nation-wide system of local 
courts signalled “the destruction of the social capital that underpins the traditional 
system.”715  Moreover, this new system has merely transformed the old Hutu-Tutsi 
identity markers into a new nomenclature of genocidiares-victims.
716
  For Waldorf, 
this system represented another form of victor’s justice as Kagame’s regime excluded 
all war crimes and, hence, precluded potential atrocity crimes committed by the RPF 
from the Gacaca court’s jurisdiction.717  
Once the ICTY began to near the completion of its work it began referring 
cases back to national courts.
718
 The United Nations Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunals (MICT) was established in late 2010 as a means of completing the 
work of the ad-hoc tribunals following the final trials and related appeals.  The MICT 
ensures a judge and prosecutor will be available not only to try any of the few 
suspects who, having been indicted yet remaining at large as fugitives, are 
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apprehended, but also to review any subsequent appeals based on new evidence 
which might exonerate any of those convicted under either the ICTY or the ICTR.
719
   
The establishment of both ad-hoc tribunals generated immediate impacts at the 
state-level.  Becoming the subject of an indictment and the related arrest warrant can 
encourage leaders and potential leaders to flee.
720
  It can also deter others who would 
otherwise associate with the accused, which makes it difficult for such suspects to 
exercise power over others within their state’s jurisdiction.721  This is particularly 
significant in Rwanda where:
722
   
The ICTR has made its most obvious contribution by politically 
incapacitating the remnants of the Hutu extremist leadership responsible 
for the 1994 genocide… This is the result of the arrest as well as the 
stigmatization of those associated with the previous governments.  
Without the ICTR, it would have been much easier for the defunct 
Interahamwe to find political sympathisers, and to launch a more vigorous 
campaign against successor governments.   
The establishment of both ad-hoc tribunals generated immediate impacts at the 
national level as well.  Atrocity crimes trials can encourage “the progressive 
entrenchment of a more lawful self-conception” among local communities and 
national societies which, in turn, provides succour to those who are resisting leaders 
that exploit inter-ethnic tensions.
723
  Whereas the promise of the ICTR may have 
helped to discourage some Tutsi from seeking revenge killings of Hutu,
724
 
cooperating with the ICTY featured as part of the ongoing tensions between staunch 
nationalists and multi-ethnic democrats.
725
  The work of the ICTY does not merely 
affect those individuals who were prosecuted for, and found guilty of, committing 
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atrocity crimes against Serb civilians.  It also shapes the form of reconciliation within 
Serbian society and informs the transformation to a democratic culture by valorising 
the individual, with attendant voting rights, as the basic unit of society.
726
  There is, 
however, a dearth of strong evidence indicating that international criminal tribunals 
contributed much to the reconciliation of warring factions, especially as in places, 
such as Bosnia, ethnic tensions continue to dominate national politics.
727
   “Against 
this backdrop,” Akhavan argues, “the first experiments in international accountability 
could not have been expected to instantly transform an entrenched culture of 
impunity into an abiding respect for the rule of law… yet the potential impact of the 
ICTY and ICTR on political behaviour [could be] subtle and long-term, profound and 
lasting.”728 
Ad-hoc tribunals also contribute to the process of identity formation in societies 
confronted with the legacies of atrocity crime.  In particular, the establishment of both 
the ICTY and the ICTR has helped entrench individualism ahead of other possible 
identity markers.  They may even understand themselves to be global citizens.  
Important variations exist on the ground, however, with the situation in Rwanda 
differing from that in the former Yugoslavia as Rwandese society is still suffering as 
a consequence of the ongoing armed conflict fought between government forces and 
Hutu insurgents; post-genocide Rwandese society appeared to many to be beyond 
repair and the travails of the daily struggle for survival overshadowed immediate 
consideration of prosecutions.
729
  The trials occurring at the ICTR are, in part, an 
effort to protect the rights to “life, liberty, and security of person”730 as a means of 
reconstituting Rwandese society along the lines of “social justice and respect for the 
fundamental rights of the human person.”731  
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The rise of the human rights agenda informing transitional justice initiatives is 
significant here.  These initiatives are, as Chandra Lekka Sririam points out, “are not 
simply contemporaneous with peacekeeping; they share key assumptions about 
preferable institutional arrangements and a faith that other key goods—democracy, 
free markets, “justice”—can essentially stand in for, and necessarily create, peace.”732  
Yet such initiatives imposed by the international community, like liberal 
peacebuilding, can destabilise post-conflict countries as they may be inappropriate for 
certain politico-legal cultures.
733
  The UN Security Council’s preferences for certain 
styles of legal accountably may not necessarily be a good fit with local requirements 
as:734   
…the emphasis upon individual rights, obligations and accountability 
derives from a Western liberal vision of individual rights that may not 
be appropriate to cultures that emphasise group or community identity.  
Visions of rights and justice that are communally based may not arise 
where countless numbers perpetrated crimes but only few are singled 
out as “criminals”.  Societies that engage in communally based 
treatments of wrongdoers may prefer reparations, exhumation and 
proper burial of victims, and of communal discussion of the 
reintegration of a perpetrator over individual accountability.  
These types of individually-focused transitional justice initiatives may well be “a 
particularly poor model for states emerging from armed conflict... [and by s]imply 
embedding market forces without dealing with past grievances and inequalities may 
entrench old grievances or create new ones.”735  This is, however, not to suggest that 
local practices are to be seized upon as better simply because they are indigenous.
736
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The establishment of these two ad-hoc tribunals and their impact on politico-
social identity-making processes in the aftermath of mass atrocities must be seen in 
the context of politico-strategic state-making practices and politico-economic market-
making practices in the aftermath of internal armed conflict.  The democratisation 
occurring within the immediate aftermath of Yugoslavian balkanisation took various 
forms, depending on the territory in question.  The Dayton Accord contained 
agreement on, inter alia, national elections for pan-Bosnian political institutions, 
including a three-member presidency, which has one from each of the three major 
ethnic groups, and a bicameral parliament.  According to Paris “[t]he Dayton Accord 
explicitly sought to transform Bosnia into a liberal democracy on the assumption that 
doing so could reduce the likelihood of renewed fighting.”737  While the election was 
generally seen as being free and fair and reflecting Bosnian’s electoral preferences, 
US negotiator Richard Holbrooke later pointed out that the election results served to 
buttress those individuals and groups who had triggered and waged the internal armed 
conflict.  These circumstances rendered a vibrant and democratic Bosnian 
Government unfeasible, especially as many of the newly-elected hardliners appeared 
disinclined to engage in the democratic institution to which they had been elected.
738
 
Croatia’s transition to democracy was different to the transition occurring in 
Bosnia, as post-war elections did not enshrine existing ethnic cleavages.
739
  
Chauvinist attitudes abounded during the 2000 election campaign, though the absence 
of an assertive Serbian community, one of the key parties to the conflict, may have 
dulled the appeal of, and enthusiasm for, various staunch forms of ethno-nationalism.  
As Paris elaborates: “In Croatia, the virtual elimination of the Serbian community as 
a serious political force removed the immediate threat to Croatian cultural security 
and may help explain why political liberalization did not seem to exacerbate divisions 
and tensions among formerly warring parties, as happened in Bosnia”740   
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The transition to democracy occurring within Kosovo was different still, as the 
territory was administered by international officials in what Paris describes as “the 
creation of a UN Protectorate.”741  These international officials took responsibility for 
reconstructing governmental institutions, carefully managing the processes 
underpinning political liberalisation and training locals to eventually serve in a new 
bureaucracy.
742
  There were, however, important similarities to the transition in 
Bosnia as Kosovo separatists gained power through democratic elections.  The 
holding of elections which empowered secessionist individuals and groups occurred 
in spite of the then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s comments indicating he 
wanted to avoid repeating the “mistakes” made in the Bosnian elections which merely 
provided those who initiated the conflict with an unwarranted degree of legitimacy.
743
 
These democratic reformations, occurring during the immediate aftermath of 
the Yugoslav conflict, were accompanied by the reconstruction of the economy along 
orthodox neoliberal lines, which McKinley would describe as resting upon “a form of 
dogmatic theology” intolerant of dissent.744  As the socialism of Tito’s regime began 
to unravel during the 1980s and the USSR dissolved during the early 1990s, the IMF 
required Yugoslavia to implement draconian austerity measures, including 
eliminating trade barriers and food subsidies, devaluing the currency and curtailing 
funding of social services.  By resulting in increasing levels of unemployment and 
economic inequality, these measures exacerbated existing tensions within Yugoslav 
society and between central government and its constituent republics.  These factors 
are salient to understanding Yugoslavia’s rapid and violent disintegration.745  In the 
conflict’s aftermath the Dayton Accord sought to promote economic growth by 
protecting private property and promoting a market-style economy, which included 
the IMF appointing the Governor of Bosnia’s new central bank.746  International 
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peacekeepers played a role here by repairing much-needed housing and war-damaged 
infrastructure, including bridges, roads, and water and sewage facilities.  These 
peacekeepers also helped establish the institutional structures and processes needed to 
manage a market economy, including the means of regulating the financial and 
commercial sectors, creating a central bank and founding a common currency.
747
  
Economic reform was limited while IMF officials waited until the necessary 
structures and processes for managing the economy were operating before 
implementing a full-scale structural adjustment programme in Bosnia. 
The shift towards democratisation in Rwanda began with the Belgian colonial 
administration in the 1960s when, as a UN Trust territory, the country began to grow 
some of its key democratic institutions. The shift re-emerged in the early 1990s with 
the Arusha Accords, which sought to end the most recent internal armed conflict that 
began in 1990.  At the heart of the Arusha Accords lies a desire to transform Rwanda 
from a single party system—with the National Republican Movement for Democracy 
and Development (MRND), the only lawful party since 1975—to a multi-party 
democracy.  As Paris argues:748 
Although the internationally-sponsored plans for democratisation and 
power sharing do not provide a complete explanation for the events of 
April 1994, they do appear to have provoked extremist members of the 
regime to act quickly—both in preparing for the massacres and in 
initiating the genocide immediately after Habyarimana’s death—in order 
to prevent the Arusha Accords from being implemented.  At the very 
least, then, the effort to move Rwanda in the direction of democracy did 
not have the pacifying influence that international peacebuilders had 
hoped for and apparently expected.  The international community had 
presented the plan for power sharing followed by democratic elections as 
a means of resolving Rwanda’s civil war, but attempts to foster peace and 
stability in Rwanda backfired, and in the worst possible way.  
Rwanda, however, does not appear to have a “post-conflict successor regime” that is 
intent on fully implementing wholesale democratic reform.  Kagame’s regime, while 
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rebuilding much of Rwanda, stimulating economic growth and providing a measure 
of security, is also widely recognised as being increasingly authoritarian, despite 
handsomely winning elections in 2003 and 2008.
749
 
Before this latest transition to democracy the Rwandan Government 
experienced “pressure from the international financial institutions to implement 
structural adjustment programs”750 to reform its economy.  In September 1990, for 
example, the Government agreed to reduce public spending and public debt, to 
privatise state-owned assets, to improve revenue collection and to eliminate export 
controls and subsidies, including for coffee producers, in exchange for financial 
assistance from the IMF and the World Bank.
751
  These measures resulted in 
Rwanda’s declining economic performance during the early 1990s, which created 
conditions within which Rwandese communities became more susceptible to hate 
speech inciting atrocities against the Tutsi.  As Michel Chossudovsky astutely 
recognises “the imposition of sweeping macro-economic reforms by Bretton Woods 
institutions exacerbated simmering ethnic tensions and accelerated the process of 
political collapse.”752  This is very similar to the Yugoslav case. 
This reconstruction of Yugoslavian and Rwandan conflict-afflicted state and 
economic structures was part of a broader and more profound transformation of 
particular locales during the 1990s, when UN Security Council-authorised post-
conflict peacebuilding efforts “represented the most ambitious and concerted 
international effort to rehabilitate war-shattered states since the Allied post-war 
reconstruction of Germany and Japan.  The attempted peacebuilding was nothing less 
than an enormous experiment in social engineering, aimed at creating the domestic 
conditions for durable peace within countries just emerging from civil wars.”753  
According to Paris:
754
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Peacebuilding missions in the 1990s were guided by a generally unstated 
but widely accepted theory of conflict management: the notion that 
promoting “liberalization” in countries that had recently experienced civil 
war would help to create the conditions for a stable and lasting peace.  In 
the political realm, liberalization means democratization, or the promotion 
of periodic and genuine elections, constitutional limitations on the 
exercise of governmental power, and respect for basic civil liberties, 
including freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience.  In the economic 
realm, liberalization means marketization, or movement towards a 
market-orientated economic model, including measures aimed at 
minimizing governmental intrusion in the economy, and maximizing the 
freedom for private investors, producers, and consumers to pursue their 
respective economic interests.  
Thus, the reconstruction of Yugoslavia’s and Rwanda’s state and economic structures 
as part of peacebuilding efforts was strongly informed by the desire to have these 
institutions engage more fully with the global free market and by the so-called 
Washington Consensus—that is, the view that prosperity in terms of economic 
growth in the developing world required international donors to encourage “recipient 
states to implement economic liberalization policies, on the grounds that deregulation 
and privatization of these states’ economies would create the most propitious 
conditions for sustained growth.”755 
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Yet this type of reconstruction employed by peace-builders “seems, 
paradoxically, to have increased the likelihood of renewed violence in several of 
these states.”756  The politico-strategic and politico-economic interventions preceding 
the conflict in Yugoslavia were central to the growing crises and atrocity crimes 
committed therein.
757
  The neoliberal reconstruction of the Yugoslav state and the 
opening up of the Yugoslav economy to the flows of goods, services and currencies 
from the Global North, undertaken from the late 1970s up until the wars of 
dissolution, has been identified by some scholars
758
 as generating the very conditions 
of “socioeconomic inequality, insecurity, and human misery” within which social 
order breaks down.
759
  In this context celebrating ICL enforcement upon particular 
individuals as some kind of ready-made antidote to outbreaks of armed conflict and 
atrocity crime obscures and, to an extent, normalises the roles played by those 
benefiting from the spread of neoliberal reform in pre-war and post-war Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, among various other countries.
760
  The ending of the Cold War heralded 
the demise of the last major obstacle—the USSR—to the US-led building of a 
neoliberal free market of global proportions, the first steps of which were taken in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War with the reconstruction of war-torn 
Germany and Japan.  At this moment in time, Zolo explains, the US:761 
had within its grasp the ‘extraordinary possibility’ of building a just, 
pacific international system based on the values of liberty, the rule of law, 
democracy, and the market economy.  The foundations for this new world 
order were to be a system of ‘global security’, reflecting the ever 
increasing interdependence of economic, technological and 
communication factors on the planetary scale.  Such a system would 
require the close cooperation of the nations in the three most highly 
industrialised areas on the planet: North America, Europe, and Japan.  
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Here, then, neo-capitalism was for US policymakers in the aftermath of the Second 
World War what neoliberalism was for their counterparts in the aftermath of the Cold 
War.  Although US foreign policymakers were at the forefront of both efforts, the 
political movement which they were furthering was economic liberalisation, which 
found support among many of the elite in other capitals around the world.  The peace 
dividend following the Cold War was not to be lost.  While the new power 
configuration resulting from the Cold War enabled the founding of two new 
institutions designed specifically to enforce ICL, these arrangements also marked a 
continuation of the politico-cultural civil war over modernity in which the new 
hegemon remakes war-torn countries and exerts control over the key institutions used 
to govern the politico-strategic and politico-economic dimensions of international 
life.  It is a silent war, as Foucault suggested, underpinned by a force of arms but not 
expressed as a clash of arms in battle.     
 
V Conclusion  
The quest for international criminal justice in the aftermath of the Cold War was 
informed by the discourse against politico-cruelty, which was manifested so clearly in 
the establishment of the international military tribunals half a century earlier, but 
which now required a new set of propitious politico-strategic circumstances.  While 
the US did not achieve a military victory over the USSR, its rise to global hegemon 
was facilitated by the USSR’s dissolution and was the basis for the consensus forged 
within the UN Security Council which established both the ICTY and the ICTR.  This 
signalled the end of a period of dissonance between the underlying discourse and the 
prevailing politico-strategic circumstances.  As an extension of this new configuration 
of global power, the establishment of the ICTY and, to a lesser extent, the ICTR was 
driven more by the opportunity to exercise and demonstrate primacy in world affairs 
over these trouble spots, than to eliminate a threat posed by particular war-makers to 
the security of international society and its system.  Moreover, the establishment of 
these two tribunals cannot be fully understood in isolation from the Washington 
Consensus pursued through the IMF and the World Bank, which was at play locally 
prior to the conflicts and, probably, played a significant role unleashing the armed 
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violence and mass atrocity.  Efforts to liberalise the state and the economy intensified 
in the aftermath of these two internal armed conflicts and was accompanied by social 
engineering efforts.  It was part and parcel of managing the expansion of the global 
neoliberal free market under the politics of economic liberalisation, though Rwanda 
itself had very little natural resource of high commercial value.  As McKinley 
observes, Rwanda was not only regarded as “geopolitically and geoeconomically 
insignificant” but was also “accorded no obvious priority; ‘comfort measures’ were 
withheld from the mutilated and dying ethnic groups who numbered in the hundreds 
of thousands.”762  It is in this set of politico-strategic circumstances in particular, and 
the broader material and ideational conditions more generally, that the ad-hoc 
tribunals were prepared as a stage upon which the second generation of international 
prosecutors of serious international crime would perform their legal functions.   
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CH. 6: ICTY AND ICTR INDICTMENTS 
 
I Introduction 
The discourse against politico-cruelty not only informed the UN Security Council’s 
decision to establish the ad-hoc tribunals, but it also empowered the pre-trial efforts 
of the second generation of international prosecutors.  This chapter opens by 
introducing the men and women who served as prosecutors at the ICTY and the 
ICTR.  It then draws on empirical evidence extracted and collated from over 300 
original and revised indictments as a means of illustrating the ways in which this 
second generation of prosecutors determined their various selections.
763
  As these 
prosecutors developed their various approaches for selecting the charges, the 
respective Statutes provided frameworks for those decisions,
764
 underscoring the P-
5’s power to deploy a form of hegemon’s justice against unruly trouble-makers.  At 
the same time, the prosecutor’s selection of the accused drew attention to the 
particular utopian movements of Christo-Slavism and Hutu supremacy, though their 
ongoing emphasis on the politico-strategic dimension—which includes governmental, 
military and constabulary leaders, as well as their lower-level subordinates—
overshadowed an important politico-economic dimension at play in these crimes.  
While the prosecution’s early focus on Christo-Slavism is subsequently balanced, to 
some degree, with representatives from other ethno-national groups, no such 
balancing occurred within the ICTR, which was a much more one-sided affair.  
Moreover, just as gender-based crimes came into focus in a few of these indictments, 
so too did a very modest form of gender balancing. The chapter concludes that 
members of this generation, like their predecessors, breathed life into their formal 
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prosecutorial mandates through their various approaches, yet each did so largely in 
accordance with the wishes of their politico-strategic masters, the P-5.  Hence, as this 
second generation of international prosecutors illustrated their importance to ICL 
enforcement, they unveiled themselves as politico-legal actors deeply complicit with 
the values and interests of neoliberalism. 
 
II Second Generation of International Prosecutors 
A second generation of international prosecutors of serious international crime, 
comprising of Justice Richard J Goldstone, Justice Louise Arbour, Carla Del Ponte, 
Serge Brammertz and Justice Hassan Babacar Jallow, emerged from within the ad-
hoc criminal tribunals.
765
  By most accounts it was a difficult gestation period, 
particularly for the ICTY, as the UN Security Council bickered over candidates for 
the prosecutor’s post.  Consequently, the ICTY was left without a prosecutor for its 
first eighteen months.  Cherif Bassiouni—an Egyptian-born academic already cited in 
this thesis—was a leading contender, but failed to garner Russia’s support, possibly 
due to his Islamic faith.  Luis Moreno-Ocampo, an Argentine lawyer who found fame 
by helping to prosecute his county’s junta, had strong support from the US, but failed 
to attract sufficient enthusiasm from his own government.
766
  A Venezuelan, Ramón 
Escovar Salom was appointed as the first ICTY prosecutor in October 1993.  Salom 
took a Degree in Law and a Doctorate in Political Science from the Central 
University of Venezuela, holding academic positions at the Central University of 
Venezuela, the Centre for International Affairs at Harvard University and the 
University of Cambridge.  He was Minister of Justice between 1964 and 1969, 
Ambassador to France between 1986 and 1989 and Attorney-General between 1989 
and 1994.  Although Salom was appointed as the first ICTY prosecutor, he resigned 
before ever assuming the post in favour of becoming Minister of the Interior.  His 
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deputy prosecutor, Graham Blewitt, served as temporary prosecutor until Goldstone 
was appointed in July 1994. 
Goldstone was, in effect, the ICTY’s and the ICTR’s first prosecutor, serving 
between August 1994 and September 1996.  Goldstone graduated with a Bachelor of 
Arts Degree and a Bachelor of Laws Degree cum laude from the University of 
Witwatersund.  Prior to his appointment Goldstone practised as an Advocate at the 
Johannesburg Bar, rising to Senior Counsel in 1976 and then to Judge of the 
Transvaal Supreme Court in 1980.  During South Africa’s transition from apartheid to 
democracy, he chaired South Africa’s Commission of Inquiry regarding Public 
Violence and Intimidation between 1991 and 1994, which quickly became known as 
the Goldstone Commission.767  Arbour was the second prosecutor to serve 
simultaneously at the ICTY and the ICTR between October 1996 and September 
1999.768  Her academic qualifications include a Master of Laws Degree (with 
Distinction) from the Faculty of Law, University of Montreal.  She held a number of 
academic posts, the most senior of which was Assistant Professor and Associate Dean 
at the Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.  Arbour was called, in 1971, to the 
Quebec Bar and, in 1977, to the Ontario Bar.  Arbour was appointed to the Supreme 
Court of Ontario in 1987 and to the Court of Appeal for Ontario in 1990.  Del Ponte, 
the third of the ICTY’s prosecutors, served between 1999 and 2007; she was also the 
third ICTR prosecutor between 1997 and 2003 before her responsibilities were 
narrowed exclusively to the ICTY.  Del Ponte graduated from the University of 
Geneva with a Master of Laws Degree and practiced law in her own firm from 1975 
until 1981 when she was appointed Investigating Magistrate and then Public 
Prosecutor, focusing her prosecutorial efforts on financial, white-collar and organised 
crime.  In 1994 Del Ponte became the Attorney-General of Switzerland.769   
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The fourth and final ICTY prosecutor is Brammertz, first appointed to the role 
on 1 January 2008 and reappointed in September 2011.  He remains at the post, which 
he holds in conjunction with the post of prosecutor of the MICT, to which he was 
appointed on 26 February 2016.  In addition to holding Degrees in Law and 
Criminology, Brammertz also holds a Doctor of Philosophy Degree in International 
Law from the Albert Ludwig University in Germany.  He was professor of law at the 
University of Liege, a post he held until 2002, a year after which he was appointed 
the ICTY Deputy Prosecutor.  The final ICTR prosecutor, Jallow, was appointed by 
the UN Security Council on 15 September 2003 and reappointed in 2011.  He 
remained in that post until the ICTR ceased operating on 31 December 2015.  Jallow 
studied law at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the Nigerian Law School, 
and the University College, London, and is author of a number of publications 
concerning international criminal law, public international law and human rights law.  
Jallow was a State Attorney in Gambia from 1976 until 1982 when he was appointed 
Solicitor-General before serving as Gambia's Attorney-General and Minister of 
Justice between 1984 and 1994 and, later, as a Judge of the Supreme Court of 
Gambia.  Prior to becoming the ICTR prosecutor, he was a Judge of the Appeals 
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone on the appointment of the UN 
Secretary-General in 2002 and, before that, conducted a juridical evaluation of the 
ICTY and the ICTR at the UN Secretary-General’s request.   
Just as the first generation of international prosecutors were supported by staff, 
so too were the ICTY and ICTR prosecutors.  When Goldstone arrived at The Hague 
in 1994, he had a staff of 40, mostly from the US.  By 1995 the number of staff had 
risen to 116, from 34 countries, though his budget provided for 126 positions.  There 
were problems with recruitment, however, as the Registrar had the authority to hire 
and fire all ICTY staff, including the prosecutor’s staff, and states that seconded staff 
into the ICTY had to pay the UN a 13 per cent ‘subvention,’ discouraging the 
seconding practice.  At full capacity in 1998, the prosecutor’s office had about 225 
                                                                                                                                                                     
talent and energy to the criminal-justice system in order to restore the balance other people lost 
in their lives through some wrong.  Perhaps I simply inherited some deep-seated drive to 
vanquish evil.” At 13. 
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staffers, though the structures constantly evolved and new units and positions were 
established as others were discontinued.770  Staff numbers at the ICTR were similar: 
in 2006 there were 256 established posts, though when the ICTR was first established 
there was less than a dozen staff employed and, towards the end of 1995, there was 
about only 50 staff, mostly seconded from states, including 21 Dutch investigators.771  
This level of resourcing is significantly less than that of the IMT and the IMTFE.  
There were, moreover, varying degrees of competencies among staff, an issue 
provoking Del Ponte’s ire, particularly at the ICTR, where she “discovered the 
inexperience and incompetence of about a dozen of them, which was making the 
workload on the others all the more burdensome and was significantly detracting 
from the quality of cases the Office of the Prosecutor was presenting.”772  The 
drafting of indictments was particularly woeful, as Del Ponte recalls:  
The first draft indictment to come across my desk had a meticulous 
presentation of crime-scene evidence, but a flimsy fact-base linking 
this evidence with the political leader the indictment was supposed to 
be targeting.  I cannot remember how many drafts I sent back to the 
staff attorneys because the linkage evidence was inadequate.  I cannot 
remember how many meetings I had with attorneys and investigators 
to explain this problem.  I know Louise Arbour rejected many draft 
indictments for the same reason.
773         
 
III  Selecting the Charges 
As the ICTY’s first active prosecutor, Goldstone’s “first priority was to set the wheels 
of international prosecution in motion.”774  In his memoir Goldstone recalls being 
informed that the UN General Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Administrative 
and Budgetary Questions had determined at least one indictment had to have been 
issued prior to his first meeting with them, in order to demonstrate that “the tribunal 
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was worthy of financial support.”775  In his two years at the ICTY Goldstone issued at 
least 20 separate indictments containing a total of 612 war crimes charges, 364 
charges of crimes against humanity and nine charges of the crime of genocide.  
Goldstone also revised and reissued at least seven of those indictments, reducing by 
35 the total number of charges of crimes against humanity (three amendments added 
21 further charges whereas eight amendments dropped 56 existing charges) and 
reducing by eleven the total number of war crimes charges (three amendments added 
37 further charges whereas seven amendments dropped 48 existing charges); the 
charges of crimes of genocide remained nine.   
As the second ICTY prosecutor, Arbour issued—and authorised her 
subordinates to issue—at least 13 indictments, though some of these were based on 
investigations that began under Goldstone’s tenure.776  These new indictments 
included 110 war crimes charges, 92 charges of crimes against humanity and five 
charges of the crime of genocide.  Arbour also amended and reissued 17 existing 
indictments.  These reissued and amended indictments decreased by 43 the number of 
war crimes charges (nine amendments added 57 further charges whereas 14 
amendments dropped 100 charges) increased by five the total number of charges of 
crimes against humanity (thirteen amendments introduced 31 further charges whereas 
five amendments dropped 26 existing charges); the number of genocide charges 
remained the same.
777
  Arbour revised only one set of war crimes charges that she had 
originally proposed.  Arbour, however, withdrew indictments against twenty 
individuals, which had been issued by Goldstone but which she deemed to be too 
low-profile.
778
 
As the third prosecutor at the ICTY, Del Ponte issued at least 36 separate 
indictments, which, collectively, included 395 war crimes charges, 250 charges of 
crime against humanity and 13 charges of the crime of genocide.  One charge of 
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contempt of the tribunal was issued.   On 120 occasions Del Ponte also revised and 
reissued existing indictments.  When Del Ponte revised and reissued indictments that 
she had originally prepared, the effect was to reduce by 94 the number of war crimes 
charges (adding six new charges but dropping 100 existing charges) and to reduce by 
38 the number of charges of crimes against humanity (adding 18 new charges but 
dropping 56 existing charges); charges of the crime of genocide increased by six, 
with seven new charges added and one existing charge dropped. When Del Ponte 
revised and reissued indictments prepared by either Goldstone or Arbour, the effect 
was to decrease by 58 the total number of war crimes charges (adding 45 new charges 
but dropping 103 existing charges) and to increase by 14 the total number of charges 
of crimes against humanity (adding 46 new charges while dropping 32 existing 
charges); charges of the crime of genocide increased by one, following the addition of 
four new charges and the dropping of three existing charges. 
Brammertz, the last of the ICTY prosecutors, did not issue any new 
indictments, instead amending and reissuing at least 15 indictments.  The effect of 
these amendments decreased by four the number of war crimes charges and decreased 
by two the total number of charges of crimes against humanity.  Charges of the crime 
of genocide remain unaffected.  This was very much in accordance with the 
Completion Strategy insisted upon by the UN Security Council, which, firstly, called 
“on the ICTY and the ICTR to take all possible measures to complete investigations 
by the end of 2004, to complete all trial activities at first instance by the end of 2008, 
and to complete all work in 2010” and then called “on each Tribunal, in reviewing 
and confirming any new indictments, to ensure that any such indictments concentrate 
on the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the relevant Tribunal.”779 
In his role as the ICTR’s first prosecutor Goldstone issued at least two 
indictments, covering 29 charges of war crimes, 43 charges of crimes against 
humanity and 25 charges of the crime of genocide.  Arbour issued at least five new 
indictments, including 14 war crimes charges, 28 charges of crimes against humanity 
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and 29 charges of the crime of genocide.  Arbour also amended and reissued at least 
12 existing indictments, which resulted in 23 war crimes charges, 56 charges of 
crimes against humanity and 40 charges of the crime of genocide.  Del Ponte issued 
at least 16 indictments, which, collectively, included 13 war crimes charges, 61 
charges of crimes against humanity and 39 charges of the crime of genocide.  Del 
Ponte also amended and reissued at least 14 indictments, resulting in 35 war crimes 
charges, 97 charges of crimes against humanity, and 69 charges of the crime of 
genocide.  As the final ICTR prosecutor, Jallow issued nine new indictments, 
including one indictment containing four contempt of court related charges.  Taken 
collectively, these indictments included 14 charges of crimes against humanity and 15 
charges of the crime of genocide; there were no war crimes charges among these 
indictments.  Jallow also amended and reissued 24 existing indictments, the effect of 
which was 15 war crimes charges, 50 charges of crimes against humanity, and 45 
charges of the crime of genocide.  Jallow prioritised the crime’s gravity, favouring 
crimes of murder, especially the murder of children and sex-related crimes.
780
   
The rate at which indictments were issued and, in many cases, reissued (and 
reissued multiple times) varied throughout each tribunal’s caseload lifecycle.  At the 
ICTY Goldstone brought at least 985 charges in his two years in the job, whereas 
Arbour and Del Ponte brought at least 207 and 658 charges, respectively.  In other 
words, Goldstone delivered charges at a rate of about 500 a year whereas Arbour 
delivered about 70 per year and Del Ponte about 80 per year, though the latter two 
also amended and reissued multiple existing indictments.  At the ICTR Goldstone 
brought at least 97 charges, whereas Arbour, Del Ponte and Jallow brought at least 
71, 113 and 29 charges, respectively.  This means that Goldstone delivered charges at 
a rate of about 50 per year whereas Arbour and Del Ponte delivered about 23 charges 
per year and Jallow about ten per year, though the latter three amended and reissued 
multiple existing indictments too.  There are a number of reasons for this variance, 
including Goldstone’s decision to focus on low-hanging fruit, the discovery of new 
evidence, both incriminatory and exculpatory, and the changing circumstances within 
which prosecutorial discretion occurred.    
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While the categories of serious international crime featuring in these 
indictments were determined by the UN Security Council when it authorised the 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes, the second generation of international prosecutors were 
largely free to select the particular charges that they each wished to put.  Charges of 
the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity far exceeded war crimes within 
the ICTR.  This reflected the UN Security Council’s concern with the genocide ahead 
of the situation of internal armed conflict as well as the de facto immunity enjoyed by 
the RPF, shielded from prosecution by President Kagame.  Significantly, when 
Arbour sought to indict an individual for genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, and the relevant judge rejected the genocide charge on the grounds of 
insufficient evidence, Arbour withdrew the case rather than prosecute only war 
crimes and crimes against humanity; this suggests that for at least one prosecutor 
“prosecuting charges other than genocide was a distraction from the Tribunal’s 
mission.”781 
Within the ICTY, war crimes were predominant and genocide charges were 
rare, reflecting the armed conflicts unfolding throughout the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia.  More specifically, the high frequency of war crimes charges occurring 
in Goldstone’s indictments, especially when compared against genocide-related 
charges, reflects the ongoing internal armed conflicts occurring in Croatia and Bosnia 
at that time.  In addition to the armed conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, Arbour had to 
respond to the armed conflict that erupted in Kosovo during her tenure as prosecutor.  
While the frequency of war crimes charges here was comparable to the charges of 
crimes against humanity, genocide charges remained rare.
782
  In addition to the wars 
of dissolution that confronted her predecessors, Del Ponte had to contend with new 
internal armed conflicts in Macedonia and in the Preševo Valley.  She readily 
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concedes that “[g]enocide is the most difficult of international crimes to prove. It 
requires the prosecution to show beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended 
to destroy a group of people physically; and persons contemplating genocide, 
particular as shrewd as Milošević, do not express a genocidal intention in public.”783  
Given the ICTY Statute was produced as a means of contributing to the restoration 
and maintenance of international peace and security, the prosecutors’ favouring of 
war crimes within the ICTY merely illustrates the UN Security Council’s concern not 
so much with the territorial disintegration of a sovereign state, since the self-
determining new states were quickly recognised as sovereign unto themselves, but 
more with Serbians trying to prevent this balkanisation by using the military, armed 
force and ethnic cleansing.  These unruly troublemakers are what Simpson would 
describe as outlaw states subjected to the disciplinary apparatus of the hegemons who 
“polic[e] the international order from a position of assumed cultural, material and 
legal superiority.”784  In this sense, the wars of dissolution are not so much a direct 
threat to the entire international system in the way that World War II was, but rather, 
present a more localised opportunity for those with real power over the international 
system to discipline a former communist state through neoliberal reform.  The 
prosecution’s selection of charges are, therefore, best understood as being part of a 
much larger phenomenon, identified by Paris, as “the globalisation of a particular 
model of domestic governance—liberal market democracy—from the core to the 
periphery of the international system” and, in the case of Rwanda especially, may 
constitute another “modern rendering of the mission civilisatrice—the colonial-era 
belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to ‘civilise’ their overseas 
possessions.”785    
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IV  Selecting the Accused 
Goldstone indicted at least 77 individuals under the auspices of the ICTY.  
Accusations focused on those who were either in positions of authority within local 
or national governance structures or were involved with the armed forces, 
constabulary or guarding prisons.  The indictment of Serb leaders Radovan Karadžić 
and Ratko Mladić during a situation of armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
even earned Goldstone an admonishment by the then-UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali for engaging in political matters.
786
  Although Goldstone typically 
refrained from commenting publicly on his approach to selecting the accused for the 
ICTY,
787
 others have described it as a pyramid strategy.  This means that Goldstone 
began by deliberately investigating and prosecuting relatively low-level, but direct, 
participants in the commission of atrocity crimes, the prosecution of whom required 
less complex investigations than more senior figures, but whose testimony would lead 
on to evidence of crimes committed by more senior persons.  Dragon Nikolić, the 
first person indicted by the ICTY, was a “small fish.”  So too was Tadić, but 
Goldstone preferred to demonstrate the tribunal in motion.
788
  Goldstone also tended 
to select his accused from those suspects who were already in custody, in part 
because the ongoing armed conflict made on-site investigation too dangerous,
789
 and 
relied on evidence gathered by other organisations, which had conducted 
investigations into the atrocities.
790
  While Goldstone’s criteria listed “the social 
sectors targeted for prosecution: politicians, the armed services and paramilitary 
groups as well as government officials at local, provincial and national level,”791 this 
strong focus on those individuals involved in politico-strategic affairs also reveals 
deep ethno-national divisions and a corresponding prosecutorial bias.  Goldstone, for 
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example, indicted 49 Bosnian Serbs, but only 20 Bosnian Croats, three Croatian 
Serbs, and two Bosniaks as well as a Serb and a Montenegrin. 
Arbour’s indictments produced a further 22 accused for the ICTY.  Like her 
immediate predecessor, Arbour focused exclusively within the politico-strategic 
dimension.  She did not, however, continue Goldstone’s pyramid strategy when it 
came to launching investigations into atrocity crimes committed in Kosovo.  As a 
consequence of this change in policy, no low or mid-level officials appeared in the 
indictments whereas Serb President Slobodan Milošević did.792  Moreover, Arbour 
relied more heavily on the evidence discovered by the prosecution’s own 
investigations and less on evidence provided by other organisations’ investigations of 
suspected atrocity crimes.  The pool of potential accused broadened beyond those 
already held in custody and Arbour introduced sealed indictments and sought greater 
levels of international assistance to arrest suspects.  According to de Vlaming:793 
A striking difference with her predecessor was Arbour’s ‘offence-driven’ 
approach, which prioritized incidents based on the crime’s gravity in 
order to target the highest possible defendants, such as ‘Srebrenica, where 
there was massive loss of human life, and the promise of climbing up the 
chain of command to visit the responsibility of the highest echelons was 
greatest.’ 
Arbour’s focus on politico-strategic affairs also signalled ethno-nationalist cleavages 
by indicting 15 Bosnian Serbs, but only five Serbs and two Bosnian Croats, echoing 
Goldstone’s prosecutorial bias.  Arbour went as far as to state that “leaders’ crimes 
advanced group claims of entitlement, based, for instance, on alleged unsettled 
historical grievances or, worse, on assertions of racial, ethnic, or religious 
superiority.”794  
Carla Del Ponte indicted 58 individuals, maintaining strong focus on the 
politico-strategic dynamics which informed the conduct of the armed conflicts and 
the commission of atrocity crimes by indicting more senior officials than had any of 
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her predecessors.  Like Goldstone, she received a form of censure from the UN 
Secretary General when he felt that she had “entered in the discussion of more 
general political issues.”795  Del Ponte explicitly connected her selection of the 
accused to the UN Security Council’s purposes of contributing to the restoration and 
maintenance of international peace and security; removing those local and national 
leaders who perpetuate armed violence would help restore peace within the former 
Yugoslavia.  To that end, Del Ponte assumed lasting peace rested on investigations 
into all parties to the conflict.
 796
  This policy of even-handedness would broaden the 
prosecution’s politico-social perspective to include among Del Ponte’s indictments 
individuals belonging to nine separate ethnic groups: sixteen Bosnian Serbs; nine 
Serbs; eight Kosovo Albanians; seven Bosnian Croats; six Bosniaks; six Croats; two 
Montenegrin Serbs; two Macedonians; and two Croatian Serbs.  While the new 
armed conflict in Kosovo and Macedonia increased the geographical spread of the 
atrocity crimes under the ICTY’s jurisdiction and can partially explain this enlarged 
perspective, Del Ponte’s even-handed approach to selecting the accused appeared to 
be based less on the gravity of crimes and more on the social groups to which the 
accused belonged.
797
  She admits that she “was determined to present indictments 
against KLA leaders implicated in criminal activity.  The tribunal’s credibility 
depended upon this.  A war crimes tribunal that tries the accused from only one side 
of the given conflict is dispensing only a victor’s justice.  This alone cannot help end 
the culture of impunity.”798  Nevertheless, a clear prosecutorial bias in favour of 
politico-social representation is evident here too. 
When considered collectively, the ICTY indictments overwhelming target Serb 
nationalists, presumably because Serb nationalism “served as the pacesetter of events 
and as the ideology that, ultimately, underpinned the most extreme forms of 
population politics.”799  As Weitz explains further:800    
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By the mid-1990s, the original ideological synthesis of communism 
and nationalism seems to have faded and was replaced by a Serbian 
nationalism couched in such extreme terms that it barred the 
participation of other peoples in the exclusive Serbian state that 
Milošević and his supports attempted to construct…. The genocide 
also developed because of a set of deeper historical factors, notably, 
the potency of nationalism, the continued commitment to communism 
on the part of important segments of the Serbian elite, and the 
typical—certainly by the 1990s—communist reliance on a powerful 
state to engineer the transformation of society.  
But there was more than Serb nationalism at play here, though ethnic identity politics 
are extremely important.  In order to create a special enclave in Europe, Serb 
nationalists relied on violence, including ethnic cleansing, to transform their society 
into their version of utopia.  For Michael A Sells, religion played important roles as 
both a cause and a justification for the violence; he explains:801 
Christoslavism maintains that Slavs are Christian by nature, that 
conversion to another religion entails or presupposes a transformation 
or deformation of the Slavic race, and that all Muslims in Yugoslavia 
(whether ethnic Slavs or Albanians) have transformed themselves into 
Turks and are personally responsible for the death of the Christ-prince 
Lazar at the Serbian Golgotha (the battle of Kosovo) and for the 
pollution of the Slavic race.  At moments of crisis, the Kosovo 
ideology helps efface the boundaries between notions of religion and 
race and turn religious nationalism into the most virulent form of 
realist ideology.  
Christoslavism is thus another modernist utopian movement emerging “in the long 
dissolution of Christianity and the rise of modern political religion.”802  
In terms of the ICTR, Goldstone’s indictments accused 17 individuals, 
Arbour’s indictments accused 29 individuals, Del Ponte’s indictments accused 28 
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individuals and Jallow’s indictments accused six individuals.803  Many of those 
indicted were ministers or senior officials in the Hutu-led government, held the 
position of Bourgemestre or prefet or counsellor, were members of the Rwandan 
armed forces and constabulary or belonged to the Interahamwe.  Goldstone continued 
his pyramid approach, which guided his prosecutorial efforts at the ICTY.  He 
investigated lower-level perpetrators within Rwanda’s communes as he sought to 
gather evidence against more senior leadership roles, such as Bourgemestres and 
prefets.
804
  Arbour, however, chose to investigate suspects who held power at the 
state level,
805
 an approach that Del Ponte maintained.  Businessmen and other 
individuals involved in managing aspects of the Rwandan economy were also 
indicted.  Churchmen were transformed into the accused as were individuals involved 
in political parties and the associated movements. Journalists also featured here.  
All of the ICTR indictments take aim at Hutu nationalism.  Even though the 
notion of Hutu was largely constructed as an ethnic identity marker by the former 
Belgian colonial authorities, it formed the basis of an exclusive vision of Rwandan 
society.
806
  Reminiscent of the Nazi’s hatred of the Jewish people, a hatred of ‘Tutsi’ 
is central to this Hutu nationalist sense of being, though the hating group is no longer 
defined by a convergence of nationalism and race, but instead by the amalgamation of 
nationalism and ethnicity.  The Tutsi were characterised as a homeless ‘Other’ who 
migrated to Rwanda before destroying Hutu dynastic rule in order to impose their 
despotic rule over the hapless Hutu.  According to this reductive view, “Tutsi were 
proud, arrogant, tricky and untrustworthy… [whereas] Hutu were modest, loyal, 
independent and impulsive.”807  Linda Melvern captures well the utopian ends sought 
by Hutu when she describes the Hutu Manifesto of 1957 in the following terms:
808
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The manifesto maintained that the problem in Rwanda was Tutsi 
supremacy….  A rallying point for this so-called social revolution was 
a belief that the Tutsi were not really Rwandans at all; they had 
overrun the country years before.  For the Hutu the future of Rwanda 
meant freedom from Tutsi rule and for the Tutsi it means restoration of 
their dynamic customs and an end of Belgian colonisation.  In turn, 
there were Tutsi supremacists who belied that the Hutu were by their 
very nature subservient.  
This version of staunch Hutu nationalism became another failed modern utopian 
movement when state power was used to radically transform Rwandan society not 
merely by using violence to forcibly remove unwanted Tutsi from a particular 
geographic area but by using violence to destroy that group in its entirety.  As one 
African specialist puts it, “[t]he Rwandese genocide is an example of an atrociously 
violent leap into some form of modernity.  The lack of previous economic and social 
modernization was not its cause, but it created the conditions of its feasibility.”809  A 
pernicious religious factor was evident in the role played by various Christian 
churches which, failing to provide an effective place of sanctuary for the genocide’s 
victims, functioned instead as sites for massacre.
810
 
Even though the politico-strategic, politico-economic and politico-social 
dimensions of Hutu supremacy were addressed by the prosecutor, the indictments 
focused only on one side of the underlying armed conflict and did not address atrocity 
crimes committed by the RPF.  No Tutsi and no member of Kagame’s RPF would 
stand trial, reminiscent of the victor’s justice in the immediate aftermath of the 
Second World War.  From the outset, Goldstone had a fractious relationship with the 
Rwandan authorities, particularly over investigations and prosecutions.
811
 While 
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Arbour discreetly commenced investigations into RPF crimes, no indictments were 
forthcoming, possibly because she feared some form of retaliation from Kagame’s 
Government.
812
  Del Ponte was less discreet and more aggressive,
813
 announcing to 
the world in general and to Kigali in particular that she would launch ‘special 
investigations’ into Tutsi RPF army officers suspected of committing atrocity 
crimes.
814
  Lacking support from the international community, including the P-5, and 
encountering obstructive authorities in Rwanda, these investigations did not result in 
any indictments during Del Ponte’s tenure815 despite her occasional public statements 
claiming indictments were imminent.  Del Ponte maintains that the Rwandan 
Government lobbied the UN Security Council to have her removed as ICTR 
prosecutor in order to prevent her special investigations from bearing fruit.
816
  Jallow 
refocused the prosecutorial effort squarely on the Hutu and the genocide.
817
  Victor 
Peskin muses that Jallow did so in order to foster better relations with the Rwandan 
Government,
818
 though Schabas suggests the decision may merely “reflect a genuine 
and sincere belief that the mission of the Tribunal is to address the 1994 genocide.”819  
Gender representation deserves a brief mention here since gender is an identity 
marker that is far more broad than the ethnic-based nationalism at play in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  Arbour was, of course, the first female to be appointed as 
an international prosecutor of serious international crimes.  Before her arrival, 
however, Goldstone took a deliberate decision to give greater focus to gender-related 
crimes following some harsh criticism over his dealing with Duško Tadić, the first of 
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the accused to stand trial.
820
  The cases against Tadić, Mucić, Furundžija and Kristić 
contained important gender-based crimes.  Plavšić Biljana was the first female 
formally accused of committing serious international crimes in the ICTY.  Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko was first in the ICTR.  This focus highlights the very important 
gendered dimensions not only of commission of atrocity crimes but also of the 
prosecution of those crimes.821  
There are, however, some notable omissions in the ICTY and ICTR 
indictments.  NATO could have been thoroughly investigated. Del Ponte explains 
why she did not indict NATO command, which was responsible for, among other 
acts, an attack on a passenger train crossing on a railroad bridge:
822
 
No one in NATO ever pressed me to refrain from investigating the 
bombing or from undertaking a prosecution based upon it.  But I 
quickly concluded that it was impossible to investigate NATO, 
because NATO and its member states would not cooperate with us.  
They would not provide us access to the files and documents.  Over 
and above this, however, I understood that I had collided with the edge 
of the political universe in which the tribunal was allowed to function.  
If I went forward with an investigation of NATO, I would not only fail 
in this investigative effort, I would render my office incapable of 
continuing to investigate and prosecute the crimes committed by the 
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local forces during the wars of the 1990s.  Security for the tribunal’s 
work in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo depended upon 
NATO. 
On this occasion Schabas agrees with prosecutor when he writes that, “[p]rivately, 
many at the Tribunal said the Prosecutor had little choice because the Security 
Council would have shut down the entire operation if even serious consideration was 
given to prosecuting Americans, or other NATO nationals.”823  To varying extents all 
of the ICTY prosecutors were “enmeshed in NATO’s political and military 
strategy.”824  Here, then, while the discourse against politico-cruelty encourages an 
expansion of international criminal law, this expansion occurs only to the extent 
permitted by the prevailing politico-strategic circumstances. 
 
V Conclusion  
The second generation of international prosecutors’ selection both of charges and of 
the accused represents a further and more recent manifestation of the discourse 
against politico-cruelty.  The indictments prepared under the auspices of the ICTY 
and the ICTR identify specific acts of politico-cruelty that cannot be tolerated, 
fulfilling a fundamental function in the pre-trial process.  While the selection of 
specific charges reflected the will of the P-5 to demonstrate their primacy in the 
conduct of international affairs in the aftermath of the Cold War, the selection of 
suspects draws attention to two discredited utopian movements: namely 
Christoslavism and Hutu supremacy.  The prosecutorial performance within the ad-
hoc tribunals thereby constitutes a form of modernist world politics because these 
prosecutors seek to have their way over others for non-trivial purposes, not merely as 
an extension of the politico-strategic circumstances that established the ad-hoc 
tribunals, but also as part of a contest between proponents of neoliberalism and those 
that prove to be unruly troublemakers.  There is no longer a contest between rival 
economic systems of global proportions.  Significantly, the ICTR indictments 
included a few politico-economic actors whereas the ICTY indictments contained 
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none whatsoever.  This omission might reflect the unease of bringing to the world’s 
attention both the complicity between the prevailing economic system of 
neoliberalism and the conditions giving rise to armed conflict and atrocity crime.  The 
reluctance to indict economic actors might also reflect awareness that post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts will need to engage with local entrepreneurs and business 
owners without wanting to await their ‘rehabilitation’ as occurred in the aftermath of 
the Second World War.  By shielding the politico-economic dimensions of atrocity 
crime from the quest of international criminal justice in the aftermath of the Cold 
War, these prosecutors function as servants of the great powers and their sovereign 
prerogatives, diverting attention away from the dominant politico-economic system 
and its violent eruptions and structural pathologies.  Building on the content of the 
indictments prepared in the pre-trial phase, the first opening statements delivered, 
respectively, during the first trials held at the ICTY and the ICTR express both legal 
and political rhetoric as well as invoke the rhetoric of war.  
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CH. 7: NIEMANN’S AND HAILE-MARIAM’S OPENING 
STATEMENTS 
 
I Introduction 
The discourse against politico-cruelty not only empowered the second generation of 
international prosecutors’ preparation of indictments, but also animated the first 
opening statements at the ICTY and the ICTR, made by Grant Niemann and Yakob 
Haile-Mariam, respectively.  Like the opening statements delivered at the 
international military tribunals, both these statements were vital ingredients in the 
trial process, announcing the commission of atrocity crimes expressed in the 
respective indictments, foreshadowing evidence of those crimes and seeking to 
preclude foreseeable defences.  These orations proved fundamental to the 
reinvigorated enforcement of ICL.  A close reading of these statements reveals the 
same legal rhetoric, self-consciously distinguishing itself from the world of politico-
strategic power calculations and the ugly realities of armed conflict, as was used by 
the first generation of international prosecutors.  There was no need for these opening 
statements to overtly vilify Christoslavism or Hutu supremacy as two discredited 
utopian movements given the extent to which neoliberalism was spreading beyond 
the US and parts of western Europe to many places throughout the world following 
the ending of the Cold War.  Their prosecutorial conduct, nevertheless, produces a 
political rhetoric implicitly endorsing the neoliberal dispensation and thereby 
constitutes a form of politics.  By denouncing the defendants and, thereby, calling for 
them to be cast out beyond the ranks of the human community, these statements 
contain a rhetoric of war too.  When that war rhetoric is placed alongside the 
concerted and sustained efforts to reconstruct the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 
accordance with the Washington Consensus, then these prosecutors can be understood 
to be supporting those who manage the institutional architecture used to govern 
politico-strategic and politico-economic affairs in international life as a means of 
controlling the modernist project.  Despite key differences, the continuities between 
the first and second generations of international prosecutors are striking, leading Part 
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II of this thesis to close by concluding that the second generation, belonging to 
international criminal tribunals established in the aftermath of the Cold War, are very 
much like their predecessors as agents of ICL, economic liberalisation and politico-
cultural civil war. 
 
II Rhetoric of Law 
Duško Tadić, a Bosnian-Serb accused of persecuting Muslims, was, as mentioned, the 
first person tried before the ICTY.  According to his indictment, which was amended 
for a second time on 14 December 1995, Tadić stood accused of twelve counts of 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, ten counts of violations of the 
laws or customs of armed conflict and eleven counts of crimes against humanity, 
though some counts were laid in the alternative.825  Tadić’s trial began on 7 May 
1996.  Following a further amendment of the indictment, which removed three counts 
charging the accused with forcible sexual intercourse, the bench seized upon the 
historic occasion to make a few preliminary remarks, placing law’s majesty well 
above any political fray.  The presiding judge, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, 
reflected upon the importance of fair trial standards before stating the judges “will be 
tryers of fact and we will apply the law to our findings.”826  Unlike the two trials at 
the international military tribunals, the indictment was not read aloud, though Tadić 
was asked if he understood the charges against him.  Moreover, unlike at the 
international military tribunals, the ICTY’s then chief prosecutor, Justice Goldstone, 
did not deliver the opening statement.  Instead, Senior Trial Lawyer Grant Niemann 
delivered the first opening statement at the ICTY.   And unlike Justice Jackson fifty 
years earlier, who took the best part of a day to deliver his opening address, Niemann 
took a mere two-and-a-half hours of the tribunal’s trial time.  
Placing this particular pursuit of international criminal justice within a broader 
project of maintaining international peace and security, Niemann explained to the 
bench that the ICTY was “created not only to administer justice in respect of the 
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accused that stands before you, but there is an expectation that in so doing you will 
contribute to a lasting peace in the country that was once Yugoslavia.”827  Niemann 
continued by giving focus to the composition and dissolution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly the ethnic divisions both preceding and 
outlasting the communist regime, the composition of military forces along ethnic 
lines and the ensuing internal armed conflict.  He argued that to understand the 
conflict’s nature, the people of Yugoslavia and their ethnic composition, and the 
reasons why one ethnic group would want to so cruelly turn upon another with the 
intent of bringing about their destruction, it is first necessary to understand what 
Yugoslavia once was.  The “bringing of Yugoslavia into a federation of states was the 
realisation of a dream,” according to Niemann, “but it also was an uneasy attempt to 
embrace the complicated mixture of diverse peoples, cultures, historic and religious 
traditions, and geography.”828  Niemann’s opening statement then focused upon 
particular geographic areas and timeframes relevant to the Serbian forces’ military 
attacks and, in the context of those attacks, a “campaign of terror to drive out the non-
Serbs and those ‘disloyal’ Serbs from the occupied areas” dubbed as “ethnic 
cleansing” by the Serbian extreme nationalist leader, Vojislav Šešelj.829  In other 
words, it is clear that atrocity crime, such as persecution, torture, rape and murder, 
occurred in the shadows cast by an internal armed conflict. 
The first trial held at the ICTR was of Jean-Paul Akayesu and it began on 9 
January 1997.  Like Justice Goldstone before her at the ICTY, Justice Arbour was 
absent from the opening of the ICTR’s first trial.  The prosecutor’s opening statement 
was introduced instead by Deputy Prosecutor Honoré Rakotomanana.  Before 
reminding the judges of their own roles during the trial, providing the context for the 
ICTR’s establishment and reflecting on reasons for the various delays in beginning 
the ICTR’s first trial, Rakotomanana declared that “[n]o matter which side of the bar 
you are on, our objective is one and the same; that is to say that we are here to 
eradicate the culture of impunity, which has reigned and which has destroyed the 
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social fabric of Rwandan society.  We are both trying to obtain national 
reconciliation, fair trials and justice.”830  Like the ICTY, the indictment was not read 
aloud.  Akayesu was asked in French, his native tongue, by the bench if he 
understood the charges facing him which, according to the amended indictment, 
included three counts of genocide, seven counts of crimes against humanity and five 
counts of violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions.  The 
substantive opening statement was delivered by Senior Prosecutor Yakob Haile-
Mariam.    
Haile-Mariam began his opening statement with an overview of the charges 
against the accused before dealing with the nature of Rwandan society, the road to 
internal armed conflict in Rwanda during the early 1990s and the genocide of 1994.  
Haile-Mariam’s statement then provided some of Akayesu’s personal and 
professional details, including his role as bourgemestre and his motives for 
committing genocide.  The widespread and systemic attack on civilians, of which 
Akayesu’s crimes were a part, were sketched and two experts who were to testify 
before the court were named, including the late Dr Alison Des Forges.  Haile-Mariam 
went on to deal with some questions of law, particularly the trial chamber’s need to 
determine the character of the armed conflict in Rwanda.  The defence of superior 
orders was precluded by Haile-Mariam before the Genocide Convention and the 
Geneva Conventions were cited and the solemn nature of the collective task before 
the tribunal was reflected upon. 
The first opening statements at the ad-hoc tribunals focused on armed conflict 
as a situation that underlies the commission of atrocity crime, rather than as a crime 
of aggression or a crime against peace, which was the case fifty years earlier at the 
international military tribunals.  Niemann’s statement at the ICTY devoted a 
significant amount of space to describing the situation of internal armed conflict, 
particularly its causes which he saw as being rooted in diverging interests at the local 
and national levels.831  Serbians perceived themselves as victims, especially of the 
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Nazi-backed Ustasha during the Second World War, and were deeply suspicious of 
other states within Yugoslavia.  According to Niemann, a tension existed between 
“the Yugoslav ideal of one people and the ethnic divisions promoted by the nationalist 
interest of the various republics.”832  Following the death of President Josip Broz Tito 
in 1980 the centre could no longer hold and the Federation began to collapse.  The 
end was signalled on 6 March 1992 when Bosnia declared independence, followed on 
7 April 1992 by the declaration of the Republika Srpska: “[A] brutal war ensued.”833  
Niemann provided the following description of activities which, occurring in the 
midst of armed conflict but following military occupation and the establishment of 
administrative controls over some of the civilian population, comprised ethnic 
cleansing:834 
In those areas where the Serbs were not in control of the local 
administrations, including the police, every effort was made to 
undermine their authority.  In most of the occupied cities, the Serbs set 
up ‘crisis headquarters’ which took over the control of the local 
government including the Territorial Defence.  In those places where 
this occurred, the Serb population received advanced notice—the 
Bosnian-Serb populations received advanced notice of what was about 
to occur.  In those cities where there was to be a Serbian attack either 
by the JNA, paramilitary groups or both, a significant proportion of the 
Bosnian-Serb population was evacuated before the attacked 
commenced.  This pattern repeated itself in a consistent manner all 
over Bosnia.  Many Muslims tried to negotiate a resolution in the hope 
of avoiding violence.  As a consequence, the Muslims did little in 
preparation for the Serbian attack.  The military operations by the JNA 
and the pro-Serb military groups followed in a consistent pattern.  
Excessive amounts of artillery were used in the initial stages to shell 
non-Serb neighbourhoods in order to discourage resistance, non-Serbs 
were expelled from the area and where resistance occurred it was 
ruthlessly crushed.  The artillery attack by the JNA was usually co-
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ordinated by the paramilitary groups who were assisted by Serb 
irregulars in street fighting and the rounding up of the non-Serbs of the 
district.  The paramilitary group operated right across Bosnia. The 
rounding up of the non-Bosnian-Serb population was a systemic and 
thorough operation, with the paramilitary groups relying on local 
information and identification of the non-Serbs by the local irregulars.  
Once the non-Serb population had been collected together, they were 
then sorted: Women, children and elderly men were separated from the 
men of military age, although at times and in some places all men were 
separated from the women and children, making the women much 
more vulnerable to rape and mistreatment. 
Having pointed out that mosques were deliberately destroyed, camps were established 
and rape and torture became commonly-used tactics, Niemann focused upon Tadić by 
describing his role before the fighting as a café and bar owner with an interest in 
martial arts, though he began to display intense Serb nationalism as the conflict 
loomed.  Tadić was described as “an important source of intelligence” for the 
advancing Serb forces during the conflict and as “a person capable of identifying 
local Muslims, Croats and other persons disloyal to the Serb nationalist cause.”835  
Tadić assisted the Serbian artillery shelling of his home town of Kozarac and, in the 
immediate aftermath of the shelling, shot unarmed civilians who he knew to be 
Muslim.  Following the successful attack Tadić visited the camps to carry out 
“assaults, murders, rapes, and sexual assaults on the prisoners that he had 
selected.”836  
Haile-Mariam similarly provided background material for the internal armed 
conflict in Rwanda, which, lasting three years, began on 1 October 1990 when the 
RPF—comprising of Tutsi refugees, descendants of refugees and exiles—invaded 
Rwanda from their bases in Uganda.837  The conflict was temporarily halted by the 
Arusha Accords, which sought to encourage power sharing among the RPF, the 
MRND and other rival political parties.  The peace did not hold in Rwanda as the 
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Accord was opposed by Hutu supremacists.  A series of assassinations in Kigali on or 
about 21 February 1994 offered “a prelude for the forthcoming apocalypse.”838   
According to Haile-Mariam the internal armed conflict was a precursor for 
genocide:839 
[O]n April 6 1994, towards dusk, President Habyarimana’s plane was 
shot out of the sky, as it approached Kigali Airport, killing all aboard, 
including the president of Burundi.  Then all hell broke loose.  The 
planners of the genocide went to work with speed and precision.  
Shortly after the president’s plane crashed, and before any official 
announcement by Radio Rwanda was made, roadblocks went up 
around Kigali and environs and the killing of Tutsis and moderate 
Hutus began with chilling efficiency by the units of the Force Army 
Rwandese and the Interahamwe militia. 
In his opening statement Haile-Mariam linked the actions of the accused to this crime 
of genocide: Akayesu was in a position of authority, which carried powers beyond 
those prescribed by law, and encouraged local civilians to approach him for advice, 
including informally settling disputes.  Using his position of authority Akayesu gave 
a speech which incited the people of Taba to commit genocide,840 ordered the killing 
of those Tutsis who, fleeing a neighbouring commune where they were being killed, 
sought Akayesu’s protection841 and did nothing to prevent the murder of those people 
held at the local prison.842   
Both opening statements signalled that the prosecutors intended to rely heavily 
upon witness testimony, differing from the international military tribunals which 
relied heavily on documentary evidence.  Niemann informed the bench that he 
expected to call over 80 witnesses, including expert witnesses would speak to the 
armed conflict’s emerging international character and its politico-historical 
background, special fact witnesses who would show the international element 
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underlying the Serbian armed forces operation within Bosnia and medical and 
forensic expert witnesses.  Eye-witnesses to Tadić’s atrocity crimes would offer the 
most significant evidence, however.  Niemann elaborated his special concern here:843 
For some of the witnesses the recounting of what occurred to them 
may cause them stress, more so than what one may ordinarily 
encounter in a national forum.  The recounting by a number of people 
of the same events may reflect the horror and confusion of the 
occasion.  This may sometimes prevent the neat and orderly 
dovetailing of the evidence, but such minor variations or descriptions 
will only serve to reinforce the reliability and integrity of their 
evidence, because it is almost beyond human capacity for two human 
beings to witness such appalling scenes and to later recount them with 
identical descriptions of what occurred.  
Other forms of evidence included documents supporting expert witness testimony, 
video evidence, maps and photographs taken by ICTY investigators.  Haile-Mariam 
similarly foreshadowed his use of expert witnesses to describe the conditions 
triggering the application of IHL844 while confirming the existence of a situation of 
internal armed conflict in Rwanda between 1 January and 31 December 1994.845  In 
addition to experts the prosecutor would draw on video footage of various killings, 
international news media and NGO staff who, as eyewitnesses, were to speak to the 
widespread and systemic attacks against the civilian population throughout Rwanda, 
as well as Akayesu’s role in these atrocity crimes.846  Like Niemann, Haile-Mariam 
stressed his concern that:847  
The witnesses are persons who lived through the ordeal.  Some of 
them survived death by dint of chance and others by heroic 
determination to live.  Their words are irreproachable, because they 
have stared at death in the eye and brushed against it. Would their 
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judgements be impaired by the horror of death they were staring at?  In 
our view, no.  Because what we see in terror or extreme pleasure is 
usually indelibly embedded in our consciousness.  As someone said, 
perhaps in jest, there is nothing like death which concentrates the 
mind.  Men and women who brushed with death do not lie.  The 
prosecution witnesses are simple family men and women who are 
struggling through life without intentions of hurting anybody.   
The issue of translation also received comment, with the prosecutor suggesting that 
Akayesu can himself correct any inaccuracies as the evidence against him is heard,848 
no doubt placing an unwelcome burden on the accused and his defence team.   
Whereas Niemann refrained from discussing applicable ICL rules, Haile-
Mariam cited the Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide as well as the 
Geneva Convention’s provisions concerning attacks on civilians.  Although the 
definition contained within the Genocide Convention states that genocide must target 
groups defined by nationality, ethnicity, race or religion, ambiguity remains around 
the exact composition of such groups.  Haile-Mariam argued that these identity 
markers have a “broad and expansive meaning” and the Rwandese Tutsi’s distinctive 
identity and common descent meant that group fell within the terms “ethnical” or 
“racial.”849  Haile-Mariam went on to argue that “[t]he fact that a group is political, 
social, or other group, is irrelevant, so long as the particular intent to destroy a group 
perceived by the killers as ethnical or racial is established.”850  He also noted that the 
ICTY’s Appeals Court decision concerning the Tadić case—reflecting as it does on 
“elementary considerations of humanity”—means that IHL applies to any armed 
conflict, regardless of its international or non-international character.851  Moreover, 
Haile-Mariam sought to preclude a superior order defence by arguing that no 
evidence existed to suggest that Akayesu was forced to commit atrocity crimes and, if 
there was pressure from his superiors, it was of a sort which he could resist.852  
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Akayesu could have chosen to save the civilians under his authority without risk to 
himself.853   As the prosecutor puts it:854 
[I]t is almost trite to say that he should not have ordered the massacre 
of innocent people, because he was going to be [sic] reprimand, or 
because he was threatened with the loss of his position as 
bourgemestre, that is trite.  Even death threats to him or his family, 
even if imminent, would not exculpate him from responsibility for the 
murder of innocent people.  If that were proven, it would only help to 
reduce his punishment. 
 
Here, then, building on the content of their respective indictments, this second 
generation of international prosecutors used their opening statements to frame their 
legal arguments.  They did so by contextualising atrocity crimes within situations of 
internal armed conflict, foreshadowing evidence of those atrocity crimes 
subsequently submitted during trial and precluding any foreseeable defence rebuttals.  
The relative brevity of these statements signals a more self-assured and sure-footed 
legal approach based on various factors, including the civilian (as opposed to 
military) character of the tribunals, the tribunals’ international nature derived from 
being a product of the international community (as opposed to an alliance of powerful 
states) where frequent assertion of sovereign prerogatives is eschewed more than 
welcomed, and the tribunals’ seemingly neutral status vis-à-vis the internal armed 
conflicts.  Moreover, these statements express a legal rhetoric, which self-consciously 
distinguishes itself from the Machiavellian world of politico-strategic power 
calculations, as though ICL enforcement is somehow above the cut-and-thrust of the 
national-level politics unfolding in post-conflict zones or immune from the 
politicking within the UN Security Council’s chamber.  The deliberate neutrality of 
their language suggests a conscious effort to eschew the emotive and rather grandiose 
oratory used by Jackson and Keenan and to favour a more technocratic rhetoric.  As 
Haile-Mariam put it, the ICTR “was established by the Security Council as a 
collective expression of the international community for justice.  It has, therefore, a 
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mammoth task, as well as a historical opportunity, for adding one more brick to the 
great edifice of a more humane society, where rule of law is elevated over force.”855  
This legal rhetoric also reduces the ugly realities of internal armed conflict to 
background material, which, providing the required context for certain atrocity 
crimes, is not justiciable in itself.  Vital to ICL enforcement, these statements echo 
expressions of the Security Council’s will to establish ad-hoc tribunals in the 
aftermath of the Cold War.   
 
III Rhetoric of Politics 
A close reading of these opening statements reveals an attempt to denigrate the 
discredited utopian movements of the accused in a way that is more subtle than the 
earlier vilification of Nazism as evil or Shinto-Imperialism as insane.  Niemann, for 
example, depicted Christoslavism as being responsible for unleashing “unspeakable 
horror,” “human tragedy” and “absolute terror,” which the international community 
must confront “otherwise evil has no boundary.”856  In other words, the staunch 
ethno-nationalism driving the Serbian utopian movement, while destructive, is not 
evil in itself.  While much attention was given to Christoslavism’s politico-strategic 
dimension, particularly the evolution and use of the Serbian military and its militia, 
special focus was given to its politico-social dimension.  On the one hand, 
notwithstanding the apparent shallowness of Milošević’s own Christoslavic 
convictions, the armed forces he controlled were deeply and, in many cases, 
fanatically religious without observing regular rituals and practices.857  On the other 
hand, participants in this utopian movement, Niemann suggested, “either had anti-
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Muslim, ethno-centric political dispositions which was conducive to the performance 
of these deeds or, alternatively, they were sadistically predisposed towards violence 
and took pleasure in inflicting tremendous pain and suffering upon the helpless 
victims, and thus served as an agent of the authorities.”858  The objective of ethnic 
purity, which lay at the heart of Christoslavism and was the purpose for which the 
persecution of Muslims and other acts of politico-cruelty were committed, was placed 
at odds with the co-existence of multicultural societies within a sovereign state.  On 
these grounds alone, it was suggested, the Christoslavic utopian movement should be 
rejected by the bench and the wider audience-at-large.  Sitting just below the surface 
of the oration too is a gentle rebuke of Tito’s Soviet-styled communism, which 
controlled, but only for a while, the contending ethno-nationalist forces but, 
eventually, let the destructive ethno-national genie out of the old socialist bottle. 
While Haile-Mariam did give some focus to the politico-strategic dimension of 
the Hutu supremacy’s utopian movement, particularly when he discussed the Arusha 
Accord’s recognition of the need to “integrate the military of the country together 
with the RPF”859 and the Hutu militia, known as the Interahamwe, more energy was 
devoted to explicating the movement’s politico-social dimension.  Haile-Mariam was 
at pains, for example, to explain that:860 
… the massacre of 1994 was not a spontaneous outburst of popular 
anger at the death of a beloved president, as some detractors would 
like us to believe, rather it appeared to be a carefully calculated, 
systematically planned, and meticulously executed carnage.  The 
ideological basis for the massacres was carefully laid down by 
branding all Tutsis as invaders, feudalists, and aristocrats, who have 
no right to live in Rwanda.  The ideology was disseminated by hate 
spewing Radio Mille Collines, Radio Rwanda, and an array of 
publications dedicated to incite the Hutu population to a frenzy of hate, 
to make sure that all non-Tutsi Rwandese participated in the killings so 
as to blur individual accountability…. Beaten into years of submission 
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and unquestioning obedience by a strong authoritarian state, the 
peasants obeyed the order to kill their neighbours, sometime their 
relatives, their wives, and their children.  Your honours, the objective 
was to completely erase the Tutsi population in Rwanda so that, as one 
leader said, the next generation of Rwandese will ask, “What did 
Tutsis look like?”  
As a means of dehumanising Tutsis the genocidaires relied upon the impulse to 
affirm one’s sense of self by degrading others and denying their claims to 
humanity.
861
  Put in another way, the category of the Tutsi as negated Other was 
deliberately constructed and perpetuated for political gain.   Former European 
colonial masters also receive rebuke here:862   
During the colonial period, the benign and not always identifiable 
physical differences between Hutu and Tutsis were given an 
ideological content by the European colonizers. The Belgium 
colonialists graded the Tutsis as the top, Hutus lower down, and Twa at 
the bottom of the heap.  The classification was reinforced with ID 
cards issued by colonial authorities.  Hence forth the possibility of 
crossing over from being a member of the Hutu ethnic group to that of 
Tutsi ethnic group, depending on the amount of wealth one had, was 
closed for good with ID cards.  
 
Even though neither Niemann nor Haile-Mariam articulated strong preferences 
for democracies, free markets or individualism in their opening statements, this does 
not mean that they are devoid of such preferences.  Rather, their speech acts are, in 
this sense, acts of omission.  The history of the events surrounding the armed 
conflicts and mass atrocities committed therein creates a responsibility for the 
prosecutors to identify all contextual factors, including western interventions, though 
these prosecutors fail to do so as they define their trial functions in narrow and 
reductive terms.  Thus, a critical examination of these opening statements reveals 
preferences implicitly endorsing the status quo arrangements emerging in the 
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aftermath of the Cold War.  Significantly, neither opening statement criticised the role 
played by the forces of neoliberalism in creating the conditions encouraging armed 
conflict and atrocity crimes, despite, as Chapter 5 explained, the conditionalities of 
IMF support, most notably the structural adjustment programmes, stimulating the 
descent into internal armed conflict in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 
early 1990s.863  The UN Security Council’s limited action with respect to both the 
escalation of conflict and the commission of atrocity crime were also omitted in both 
statements.  The prosecutors’ implicit endorsement of neoliberalism, which flows 
from their silence when the conditions for the existence of these atrocities—
including, specifically, the impact of economic liberalisation under the Washington 
Consensus—called on them to speak, also silently endorses the views held by the 
most powerful members of the UN Security Council in the immediate aftermath of 
the Cold War.  It suggests too that the key political contest here is no longer between 
the US and the USSR, as representatives of liberal democracy or communism, 
respectively, but is now between modernity’s proponents of neoliberalism and all 
others.  Those who pursue alternative visions to neoliberalism are seen as unruly 
trouble makers who need to be disciplined by the rule of law or the force of arms, or 
both.  Neoliberalism was becoming so entrenched by the mid-1990s that the 
prosecutors needed not articulate its values; they were implicitly understood by the 
international community to be the undisputed order of the day.  
This has not gone unnoticed.  Orford laments that “[t]he ‘myopia’ of 
international lawyers about the effects of the new interventionism means that, in 
general, international legal debate fails to address the ways in which the destructive 
consequences of corrosive economic restructuring contributes to instability, leading to 
further violence and denials of human rights.”864  This is significant because, as 
Koskenniemi explains further, the entire field of international law “was born from a 
move to defend a liberal-internationalist project in a time of anger and opportunity”865 
and the legal profession has, since the ending of the Second World War, either 
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become “depoliticised and marginalised” or “turned into a technical instrument for 
the advancement of the agenda of powerful interests or actors in the world scene.”866  
“Non-intervention is intervention” he says, “namely intervention on the side of the 
status quo” and in so doing “throws light on aspects of international law’s 
involvement in the construction and maintenance of an international political and 
economic system.”867  
To varying extents both prosecutors used their opening statements to suggest 
that this liberal movement somehow represents all humanity or, at least, the very best 
of humanity.  While Niemann recognised that “[w]hat man has done to man in the 
cause of nationalism, or ethnic hegemony in the former Yugoslavia, strains the most 
agile of human reasoning,”868 he did not talk explicitly of defending civilisation 
through the international rule of law.  Instead, he views himself as a lawyer merely 
seeking to apply ICL on behalf of a community of states and their state-makers.  
Unlike Jackson and Keenan, Niemann did not need to persuade his audience-at-large 
of the virtues and necessity of trials, which had well-known precedents at Nuremberg 
and, to a lesser degree, Tokyo.  Haile-Mariam did, however, claiming with the 
following flourish:869    
[A]t this age of dawn of human rights, this first trial in the African 
continent for the violations of international humanitarian laws is one of 
the greatest leaps forward in the protection of human rights 
everywhere, with particular emphasis in the continent of Africa, at 
least in some parts, a continent racked by dictators, ethnic hate 
mongers, a continent in agony, epitomized by genocide in Rwanda.  
This trial, your Honors, is also unique in the annals of jurisprudence in 
our navigation of these uncharted waters of jurisprudence and, as an 
offshoot of our relentless prosecution of those suspected, it is our hope, 
also, that some jurisprudence will emerge to govern irrational actions 
of men and women in future. It is in this recognition of this historical 
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occasion, and responsibility, that we, at the prosecution, brace 
ourselves to our task with humility and keenly aware of the need to say 
or do nothing that may inflame the already incendiary ethnic relations 
in Rwanda, because our purpose here is not to do justice in the 
abstract, but to do a just justice for reconciliation and peace in Rwanda 
and to do our part in mending the tattered social fabric of the 
Rwandese society…. [W]e, at the prosecution, will do our utmost to 
meet the challenges and be worthy of the sacred trust humanity has 
entrusted us with. We will do our best in joining your honors in your 
historic task of rendering justice and in your attempt to exorcise the 
demons and scourge of genocide from the Rwandese social fabric once 
and for all.  
Echoes of the civilising mission are easy to identify, especially as the statement 
endorses the superiority of modern Western culture through ICL’s long reach.  
Perhaps more poignant, however, is modernity’s penchant for reason as an end in 
itself and the modernist belief that humanity can be perfected through civilising, 
enlightened instruction.  Whereas the first generation of international prosecutors 
were confronted by crimes committed by members of highly civilised societies; it 
appears Haile-Mariam confronts, on behalf of humanity, crimes committed by 
individuals embedded in Joseph Conrad’s heart of darkness.  They are not yet fully 
illuminated by the light of reason, which is grasped at here as some kind of antidote 
to the pathologies of armed conflict and other forms of illegitimate organised 
violence.  He is, in this respect, more lawyer rooted in western modernity than 
African nationalist blaming the West.  
Considered in light of these complexities, the distinction between legal and 
political registers of these opening statements dissolves as soon as ICL enforcement is 
understood as a form of modernist world politics, which is, of course, broader than 
the diplomacy of state-makers, though such diplomacy remains important.  Indeed, 
the second generation of international prosecutors’ opening statements were at once 
shaped by the politics of the UN Security Council and express rhetoric constitutive of 
modernist world politics.  This rhetoric seeks to use power over others for non-trivial 
purposes not only by persuading the bench and the wider audience-at-large of the 
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accused’s guilt, but also by tacitly endorsing neoliberalism as the dominant 
movement within modernity.  Even though the politico-strategic circumstances 
evolved since the establishment of the international military tribunals, the efforts of 
the second generation of international prosecutors took place in trials which occur on 
stages reflecting, re-inscribing and extending existing power relations.  These power 
relations, however, are not necessarily drawn along politico-strategic lines, as they 
have important politico-economic and politico-social dimensions too, and are utopian 
in their vision of reshaping the world.  These configurations of power, having already 
constructed various instruments of control and organisations of global governance in 
the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, are focused in the 1990s more on 
maintaining control over those organisations and extending the reach of their 
instruments into the former USSR’s spheres of influence and the former 
battlegrounds of the Cold War in central Europe and postcolonial Africa.  Proponents 
of economic liberalisation, no longer favouring the neo-capitalism of the 1940s and 
fifties, wish to extent the depth and spread of neoliberalism. 
 
IV Rhetoric of War  
Both opening statements graphically describe particular acts of politico-cruelty, 
which, given their significance to this thesis, deserve to be quoted here in some detail.  
Niemann, for example, said: 870 
Defenceless and unable to negotiate a cease-fire, the terrified 
townsfolk, mostly Muslims and non-Serbs, desperately clinging to 
their white flags emerged in their thousands from their hiding places, 
in basements, under rubble and in creek beds.  These people were not 
soldiers, they were not armed, they were for the most part civilians, 
including women, children and the elderly.  They were the innocent 
citizens of this area.  Serbian soldiers and local armed citizens, 
including Tadić, who by now had armed himself with an automatic 
weapon, ordered these unfortunate people into columns, to remain 
silent and to keep their heads bowed.  They were then marched 
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through Zozarac, as the trophy of war, to the taunts and curses of the 
Serb on-lookers.  Some of the Muslims and non-Serbs were pulled 
from the line and beaten or killed.  The bodies of the dead were left 
beside the roads as the column marched by.  Mother and fathers 
watched in horror as their military aged sons were pulled out from the 
column and shot before their very eyes.  In the mid-afternoon on a day 
in June 1992, the accused Tadić entered the Omarska camp with a 
group of Bosnian Serbs.  They went to the large garage building 
known as the ‘hangar.’  They proceeded to call out the names of a 
number of people, including Emir Karabasic, Jasmin Hrnic, Enver 
Alic, Fikret Harambasic and Emire Beganovic…. These men were 
then subjected to the most horrific beating and torture.  Two other male 
prisoners were then called out forced to perform oral sex on Fikret 
Harambasic and then to sexually mutilate him.  Karabasic, Hrnic, Alic 
and Harambasic died as a result of these assaults [….]  Tadić also 
physically took part or otherwise participated in the torture of more 
than 12 female detainees, including several gang rapes…. [and] was 
aware of the widespread nature of the plunder and destruction of 
personal and real property of the non-Serbs and was physically 
involved in this plunder and destruction himself.  
Haile-Mariam offered similarly vivid descriptions of acts of politico-cruelty 
committed by Akayesa: 871 
[O]n April 19th, 1994, Akayesu in a speech where he was addressing 
the people of his commune identified all Tutsis as the enemy and urged 
that they should be killed.  He also ordered the killing of Tutsis who 
came from the neighbouring commune of Runda and other communes 
where they were being killed, to seek refuge and protection, which 
they, in vain hoped they would get from Mr Akayesu… Akayesu 
incited the Hutu population by telling them that they were going to be 
massacred by Tutsis, which immediately resulted in the massacre of 
the Tutsi minority…. Akayesu purposefully went and brought the 
Interahamwe militia, armed with machetes and long knives.  He stood 
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by and did nothing when people were brought out of the prison of the 
commune and killed…. innocent children and babies were thrown into 
the river and drowned with the full knowledge of Mr Jean-Paul 
Akayesu…. Akayesu ordered the beating of three mothers of 15 
children, all the three were mothers. One of the sisters was severely 
beaten, from which she fainted.  Then Akayesu ordered the children, 
the 15 children to the checkpoint, which doubled as a slaughter spot.  
When the younger ones refused to go with Akayesu he told them that 
their fathers were waiting for them at the road with candies.  Innocent 
as they were, they followed Akayesu and when they reached the 
roadblock the waiting crowd split their tender skulls with machetes. 
These are no ordinary crimes.  Signalling a key difference between the deplorable 
behaviour of the accused and the laudable behaviour of the prosecutors, such acts of 
politico-cruelty help justify the power relationships undergirding the two trials in 
particular and the pursuit of international criminal justice in general. 
Rather than disqualifying the accused from humanity’s ranks by describing 
them as evil or insane, as had the first generation of international prosecutors, both 
Niemann and Haile-Mariam demonstrate a more complex and nuanced understanding 
of the relationship between the accused’s acts of politico-cruelty and the immediate 
circumstances underlying the two differing situations of internal armed conflict.  
They suggested that the capacity to commit these atrocity crimes was an intrinsic 
aspect of the accused’s character, which lies dormant until their respective underlying 
politico-strategic situation changes during the course of an internal armed conflict.  
Instead of denouncing Tadić by characterising him in an overtly derogatory way, 
Niemann gave focus to the way in which Tadić underwent a metamorphosis from 
appearing “to get on well with the Muslim population and [who counted] among his 
close associates one Emir Karabasic”872 to someone capable of committing atrocity 
crimes.  The transformation is signalled by Tadić’s increasing involvement in the Serb 
Nationalist Party as civil war approached.  Haile-Mariam took an approach similar to 
Niemann’s, saying that Akayesu “was seen as a gentle and amiable person, who drank 
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beer with the local boys and played football with the local boys”873 until the Prime 
Minister made a speech in which senior members of the Government made it clear 
that officials either side with them and support the killing or lose their positions of 
authority, after which “Akayesu succumbed and followed the avenue of killing, and 
ordering killings.”874  Furthermore, Akayesu “initially appeared to comply with the 
Prefet’s order to protect ordinary people, and, at first, managed to keep things calm in 
his commune.  Patrols were set up to keep residents safe from outside attackers and 
maintain security.”  The prosecution notes that:875 
All that began to change, however, after the interim government 
moved from the capital, Kigali, due to increased fighting, to Gitarama 
on April 12, 1994…. The Interahamwe militia, the killing machine of 
the Rwandese genocide, became more active and began a campaign 
which appeared to be aimed at eliminating Tutsis and driving the 
moderates of opposition party, MDR.  
Akayesu simply acted in order to keep his job, status and the associated benefits of 
both.  Stark contrasts are drawn to their victims’ innocence and virtue in order to 
illuminate the grotesqueness of the accused’s actions.  Niemann ascribed virtue to 
Tadić’s Muslim victims who “were desperately trying to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement of the crisis, thereby avoiding bloodshed and destruction, [when] the Serbs 
attacked.”876  Haile-Mariam also ascribed virtue to Akayesu’s Tutsi victims by 
focusing on their innocence, particularly when they sought protection from the man 
who would facilitate their death. 
While both prosecutors refrained from engaging in a tribal war thesis—that is, 
attempting to explain the causes of the Rwandan genocide as “an unforeseeable and 
spontaneous outburst of primordial bloodlust,” which is merely a “reflection of ethno-
centrism, if not an exercise at absolution from apathy in the face of immense human 
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suffering”877—neither offers a full explanation connecting the decisions of the global 
hegemon to the actions of the accused.  As Akhavan explains:878 
[C]ontrary to the simplistic myths of primordial ‘tribal’ hatred, the 
conflicts in the  former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were not expressions 
of spontaneous bloodlust or inevitable historical cataclysm.  Both 
conflicts resulted from the deliberate incitement of ethnic hatred and 
violence by which ruthless demagogues and warlords elevate 
themselves to positions of power.    
Missing here, however, is an acknowledgement of the various roles played by 
foreign-led restructuring of Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990s, by the UK and 
France during the Rwandese internal armed conflict or by the UN Security Council’s 
actions, or inactions, to ensure international peace and security in Europe and Africa. 
Although the capacity to commit atrocity crimes is understood to be an intrinsic 
part of the accused’s character unleashed only under certain conditions, that 
behaviour had to be condemned by the prosecutors as well as by those who authorise 
their mandates.  Just as those Nazis and Shinto-Imperialists who committed crimes 
against peace could not be tolerated at the international military tribunals, those 
accused of atrocity crime in the 1990s are categorised as hostis humani generis.  As a 
consequence of this denouncement, the accused, if found guilty, are deemed no 
longer fit to belong to the human species, at least symbolically, and must forfeit their 
liberty (but not their lives).  Put simply, the atrocity crime is personalised in the figure 
of the accused, hostis humani generis, and as a representative of a utopian movement 
unleashing destructive forces into the world.  They must be expelled, symbolically, 
from the human community.  Denouncing the accused at the start of international 
criminal trials sharpened focus on the utopian movements of the accused, enabling 
them to be subjected to the disciplinary process of abjection.  However, that the 
accused are denounced by virtue of their recourse to acts of politico-cruelty serves no 
obvious legal purpose within international criminal trial process.  It does not 
strengthen, for instance, the prosecutors’ arguments concerning the nature of the 
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alleged act, the guilt of the accused or the legal findings of the bench.  Less 
dangerous than those who initiate international armed conflicts only to lose them, 
these deviants and troublemakers must be expelled and their utopian movements 
destroyed through “the often highly discretionary legal and political violence of the 
hegemon”879 because their mere existence is an affront to those who enjoy positions 
of power and influence over modernist world affairs.  Arbour underscored the 
urgency of taking action against these movements when she decried that “it is truly 
astonishing that powerful perpetrators of atrocities have not only remained 
unpunished over the years, but that they have not even been ostracized.  It is the 
‘them among us’ that must be addressed through the exposition of their crimes, 
because as long as they are among us, we are them.”880  But the tone here is not 
belligerent as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.  It remains 
a rhetoric of war but one which reflects, reinforces, and reproduces the power 
enjoyed by those in positions of superior authority within zones of privilege and 
prosperity.  
This rhetoric of symbolic expulsion and excommunication is the rhetoric of 
war.  It is war rhetoric not in the sense that it calls for waging of international or non-
international armed conflict through a clash, or a series of clashes, of arms in battle.  
It is war rhetoric in the sense that it calls for, and normalises, the ongoing politico-
cultural civil war fought through, firstly, the reconstruction of conflict-affected 
countries and, secondly, the enforcement of ICL in the aftermath of mass atrocity.  
Under these conditions the reconstruction of the state entails a shift toward 
democratisation through promoting periodic and genuine elections, establishing 
constitutional limits on governmental power and encouraging respect for civil 
liberties, such a freedom of speech, assembly and conscience.  Concomitantly, the 
reconstruction of the economy entails a shift towards marketisation through a range 
of policy measures limiting governmental control over the market while maximising 
the ability of private investors, producers and consumers to protect and advance their 
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own narrow interests.
881
  The enforcement of ICL operates here like some covert fifth 
column.  Modernity is remaking itself in terms determined by those in positions of 
power and influence in world affairs and it is done as a means of reflecting their 
values and serving their interests. 
Throughout ICL’s evolution—that is, since its beginning at the international 
military tribunals up until the ad-hoc tribunals of the 1990s—“we have seen the 
development in Western legal culture of a simplified version of the relationship 
between the exercise of judicial power at the international level, the phenomenon of 
war, the safeguarding of human rights, and the process of pacification.”882  This 
simplified relationship is a function of politico-cultural civil war, illustrating the 
changing modalities of power at the global level from the efforts of the victors of the 
Second World War to transform zones they occupied and to establish an international 
architecture within which post-war international affairs would be conducted.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, the US established itself as the global hegemon, setting and 
enforcing rules for international affairs in a manner underscored by the extraordinary 
material power of their armed force.  As Schabas reminds us “[i]t may be worth 
recalling that those who effectively controlled the establishment of the United 
Nations tribunals, namely the permanent members of the Security Council, are 
essentially the same countries that set up the Nuremberg court (with the addition of 
China).  In 1945 they were called the ‘great powers’, whereas today they are the 
‘permanent five’. Same product, different packaging.”883  He goes onto to quip that 
“[i]n 1945 they claimed to act on behalf of ‘civilized nations’; today, they prefer a 
more modern and politically palatable term, the ‘international community.’”884  Since 
the end of the Second World War, then, much of global politics occurs in the 
shadows cast by the Big Three.  The forty-four year contest known as the Cold War 
(1947-1991) between socialism and liberalism has also given way to a neoliberal 
orthodoxy which, while ascendant, is not without challenge from the authoritarian 
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regimes of the People’s Republic of China or the Russian Federation.  Unlike the 
victor’s justice pursued in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, when 
prosecutors were appointed by, and reported to, the governments that had defeated the 
military forces led by those in the dock, the second generation of prosecutors were 
authorised by the UN Security Council, the five permanent members of which did not 
defeat those in the docks with their own military forces (though, as explained in 
Chapter 5, both the UK and France were seriously implicated in Rwanda’s internal 
armed conflict).  This second generation of prosecutors serve at the pleasure of the 
global hegemon who, when consensus among the P-5 prevails, sets and enforces the 
rules of international affairs on those occasions and upon those deviants and 
troublemakers when it suits their shared interests to do so.  By reproducing these 
power configurations the prosecutorial opening statements examined in this chapter 
reduce and curtail the spaces available to voice and practice dissent, even when this 
dissent takes place far beyond the zones of privilege and prosperity.  
 
V Conclusion 
The opening statements examined in this chapter constitute a tangible manifestation 
of the discourse against politico-cruelty, which comprises material and ideational 
conditions that shape the responses to the problem of atrocity crimes.  Like the 
statements made by Jackson and Keenan fifty years earlier, Niemann’s and Haile-
Mariam’s orations proved vital to the trial phase of enforcing ICL by announcing the 
commission of atrocity crimes, foreshadowing evidence of those crimes and 
precluding foreseeable defences in a legal rhetoric that self-consciously distinguishes 
itself from the world of politico-strategic power calculations.  And like those earlier 
statements, these statements contain a political rhetoric, full of silences and omissions 
that serve neoliberal interests.  Whereas neo-capitalism was, for the first generation of 
prosecutors, key to taking the first steps towards building a free market of global 
reach, neoliberalism was key to entrenching this utopian movement in the 1990s.  
“Detached from religion and at the same time purged of the doubts that haunted its 
classical proponents,” Gray expounds, “the belief in the market as a divine ordinance 
became a secular ideology of universal progress that in the later twentieth century 
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was embraced by international institutions.”885  There is more than politics occurring 
here, as Niemann and Haile-Mariam both invoked war rhetoric when they denounced 
Tadić and Akayesu as hostis human generis, calling for the bench to expel these men 
from the human community.  Such calls were made in support of those who manage 
the politico-strategic and politico-economic institutions governing international life 
and, in so doing, helped wage a form of politico-cultural civil war for control of the 
modernist project that presents itself as a kind of policing act in these two cases.   
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CONCLUSION TO PART II 
 
By examining the institutional arrangements of the ad-hoc tribunals, including the 
formal prosecutorial mandates, Part II of this thesis recognises that the second 
generation of international prosecutors played vital roles in the enforcement of ICL 
during the aftermath of the Cold War.  As agents of the law these prosecutors 
prepared indictments and made opening statements as well as conducted 
investigations, presented evidence and cross-examined witnesses, though, unlike the 
first generation of international prosecutors, they did not provide administrative 
support to the bench.  Members of this second generation of international prosecutors 
indicted 161 persons under the auspices of the ICTY, 141 of whom had their 
proceedings concluded at the time of writing.886  Between 1997 and the end of 2015, 
when it closed its doors for the last time, members of this second generation of 
prosecutors also indicted 93 persons under the auspices of the ICTR.887   
While there was much commonality between the functional responsibilities 
given to both the first and second generation of international prosecutors, the pre-trial 
efforts of this second generation differed in various important respects from 
                                                          
886
  ICTY “Key Figures of the ICTY Cases” available at http://www.icty.org/en/about.  Between 
1996 and the end of 2015, 18 of the 141 persons tried were acquitted, 13 were referred to a 
national jurisdiction and 20 had indictments withdrawn.  Ten were reported dead before they 
could be transferred to the ICTY and nine died after transfer to ICTY.  Of the 74 persons who 
received sentences, 20 pled guilty.  Fifty have now served their sentences, 19 have been 
transferred to prisons in order to serve their sentences, two are awaiting transfer to serve their 
sentences and three have died while serving their sentences.  Four of the accused are still at trial 
while 16 others are before the Appeals Chamber.  There are no fugitives at large.   
887
  ICTR “Key Figures of ICTR Cases” see instead http://unictr.unmict.org.  Seventy-seven of 
those indicted have had their proceedings concluded at the time of writing.  Of these 77, 32 are 
currently serving sentences in prisons in another state, six are awaiting transfers to a state in 
order to serve their sentences and fourteen have served their sentences.  Fourteen were acquitted 
and released, two had their indictments withdrawn, three died before or while serving their 
sentence and two died before their judgment.  Four have been transferred to another jurisdiction 
(two to Rwanda and two to France).  Six persons are currently before the Appeals Chambers.  
There are nine fugitives at large, six of which are under Rwandan jurisdiction and three are 
under MICT jurisdiction. 
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Jackson’s and Keenan’s earlier approaches to drafting indictments.  Firstly, the 
second generation of prosecutors were not beholden to their respective government’s 
formal instructions
888
 and none were US nationals.  Secondly, this generation of 
prosecutors served consecutively, rather than concurrently, which meant the ways in 
which indictments were prepared evolved throughout the life of the tribunal.  Thirdly, 
four ICTY prosecutors served concurrently as the ICTR prosecutor.  Fourthly, the 
underpinning armed conflict had not yet ceased when the prosecutors began the 
indictment process, with fighting occurring in both Bosnia and Croatia.
889
  This 
second generation of prosecutors seemed more subdued that their predecessors, 
particularly in the sense of taking a more assured legalistic tone in their opening 
statements, primarily because the work of that first generation made it possible to do 
so without the significant efforts of rhetorical justification.  This signals an evolution 
of ICL to a point of self-confident maturity in its own understanding of its purposes, 
structures, processes and procedures as well as the growing acceptance of the 
endeavour’s legitimacy as a preferred solution to the problem of mass atrocity.  
Notwithstanding these differences an important legal thread runs through these 
opening statements, the indictments upon which these statements draw and the legal 
instruments establishing international criminal tribunals.  This thread has its roots 
firmly placed in the London and Tokyo Charters examined in Chapter 2 as well as in 
the material and ideational conditions described in Chapter 1 as the discourse against 
politico-cruelty.   
Critically examining prosecutorial performance during pre-trial and trial phases, 
Part II went further than merely recognising this second generation of prosecutors as 
legal actors.  For starters, the fact that a leader such as Milošević was put on trial, and 
certain Western leaders were not, implies the Western view of the relevant political 
and historical context is automatically correct and beyond dispute.
890
  Taken together, 
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  De Vlaming, above n 14, at 547. 
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  At 549. 
890
  Martti Koskenniemi “Between Impunity and Show Trials” (2002) 6 Max Plank UNYB 1 at 17. 
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the ICTY and ICTR indictments signal important politico-strategic and politico-social 
dimensions of Christoslavism and Hutu supremacy, helping to discredit the failed 
utopian movements of the accused.  The first two opening statements further discredit 
these movements while implicitly endorsing the neoliberal dispensation, which has 
emerged as the status quo at the end of the Cold War.  There were, admittedly, 
significant attempts to bring a semblance of balance to the prosecutor’s charge sheets. 
Del Ponte’s even-handed approach resulted in greater inclusiveness of those suspects 
transformed into the accused, for instance.  Yet rebalancing on the basis of the 
politics of representation placed the tribunals at risk of reputational harm.  This is 
because representatives of some groups were indicted on the grounds of an identity 
politics, which also informed the actions of those accused of targeting others merely 
for their membership to a particular social group rather than for any specific act that 
they have done.  Part II drew a political thread from these performances, intended for 
the most part to please those state-makers who established two ICL enforcement 
institutions in the aftermath of the Cold War, to the prosecutorial performances 
occurring at the international military tribunals.  Whereas victors of the Second World 
War pursued neo-capitalism as the first step of building a global free-market, in the 
post-Cold War era the global hegemon pursued neoliberalism as a means of 
entrenching the global free market; as previously mentioned both neo-capitalism and 
neoliberalism are versions of economic liberalisation, which dates back to the 19th 
century liberalism.  The quest for international criminal justice during the 1990s, it 
seems, occurred at the hegemon’s pleasure.   
By foregrounding the material and ideational conditions giving rise to the 
establishment of the ad-hoc tribunals, Part II also contends that when these 
indictments and opening statements are considered alongside the post-war 
reconstruction efforts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, then the prosecutorial effort is, in 
effect, an extension of hegemon’s justice by other means.  By fulfilling their 
prosecutorial functions in a way that normalised democratic reform, individualism, 
and the free market, each assisted the furtherance of the Washington Consensus.  In 
the aftermath of the Cold War—a major global conflict as significant for modernist 
world politics as the Second World War—the prosecutors positioned themselves as 
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auxiliary combatants of those who seek to maintain, extend and strengthen their 
control over the modernist project.  In so doing, their silences and omissions 
reproduced the power configurations at play in modernist world affairs and concealed 
the consequences of neoliberalism.  It would be wrong to suggest that individual 
prosecutors always fully supported the foreign policies of the US, but they seldom 
distanced themselves from the broader utopian movement of remaking the world 
through economic liberalisation.  While this second generation of prosecutors 
maintained a rhetoric of war, this was no longer as belligerent as their predecessors.  
The time was more majestic, authoritative and ‘civil’, signalling that the politico-
cultural civil war for modernity was now being waged as “a war of pacification” 
taking place beyond the “zones of prosperity.”891   
Relying heavily on the widespread and deeply-held collective will to prosecute 
those individuals who commit acts of cruelty for some substantive ends, the second 
generation of international prosecutors furthered the interests of the executives who 
appointed them.  They did so by leading the charge within two separate tribunals, 
both of which purported to adjudicate from a position of neutrality.  Like the 
prosecutors at the international military tribunals before them, however, this 
neutrality was more apparent than real as the various prosecutorial efforts 
strengthened economic liberalisation ahead of both Christo-Slavism and Hutu 
supremacy, two rival modernist utopian movements.  Notwithstanding the importance 
of the ideas of ethnicity and nationalism, this rivalry was more than an intellectual 
clash.  Both rival utopian movements had enormous real world consequences not 
only for those who lived within the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but also for those 
who considered internal armed conflict and mass atrocity an affront to human dignity.  
Far from being neutral adjudicators of ICL, the ad-hoc criminal tribunals formed part 
of what Foucault would describe as silent war, underpinned by the force of arms 
where it was not waged through armed clashes, battles and armed conflict.  By 
seeking to eliminate the leaders of rival utopian movements while rebuilding the war-
torn machinery of government, markets, and communities, this second generation of 
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  Herfried Münkler “Old and new wars” in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer (ed) 
Routledge Handbook of Security Studies (Routledge, London and New York, 2010) 190 at 197. 
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international prosecutors help wage a politico-cultural civil war, firstly, by deflecting 
attention away from the motives informing post-conflict reconstruction efforts while 
normalising the geopolitical status quo and, secondly, by maintaining the false 
distinction among law, politics and war while prioritising certain aspects of the 
historical record.  This second generation of prosecutors shared much in common 
with their predecessors, signalling there is more continuity than change in the ways in 
which both the first and the second generations set out to prosecute the most serious 
of international crimes.  Part II of this thesis concludes that the second generation of 
international prosecutors of serious international crime, belonging to international 
criminal tribunals established in the aftermath of the Cold War, are agents not only of 
international criminal law, but also of the modernist world politics and politico-
cultural civil war.   
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CH. 8: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
I  Introduction  
Offering a proven and enduring paradigm for state-makers wishing to confront those 
who commit serious international crimes, the discourse against politico-cruelty 
needed to be accompanied by yet another altered set of propitious politico-strategic 
circumstances before the ICC would be established.  This chapter argues, firstly, that 
the broad-based consensus for establishing the ICC not only reflects the degree to 
which much of the international community has its strategic thinking informed by the 
discourse against politico-cruelty, but also signals the extent of US estrangement 
during the few years leading up to and during the US-led War on Terror.  As Bosco 
usefully suggests “[t]he ICC was negotiated in a very different climate from the one 
in which it would operate”892—a climate, that is, which offered a unique window of 
opportunity for NGOs in particular to play important roles in drafting the Rome 
Statute and encouraging its ratification.  The chapter argues, secondly, that the ICC 
was designed less as a means of securing victor’s justice or enforcing hegemon’s 
justice and more as the fulcrum of a legal regime that pursues victim’s justice by 
combating the impunity enjoyed by some local and state-level leaders around the 
world.  Victim’s justice is, however, the marketable face of NGO/donor justice and is 
further evidence of the extent of neoliberalism’s entrenchment in contemporary world 
affairs.  The chapter argues, thirdly, that the establishment of the ICC, six decades 
after the founding of the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions, completes the 
tripartite architecture for governing modernist world affairs.  As such, the ICC’s 
workload cannot be fully understood in isolation of the politics of economic 
liberalisation, especially in those parts of Africa rich in natural resources required to 
fuel the globalising world economy.  The connection between the pursuit of 
international criminal justice and the ongoing reformation of local politico-strategic 
and politico-economic governance arrangements, which facilitate the free market’s 
exploitation of natural resources, has not gone unnoticed by Africans in particular.  
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  Bosco, above n 623, at 72. 
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This has stimulated calls for an African court equipped to prosecute western firms for 
illegal commercial activities on the continent and has, in part, led to the adoption of 
the Malabo Protocol.
893
  A resurgent anti-colonial nationalism might also be 
informing the decisions of some African leaders to withdrawal from the Rome 
Statute.   
 
II Politics: Consensus among the Like-Minded Group 
The experience of overseeing the ad-hoc tribunals probably encouraged efforts to 
build a more enduring and wide-reaching court,
894
 particularly as the various costs 
associated with those tribunals discouraged state-makers from establishing more 
courts along those lines.
895
  According to Cassese “the logistics of setting up the two 
ad hoc tribunals strained the capabilities and resources of the UN and consumed the 
[Security Council’s] time.  The [Security Council] found itself frequently seized with 
issues and problems concerning these tribunals and their administration, and as a 
result became less inclined to establish other similar organs.”896  Tribunal fatigue 
may have prompted a shift away from using the enforcement powers of the UN 
                                                          
893
  Amnesty International Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications of the Merged 
and Expanded African Court, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/ documents/ 
afr01/3063/2016/en. Article 28L Bis of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (as amended by the Malabo Protocol) states: “Illicit exploitation of 
natural resources” means any of the following acts if they are of a serious nature affecting the 
stability of a state, region or the union: (a) Concluding an agreement to exploit resources, in 
violation of the principle of peoples’ sovereignty over their natural resources; (b) Concluding 
with state authorities an agreement to exploit natural resources, in violation of the legal and 
regulatory procedures of the State concerned; (c) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural 
resources through corrupt practices; (d) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources 
that is clearly one-sided; (e) Exploiting natural resources without any agreement with the States 
concerned; (f) Exploiting natural resources without complying with the norms relating to the 
protection of the environment and the security of the people and the staff; and (g) Violating the 
norms and standards established by the relevant natural resources certification mechanism. 
894
  Goldstone and Smith, above n 15, at 110. 
895
  At 106. 
896
  Cassese, above n 15, at 328.  This point did not make it into the revised 2013 edition.  
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Security Council as a means of pursuing international criminal justice toward a 
treaty-based approach still linked to the UN Security Council but not necessary 
hostage to the travails of its dynamic agenda or the interests of its veto-wielding P-5.  
While the ad-hoc tribunals were being established by the UN Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a road was being paved for a more permanent 
institution for enforcing ICL: in particular, the debates focusing on the ICTY’s 
establishment within the UN Security Council revealed that plans for a permanent 
international criminal court were being discussed back then.
897  The negotiations 
establishing the ICC must be understood, then, within a similar set of politico-
strategic circumstances that gave rise to the ad-hoc tribunals in the aftermath of the 
Cold War, though, of course, these negotiations, occurring in Rome, were not 
constrained to the same extent as those that took place within the UN Security 
Council during the mid-1990s.  Having negotiations occur beyond the Council’s 
chambers opened up opportunities for non-state actors to foreground their own views 
and actions, for instance.  As Michael J Struett puts it:
898 
The existence of a unique set of circumstances in world politics was an 
important condition that facilitated the success of NGO efforts at 
discursive persuasion.  The end of the Cold War, the tragic 
developments in the former Yugoslavia and the creation of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the election 
of Tony Blair as British Prime Minister, among countless other local 
and global factors, were all crucial developments that facilitated the 
prompt establishment of an ICC.  The end of the Cold War removed 
the tendency to view every international conflict in terms of its 
implications or the categorical struggle between the West and the East. 
This is not to say that NGOs and other members of global civil society were absent 
during the establishment of the military and ad-hoc tribunals, or that these groups did 
not support certain prosecutorial efforts.  Rather, it is to emphasise that such efforts 
surrounding the negotiation of the ICC were both more extensive and intensive, 
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  Struett, above n 85, at 88. 
898
  At 25. 
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gaining greater prominence than before.  As Bosco explains “the period between the 
end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks had likely been a unique and limited 
window to launch the ICC.  For that brief period, the security and sovereignty 
concerns of certain major powers were reduced enough for several of them to 
acquiesce to the court.”899  This is not to imply, however, that the security concerns of 
the major powers are identical, but rather that these concerns are underpinned by the 
ongoing propagation of a neoliberal agenda, of which the governing global elite have 
a stake in entrenching and protecting.  This was the most recent moment of 
consonance between the underlying discourse and the prevailing politico-strategic 
circumstances.  
The ICC’s diplomatic roots can be traced back to 1989 when Trinidad and 
Tobago requested the UN General Assembly consider establishing a court designed 
specifically to try cases of transnational drug trafficking.  The draft statute produced 
in 1994 by the ILC for an “international drug court” served as a basis for the statute 
that would establish the ICC, though “much to the chagrin of some, despite its critical 
role in forming the court, international drugs crimes would not be within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.”900  It is possible that the regulation of commercial activity—even illicit 
commercial activity—was at odds to the underlying free-market ethos circulating 
among the world’s elite during an era of intensifying globalisation.  The ILC’s draft 
statute was examined by an ad-hoc committee established for that purpose and, in 
1996, the General Assembly established a Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which drafted the text of a possible 
treaty.  Following the decision to hold a Diplomatic Conference at Rome on the issue, 
the Committee submitted both a draft Statute and a draft Final Act which, spread over 
173 pages, included “some 1300 words in square brackets, representing multiple 
options either to entire provisions or to some words contained in certain 
provisions.”901  At the 1998 Rome Conference the negotiation of these bracketed 
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  Bosco, above n 623, at 72. 
900
  Goldstone and Smith, above n 15, at 96-97. 
901
  Cassese, above n 15, at 262-263. 
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sections of specific text proved slow going as these discussions took place in informal 
committees which agreed by consensus only.
902
     
During these negotiations three major groups emerged, the largest of which was 
the so-called like-minded group of states which included Canada, Australia, UK and 
France among its sixty members.  These states believed they could design a global 
architecture for the pursuit of international criminal justice, which would be 
considered fair and legitimate by the most of the international community because 
members of the group lacked great power status.
903
  This group played a progressive 
and constructive role as a force driving the negotiations, offering specific remedies to 
contentious text.
904
  Among this group Germany supported a strong and independent 
ICC, promptly ratified the Rome Statute and publicly encouraged other states to 
ratify.
905
  Dutton believes that in so doing Germany sought to “distance itself from its 
shameful past” and its nationals whom the IMT found guilty.906  Germany was also 
asserting its leadership within the EU.   
The efforts of the group of like-minded states were informed, shaped and 
buttressed by NGOs advocating for a strong independent prosecutor (with proprio 
motu powers) and an ICC capable of exercising jurisdiction over atrocity crimes.
907
  
As early as the beginning of 1995, some NGOs met in New York in order to better 
coordinate their advocacy efforts, forming the Coalition for an International Criminal 
Court (CICC).
908
  Some of the NGOs involved themselves at an early stage of the 
negotiations through a Committee of Experts which, led by Cherif Bassiouni, drafted 
a statute for the establishment of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over 
all international crimes as the UN General Assembly and the ILC devoted themselves 
to similar tasks.
909
  Represented at the Conference in large numbers—officially-
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  Cryer and others, above n 15, at 47. 
903
  Bosco, above n 623, at 39. 
904
  Cryer and others, above n 15, at 148. 
905
  Dutton, above n 91, at 72. 
906
  At 74. 
907
  At 14. 
908
  Bosco, above n 623, at 39.  Refer to http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org.  
909
  Struett, above n 85, at 73.   
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accredited NGOs outnumbered states by a figure of 236 to 160
910—NGOs pursued 
their various objectives by presenting papers and lobbying delegations.
911
  Some 
members belonging to NGOs participated on delegations as consultants and others as 
full members of delegations; Canada and Costa Rica are two examples where such 
representations were offered as a symbol of goodwill.  The limited capacity of 
numerous smaller delegations to engage with, and fully understand, many of the 
important proposals was ameliorated, to a modest extent, where these delegations had 
ongoing access to the legal expertise provided by NGOs.
912
  At least 30 less 
developed states, for example, relied upon legal expertise drawn from graduate 
students and faculty members belonging to US or western European laws schools.
913
  
NGOs also ensured that the perspectives of states, such as Sierra Leone, and Bosnia, 
which had recently experienced atrocity crime, were given voice and heard.
914
  The 
Rome Conference was, thus, notable for the various roles played by NGOs,
915
 both 
from within delegations and from the meeting’s margins, helping foster a sense of 
purpose among, and a set of expectations of, the group of like-minded states.
916
  
Indeed, the ranks of the like-minded states began to swell to nearly 60 members by 
the Conference’s third week, helped no doubt by CICC’s publicising a list of 
affiliated states that “served both as recognition from the human rights community of 
the favourable stance that these states were taking and also created pressure on other 
states to have their names added to the list.”917  By the close of the Conference, over 
100 states claimed some form of association with the positions adopted by the group 
of like-minded states.  
A second major group comprising three of the P-5—the US, Russian Federation 
and the PRC—also emerged during negotiations.  The consensus among the Grand 
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911
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Coalition established half a century earlier and the consensus among the UN Security 
Council in the mid-1990s had been broken as France and the UK voted as part of the 
like-minded group of states whereas the US, Russian Federation and PRC did not.
918
  
A non-aligned movement was the third major group emerging from within the Rome 
Conference.  This group comprised many of those smaller, developing states which, 
having achieved independence after the Second World War, were numerically 
dominant in this forum.  This latter group played an important role in shifting the 
debate over an ICC from the UN General Assembly to a diplomatic Conference,
919
 a 
vital step along the path towards building the capability needed to pursue 
international criminal justice. 
At the Rome Conference’s closing session the text of the Statute was adopted 
along with a Resolution establishing a Preparatory Committee to prepare any other 
documents required to establish the ICC.
920
  As Cassese explains:
921
 
A group of distinguished diplomats, and in particular the Canadian 
Philippe Kirsch, who chaired the Committee of the Whole (where the 
major points of the draft statute were substantially negotiated) must be 
credited with having been able skilfully to devise and suggest a 
number of compromise formulae that in the event permitted the 
Conference to adopt the Statute by 120 votes to 7 votes (USA, Libya, 
Iraq, Israel, China, Syria, Sudan) with 20 abstentions. 
The Rome Statute required sixty state-parties to ratify it in order to enter into force.  
That occurred, relatively expeditiously compared to other international treaties, on 1 
July 2002.
922
  Whereas the London and Tokyo Charters were drafted by “a handful of 
statesmen from the highest echelons of government” the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR 
and ICC were drafted by “career diplomats, international civil servants, and experts 
and activists of all types.”923  The role played by NGOs in encouraging the 
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ratification of the Rome Statute warrants particular attention; once they had agreed 
that the compromises reached over the draft Statute were acceptable, NGOs began 
mobilising “a worldwide campaign to secure signatures and ratifications of the Rome 
Statute.”924  This included educating legislators925 and building alliances among 
NGOs from the Global North, with significant legal and media resources, and those 
from the Global South.
926
 
The US, which had been central to the development of the international military 
tribunals in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, and instrumental in 
the development of the ICTY and, to a lesser extent, the ICTR in the aftermath of the 
Cold War, was less so when it came to the development of the ICC.  US delegates 
played a significant role at first, but their influence waned as they began to object to 
the draft statute as it was taking shape.  When 120 states voted to establish an ICC 
largely unfettered by the UN Security Council, the US voted against the Rome 
Statute’s adoption,927 though the US was, as mentioned, not the only state opposing 
the ICC’s establishment.928  Despite signing the Rome Statute in the closing moments 
of the Clinton Administration and at the last possible moment for a founding member 
to sign it without having to have had also ratified it,  the US later signalled its 
intention not to ratify the Statute through correspondence with the UN Secretariat.
929
   
On 6 May 2002 John Bolton, then-undersecretary of state for arms control and 
international security for the Bush Administration, advised then-UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan that the US did not intend to ratify the treaty.  The decision was 
based around fears of the prosecutor’s powers and the spectre of a runaway 
prosecutor.
930
  As Bolton subsequently put it, “[t]he United States should raise our 
objections to the ICC on every appropriate occasion, as part of our larger campaign 
to assert American interests against stifling, illegitimate and unacceptable 
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international agreements.”931  The US frequently discouraged other state-makers, 
which they could influence, from ratifying the Rome Statute while encouraging those 
and other state-makers to sign agreements to refuse to surrender American military 
personnel to the ICC.  As Dutton reflects “[a]lthough the United States is a leader in 
promoting better human rights practise and accountability mechanisms, the evidence 
suggests that it viewed, and continues to view, the ICC’s strong enforcement 
mechanisms as a credible threat to state sovereignty.”932  US cooperation with the 
ICC was further curtailed by the American Service Members’ Protection Act, which 
not only provided for cancelling aid to those state parties refusing to sign a non-
surrender agreement with the US, but also authorised the use of “all means necessary, 
including military force” to release suspects arrested by the ICC prosecutor.  This 
raises the possibility of US Special Forces conducting hostage rescue missions if any 
US national is taken into custody at The Hague.  The decision taken by the Bush 
Administration to not ratify the Rome Statute signals both a divergence from 
Clinton’s commitment to pursuing international criminal justice and an estrangement 
from the international community’s respect of emerging norms. 
An even more dramatic event was to irrevocably shift the focus of US foreign 
policy, especially its defence, international security and justice dimensions.  On 11 
September 2001, as the Rome Statute was being ratified but before the ICC was 
formally established and operating, members of a fundamentalist Islamic group 
known as Al Qaeda executed a well-planned and well-coordinated attack on the 
continental US, most notably targeting New York’s World Trade Centre and 
Washington’s Pentagon.  Richard Falk describes these targets, respectively, as “the 
prime expression of American economic dominance in an era of globalization” and 
“the core embodiment of American military power.”933  This attack offered an echo 
of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, though Al Qaeda’s 
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attacks penetrated deeper into American mainland and gave focus to civilian targets 
while Al Qaeda’s organisational structure presented a more original challenge to US 
as “a network that could operate anywhere and everywhere, and yet was definitely 
situated nowhere.”934  The attacks in New York and Washington resulted in a civilian 
death toll reaching 3,000, signifying a form of mega-terrorism which “is violence 
against civilian targets that achieves significant levels of substantive as well as 
symbolic harm, causing damage on a scale once associated with large-scale military 
attacks under state auspices, and thus threatening to target society in a warlike 
manner that gives rise to a defensive urgency to strike back as effectively as 
possible.”935 
It was, however, the US Government’s response which resonated more 
powerfully within contemporary world affairs.
936
  While in the immediate aftermath 
of these terror attacks the US enjoyed a high level of international support for its 
reprisals against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, some legal scholars now suggest 
that these attacks may not have been covered by the self-defence provisions of Article 
51 of the UN Charter.
937
  Moreover, the US invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq 
and, more specifically, the conduct of the ensuing occupation may have undermined 
perceptions of US prestige.  When the US Government favoured the extra-judicial 
killing of Osama bin Laden ahead of an international trial similar to that which it had 
used to punish the Nazis and Shinto-Imperialists, it fully abdicated its leadership role 
in the quest for international criminal justice.  The US continues to shield from 
international justice its own security, military and intelligence apparatus, engaged in 
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936
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its War on Terror, on the grounds that it plays a unique role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security.
938
  
As dramatic as the events of 11 September 2001 were, the US-led War on 
Terror is reshaping the politico-strategic dimension of contemporary world affairs, 
but it may have roots in the nineteenth-century notion of manifest destiny, the 
attempted annihilation of native Americans and US exceptionalism.  According to 
Patman:
939
 
The idea of US exceptionalism refers to an informal ideology that 
endows Americans with a pervasive faith in the uniqueness, 
immutability, and superiority of the country’s founding liberal 
principles, and also with the conviction that the USA has special 
destiny among nations.  The founders of America saw the country as a 
new form of political community, dedicated to the Enlightenment 
principles of the rule of law, private property, representative 
government, freedom of speech and religion, and commercial liberty. 
More than that, however, “American exceptionalism and its successor ontologies of 
indulgence and self-justification—manifest destiny, Pax Americana, Containment, 
and Roll-back—were, it should be noted, at first conceded in terms of this character, 
hence the term ‘liberal empire.’”940  US exceptionalism, particularly its search for 
national security, has resulted in a new level of estrangement from the norms 
increasingly respected by the wider international community.  The US Government 
openly eschews international law-making process that it cannot control or use as an 
instrument to further US security and economic interests.   
More recently, however, the US appears to be in a mood for rapprochement 
with the Court and its proponents.  Significant here is the US decision not to veto a 
Security Council Resolution referring the Darfur situation to the ICC prosecutor.
941
  
The US also softened its positon on providing military aid only to states with a Status 
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of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and removed a restriction on providing military 
training to non-SOFAs.
942
  Even though the US attitude towards the ICC began to 
soften during the Bush Administration’s second term, it is the Obama Administration 
that has encouraged a more positive attitude.
943
  This was signalled by that 
Administration sending the largest delegation to the Kampala Review Conference in 
2010, supporting the Security Council’s Resolution 1970 (2011) referring the Libyan 
situation to the ICC prosecutor,
944
 and dispatching 100 military advisors to hunt down 
Joseph Kony, a fugitive wanted by the ICC prosecutor.
945
  It is no coincidence that 
the situations in Sudan and Libya, the only two situations so far referred to the ICC 
prosecutor by the UN Security Council, involved leaders who follow of Islam in a 
time when the US remain embroiled in its War on Terror.  This signals important 
linkages between the search for international security and the quest for international 
criminal justice.  The fierce contest between two rival modernist utopian movements 
could not be plainer: US-led economic liberalisation on a global scale versus 
representatives of an expansive Muslim fundamentalism.  The irony here is, of 
course, that “[r]adical Islam is a symptom of the disease of which it pretends to be the 
cure”946  As Gray explains further:947  
Like communism and Nazism, radical Islam is modern.  Though it 
claims to be anti-western, it is shaped as much by western ideology as 
by Islamic traditions.  Like Marxists and neo-liberals, radical Islamists 
see history as a prelude to a new world.  All are convinced they can 
remake the human condition.  If there is a uniquely modern myth, this 
is it.   
 
The consensus to establish the ICC was shaped by the discourse against 
politico-cruelty, particularly its abhorrence of mass atrocity and its favoured recourse 
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to ICL as a means to excommunicate hostis humani generis.  A set of propitious 
politico-strategic circumstances, including the appetite of a group of like-minded 
states and certain NGOs to establish a permanent court designed specifically to 
enforce ICL, were also required.  “Only by breaking with a statist ontology and 
examining the agency of individual actors is it possible to account for the emergence 
of an ICC,”948 Struett explains, where NGOs “played a crucial role in shaping the 
Rome Statute for the ICC and in securing its entry into force less than four years after 
it opened for signatures.”949  Struett goes on to argue that:950 
[A] crucial factor leading to the adoption of the Rome Statute was 
the development of a normative discourse between nongovernmental 
organizations, lawyers, academics, international civil servants, and 
states. In many respects it was the NGOs, and not state governments, 
that predominantly shaped the content of the Rome Statute.  The 
outcome of the Rome ICC Treaty Conference was driven by a 
discourse that was orientated towards creating the widest possible 
normative consensus recognizing the legitimacy of the new court’s 
power to enforce international criminal law.  The relatively 
disinterested nature of NGOs allowed them to contribute to this 
discourse in a way that was morally resonant; consequently they 
were influential. 
Notwithstanding the significance of the group of like-minded states and the coterie of 
NGOs forging the abovementioned consensus, the US’ decision not to be a member 
of the court signals an important departure from earlier ICL enforcement efforts.  
Unlike previous quests for international criminal justice, which the US has led, 
supported or enabled, the establishment of the ICC is less dependent on US largesse.  
The US, while still powerful, is no longer the driving force behind the quest for 
international criminal justice that they once were, focusing instead it seems on 
waging its War on Terror.  Nevertheless, the consensus to establish a permanent court 
designed specifically to enforce ICL provided another temporal manifestation of the 
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discourse against politico-cruelty.  Despite the loud proclamations asserting the 
centrality of victim’s justice by the court’s proponents, the design of this institution 
was informed by EU members and by assertive NGOs underwritten by donor 
capitalism. 
 
III Law: Donors’ Justice 
Borrowing much from the statutes establishing the ad-hoc tribunals, the Rome Statute 
provides a blueprint for the ICC’s structure and composition.  According to Article 34 
of the Statute, the ICC comprises of four organs: a Presidency; Chambers (which 
includes a Pre-Trial Division, a Trial Division, and an Appeals Division); a Registry; 
and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).  (While the Statute recognises the Defence as 
being an important pillar of international criminal justice, it was not included as an 
organ of the ICC.)  The key pillar, at least for the purposes of this thesis, is the OTP.  
The design of prosecutorial functions here is very similar to earlier tribunals; namely 
to investigate potential serious international crimes by collecting, examining and 
analysing evidence (including questioning the accused, witnesses and victims), 
preparing indictments, making opening statements, presenting evidence, cross-
examining witnesses and making closing arguments.  The prosecutor is also 
empowered to seek the cooperation of any state or intergovernmental organisation 
and to enter into agreements facilitating the cooperation of a state, intergovernmental 
organisation or person.  The prosecutor has obligations not to disclose information 
obtained on the condition of confidentiality and can take necessary steps to ensure the 
integrity of that information is preserved.  According to Article 42, the prosecutor is 
also “responsible for receiving referrals and any substantiated information on crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, for examining them and for conducting 
investigations and prosecutions before the Court.”  The Statute goes further at Article 
54, stating “The Prosecutor shall: (a) In order to establish the truth, extend the 
investigation to cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether 
there is criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.”  This is a significant 
development from the earlier tribunals’ prosecutorial mandates, reflecting the 
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significance of truth to the pursuit of international criminal justice whereas 
punishment and then prosecution had been the focus on the first and second 
generation of prosecutors, respectively.  
Prosecutorial focus is constrained by the court’s jurisdiction, meaning the 
prosecutor cannot pursue any charges outside the ICC’s jurisdiction.  There are other 
important fetters on the prosecutor’s independence, which did not exist at earlier 
tribunals.  Firstly, the Pre-trial Chambers represent a legal fetter by authorising 
investigations, issuing warrants and summons to appear and conducting pre-trial 
hearings.  Secondly, a politico-strategic fetter is held by the UN Security Council, 
which can not only refer situations to the ICC prosecutor, but can also compel the 
prosecutor to defer his or her investigation for up to twelve months at a time.  The 
design of the OTP also differs from earlier international tribunals by having one 
prosecutor, rather than a team of prosecutors as occurred at the international military 
tribunals, or a single prosecutor responsible for managing the caseload of two 
contemporaneous tribunals with differing mandates and jurisdiction, as occurred in 
the case of the international criminal tribunals until 2003.  Moreover, the appointment 
process for the ICC’s prosecutor differs from the court’s predecessors.  While he or 
she is elected by a majority of the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) for a term of nine 
years without prospect for reappointment, the ICC prosecutor “once elected… moves 
largely beyond the control of states.”951  The prosecutors and their deputies must be 
of different nationalities,
952
 reducing other forms of identity-markers, such as gender, 
ethnicity, religion or class, to secondary importance. 
Just as the discourse against politico-cruelty informs the ICC’s design through 
its reliance on the rule of international criminal law, it also shapes the scope of its 
jurisdiction.  Although Article 5 of the Rome Statute states that the ICC will have 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, the content of that crime was not agreed at 
the Rome Conference.  The US led an unsuccessful effort to exclude this crime from 
the Statute.  The P-5 were keen to protect their unique authority to determine when an 
act of aggression causes a breach of the international peace, believing that their 
                                                          
951
  Bosco, above n 623, at 54. 
952
  Townsend, above n 1, at 287. 
262 
 
determination would be a pre-requisite for an ICC investigation.
953
  Although the 
Rome Conference did not agree on the definition of the crime of aggression, an 
agreement was reached at the subsequent Review Conference in Kampala in 2010.  
The inclusion of aggression as a crime reflected the desires of many smaller states, 
which thought themselves more likely to become victims of aggression than to 
become alleged aggressors.
954
  According to the outcome of that Conference, the 
crime of aggression means, as previously mentioned, “the planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or 
to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by 
its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”955  An “act of aggression” is defined as “the use of armed force by a 
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”956   
This wording signals that initiating international armed conflict—which is not 
an act of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter or authorised by the UN 
Security Council under Chapter VII—is no longer considered the supreme 
international crime, as it was at the military tribunals, or only as an underlying 
contextual factor of atrocity crimes, as it was at the ad-hoc tribunals.  Instead, the 
crime of aggression now sits alongside war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
crimes of genocide as a serious international crime that merits inclusion in the 
prosecutor’s reach, given that the Rome Statute’s preamble reaffirms “the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular that all States 
shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations.”957  This means the status quo system of politico-strategic affairs, 
established in 1945, is preserved and remains stable, though the ability of the P-5 to 
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wage aggressive wars of their choosing or to veto any proposed ICC-related UN 
Resolution is mitigated somewhat because the Council’s power to defer an ICC 
investigation requires the consent of all five veto holders.  Yet the Council can refer 
situations occurring in states that are not signatories to the Rome Statute, which some 
legal scholars protest is in tension with existing principles of international law which 
suggest “that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for third parties.”958 
Whereas the ICTY and ICTR Statutes did not provide for detailed definitions of 
atrocity crimes, the Rome Statute defines war crimes and crimes against humanity to 
an unprecedented degree,
959
 though those who negotiated the definitions claimed they 
were only designing an ongoing mechanism to punish what ICL determines is a 
serious international crime, rather than defining new crimes per se.
960
  Despite a 
strong minority opposing the inclusion of war crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction961 
the Rome Statute defines war crimes in greater detail than the statutes of the earlier 
tribunals.  It reflects developments in ICL by building upon the ICTY’s Tadić 
judgement that IHL can be applied to situations of non-international armed conflict.  
About half of the provisions applicable to situations of international armed conflict 
were deemed applicable to situations of non-international, or internal, armed 
conflict.
962
 
Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute states that war crimes means: (a) grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; (b) other serious violations 
of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the 
established framework of international law; (c) in the case of an armed conflict not of 
an international character, serious violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949; (e) other serious violations of the laws and customs 
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applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established 
framework of international law.  
Notwithstanding these significant developments in ICL, the Rome Statute has 
its omissions, including the war crime of employing weapons calculated to cause 
unnecessary suffering.  Although this war crime featured in the ICTY Statute, and 
was thereby deemed by the UN Security Council to reflect the state of customary 
international law at that time, delegates to the Rome Conference were unable to reach 
an agreement on a set of words defining the crime, possibly because it might be 
applied to the nuclear weapons arsenals held by the major powers.
963
  Other parts of 
the Rome Statute appear retrograde.  The inclusion of the phrase “within the 
established framework of international law” in Article 8(2) (b) and (e), but not in 
other provisions, implies that those crimes are justiciable under the ICC only if they 
are found in customary international law.  In other words, there are two categories of 
war crime that require the ICC to examine on a case-by-case basis the current status 
of general international law.  Moreover, the ICC’s jurisdiction over the means of 
warfare appears narrower than that of customary international law.  Customary 
international law, for example, prohibits the use of indiscriminate weapons in 
international armed conflict as a war crime whereas the Rome Statute apparently does 
not.  Furthermore, the Statute’s prohibition of certain weapons used in non-
international armed conflict as a war crime also falls short of the general international 
law.
964
  “One is therefore left with the impression that the framers of the ICC Statute 
were eager to shield their servicemen as much as possible from being brought to trial 
for war crimes,” Cassese avers.  Cassese went on to surmise that “a tentative 
appraisal of the provisions on war crimes of the ICC Statute cannot but be chequered: 
in many respects the Statute marks a great advance in ICL, in others it proves instead 
faulty; in particular, it is marred by being too obsequious to state sovereignty.”965 
The Rome Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity also reflects the 
development of ICL since the international military tribunals, particularly where there 
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is no longer a requirement for a nexus with an underlying international armed 
conflict.  Article 7 of the Rome Statute states that crime against humanity means: 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) 
Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) 
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) 
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or 
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection 
with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) 
The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health. 
This list is significant for it not only elaborates and clarifies aspects of customary 
international law by rejecting the requirement of both an underlying situation of 
armed conflict and discriminatory grounds (with the exception of persecution), but 
also builds on the relevant provisions of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.  Acts of forced 
transfer of population, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilisation, sexual violence, enforced disappearance and apartheid are 
included in the Rome Statute, but were absent from the previous Statutes.
966
  In so 
doing, the drafters at Rome again claimed they were not expanding ICL’s reach, but 
rather, were merely codifying and reflecting what was already understood to be 
inhumane acts.
967
  The effect, however, is “to broaden the classes of conduct 
amounting to crimes against humanity” and the discriminatory grounds underpinning 
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persecution from political, racial, ethnic or religious to include cultural and gender 
grounds.
968
 
While some aspects of Article 7 elaborate, clarify or broaden customary 
international law, other aspects appear narrower.
969
  Article 7 is narrower than 
customary international law where it states that victims of crimes against humanity 
are civilian, thus excluding non-civilians such as belligerents who, having been 
wounded or captured, lay down their weapons.  This seems at odds with custom 
concerning hors de combat.
970
  So too does the requirement that an attacker of 
civilians must be seeking to further a state or similar organisation’s policy.  Article 7 
has a higher threshold than international customary law when it comes to the crime of 
persecution which, under the Rome Statute, must be committed in connection with 
another act or crime contained in the Statute.
971
  The US, UK and France continued to 
resist proposals which would have seen crimes against humanity requiring the terms 
widespread or systemic attack instead of  widespread and systemic attack, thereby 
“raising the bar of what a prosecutor would have to show in order to prove the 
commission of a crime against humanity.”972  Those efforts were unsuccessful as the 
Rome Statute includes the phrase “widespread or systematic attack.” 
Article 6 of the Rome Statute follows the ICTY and ICTR Statutes by 
reproducing the definition of genocide found in Article II of the Genocide 
Convention.  Yet, as Cassese notes, the conspiracy elements of Part III of the 
Genocide Convention were not taken up and included in the Rome Statute.  This 
signifies “an inconsistency between customary international law and the ICC Statute.  
The former prohibits and makes punishable ‘conspiracy to commit genocide’; that is, 
an inchoate crime consisting of the planning and organizing of genocide not 
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necessarily followed by the perpetration of the crime, whereas Article 6 does not 
contain a similar prohibition.”973   
While the elaboration of war crimes and crimes against humanity in greater 
specificity is one key difference between the ICC and its predecessors, a more 
significant difference lies in the ICC’s temporal and jurisdiction reach.  Unlike the 
international military tribunals’ jurisdiction covering the spatial and temporal zones 
relevant to the Second World War’s two major theatres in Europe and Asia, and 
unlike the ad-hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction covering internal armed conflict’s spatial and 
temporal zones, the ICC’s permanence means it is future orientated, covering serious 
international crimes committed since the treaty entered into force on 1 July 2002, but 
not before that.  This is significant for, “[i]f a state becomes a party to the Statute 
after its entry into force, the court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to 
crimes committed after the Statute has come into force for that particular state.”974  
Since it has jurisdiction over situations referred to it by the UN Security Council, the 
ICC has “potentially worldwide jurisdiction,”975 establishing an ICL regime of near 
global reach.  In addition to this expansive temporal jurisdiction the geographic reach 
of the ICC is sweeping, though not quite universal.  Perhaps more than half of 
humanity is not protected by the Rome Statute given that the PRC and India have not 
signed and ratified the Rome Statute.  As Bosco explains, the “battle royale at Rome 
was over the court’s jurisdiction, and the last-minute changes left two principal 
avenues.  The Statute allows the ICC to prosecute crimes committed on the territory 
of a court member or by a national of a court member”976 provided that person was 
over the age of 18 when the alleged offence took place.
977
  There are, of course, 
important limits to this jurisdiction as powerful states, such as the current hegemon 
and other victors of the Second World War—namely the US and the Russian 
Federation—are not signatories, or have not acceded, to the Rome Statute.  However, 
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while some observers expected the UN Security Council not to refer any situations to 
the ICC, the Council did so in early 2005 and again in early 2011, thereby helping, to 
a limited degree, to legitimise the court (though this did present opportunities to the 
P-5 to inform and shape the ICC’s docket.)978  Whereas NGOs argued for an end to 
impunity for all perpetrators of atrocity crimes, the UN Security Council argued to 
limit the range of cases that the ICC could hear, creating certain loopholes to avoid 
future international prosecutions targeting their citizens.
979
  
The ICC is not another example of victor’s justice, however.  The ICC was not 
established following a major international armed conflict as a means of punishing 
only the vanquished.  It was, rather, established by way of treaty and has broad 
support not only from among the society of states, but also from across the wider 
international community, which includes global civil society, NGOs and academics.  
Citizens belonging to ASP members will face trial.  Nor is the ICC another example 
of hegemon’s justice as it was not established following an internal armed conflict as 
a means of restoring or maintaining peace and international security.  Whereas the 
military and ad-hoc tribunals were retrospective enforcement institutions (with the 
partial exception of the ICTY) imposed on the vanquished or weak by powerful 
states,
980
 there was, in fact, no particular, single armed conflict that spurred on this 
latest quest.  Whereas the substantive elements and jurisdictional reach of the military 
tribunals meant those institutions were designed in order to deliver victor’s justice, 
and the substantive elements and jurisdictional reach of the ad-hoc tribunals meant 
those institutions were designed in order to deliver hegemon’s justice, the ICC has 
been designed by medium and small states in conjunction with NGOs as the fulcrum 
of an ICL regime that pursues victim’s justice on the victim’s behalf.  It does so 
because the court combats the impunity enjoyed by some, but by no means all, local 
and state leaders around the world when they commit war crimes, crimes against 
humanity or crimes of genocide.  Victims of the atrocity crimes under examination 
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are incorporated into trial proceedings not merely as witnesses, but also as key 
stakeholders in the pursuit of international criminal justice.  By targeting the culture 
of impunity enjoyed by those who commit serious international crime, the ICC places 
the victim at the centre of the pursuit of international criminal justice in a way not 
previously seen in earlier ICL enforcement efforts.  While victims are proclaimed the 
ICC’s raison d’être, their actual access to international criminal justice is restricted 
by the prosecutor’s selection of cases and charges as well as the victim’s knowledge 
of their own eligibility.  As Sara Kendall and Sarah Nouwen lament, “[o]f the 
millions of victims in the world, only thousands have managed to reach the top of the 
pyramid of juridified victimhood and have been granted provisional recognition as 
victims before the ICC. To date only a handful of these have been permitted to speak 
directly in ICC proceedings.”981         
Yet this victim’s justice is also a form of NGO justice; that is, the justice of self-
congratulatory global social movements, the most prominent NGOs of which are 
based in advanced industrial societies and tend to “try to speak for groups that are not 
well represented in intergovernmental decision making.”982  According to Sara 
Kendall, “[d]onors’ justice can be defined as third-party financial support for the 
work of international criminal justice institutions, where funders are not a party to the 
conflict that the court was set up to adjudicate…. [and] International criminal justice 
thus becomes a marketplace for the global ‘haves’ to participate based upon their 
foreign and domestics agendas.”983  Even though the most significant donor moments 
occur within the Assembly of State Parties, the activities of NGOs are worthy of 
consideration, and not merely because they often portray themselves as somehow 
independent from the political forces circulating around them. These NGOs, 
particularly those advocating for democratic reform, market liberalisation and “a 
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prevailing discourse of ‘rights talk’ and general principles of individualism” enjoy the 
financial and diplomatic support of international donors.  As a result, many of these 
NGOs suffer a democratic deficit yet have “budgets as large as a regularly 
functioning corporation, [and] thus became public intermediaries, increasingly central 
to the transnational flow of ideas from international organizations to national cultural 
domains.  In a symbolic way, they furthered the political aims of economic donors of 
the 1980s and 1990s while benefitting directly from their patronage.”984  This is 
important because:985 
the rise of the rule of law as another regime of knowledge and truth is 
fundamentally connected to an even more intertwined economy, 
which, although interconnected with human rights, is directly related 
to struggles over the management of Africa’s violence through a 
complex moral sphere to protect the ‘victim’ but is driven by the quest 
for justice made possible through donor capitalism. Thus, the new 
sphere of internationalisation is certainly about victim’s justice but 
must be understood through an ontology of the management of 
postcolonial African resources, the place of Europe’s declining 
colonial power, and American and Asian capital in the new ‘scramble 
for Africa.’  
Victim’s justice, then, is the more marketable human face given to NGO justice 
which, in turn, constitutes donors’ justice, serving the interests of those advocating 
for neoliberalism.  To a large extent the ICC’s jurisdiction reach maps closely against 
the distribution of the world’s more easily exploited natural resources.  While the 
quest for international criminal justice is no longer as dependent on US policymakers 
as it once was, it is now being propelled by the EU, the strongest members of which 
are still advocating and entrenching neoliberalism at home and abroad as part of their 
policy agenda.  While proponents of the ICC proclaim that the virtues of justice 
seeking informed the design of the Court, there are less obvious and more subtle 
factors at play here.  The ICC has been designed as a propagator of virtue—or, to 
rephrase Arendt, as an institutional provider of a banality of goodness—which 
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defends the moral interests of the international community and, through that society 
of states, our shared humanity.  Yet, the Court’s design also means that it will obscure 
and erase the negative consequences flowing from the globalising neoliberal 
economic system, which provides conditions for many recent atrocity crimes.  In so 
doing, this banality of goodness masks a deeper transformation (which for some 
people almost epitomises evil in itself) that is present in neoliberalism and conceals 
the gulf between contemporary neoliberal practices and nineteenth-century classical 
liberalism.
986
  
 
IV War: Rebuilding after Mass Atrocity 
The ICC’s seat was initially located on the outskirts of The Hague in the seaside 
resort town of Scheveningen, until a new building was constructed specifically to 
house the court in the international zone of The Hague.  The ICC finalised its move to 
these new premises in mid-December 2015 and is now located there.  The selection of 
The Hague as the court’s permanent seat supports the city’s claim to be a new centre 
of international peace and justice as the ICTY also has its seat there, as does the 
International Court of Justice and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
987
  This cluster of 
institutions of international law signals a potential shift in the underlying 
configurations of power in contemporary world politics, including the importance of 
EU funding, from the international military tribunals established by the victors of the 
Second World War on their newly-occupied territories.  The peace, civility and 
sophistication of The Hague stands in deliberate contrast to the violence, carnage and 
brutality of recent atrocity crimes committed in places such as the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, 
Kenya, Libya, Ivory Coast and Mali.  
A key feature of the ICC is its permanence, which marks a major difference 
between it and its predecessors, all of which are more accurately described as being 
ad hoc— a Latin term that “generally signifies a solution designed for a specific 
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situation, non-generalizable, and not intended to be able to be adapted to other 
purposes.”988  This difference is important because the permanent nature of the ICC 
means that it is a future-orientated institution, offering a more robust form of 
deterrence to those would-be perpetrators of serious international crime who believe 
that the international community would be reluctant to establish tribunals specifically 
to deal with their situations.
989
  Augmenting the ICC’s permanent nature is the 
principle of complementarity and its status as a court of last resort.  This 
complementarity calls for the strengthening of national-level judicial systems to the 
extent that they can themselves deal with prosecuting serious international crimes, 
though the power to determine if these national-level prosecutorial efforts are genuine 
belongs to the ICC.
990
  In this way the relationship between the ICC and the domestic 
judiciaries of signatories to the Rome Statute is one which supplements rather than 
supplants.
991
  The ICC’s geographic reach thus continues to grow as more states ratify 
the Rome Statute and take steps to strengthen their domestic justice sectors, including 
by developing relevant provisions in their respective municipal laws, for enforcing 
ICL.
992
  However, this strengthening of domestic justice sectors does not necessarily 
deliver better criminal justice as investigations might be launched and trials 
conducted at the domestic level in order to shield certain individuals and groups from 
international scrutiny, though if the ICC prosecutor determines the prosecutions are 
bogus he or she can seize the case and place it before the ICC.  States can also use the 
self-referral trigger process as a means of targeting opposition political parties or 
armed groups.  Despite its design as a court of last resort, the ICC has on more than 
one occasion deemed admissible situations that are self-referred by an authority that 
has a functioning juridical system,
993
 which was, as we shall see in the following 
chapter, the case for Uganda, the DRC (at least in the Ituri province) and Mali.
994
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  Reydams and Wouters, above n 137, at 19. 
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  At 13. 
991
  Cryer and others, above n 15, at 154. 
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  Struett, above n 85, at 124-125. 
993
  Hoile, above n 958, at 219; see also Charles Chernor Jalloh “Regionalizing International 
Criminal Law?” (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review 445.   
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Like the vanquished enemies tried at the military tribunals and the weak 
opponents of the hegemon tried at the ad-hoc tribunals, local or state leaders who face 
trial at the ICC are removed from their operating environments and those subject to 
arrest warrants are usually denied the freedom to travel at will.
995
  This has 
predictable negative consequences on the prospects of peace negotiations where the 
accused are discouraged from giving up their arms, as occurred when the leaders of 
the LRA were indicted, undermining their incentive to negotiate within the Juba 
peace process.
996
  At the same time, the ongoing strengthening of national judiciaries 
tends to entrench, locally, the global or cosmopolitan doctrine of individualism ahead 
of alternative forms of group identity based on national, ethnic, tribal, gender, class or 
religious affiliations.  This cult of individualism not only reflects, but also inscribes 
“a political economy of human rights that draws its power from ritual spectacles 
funded through donor capitalism and positioned within new biopolitical 
bureaucracies compromising governmental and nongovernmental organizations.”997  
While the doctrine of individual responsibility draws upon western liberal thought 
and gives focus to the quest for international criminal justice on humanity’s behalf, it 
falls short of reconsidering root causes of armed conflict and mass atrocity in places 
such as Sub-Saharan Africa.  Rather “root causes of violence are only collected as 
histories for establishing mitigating circumstances,” Clarke laments.998  Nor does the 
doctrine of individual responsibility interrogate the power configurations imposed on 
those subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction—namely Libya and Sudan—and those who are 
beyond its immediate reach, such as the US, PRC, Japan, India and Pakistan. 
The establishment of the ICC and the concomitant strengthening of state-
parties’ justice sectors has occurred simultaneously with efforts to reconstruct 
particular states and economies in aftermath of mass atrocity.  The UN Security 
Council has authorised some peacekeeping operations not only to support the work of 
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the ICC prosecutor,
999
 but also to strengthen democratic institutions and processes in 
DRC,
1000
 CAR,
1001
 Ivory Coast
1002
 and Mali.
1003
  This signals the close relationship 
between ICL enforcement and politico-strategic transitions to democracies.  Yet at 
the same time it reveals a tension between the UN Security Council and the ICC 
because peacekeepers are excluded from the prosecutor’s purview.1004   It also signals 
                                                          
999
  See for instance: UN Security Council Resolution 2164 (2014), para 8, which states the Council 
“[u]rges the Malian authorities… to continue to cooperate with the International Criminal 
Court”; and UN Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014) para 30((f)(i), which states the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA) shall “support and work with the Transitional Authorities to arrest and bring to 
justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country, including 
through cooperation with States of the region and the ICC.” 
1000
  UN Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010), para 12, clause (q) states: “Provide technical and 
logistical support for the organization of national and local elections, upon explicit request from 
the Congolese authorities and within the limits of its capacities and resources.” 
1001
  UN Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014) para 30 (b) (i) states: “To take a leading role in 
international efforts to assist the Transitional Authorities working with  ECCAS, the African 
Union, relevant stakeholders and the international community to devise, facilitate, coordinate, 
and provide technical assistance to the political transition and electoral process” and (v) “To 
devise, facilitate and provide technical assistance to the electoral process and make all 
necessary preparations, in support of the Transitional Authorities and working on an urgent 
basis with the National Electoral Authority, for holding free, fair and transparent and inclusive 
elections, including the full and effective participation of women at all level and at an early 
stage, and the participation of CAR IDPs and refugees no later than 2015.” 
1002
  UN Security Council Resolution 1528 (2004) para 6 (m) states: “To provide oversight, 
guidance and technical assistance to the Government of National Reconciliation, with the 
assistance of ECOWAS and other international partners, to prepare for and assist in the conduct 
of free, fair and transparent electoral processes linked to the implementation of the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement, in particular the presidential election.” 
1003
  UN Security Council Resolution 2164 (2014), para 13 (b)(v) states, respectively: “To support, 
within its resources and areas of deployment, the conduct of inclusive, free, fair and transparent 
local elections, including through the provision of appropriate logistical and technical assistance 
and effective security arrangements, in the context of an inclusive decentralization process led 
and owned by the Malian authorities.” 
1004
  Neha Jain “A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council and the 
International Criminal Court” (2005) 16(2) EJIL 239.  
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the politico-economic transitions simultaneously underway in these countries.  MA 
Mohamed Salih acknowledges that “the architects of the liberal peace are in fact 
empowered by the prevailing neo-liberal paradigm and economic liberalization, 
which explains why they keep silent about the root causes of African conflict.”1005  
Salih also rues the fact that tension between democracy and economic liberalisation 
has meant the liberal peace’s dominant form of political economy not only fails to 
resolve major issues— including systemic poverty and woefully inadequate access to 
basic human needs, as well as democratic, economic and social exclusion, the social 
justice deficit—but also tends to “increase rather than decrease the likelihood of the 
social conflicts and violent struggles that undermine development and by the same 
token also undermine peace and democracy in the long term.”1006 
The establishment of a permanent court designed specifically to judge and, if 
necessary, punish those accused by the ICC prosecutor of committing serious 
international crimes adds a new institution to the post-Second World War architecture 
of global governance.  Sitting alongside the UN and its Security Council as the 
summit of politico-strategic affairs, and the World Bank, IMF, and World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) as the pinnacle of politico-economic affairs, the ICC completes 
the tripartite system.  While the precise impact of the ICC’s workload remains to be 
seen, its ongoing existence will no doubt contribute to the making of global legal 
culture based on a notion of neo-individualism or, put in another way, 
cosmopolitanism.  The groups and networks that control these institutions have a 
powerful say over the conduct of contemporary world affairs.  Such dramatic changes 
to the governance arrangements for international life provoke unease, protest and 
resistance. The process of strengthening domestic justice sectors is, for instance, 
contested locally, in Africa especially, where the rival of Islamic fundamentalism is, 
in part, a reaction to the predominance of the Western, modernist conceptualisation of 
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human rights embodied in individuals.
1007
  This is ironic since “[t]he modernity of 
transitional justice-making is ‘at large,’ and Islamic Sharia revivalism, Ugandan 
Acholi, and Rwanda Gachacha reconciliation mechanisms, often celebrated as 
“traditional,” are as much a product of modernity as they are of local imaginaries.”1008  
The yet to be established African Court of Justice and Human Rights will be capable 
of targeting offences of a commercial nature and many African NGOs and regional 
civil society groups have called for the indictment of foreign firms either directly 
involved in armed conflict or illegitimately profiting from African resources.
1009
  The 
impact of this resistance on the ICC remains to be seen, though a resurgent anti-
colonial nationalism probably lurks behind the recent decisions by the leaders of 
Burundi, South Africa, and the Gambia to withdrawal their respective government’s 
signatures from the Rome Statute.   
 
V Conclusion 
The quest for international criminal justice in the long aftermath of the Cold War was 
informed by the discourse against politico-cruelty, with its roots in nineteen-century 
liberalism and manifested so clearly in the establishment of the military tribunals of 
the mid-1940s and the ad-hoc tribunals of the mid-1990s.  But it also required a 
propitious set of politico-strategic circumstances.  While the US had risen to global 
hegemon following the USSR’s demise, a group of like-minded states supported by 
various NGOs drove the treaty negotiation process that led to the establishment of the 
ICC.  The consensus, while purportedly seeking victim’s justice, was underpinned by 
capitalist donors from the western world.  As Clarke explains:1010  
In their attempts to implement international treaties and doctrine, 
NGOs have become more important than ever to facilitating the spread 
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of global capitalism.  This has occurred not simply through an 
ideological mission to secure rights for all on the basis of humanity; 
rather, it has necessarily involved the capitalistic circulation of donor 
funding that is producing new and entrepreneurial forms of capital 
support to some of the leading and most recent graduates and 
professionals from a range of countries. 
The key politico-strategic development here, however, was the US’s shift from a 
degree of estrangement from the international community to an exceptional use of 
force as global hegemon fighting representatives of radical Islam under the banner of 
a war against terror and, though it has re-engaged to a point, it has not reconciled with 
that community in the context of the pursuit of international criminal justice.  It ceded 
its leadership to the EU.  The ICC’s establishment cannot be fully understood in 
isolation of the continued efforts to liberalise the state and the economy in the 
aftermath of armed conflict and mass atrocity, particularly in parts of Africa endowed 
with natural resources of commercial value.  Like the ad-hoc tribunals before it, the 
ICC was designed, at least in part, to help facilitate the further expansion and, more 
specifically, entrenchment of neoliberalism and, as such, must be seen as the final 
pillar of a tripartite architecture of governing the politico-strategic, politico-economic 
and politico-social dimensions of international life.  The ICC’s designers thus 
established an important stage upon which the third generation of international 
prosecutors of serious international crime would perform, deploying a melody of 
legal, political and war registers.   
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CH. 9: A NEW GENERATION OF PROSECUTORS 
 
I  Introduction 
The discourse against politico-cruelty not only informed the consensus among like-
minded state-makers to establish a permanent court and shaped the court’s design, but 
also empowers the third generation of international prosecutors of serious 
international crime.  This penultimate chapter introduces two individuals, Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo and Fatou Bensouda, the former as the first to occupy the post of 
ICC prosecutor and the latter as the incumbent.  The chapter explores the preparation 
of 24 warrants of arrest and four summonses to appear, giving particular focus to the 
selection of the accused and the charges against them.  It argues that these choices 
reveal a prosecutorial bias favouring the referring state-based authority by targeting 
leaders of rebel non-state armed groups as well as leaders of outlaw states, a bias 
which appears more often than not based upon short-term strategic calculation rather 
than a non-partisan review of the facts and relevant evidence.  The chapter then 
examines Moreno-Ocampo’s first opening statement, which his deputy at the time, 
Bensouda, helped deliver in 2009, before examining Bensouda’s first opening 
statement as ICC prosecutor, which Anton Steynberg helped deliver in 2013.  It 
argues that both these statements, drawing on the content of the respective warrant 
and summons, express a rhetoric containing a mix of legal, political and war registers.  
Even though the prosecutors emphasise ICL enforcement as being separate from the 
conduct of armed conflict and rising above the politics of post-atrocity situations, the 
distinction drawn between law and politics dissolves when both are understood to 
serve as a means of waging politico-cultural civil war.  Part III of this thesis 
concludes by suggesting that when these prosecutorial biases and varying rhetorical 
registers are understood as an extension of the material and ideational conditions 
giving rise to the ICC and, therefore, as concomitant to the reconstruction efforts 
taking place in certain locales in the aftermath of mass atrocity, then this third 
generation of international prosecutors are explicable not only as agents of ICL, but 
also as political actors serving, unwittingly or otherwise, in the interests of economic 
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liberalisation and, in that politico-legal capacity, as auxiliary combatants helping 
wage a politico-cultural civil war for control over the modernist project.  
 
II  Third Generation of International Prosecutors 
Emerging from within the ICC, a third generation of international prosecutors so far 
includes the first ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, who served in that role 
between June 2003 and June 2012 and his successor since June 2012, Fatou 
Bensouda, before which she was ICC deputy prosecutor.  (Carla del Ponte expressed 
an interest in the position, but never gained much support as a candidate.1011)  
Moreno-Ocampo, an Argentine and graduate of the University of Buenos Aires Law 
School, was professor of criminal law at the University of Buenos Aires and visiting 
professor at Stanford University and at Harvard Law School.  As mentioned in 
Chapter 6, he prosecuted senior military figures in the Argentinian junta for its Dirty 
War in the early 1990s and was considered for the role of first ICTY prosecutor in 
1994.1012  He also featured as a judge on a television show similar to The Peoples’ 
Court.1013  Strongly desiring the position, Moreno-Ocampo chose to meet informally 
with various EU officials in Germany, Spain, The Netherlands, Norway and London 
in order to press his own case.1014    
Born in The Gambia, Bensouda holds a Master’s Degree in International 
Maritime Law and The Law of the Sea.  Before taking up her role as deputy 
prosecutor Bensouda had worked as Legal Advisor, Trial Attorney, Senior Trial 
Advisor as well as Head of the Legal Advisory Unit at the ICTR.   Her professional 
experience includes stints as Senior State Counsel, Principal State Counsel, Deputy 
Director of Public Prosecutions and Chief Legal Advisor to the President and Cabinet 
of the Republic of Gambia.  Her resume also includes experiences in diplomatic 
negotiations for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Treaty 
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and the Preparatory Commission for the ICC.  Emerging from within the court and 
involved in many of her predecessor’s decisions, Bensouda represents more 
continuity than change and “may be disinclined to chart a dramatically different 
course.”1015  
While the staffing levels supporting the ICC prosecutor are comparable to those 
supporting ad-hoc tribunals, they are much lower than the staffing levels supporting 
the prosecutors belonging to the international military tribunals.  In 2011, for 
instance, the OTP has an establishment of 218 positions, though, like previous 
tribunals, the office structures evolved and specialised units were established in order 
to cope with unforeseen developments.1016  As the ad-hoc tribunals begun to wind up 
their work, staff sought to migrate towards the ICC, further consolidating the industry 
of ICL experts; the ICC also offers academics opportunities to work within the court 
as visiting professionals. 
 
III ICC Warrants and Summonses 
Situations that might feature serious international crimes come before the ICC 
through one of three avenues.  Firstly, States-Party to the Rome Statute can refer 
certain situations occurring within their own jurisdiction to the court: Uganda, the 
DRC, CAR and Mali have undertaken such self-referrals.  Secondly, the UN Security 
Council can, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, refer situations to the ICC, 
which happened with respect to Darfur in Sudan and Libya, two non-States-Parties to 
the Rome Statute.  Thirdly, the ICC prosecutor can examine situations under his or 
her own proprio motu powers, as occurred in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire.  As Schabas 
explains “[a] situation is distinct from a ‘case’, the term used to describe the stage in 
the proceedings when an individual defendant has been identified.”1017  While States-
Party and the UN Security Council can refer situations, the prosecutor determines the 
specific cases warranting investigation, after which the Pre-Trial Chamber grants 
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approval for the prosecutor to proceed to a full investigation.
1018
  After conducting a 
preliminary examination he or she can decline to investigate situations further on the 
basis of insufficient gravity, complementarity or the interests of justice.
1019
  Ten 
situations that either have been investigated or are under investigation have given rise 
to 18 cases that have either been heard by, or are currently before, the ICC Trial 
Chamber.  In addition to the situations currently before the Court the prosecutor has 
opened preliminary investigations into a further nine, which have not yet generated 
cases.1020  Thus, “[w]hile the judges do review prosecutorial behaviour in several 
respects, the prosecutor alone takes the critical decision to trigger a full investigation 
and request arrest warrants.”1021  Prosecutors can seek a Warrant of Arrest (and can 
seek to have it sealed) or, if they have reason to believe that an arrest is not necessary 
and the accused will turn himself or herself in voluntarily, then a Summons to Appear 
will suffice.   
For the situation in Uganda, which was referred to the Court by the authorities 
in Kampala in 2003,1022 the ICC prosecutor intends to try two cases: Warrants of 
Arrest bring charges against Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, and Mr 
Lukwiya (now deceased); another brings charges against Dominic Ongwen.  These 
charges are either war crimes (52 counts) or crimes against humanity (29 counts).  All 
of the accused are believed to be senior members of the LRA, a rebel non-state armed 
group.  The situation in DRC was also the subject of a self-referral in April 2004.1023  
Here, the ICC prosecutor sought to try six separate cases against, respectively, 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Bosco Ntaganda, Germain Katanga, Mattieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
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Callixte Mbarushimana and Sylvestre Mudacumura.  Warrants of Arrest, all of which 
were issued under seal, bring charges of war crimes (33 counts) and crimes against 
humanity (11 counts).  These men are senior members of the Front for Patriotic 
Resistance of Ituri (FRPI), Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), Forces Patriotiques 
pour la libération du Congo (FPLC), Forces Démocratiques de Libération du 
Rwanda (FDLR) and the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI), all of which are 
rebel non-state armed groups.  For the situation in CAR, the ICC prosecutor sought to 
try two cases, the first against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, who commanded the 
armed group calling itself Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (MLC).  The charges 
in this first case were war crimes (initially four, but rose to five counts) and crimes 
against humanity (initially two, but rose to three counts).  The second case brought 
charges of perverting the course of justice against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Amee 
Kiliolo Musamba (lead Council for the Accused), Fidele Babala Wandu, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo (case manager for the Defence), and Narcisee Arido (defence 
attorney).  This situation was also referred to the ICC in January 2006 by the 
Government authorities.1024  This situation in CAR has been the subject of a second 
self-referral in May 2014,1025 and the situation in Mali was self-referred in July 
2012,1026 though no charges laid in respect of those two situations have been made or, 
if made, not made public. 
The selection of the accused in these cases arising from situations referred to 
the court by States-Party reveals prosecutorial bias.  The ICC prosecutor appears 
reluctant to focus investigations into allegations of atrocity crimes committed by the 
referring authority.  This signals a practice of granting de facto immunity to those 
state authorities who, belonging to the court, are quick to denounce their local rivals 
and opponents as hostis humani generis.  Clearly the abovementioned self-referring 
                                                          
1024
  ICC OTP ‘Press Release: Prosecutor receives referral concerning Central African Republic’ 7 
January 2015. 
1025
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authorities’ use of the ICC in particular, and the pursuit of international criminal 
justice more generally, is not only a form of politics in which they seek to have their 
way over others for non-trivial purposes, but is also an extension of the internal 
armed conflicts which they cannot win through the clash of arms alone.  Thus, only 
members of non-state armed groups are transformed here by the ICC prosecutor from 
rebels into the accused, despite claims of government-driven atrocities and human 
rights abuses.  More specifically, NGOs, most prominently Human Rights Watch, 
have made credible claims that the referring States-Party is almost certainly 
responsible for the commission of atrocity crimes.1027  These NGOs document 
evidence in Uganda implicating the Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Force, in the DRC 
implicating President Kabila, in CAR implicating President Francios Bozize and his 
Presidential Guard and in Mali implicating the security forces.1028   While the 
prosecutor has relied on evidence gathered by NGOs for cases against rebel groups, 
such evidence against the self-referring authorities has been marginalised when it has 
not been altogether neglected.  That the ICC prosecutor accepts and relies upon the 
evidence implicating only rebel groups and not the self-referring authority reveals 
prosecutorial bias and signals the limits of NGO advocacy and monitoring efforts. 
The situation in Darfur, Sudan was referred to the ICC on 31 March 2005 by 
the UN Security Council.1029  The prosecutor has decided to pursue five separate 
cases against the following individuals: Ahmed Muhammad Harun and Ali 
Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman; Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir; Bahar Idriss Abu 
Garda; Abdallah Nanda Abakear Nourain; and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein.  
Harun, Al-Rahman and Al-Bashir are associated with the Government of Sudan or its 
Janjaweed militia whereas Garda, Banda and Jerbo held leadership positions within, 
respectively, the United Resistance Front, the Justice and Equality Movement 
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Collective (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), each of which are so-called 
rebel organisations.  The charges include war crimes (48 counts), crimes against 
humanity (38 counts), and crimes of genocide (3 counts).  The UN Security Council 
also referred, on 26 February 2011, the situation in Libya to the Court.1030  The ICC 
prosecutor sought to charge Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-
Islam Gaddifi and Abdullas Al-Senussi for two counts of crimes against humanity 
each. Each of these men occupied a senior position within the Libyan 
Government.1031  The prosecution of heads of state, Ellen L Lutz and Caitlin Reiger 
explain, are significant for the following reasons:1032 
Because of the high publicity value of prosecutions of top political 
figures, the news media carries more information about criminal 
prosecutions of heads of state or government than it does for 
prosecutions of lower-ranking officials.  In terms of responsibility, 
heads of state or government are at the top of the chain of command…. 
Finally, at a symbolic level, these cases often represent far more than 
the individuals on trial.  Especially in situations in which the 
prosecutions have followed a political transition or the end of a regime, 
pursuing the highest individual in the hierarchy is also about marking a 
break with the past and sometimes condemning an entire system that 
facilitated the commission of serious crimes in the name of the state.  
More cynically, these indictments also help prepare the way for further public 
condemnations and subsequent transitions from authoritarian and for Muslim rule to 
democracy.  In these two instances, the pursuit of international criminal justice does 
not engage in the aftermath of international armed conflict, but rather, is used as part 
of politico-cultural civil war’s casus belli.  
Whereas the self-referring authorities are granted de facto immunity from 
charges, the first prosecutor has attempted to appear more even-handed in his 
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selection of the accused in the Darfur cases.  From the UN Security Council’s 
perspective, the real targets of its referrals are leaders of outlaw states which, as 
Simpson explains, are “a figure whose estrangement from the community of nations 
and demonisation by that community has long been required as part of the project of 
creating and enforcing international ‘society.’”1033  It is entirely plausible that 
Sudanese rebels groups are included among the accused precisely in order to 
symbolise some sort of balance and to avert unwanted criticism of prosecutorial bias, 
echoing Del Ponte’s earlier arguments for her selection of the accused for both the 
ICTY and the ICTR.  According to David Hoile, perhaps staunchest among the ICC’s 
critics, the court ignored several rebel movements responsible for committing war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.  It showed a measure of inconsistency, too, 
where the ICC prosecutor gave focus to child soldiers in the first trial concerning the 
situation in the DRC, but ignored available evidence indicating that JEM had used 
child soldiers.  Moreno-Ocampo chose instead to indict three rebel commanders on 
charges relating to an attack on an African Union peacekeeping force’s base in 
September 2007.1034  Six years later this pretence of targeting rebel groups was 
dropped in the situation in Libya where non-state armed groups were omitted from 
the warrants and summonses, despite evidence of their responsibility for the 
commission of atrocity crime.1035 
As mentioned, the ICC prosecutor has used his proprio motu powers to 
undertake preliminary investigations into two situations.  For the situation in Kenya, 
the prosecutor intended to try four cases: the first against William Samoei Ruto, 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, each of whom was associated with the 
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) which lost the elections in late 2007; the 
second of which is against Fancis Kirimi Mathaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and 
Mohammed Hussein Ali, members supporting the Party of National Unity (PNU) 
which won the election; and a third against Walter Osapiri Barasa and a fourth against 
Paul Gichera and Philip Kipkoech Bett, each charged with various counts of 
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perverting the course of justice.  The charges in the first two cases include crimes 
against humanity (27 counts).  The other situation to have found its way to the ICC 
though the prosecutor’s own volition is the situation in Cote d’Ivoire.  Here, two 
cases are being pursued, the first against former President Laurent Gbagbo and his 
close advisor Charles Ble Goude, the second against Simone Gbagbo, wife of the 
former President.  The charges include crimes against humanity (12 counts).  Unlike 
situations involving internal armed conflict or, more particularly, the use of state-
based armed force against its own citizens, these two proprio motu cases occur in the 
context of an attempted disruption of the democratic process through illegitimate 
armed violence organised in accordance with local identity markers.  The message 
here is clear: those who challenge and overthrow the results of the ballot box through 
political violence can expect to find themselves in the ICC docks.  Prosecutorial 
predilection for democracies could not be more sacrosanct or, for that matter, blatant.  
These three sets of decisions, then, reveal a prosecutorial bias favouring 
referring state-based authority by targeting leaders of rebel non-state armed groups, 
senior members of outlaw states and those who use force to subvert the democratic 
process.  This bias reflects and reinforces the authority of sovereignty-bound state-
makers.  This prejudice gives attention exclusively to the politico-strategic dimension 
of the commission of atrocity crimes or the underlying situations of armed conflicts, 
but does so at the expense of signalling important politico-economic or politico-social 
dimensions.  Unlike previous generations, the selection of the accused does not take 
aim at a particular utopian movement based on some combination of nationalism and 
race, ethnicity, class, or religion, and that uses violence embodied in the power of the 
state to radically transform society.  Instead, these selections—including the selection 
of charges—are significant because they focus on Africa and on African leaders who 
potentially control access to natural resources.  As Ann Sagan makes clear, the ICC’s 
repeated indictment of Africans tends to characterise them as both violent criminals 
and hapless victims in need of rescue and protection.  Sagan’s conclusion is 
compelling:1036 
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The shift towards cosmopolitan community and a reconciliation of the 
contestation between cosmopolitan and state-based conceptions of 
international order is made possible through a revival of historical 
representations of the African subject through the dichotomies of 
victim-criminal, insider-outsider and civilisation-barbarism.  The 
cosmopolitan and liberal narratives of international law are 
institutionalised through their articulation in the Rome Statute and the 
structure and discourse of the court, making the court particularly 
susceptible to the indictment of African criminals as well as a site of 
production for the rearticulation of historical representations of African 
subjects.  This representation is illustrated in the rhetoric of The 
Prosecution v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, which emphasises signifiers of 
victimhood, including sexualised and gendered crimes, in contrast with 
the criminalised representation of Lubanga as a representation of an 
outsider of the cosmopolitan community. 
Krever would agree, pointing out that the ICC is “less a tool of international justice 
than the judicial concomitant to Western [imperial] intervention,” particularly as the 
children of western leaders—who not only oversaw the assassination of Patrice 
Lumumba, the first democratically-elected leader of the Congo, but also actively 
supported the dictatorship of Mobuto—thought themselves morally fit to judge those 
war criminal that flourished under Mobuto’s reign.1037  Echoing paternalist colonial 
attitudes and reflecting the discourse against politico-cruelty, these representations 
also serve the interest of those who are intent on exploiting Africa’s vast natural 
resources.  It is no coincidence that the crimes being investigated and prosecuted in 
Africa occur in countries that rank among the world’s poorest, have been subjected to 
various structural adjustment programmes valorising democracy and market-based 
economies but remain rich in the natural resources vital to fuel the global free market 
economy.1038  This deliberate focus on resource-rich countries is further underscored 
by the evidential streams informing the early selections, especially, as Lubanga’s 
defence lawyer pointed out, “much of the prosecutions’ case was reliant on NGO 
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research studies and that ‘NGO justice’ was produced through highly-biased data 
fuelled through donor-sponsored agendas.”1039   
  Omitted from these warrants and summonses are “situations involving major 
powers.”1040  Bosco explains further: “Faced with several conflicts [including Iraq] in 
which major powers of their allies were directly involved, the prosecutor chose 
instead to focus on international violence in a part of the world where these powers 
had few direct interests and where the United Nations was already heavily 
engaged.”1041  Israel’s attack on Gaza in late 2008 also fell beyond the prosecutorial 
gaze.1042  The ICC prosecutor might well argue that, in his or her assessment, 
strengthening the ICL regime, especially during its embryonic stage, is more 
important than blind justice and that such a strategy requires case selection that is 
consistent with the preferences of the members of the ASP and does not incur the 
displeasure of the UN Security Council, particularly the P-5.  Bosco concludes that 
“the overall pattern strongly suggests that the prosecutor’s office has, to this point, 
used its discretion on where to open investigations strategically.”1043  Here, then, the 
prosecutor’s selection of the accused and of the charges of atrocity crime appears 
based less on a non-partisan review of the facts and relevant evidence and more upon 
short-term political calculation to curry favour with the ICC’s most powerful 
stakeholders.  These selections can, moreover, be understood vis-à-vis the 
entrenchment of neoliberalism across the world and, by extension, as forming part of 
a politico-cultural civil war, signalling a shift from ICL show trials to ICL sideshows 
best illustrated by both prosecutors’ opening statements.  
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IV Moreno-Ocampo’s and Bensouda’s Opening Statements 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo stood in the dock as the accused at the ICC’s first trial.  This 
trial began on 26 January 2009.  The charges against Lubanga—being a co-
perpetrator enlisting and conscripting children under 15 years of age—were read in 
his native tongue, French.  The opening statement was delivered by ICC prosecutor 
Moreno-Ocampo and his deputy, Bensouda.  The statement was structured in four 
main parts: the first part, read by Moreno-Ocampo, describes “the facts” of case and 
“the law to be applied,” while the second and third parts, read by Bensouda, gives 
focus to the underlying situation of armed conflict and to aspects of Lubanga’s 
biography and character.  The final section, read by Moreno-Ocampo, deals with the 
nature of the evidence against Lubanga.1044  At the close of his oration Moreno-
Ocampo promptly departed the courtroom in order to be present at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.  As a result he did not hear any of the 
defence’s opening remarks.1045  
The first case to go to trial under Bensouda’s leadership was that of William 
Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, which began on 10 September 2013.  Before the 
prosecutor’s opening statement was read aloud, the presiding judge, Judge Eboe-
Osuji, provided an overview of the procedural history of the case up until that point.  
This included an admissibility challenge posed by the Kenyan Government, which 
now wanted to exercise its jurisdiction over the case it had initially referred to the 
court, and the court’s dismissal of that challenge.  (As mentioned earlier in the 
previous chapter, this was, and remains, controversial because it flies in the face of 
the complementarity principle underpinning this court of last resort.)  A synopsis of 
the charges—three counts of crimes against humanity for both the accused—was read 
by a Court Officer and the two men accused pleaded not guilty to all charges.  
Bensouda then began her first opening statement as ICC prosecutor and was assisted 
by Senior Trial Lawyer, Anton Steynberg.  Bensouda began her opening address by 
giving focus to the local circumstances of the crimes, the biography and character of 
the accused and the problems associated with the intimidation of witnesses.  
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Steynberg then outlined in more detail the evidence that would be introduced against 
the accused.1046  The opening statement took less than an hour for Bensouda and 
Steynberg to deliver. 
At the centre of Moreno-Ocampo’s first trial were Lubanga’s atrocity crimes 
concerning the recruitment of children as soldiers in his politico-military group, 
Union dees Patriotes Congolais, and in its armed wing, the Forces Patriotiques pour 
la Liberation du Congo.  These child soldiers were used to murder, pillage and 
rape.1047  According to Moreno-Ocampo and Bensouda, a common plan also existed 
to maintain and broaden Lubanga’s control over the Ituri district through enlisting, 
conscripting and using children as combatants.1048  The perniciousness of this atrocity 
crime lies in the victims’ suffering.  These children, the ICC prosecutor lamented, 
were unable to simply forget all they saw and did, the beatings received and given, 
the terror they felt and inflicted and the rapes they committed and suffered.1049  The 
atrocities committed by Lubanga, he went on, would haunt not just one child, but an 
entire generation of children.1050  The spectre of the child soldier is, however, a 
particularly thorny issue in the pursuit for international criminal justice as they are 
constructed as both victims in need of rescuing and perpetrators of atrocity crimes 
that contain acts worthy of punishment.1051  Girl soldiers were singled out for 
particular lamentation.  According to Moreno-Ocampo and Bensouda:1052 
[I]n the training camps, girl soldiers were the daily victims of rape by the 
commanders.  Girl soldiers, some aged 12 years, were used as cooks and 
fighters, cleaners and spies, scouts and sexual slaves.  One minute they 
will carry a gun, the next minute they will serve meals to the 
commanders, the next minute the commanders will rape them.   They 
were killed if they refused to be raped.  One child soldier became severely 
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traumatised after killing a girl who refused to have sex with the 
commander.  There were very little girls.  You will hear that as soon as the 
girl’s breasts started to grow, Thomas Lubanga’s commanders could select 
them as their forced wife.  “Wife” being the wrong word.  And they were 
sexual slaves, and transformed them into sexual slaves.  One of our 
witnesses will describe how he observed daily examples of his 
commanders raping girl soldiers.  You can still meet any of them in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  Some of them kept as so-called wives by 
the commanders, some of them, in the streets of Kinshasa and Bunia, 
rejected by their community and struggling to make a living as prostitutes.  
These girl combatants are left on the margins of many disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration projects.  As emphasised by the special 
representative of the United Nations Secretary-General Ms. Radhika 
Coomaraswamy in her amicus brief to this court, girl combatants are too 
often invisible, because they’re also wives and domestic aides and slip 
away or are not brought forward for demobilisation programmes.   
By contrasting this part of the opening statement delivered by Moreno-Ocampo and 
Bensouda with Jackson’s oratory sixty-four years earlier, Sergey Vasiliev suggests 
this is an example of poor trial advocacy at the ICC.  Instead of previewing evidence 
in corroboration of actual charges (enlistment and conscription of children under the 
age of 15 and using them to participate actively in an armed conflict), this portion of 
the ICC prosecutor’s statement was devoted to describing crimes related to sexual 
violence against girls in the UPC camps that were not charged and would not have to 
be proven.  This aspect of the statement may have been grandstanding in its intent, 
yet was underwhelming and even counterproductive in its effect, fuelling some 
victims’ pre-existing frustration with the narrow scope of the charges brought against 
Lubanga.1053 
Like the opening statements at the ad-hoc criminal tribunals, armed conflict is 
treated by Moreno-Ocampo and Bensouda not as a crime in and of itself, but as an 
underlying condition for atrocity crimes.  Firstly, the causes of the armed conflict 
occurring in Ituri between September 2002 and August 2003 were located in the 
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aftermath of the genocide occurring in Rwanda during 1994, when hundreds of 
thousands of Rwandese, including some of those responsible for the genocide, fled to 
eastern Zaire before attacking Rwanda, triggering the First Congo War in 1996.1054  
Also contributing to the underlying situation of armed conflict was the Second Congo 
War, which began in 1998 and involved some nine African countries.  According to 
Bensouda “[c]lose to 4 million are estimated to have died in the DRC between 1998 
and 2004, in particular due to starvation and disease resulting from war…. the highest 
number of civilians killed as a consequence of war since the Second World War.”1055  
The armed conflict has both international and non-international elements, though the 
prosecution signalled its intention to disclose all of its evidence concerning both 
elements in order for the Trial Chamber “to determine whether the Ugandan 
occupation of Ituri between the 1st of September, 2002 and early June 2003 
transformed the character of the conflict into an international armed conflict.”1056 
In their opening statement Bensouda and Steynberg announced serious 
international crimes too. Crimes against humanity, specifically murder, deportation or 
the forcible transfer of population and persecution, were the focus here.  The 
prosecutor declares:1057 
It is the violence in the Rift Valley, in particular the districts of Nandi 
and Uasin Gishu, that is the subject of the present case.  Once the dust 
had settled and the flames were doused, over 200 people lay dead and 
another 1,000 people were injured in these two constituencies alone.  
Over 50,000 homes were razed to the ground in the Uasin Gishu 
alone—the highest number in any single district in Kenya—and tens of 
thousands of people fled the areas.   
An underlying situation of armed conflict is absent here, however.  Rather, organised 
post-election violence is at issue.  Again, the prosecutor declared:1058 
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There has been, Mr President, much speculation and often inaccurate 
public and political discourse regarding the Prosecution’s reason for 
investigating the post-election violence in Kenya.  Today too many 
people have forgotten the intensive efforts of the International 
Criminal Court throughout 2008 and 2009 to encourage Kenya to 
establish genuine national proceedings.  Let me emphasise that the 
Prosecution intervened in this matter only after the Kenya efforts to 
establish a domestic mechanisms to investigate the violence failed.   
This is consistent with the previous prosecutor’s publicly-stated reasons for 
undertaking this investigation using his proprio motu powers.  The targeting of an 
ethnic group, the Kikuyu, is significant for the enforcement of ICL because of their 
suspected proclivity to vote for a particular political party, the PNU.  Steynberg also 
expressed his concern to the bench over the probable use of the term tribe, which, 
although derogatory for it implies that a particular group is uncivilised, would 
nevertheless likely be used by many of the prosecutions’ witnesses as the word is an 
important part of their vocabulary.    
Moreno-Ocampo and Bensouda pointed to the various forms of evidence they 
intended to led, including 1,671 documents, which they claimed would incriminate 
Lubanga.  Many of these documents were composed at the time of the atrocities and 
bear Lubanga’s signature or were seen by him.  Video clips used during the opening 
statement would also be used as evidence, alongside others, as will the testimony of 
three expert witnesses.  Eyewitness testimony from thirty-three child soldiers would 
not only make visceral their individual suffering, but would also provide facts about 
“enlistment and conscription” “training” and “active participation,” as well as “killing 
civilians,” “rape,” “pillaging,” and providing “security.”  Moreno-Ocampo placed 
particular emphasis on:1059 
The nine former child soldiers you will see in this courtroom are 
remarkable individuals.  We are impressed by the way they have, and 
continue to, overcome the adversity they have faced.  Many of them have 
recently completed the high school exams and yet even these nine still 
find it painful to recount what happened to them.  Even these nine would 
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prefer not to speak about the details of what they saw and what they did.  
Testifying will force them to relive traumatic experiences they are deeply 
ashamed of and wish to forget or ignore entirely.  These witnesses are 
vulnerable witnesses, your honours.  I need say no more.  The court is 
calling two expert witnesses who will explain the difficulties that the 
witnesses will experience as they testify, how these child witnesses are 
always at risk of re-victimisation.  
 
Bensouda and Steynberg not only foreshadowed their subsequent use of brief 
video clips, but also deployed them as part of their opening statement in the more 
detailed sections covered by Steynberg.  The prosecutor signalled that twenty-two 
victims and witnesses would be asked to testify,1060 including expert witnesses who 
would provide “insight into the political and historical background against which 
these crimes were committed, including the Kenyan political environment… from a 
political, sociological, and anthropological perspective.”1061  Bensouda and Steynberg 
then decried their difficulties in securing witness testimony:1062 
[t]his trial is the culmination of a long and difficult investigation.  It has 
been fraught with co-operation challenges and obstacles relating to the 
security of witnesses.  Many victims and witnesses have been too 
frightened to come forward.  Others have given statements, but 
subsequently sought to withdraw from the process, citing intimidation or 
fear of harm.  Worrying evidence, Mr President, has also emerged of 
attempts to bribe witnesses to withdraw or recant their evidence.   
 
Relevant law received brief treatment in both opening statements.  Moreno-
Ocampo and Bensouda made reference to the crimes articulated in the Rome Statute 
concerning children in armed groups being committed in three ways: conscription, 
enlistment or using them to participate actively in combat.1063  The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone was also cited for having concluded that recruiting children soldiers 
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under the age of 15 was a crime under customary international law since at least 
1996.  Moreno-Ocampo and Bensouda also sought to preclude a legal defence 
hinging on children’s consent, which, according to the prosecutor, is not a valid 
defence for the crime of recruiting child soldiers does not allow for the lawful 
voluntary enlistment of children or for the lawful conscription of children.  “The 
prohibition is absolute and suffers no exception” Moreno-Ocampo declared, “[and] 
has been argued and settled legally by the drafters of the Rome Statute nearly 11 
years ago.”1064  With only the briefest mention of the Rome Statute, Bensouda and 
Steynberg sought to steal the thunder of the defence’s likely approach, rather than 
preclude likely defences on legal grounds.  Steynberg opined, for example:1065   
The Defence will have you believe that the post-election violence in the 
Rift Valley was not in fact the product of prior planning by the accused and 
his network, but rather the spontaneous response of the population to what 
they perceived as election fraud.  They will allege that the Prosecution’s 
evidence to the contrary is a fabrication and that many of the Prosecution 
witnesses have engaged in an elaborate conspiracy.  They will point to 
alleged inducements offered to witnesses, whether by the Prosecution or 
some other yet to be identified party in order to falsely lay the blame at the 
feet of the accused. Indeed the Defence are obliged to do so since the 
evidence against them, if accepted, is compelling.   
 
Here, then, building on the content of their respective warrant and summons, 
this third generation of international prosecutors used their opening statements in 
order to frame their legal arguments by announcing serious international crimes, 
foreshadowing evidence subsequently submitted during trial and precluding any 
foreseeable defence rebuttals.  For both these ICC prosecutors the law, and their role 
enforcing ICL, is a domain entirely separate from politics and war.  Their opening 
addresses, which commenced the trials proper, were designed to convince the bench 
and the audience-at-large of the guilt of the accused and the urgent necessity of 
finding the accused guilty.  Concomitant with strong accusations of criminal 
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culpability directed at the accused, this self-consciously legal rhetoric seeks to de-
historicise the situations within which atrocity crimes occur.  Notable for its absence 
here is a close examination of “the root causes of the violence in various postcolonial 
contexts [that] are underlain by histories of colonial subject formation, contested 
governance and boundary-making dictates, foreign resource ownership and extraction 
in the midst of poverty, and unresolved conflict—all contributory factors to this 
ongoing conflict in so many of the recent African civil wars?”1066  Rather, the legal 
register suggests that the prosecutorial rhetoric is always separate from the politics 
establishing the ICC and separate from the concomitant post-conflict reconstruction 
taking place in the situations providing cases for the court. 
Unlike the first generation of international prosecutors, this third generation 
does not articulate their politico-strategic, politico-economic and politico-social 
preferences within their opening statements.  Like the prosecutors at the ad-hoc 
tribunals, the ICC prosecutors do not explicitly extol the virtues of democratic 
government and liberal markets.  Nor do they extol the virtues of individualism.  This 
is not to suggest, however, that the ICC prosecutors are devoid of such preferences, 
but only that these preferences no longer need justification as these are now the 
entrenched status quo following the end of the Cold War, with its concomitant shift 
away from authoritarian totalitarian regimes towards democracy, away from planned 
economies towards free markets, and away from various forms of collectivism 
towards individualism, particularly as prosecuting under ICL rests upon the doctrine 
of individual responsibility.  By giving focus to African criminality and victimhood, 
prosecutors reinforce the existing power configurations in contemporary world 
affairs, normalise the current set of politico-strategic circumstances and help conceal 
the utopian nature of economic liberalisation. 
While Moreno-Ocampo and Bensouda did not explicitly mention defending 
civilisation, they did valorise the international community as the highest authority: 1067 
The Rome Statute ratified by 108 States and supported by citizens and 
institutions across the globe has given me a mandate.  I have to 
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investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole.  The aim is to end 
impunity and contribute to the prevention of future crimes.  Crimes 
like Thomas Lubanga’s crimes.  Thomas Lubanga knew what he was 
doing so clearly that he consciously tried to mislead and appease the 
international community by issuing demobilisation orders on paper 
even as he kept recruiting child soldiers in practice. …Thomas 
Lubanga has to learn that the Rome Statute could not be circumvented.  
Children are not soldiers.  If convicted, Thomas Lubanga’s sentence 
will send a clear message: the era of impunity is ending.   
Even though the meaning of the term international community, which includes states 
as well as UNICEF and local NGOs, remains unspecified here, reason, 
enlightenment, progress and the sanctity of individual life are civilised values that 
underpin the language of this statement.  Moreno-Ocampo summed up the issue at 
hand as follows:1068 
The crux of the matter is to both ensure that those children, whatever the 
function they perform, are recognised as a child soldiers and benefit from 
all the protection afforded to child soldiers under human rights law, while 
ensuring at the same time that they keep the widest protection afforded to 
civilians under international humanitarian law. It is, for this court, a 
challenging mission. 
Although there was some focus on the law criminalising certain acts of politico-
cruelty within both opening statements, even less focus is given to the importance of 
maintaining the rule of international law.  Bensouda and Steynberg did mention the 
Rome Statute, albeit cursorily and only in relation to another case before the Court at 
that time; yet the sanctity of law, they argued, must be preserved from malign 
influences.   
The ICC prosecutors did not characterise the accused as either evil or insane as 
the Nazis and Shinto-Imperialists had been characterised by the first generation of 
international prosecutors.  While the second generation of prosecutors suggested that 
the capacity to commit atrocity crimes is an intrinsic aspect of the accused’s 
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character, which lay dormant until their respective underlying material politico-
strategic situation changed during the course of armed conflict, the ICC prosecutors 
took a more essentialist view of human nature; instead of being shaped by their 
material circumstances, the accused shaped these circumstances to suit their own 
ends.  In other words, rather than using the opening statements to suggest that the 
character of the accused changed in light of their respective politico-strategic 
circumstances, the third generation of prosecutors emphasised the consistency in the 
accused’s character, as though their usual practice was to take recourse to violence 
when their politics fails them.1069   
The accused are thus depicted in prosecutorial opening statements as seeking 
political gain via illegitimate violent means.  Moreno-Ocampo and Bensouda 
described Lubanga’s insatiable hunger for power and influence:1070 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo had ambition.  He wanted political power and an 
army to build his power upon.  The evidence will show how he combined 
his talents as an educated man, as a trader, how he used his connections, 
the loyalty of the Gegere elite while harming the Gegere families at the 
same time, how he carefully selected the most opportunistic methods to 
build his power, recruiting children, recruiting children as soldiers, 
shifting alliances whenever necessary, trying to play with the international 
community.  He pretended that he was loyal to the Rassemblemnt 
Conglais when they were in power and he was conspiring against them at 
the same time.  He announced programmes of pacification, and he was 
sending his troops to kill all the Lendus at the same time.  He promised to 
demobilise the child soldiers, and he was recruiting them at the same time.  
The evidence will show that at all times relevant to the charges he had 
total control of his group.  Those who opposed his will had to leave.  
It was Lubanga’s custom to deal with opponents violently, his subordinate on one 
occasion taking a Minister hostage.1071  More Machiavelli than Mahatma, Lubanga 
deliberately misled the international community by issuing orders to demobilise child 
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solders before re-recruiting most of them and ordering them into combat roles.1072  
Bensouda and Stenberg described Ruto as “a powerful politician” who, along with 
Sang, “a radio broadcaster,”1073 exploited pre-existing ethnic tensions between 
Kalenjin and Kikuyu in order to seize political power for himself and his party if the 
resulting ballot box was not in his favour.  Ruto exhorted supporters to expel the 
Kikuyu from the Rift Valley as a means of permanently altering the area’s ethnic 
composition, consolidating his power over his Kalenjin supporters.1074  Sang, 
described as the “main mouthpiece used by Mr Ruto” made available his prime-time 
radio show.1075  Both men understood that losing the election would deprive them of 
legitimate power, “with all its attendant benefits for the winner and his supporters and 
marginalisation and disenfranchisement for the loser.”1076 
Just as the accused are not characterised as either evil or insane by the ICC 
prosecutors, the political movements of the accused are not demonised by the ICC 
prosecutors in the way that Nazism and Shinto-Imperialism had been demonised by 
Jackson and Keenan.  In fact, Moreno-Ocampo and Bensouda omit all but a bare 
mention of the political group to which Lubanga belongs, possibly as a way to ‘de-
politicise’ the trial proceedings.  Given the utopian movement of economic 
liberalisation reigns supreme within modernist world affairs, all other rivals are 
automatically deemed inauthentic, fraudulent and illegitimate.  Politico-cultural civil 
war, waged as a war of pacification, does not require an explicit declaration. 
The type of group to which the accused belong is, however, denounced by the 
ICC prosecutors in their opening statements.  Lubanga built and led a non-state armed 
group, the purpose of which was to pose a military challenge to the existing 
government.  This was no ordinary rebel army, however; the “Lubanga militia was an 
army of children.”1077  This armed group is an anathema to Moreno-Ocampo and 
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Bensouda because of its deplorable treatment of minors, which it consumed as it 
grew.  It was not only a direct threat to the state, but was also parasitic on society and 
an affront to the values of the civilised international community.  Moreno-Ocampo’s 
and Bensouda’s opening statement is replete with first-hand examples of children as 
victims and the brutality they experienced.  Described here, among other horrendous 
examples, are the experiences of children abducted as they went about their daily 
business and then forcefully enlisted into Lubanga’s militia, the combat training given 
through beatings, terror, and fear, and how Lubanga instructed his men to “ensure 
obedience” by ordering “the children to beat and kill fellow child soldiers.”1078  “The 
defendant stole the childhood of the victims by forcing them to kill and rape” the 
prosecutors charged, and “Lubanga victimised children before they ever had the 
chance to grow up into full human beings who could make their own decisions.”1079  
Child soldering proper is then described as “children were launched into battle zones 
where they were instructed to kill everyone regardless of whether their opponents 
were military or civilian, regardless of whether they were men, women, or 
children.”1080   
Moreover, Ruto and Sang belong to a political party, conducting organised 
large-scale violence among their followers in the Rift Valley in lieu of a victory at the 
ballot box.  “The network’s plan, repeated time and time again at rallies and meetings, 
was war,” Bensouda and Styenberg complained.  With such intentions, theirs’ was a 
criminal organisation resembling the Italian mafia or Chinese triads.1081  
Notwithstanding that group’s non-state qualities, it had the capacity and resources to 
conduct organised large-scale acts of violence and is, therefore, an organisation for 
the purposes of the contextual elements required for crimes against humanity.1082  
Both of these non-state armed groups, then, were deemed illegitimate as their very 
existence undermined sovereignty and tended to destabilise the state and, by 
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extension, the state-based system as it pertains to sub-Saharan Africa.  Prosecutorial 
denouncement along such lines merely entrenched the politico-strategic status quo 
within the two situations investigated.    
Given this challenge, which cannot be tolerated, those who inspire and lead 
such groups must be denounced as hostis humani generis and expelled from the 
human community.  There is no place for these groups in contemporary world affairs.  
In order to ensure that the accused are denounced both prosecutors deploy the 
provocative rhetoric of the War on Terror.  The single word, “terror,” is a loaded gun 
in the prosecutor’s hand.  Observe its frequent use: “They cannot forget the terror 
they felt and the terror they inflicted”;1083 “The environment of terror that Lubanga’s 
men created in the camps;”1084 “The children were terrorised;”1085 and “It is difficult 
to imagine the suffering or the terror of the men and the women and children who 
were burned alive, hacked to death, or chased from their homes by armed youths.”1086  
During the War on Terror language which paints the accused as terrorists—thereby 
placing these men beyond tolerance and the protection of law—is nothing short of 
war rhetoric.  There is not even a need to denigrate the utopian movement of the 
accused.  To this end, Moreno-Ocampo boldly asserted that he wants “to put the 
Defence on notice that the Prosecution anticipates to call for a severe punishment, 
very severe, close to the maximum.  The Prosecution believes that the massive crimes 
litigated in this International Criminal Court, with hundreds or thousands of victims, 
with entire communities affected, warrant very high penalties.”1087  Bensouda, 
however, is more circumspect, saying only that “[i]f the accused are, indeed, guilty, 
however the victims of the awful violence that wracked Kenya in 2007 and 2008 
deserve to see them punished.  This is a matter for the Chamber alone to decide.”1088  
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V  Conclusion  
The pre-trial and trial efforts of this third generation of international prosecutors 
represents another concrete manifestations of the discourse against politico-cruelty, 
signalling acts of politico-cruelty which cannot be tolerated under the rule of law.  As 
a fundamental component of the pre-trial process, and then commencing the trial 
proper, the preparation of these documents and the making of these statements are 
vital to ICL enforcement at the ICC.  There is more than ICL enforcement at work 
here, however.  While the selection of specific charges for inclusion within these 
legal documents sought to highlight the vulnerability of African women and children, 
the selection of suspects draws attention to the African rebel groups and outlaw state-
makers.  By examining the ways in which both statements announced serious 
international crimes, foreshadowed evidence of those crimes, signalled relevant 
applicable law and attempted to preclude foreseeable defences, this chapter found a 
legal rhetoric that self-consciously distinguishes itself from the politico-strategic 
calculations of powerful state-makers as much as it deliberately distances itself from 
the ugly realities of armed conflict.  It also found that these statements, despite the 
lack of explicit preferences for free markets and individualism, help unmask the 
fiction of international prosecutors as juridical actors remaining above all political 
considerations, revealing a political rhetoric deployed in the service of economic 
liberalisation.  Notwithstanding the fact that politics saturates the enforcement of this 
law, the prosecutorial performance itself is constitutive of modernist world politics 
because these prosecutors seek to have their way over others—whether these others 
are the leaders of rebel groups or outlaw states, their followers, or their bench—for 
non-trivial purposes.  This politics is not only an extension of the politico-strategic 
circumstances that established the ICC, but is also part of a contest between 
proponents of economic liberalisation and non-liberal utopian movements for control 
over post-conflict states, economies and societies.  When the opening statements 
denounce those rebels and outlaws, calling for their abjection from international life, 
international prosecutors invoke rhetoric of war, helping wage a politico-cultural civil 
war fought for control over politico-strategic and politico-economic institutions 
governing international life.  Even though the rhetoric of these opening statements 
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operates within three distinct registers of law, politics and war, the distinctiveness of 
these registers dissolves as soon as the enforcement of ICL is understood as a form of 
modernist world politics which is, in turn, is understood as a form of politico-cultural 
civil war.   
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CONCLUSION TO PART III 
 
Part III of this thesis recognises that this third generation of international prosecutors 
played vital roles in ICL enforcement during the US-led War on Terror by preparing 
arrest warrants and summonses to appear as well as by conducting investigations, 
presenting evidence and cross-examining witnesses.  The two individuals who have 
held the post of ICC prosecutor have, cumulatively, sought the indictment of at least 
38 individuals under the auspices of the ICC.  There are 23 cases before the ICC and 
its bench has so far delivered four verdicts in which three individuals has been found 
guilty and one has been acquitted.1089  This generation’s prosecutorial performance 
has a direct bearing on both the enforcement of ICL within the ICC and the ongoing 
development of this evolving set of rules prohibiting the commission of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide and crimes of aggression.  Yet 
assessments of the court’s impact vary.  Although Schabas complains that the ICC 
squandered its first decade by struggling “to find its way” despite its “extraordinarily 
light case-load,”1090 Dutton is more circumspect, suggesting that while this “may not 
sound like a significant number of arrests, it bears noting that the ICC is still a very 
young institution.  The fact that even some states and individuals have complied with 
this young institution’s orders suggest that its powers are viewed as legitimate and 
significant.”1091  
Following on from the preceding two parts, Part III of this thesis asserted that 
members of this third generation of prosecutors are more than agents of ICL; they are 
also political actors serving in the interests of economic liberalisation.  Part III 
described the politico-strategic circumstances enabling the establishment of the ICC, 
placing those circumstances within a set of material and ideational conditions that 
were present in the rise, spread and entrenchment of liberal regimes in the nineteenth 
century in particular and the modernist project more generally.  It illuminated a 
political thread from those material and ideational conditions, through the design and 
establishment of the international military courts, the ad-hoc criminal tribunals, and 
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the international criminal court, up to the ICC prosecutors’ pre-trial and trial efforts.  
The various warrants and summonses signal a bias against so-called rebel armed 
groups, outlaw state leaders, and those who seek to subvert the democratic process.  
Far less grandiloquent that those made by Jackson and Keenan, the first opening 
statements made at the ICC reflect the law’s majesty and reproduce the existing 
configurations of power and authority in modernist world affairs. 
Part III, moreover, argued that these prosecutors help wage a politico-cultural 
civil war over the institutions governing international affairs and, through those 
institutions, the broader and deeper project of modernity.  Modernity is a complex and 
dynamic project with many potential varieties.  Some proponents of modernist 
utopias choose to use mass atrocities as a means of achieving, at least for them, 
rational ends.  Others, in positions of power and influence in world affairs, condemn 
that cruelty through law and, in so doing, suppress the rival utopia movements.  The 
rhetoric articulated in five opening statements made by each of the three generations 
of international prosecutors—particularly the epideictic style denouncing rival, but 
discredited utopian movements and calling for their abjection from humanity’s 
ranks—plays an important part in the politico-cultural civil war fought for control 
over the project of modernity.  These statements imply that transforming local 
politico-strategic, politico-economic, and politico-social institutions is not just 
palatable, but desirable and even necessary.  Under such circumstances, the 
distinctiveness among the rhetoric of law, politics and war contained in all of the 
prosecutors’ opening statements dissolves.  Rather than helping ensure peace, 
stability and security for those victorious in Second World War, or helping the UN 
Security Council to police the world’s trouble spots in the aftermath of the Cold War, 
the ICC prosecutors are helping open up African countries so that their natural 
resources can be commercially exploited.  That is what the strong disciplining focus 
on African situations and the subsequent cases at the ICC signifies.  The prosecutor’s 
future reach may well broaden beyond Africa, but it will seldom engage in countries 
that are not endowed with natural resources required to fuel the global economy and 
will never reach as far the P-5.  If the ICC prosecutor does focus her attention in areas 
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without natural resources it will be entirely for the optical effect of appearing 
balanced and objective in its quest for international criminal justice.   
At the forefront of this quest, the prosecutor’s role in the politico-cultural civil 
war is more or less covert as it is never explicitly acknowledged.  Perhaps the 
complicity is not even fully grasped by the prosecutors themselves since the values 
informing prosecutorial action are reflected and re-inscribed through a Gramscian 
process of cultural hegemony whereby the interests of the powerful quietly and subtly 
became the values of held by the weak.  Despite the lack of a declared combat role, 
the three successive generations of prosecutors examined in this thesis played direct 
roles on a new front-line in this civil war for modernity, both by targeting political 
and military leaders and their subordinates participating in armed conflicts and mass 
atrocities and by reifying a legal solution to a pressing politico-social problem.  Put in 
another way, the prosecution’s more limited, tactical courtroom goals—namely, the 
transformation of enemies, opponents, and rivals into the accused and then the 
transformation of the accused into convicts before the expulsion of these hostis 
humani generis from the ranks of humanity—creates something of a Marxist false 
consciousness about the real and helplessly compromised nature of the society of 
states and the wider international community by offering a veneer of a humanitarian 
normative order when there is no such thing.
1092
  A banality of goodness propagated 
by the court masks a grim reality of armed conflict and atrocity crime which could 
not be more different than the lived experiences of the prosecutor based in The 
Hague. While as individuals each prosecutor of serious international crime might at 
certain times battle to change this, their efforts will always be circumscribed by the 
politico-strategic circumstances that give rise to the functional authority within the 
courtroom.  Exploiting the widespread and deeply-held repugnance directed at those 
individuals who commit acts of politico-cruelty, this third generation of international 
prosecutors help wage a politico-cultural civil war, firstly, by deflecting attention 
away from the motives informing post-conflict reconstruction efforts and, secondly, 
by maintaining the false distinction among law, politics and war. Far from being 
neutral adjudicators of ICL, the ICC formed an important aspect of what Foucault 
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would describe as silent war that masks the discontinuities between periods of armed 
conflict and ongoing pacification efforts that almost always follow.  This civil war, 
fought in and over the divided house of modernity while asserting civility and law 
ahead of barbarity and lawlessness, uses laws prohibiting the commission of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide and crimes of aggression as 
weapons in this politico-cultural civil war.  Yet the re-conceptualisation of this law to 
cover those who wage politico-cultural civil war from positions of power is 
unimaginable.  Put simply, law is politics and politics is war. 
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CONCLUSION: CHIEF AMONGST THE ANGELS? 
 
 
The preceding chapters of this thesis collectively argued that three successive 
generations of international prosecutors are best understood as agents not only of the 
law, but also of politics and war.  More than recognising the vital roles these 
prosecutors play in the enforcement of ICL, specifically preparing indictments, 
warrants or summonses and making opening statements, this thesis contends that they 
are politico-legal actors involved in a series of ongoing contests among rival utopian 
movements.  While there are obvious immediate politico-strategic factors informing 
each generation’s prosecutorial efforts, there are less easily identified deeper forces at 
play here too.  This thesis went further still by contending that international 
prosecutors help wage a politico-cultural civil war among these utopian movements 
using all of the means available to obtain and maintain control over perceived 
enemies, rivals and opponents within modernist world affairs.  By taking a critical 
approach—which as previously mentioned involves standing apart, to the extent that 
it is possible to stand apart, in order to explore the circumstances that gave rise to ICL 
institutions—the thesis signalled that the prosecutors’ agency in law, politics and war 
is derived from configurations of power emerging in the aftermath of two global 
conflicts.  The first of these global conflicts occurred as the Second World War 
during 1939-45, the second as the Cold War during 1948-1991; while a third global 
conflict, the so-called War on Terror, has been underway since late 2001 it did not 
shape the establishment and design of the ICC, though it does continue to inform the 
ideas and actions of the ICC prosecutor.  Put simply, an evolving set of politico-
strategic circumstances that established five institutions designed specifically to 
enforce ICL saturate prosecutorial mandates in ways that are inescapable for the 
prosecutors.  Yet these circumstances connect with deeper, more profound 
transformations taking place in the context of the politico-cultural project of 
modernity.  In rare moments there is a convergence between the prevailing set of 
politico-strategic circumstances and the discourse against politic-cruelty, though 
usually the relationship can be characterised by longer periods of dissonance.  This 
critical approach also illustrated the role played by nineteenth-century liberalism in 
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giving rise to a discourse against politico-cruelty that awaited favourable politico-
strategic circumstances before establishing ICL institutions as part of broader 
reconstruction efforts in which war-torn states are transformed into democracies and 
war-ravaged economies are transformed into free markets.   
This thesis is critical, then, in the sense of offering a critique along the lines of 
Karl Marx and Immanuel Kant.  As James Miller explains:1093 
For both Marx and Kant, the purpose of critique was to render explicit 
what otherwise would remain implicit, bringing to light buried 
assumptions that regulated the way we think, and submitting these 
assumptions to public examination.  In Kant’s work, critique revealed 
the limits of reason, as well as the indomitable urge of the human spirit 
to pass beyond those limits; in Marx’s work, on the other hand, 
critique revealed how categories of modern economics corresponded to 
‘the conditions and relations of a definite, historically determined 
mode of production.’  
The thesis is critical so that interested scholars may better comprehend the 
complexities and complicities of this topic.  It is self-consciously a “politicized form 
of writing” that seeks to “disturb us, force us out of our narrative habits by giving us 
an experience of discord in both our relation to things and to each other, by making 
unfamiliar, through transcoding or refiguring or otherwise re-contextualizing, what 
has been familiar.”1094  Whether they and their acolytes like it or not, the three 
generations of international prosecutors examined above are complicit with powerful 
forces animating modernist world affairs right up to, and including, the present 
moment.  As much for the prosecutors themselves, as for those who champion their 
efforts, this critique calls into question the assumption that law is an ahistorical and 
non-contingent set of rules.  Foucault is instructive here, revealing that crimes are 
neither organic nor universal, but result from complex policing and diplomacy 
practices that largely determine what actions constitute shocking crimes and what 
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actions are deemed tolerable by state-makers and the wider international 
community.
1095
  
Koskenniemi perceptively warns “[a] trial that ‘automatically’ vindicates the 
position of the Prosecutor is a show trial in the precise Stalinist sense of that 
expression.”1096  This charge is as valid for those scholars who uncritically champion 
prosecutors as legal agents while failing both to recognise their own unduly narrow 
notion of the political and to freely acknowledge their self-serving separation of law 
from politics which, as this thesis demonstrates, is a distinction that dissolves under 
sustained critical scrutiny.  ICL enforcement institutions were, and are, important 
vehicles for spreading and intensifying a set of highly-specialised legal skills and 
knowledge, enabling the development of a cadre of qualified professional and 
academic experts who, in turn, buttress the cottage industry of international criminal 
justice.
1097
  Even back in the 1950s members of NGOs were frequently legal scholars 
shifting seamlessly between civil society roles to the diplomatic corps and back again 
to academia.
1098
 As Clarke elucidates, “[w]ith the globalization of substantive and 
procedural international criminal justice institutions, studies of lawmaking and 
justice-producing domains cannot be isolated from other spheres of control and 
interaction that go well beyond the state or the materiality of the object, seen or 
unseen.”1099  Western universities in particular, as sites of teaching and knowledge 
production, are deeply embedded in the neoliberal world order and law schools are no 
exception.
1100
 According to Baars, “[a]cademic lawyers perform a post-hoc 
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rationalization of an event, attach to it a history and a logic and send it forward into 
‘progressive development.’”1101  Schwöbel seems to support this point when she 
writes: “Given that the discipline is regarded as only fully ‘coming into its own’ at a 
time when the clash between two predominant ideologies was decided in favour of 
liberalism, such a synergy [between economic liberalisation and ICL] was arguably 
inescapable.”1102 That is a deficiency from which this thesis is not immune, 
particularly given its heavy use of scholarship produced within the global north, 
predominately at British universities. 
Importantly, the thesis would have been proven false if the three generations of 
international prosecutors had, as a matter of routine, accused representatives of profit-
seeking transnational firms, especially those based in developed western-styled 
liberal democracies.  The thesis would have been proven weak, too, had there been an 
absence of evidence indicating significant political, economic and social 
reconstruction in the aftermath of mass atrocity, efforts concomitant with the quest 
for international criminal justice through the enforcement of international criminal 
law.  This was, however, not the case.   
This thesis has three implications which hold significance for all of those who 
are involved in the international prosecution of serious international crime.  Firstly, 
the thesis raises questions about the quality of international prosecutors’ juridical 
credentials by contrasting these credentials against their international security 
prerogatives.  Foregrounding significant shifts in the politico-strategic circumstances 
underpinning the development of ICL’s major enforcement institutions helps to 
explain, at least in part, why and how these institutions came into being, whose 
interests they serve and whose values they reflect and inscribe.  Whereas the pursuit 
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of international criminal justice taking place in the immediate aftermath of the 
Second World War was undertaken in order to secure the spoils of victory won by the 
Grand Coalition, the pursuit of international criminal justice in the aftermath of the 
Cold War was undertaken as part of the UN Security Council’s efforts to maintain 
their primacy in matters of international peace and security.  This demonstrates that 
the nexus between pursuing international criminal justice and the search for security 
is by no means coincidental.  To be sure, international criminal justice has been, and 
is being, pursued through major ICL institutions not as an end unto itself, but as part 
of a broader strategy that assists locales transitioning from situations of armed 
conflict toward more peaceful circumstances by establishing, transforming or 
reconstructing local politico-strategic and politico-economic institutions in ways that 
better engage with globalising governance systems.  The pursuit of this kind of 
transitional international criminal justice, then, supports the grand strategy of those 
whose primary objective is to secure the systems of contemporary world affairs to 
their own advantage. 
By illuminating those inter-related legal and political threads, the thesis 
challenges mainstream ICL scholars—much of whose work tends to offer what 
Michael J Shapiro would likely describe as a “pious mode of representation” that “has 
the effect of reproducing or reinforcing the prevailing modes of power and authority” 
and often lets “the prevailing power structure play ventriloquist”1103—to reconsider 
the relationship between the circumstances establishing ICL institutions and the 
prosecutorial performances that occur as trials within those institutions.  This is 
important since much of this scholarship meditates upon the prosecutor’s role as a 
legal actor, meaning that too often insufficient attention is given to the ways in which 
particular material and ideational conditions inform, shape and travel with the 
institutions designed to enforce ICL.  When attention is focused on the conditions 
giving rise to the courtrooms’ stage upon which prosecutors perform, it almost 
always takes a somewhat narrow focus on sets of politico-strategic circumstances 
which, while undoubtedly important, are only one element of the underlying context.  
ICL’s narrow focus on the individual’s actions in a context that amplifies that 
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individual’s conduct enables and encourages an ignorance of the broader set of 
circumstances and related complicities.  This, in turn, distorts and obscures larger, 
more profound configurations of power at play in modernist world affairs.   
Secondly, the thesis raises questions over international prosecutors’ integrity by 
contrasting their commitment to protecting what they might describe as the humanist 
values of the international society of civilised states against their unacknowledged 
and perhaps unwitting commitment to advancing the market-orientated interests of a 
particular utopian movement.  Rather than defending international society with all of 
its human diversity, the efforts of successive generations of international prosecutors 
tend to protect and advance the interests of those at the helm of the politico-cultural 
project of modernity.  Situating ICL’s development and enforcement as a significant 
temporality of the discourse against politico-cruelty, which has its origins alongside 
nineteenth-century liberalism, and contextualising prosecutorial conduct as part of a 
politico-cultural civil war played out among rival utopian visions, encourages a 
(re)conceptualisation of international prosecutors as agents of economic liberalisation 
even as this has developed over time and found expression as either neo-capitalism 
during the middle of the twentieth century or as neoliberalism from the 1970s 
onwards.  International criminal law has evolved at the same time too.  In fact, 
focusing exclusively on the juridical dimension of the international prosecutors’ 
collective efforts renders invisible the extreme injustice created by the global 
economic system dominating contemporary world affairs.  It implies that the 
enormous inequalities in the distribution of wealth flowing from that system are 
natural and determined by historical circumstance, and are not, therefore, the result of 
political decisions and not something that should be remedied through law.1104  (A 
similar point has been made by Alan Norrie with respect to domestic criminal trials as 
the “individual commits crimes under the direct influence of social circumstances and 
not as the product of rational choices made in abstraction from such 
circumstances.”1105)  The complacency of this quest for international criminal justice 
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renders it complicit with the expansion of the global free market, which creates self-
enclosing systemic conditions of poverty, trapping generations in a cycle of denied 
human potential.1106  It thus carries serious social, economic and environmental costs, 
the burden of which is a heavy and ultimately unsustainable one for the human 
community to bear and warrants denouncing.  Herein lies the basis for the claim that 
international prosecutors are in danger of being incurably infected by free market 
interests while remaining blind to its pathologies.  The question of prosecutorial 
legitimacy thus becomes a question of prosecutorial culpability to the extent that 
prosecutors are complicit with a utopian vision whose failure “expresses itself as 
comprehensive and accelerating inequality, where inequality is experienced by the 
great majority of the world’s people as the steady decline, in many cases to zero, in 
the prospects for living a full, long, and secure life as generally defined and accepted 
by values which are local and temporal.”1107   
By giving focus to these various political threads, this thesis challenges critical 
ICL scholars to broaden their concepts of the political to include not just strategic, but 
also economic and social dimensions.  Understanding these three politico-dimensions 
helps bring into sharper focus the existence of, and rivalries among, various 
modernist utopian movements.  The dominant utopian movement is, of course, 
economic liberalisation, which deploys the rule of international law as a means of 
creeping towards and then entrenching a particular world order, though its liberal 
                                                                                                                                                                     
expression of a social and political practice, and it bears the marks of that conflict within that 
practice.  Because it is founded upon the political ideology of the juridical individual, criminal 
law is constructed upon the conflicts inherent in that ideology.” 
1106
  For useful critiques of the global free market, see: Walden Bello Capitalism’s Last Stand? 
Deglobalisation in the Age of Austerity (Zed Books, London & New York, 2013); Noam 
Chomsky Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order (Seven Stories Press, New 
York, 1999); Paul Collier The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What 
Can Be Done About it (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007); Gray, above n 68; Jane Kelsey 
Reclaiming the Future: New Zealand and the Global Economy (Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington, 1999); Jane Kelsey At the Crossroads: Three Essays (Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington, 2002); and Erik S Reinert How Rich Countries Got Rich…and Why Poor Countries 
Stay Poor (Constable & Robinson, London, 2007). 
1107
  McKinley, above n 74, at 54. 
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proponents, including the international prosecutors examined in this thesis, claim that 
this order is somehow immune from politics.1108  Put in another way, the assertion of 
international law is often an assertion against politics, especially where that politics is 
understood as leading into a state of international anarchy, for the law seeks to 
constrain politics through non-political rule.1109  In practice, however, international 
law more generally presents a mechanism through which important political decisions 
are deferred elsewhere.1110  Yet the rule of international law is itself a battleground 
over which rival utopian movements seek to gain ascendency over their rivals.1111  
Creating specialist bodies of law, such as ICL, offer further opportunities to pursue 
particular agendas.1112  This, in turn, enables the use of ICL against rival utopian 
movements, effectively placing those movements on trial.  The implication here is 
that those who stand accused of committing serious international crime are indicted 
less for their actions and more for where they are positioned in the aftermath of armed 
conflict and mass atrocity.1113  Hence, as Simpson argues, “war crimes trials are 
political trials… not because they lack a foundation in law or because they are the 
crude product of political forces but because war crimes law is saturated with 
conversations about what it means to engage in politics or law, as well as a series of 
projects that seek to employ these terms in the service of various ideological 
preferences.”1114  These might be more side-shows than show trials, however.  ICL 
enforcement always endorses some hegemonic meta-narrative, implicit in which is a 
particular, but highly contested, understanding of some or other political contest.  
Couching a person’s individual culpability within the contours of that meta-narrative 
too often renders invisible the power yielded over significant politico-strategic, 
                                                          
1108
  Simpson, above n 26, at 141. 
1109
  Koskenniemi, above n 24, at 36-37. 
1110
  At 58. 
1111
  At 223. 
1112
  At 65. 
1113
  Simpson, above n 26, at 114. 
1114
  At 11. 
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politico-economic and politico-social structures and the inequalities these structures 
create by constructing a scapegoat in the form of the accused.1115   
Only a few scholars have noted the direct connection between the expansion of 
the liberal utopian movements and ICL enforcement.  Clarke, for instance, goes as far 
as to suggest that “[a]s a political project, international justice regimes have 
succeeded in laying the foundations for this illusion of justice,”1116 before arguing 
that:
1117
 
This performance, this theater, linked as it is to a profoundly uneven 
global political economy, actually serves to undermine the capacity of 
the postcolonial state to ameliorate material violence.  The 
benevolence of the new internationalism reveals some of the most 
tragic forms of victimhood—tragic because, despite its biopolitical 
mission and justice-seeking goals, the ICC’s mandate does not involve 
addressing root causes, preempting violence, and thereby fostering 
viable life-producing conditions for those who will otherwise likely 
become ‘victims’… As such, it represents the performing of justice in 
an attempt to make loss and disenfranchisement bearable. 
In other words, the quest for international criminal justice, from the end of the Second 
World War up until the present day, functions as a form of palliative care for what 
McKinley describes as “grand strategic fraud” whereby the current proponents of 
economic liberalisation, more often than not US policymakers favouring 
neoliberalism, declare the urgent need to “bring progress and prosperity to the 
[Global] South.”  The promise is, as McKinley points out, “untenable if the [Global] 
North is to remain dominant, to enjoy its standard of living.  The promise, then, is 
only a declaration devoid of intent, a consoling word for the dying.”1118  The 
                                                          
1115
  Koskenniemi, above n 24, at 235. 
1116
  Clarke, above n 27, at 5. 
1117
  At 111. 
1118
  McKinley, above n 74, at 8.  McKinley goes on to argue that “to the extent that the [Global] 
South registers upon the consciousness of the North, and the sheer magnitude of its pathologies 
determine that they must, they do so primarily and almost exclusively as a profound and 
chronic threat to Northern privileges and cultures ensuring that, at best, the Global South 
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complicity between this pursuit of international criminal justice and the construction 
of a global free market is brought into stark relief when Baars argues that, following 
the end of the Cold War and the further spread and entrenchment of capitalism:1119 
renewed impetus for international cooperation in the sphere of 
international criminal law, has not led to the application of that law to 
war’s economic actors.  Instead, international criminal law continues to 
draw our focus to individual deviancy rather than conflict produced by 
the modes of production, hiding economic grounds behind nationalist, 
racial, religious, etc explanations…. Thus, rather than suggesting 
‘corporate accountability in ICL’ is a real possibility, the hidden history 
of Nuremberg may give us cause to investigate more deeply exactly how 
and why international criminal law constructs de facto ‘corporate 
impunity’ as a necessary ingredient of today’s capitalist imperialism.  
The challenge here is for this acknowledgement to become more commonplace 
within mainstream ICL scholarship.1120  
Thirdly, the thesis raises questions over the international prosecutors’ lineage 
within the politico-cultural project of modernity by placing that project in a broader, 
deeper and altogether more profound politico-sacral tradition.  It is, of course, the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition which serves as the context for the modernist politico-
cultural project, even though a process of secularisation may have largely distorted 
any residual sacral traces.  Contemporary world affairs is conducted among the ruins 
of discredited utopian movements which, framed in secular terms denying the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
constitutes an intractable security problem which, only with imagination and the deft 
administration of aid, but more accurately conceived of as alms, might be managed.”  
1119
  Baars, above n 256, at 192. 
1120
  The Rome Statute contains provisions enabling the prosecution of those engaged in the business 
of war and the fuelling of mass atrocity, a topic somewhat belatedly being addressed by legal 
scholars.  See generally James G Stewart “Atrocity, Commerce and Accountability: The 
International Criminal Liability of Corporate Actors” (2010) 8 JICL 313; and William A 
Schabas War Crimes and Human Rights: Essays on the Death Penalty, Justice and 
Accountability (Cameron May, London, 2008) particularly Ch. 20 entitled “War Economies, 
Economic Actors and International Criminal Law.”    
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primacy of religion, were vehicles for conveying and embodying religious myths.1121  
Although dressed in secular robes, modernity’s utopian movements were imbued with 
a notion of salvation not so much in the afterlife but more in the immediate, realisable 
future, giving fresh life to Christianity’s founding apocalyptic myths.1122  For Gray, 
modernity offers a new religion of humanity, the object of worship being the human 
species.1123  When understood in terms of this sacral tradition the international 
prosecutors’ collective effort to rid humanity of its most extreme depravity constitutes 
an attempt to redeem us from our fallen state of nature.  ICL enforcement echoes the 
Spanish and Roman Inquisitions, which were themselves “enabled by some of the 
broader forces that brought the modern world into existence, and that make 
inquisitions of various kinds a recurring and inescapable feature of modern life.”1124  
In certain respects, then, international prosecutors of serious international crimes 
might function as contemporary versions of the Grand Inquisitor Tomas de 
Torquemada, using the rule of law, but always underpinned by the force of coercive 
arms, to have their way in non-trivial matters.   
A handful of critical ICL scholars are already attuned to these religious traces 
on modernist world politics and, more specifically, the politics of the law.  Krever 
finds what he describes as “an enchantment with criminal law and a growing faith in 
international criminal trials as the most suitable response and remedy to the major 
forms of violence and destruction that continue to plague the modern world.”1125  
Tallgren opines that “[i]nternational criminal justice comes close to a religious 
exercise of hope and perhaps deception”1126 and that “this kind of religious exercise 
of hope… is stronger than the desire to face everyday life.”1127  “The Rome Statute 
and its language of secular objectivity and universalism—its image of freedom and 
                                                          
1121
   Gray, above n 35, at 1. 
1122
  At 28. 
1123
  At 58-59.  
1124
  Cullen Murphy God’s Jury: The Inquisition and the Making of the Modern World (Penguin, 
London, 2011), at 21. 
1125
  Krever, above n 25, at 701. 
1126
  Tallgren, above n 17, at 561. 
1127
  At 593. 
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fairness for all of humanity and its discourse of nonpartisan and secular sensibility, 
for example,” for Clarke, “represents a language of freedom with an ontology that 
reflects ‘Western’ religious roots that have travelled and become hegemonic in a 
range of contexts.”1128  Koskenniemi not only reckons international law “a kind of 
secular faith”1129 and human rights a kind of agnostic religion of modernity,1130 but 
also that international prosecutors learn to speak a medium of moral outrage in a way 
that reflects the spirit of Christian crusades and the Enlightenment’s civilising 
mission.1131  Orford sees international prosecutors as “offering salvation to those 
threatened by state-sponsored murder and genocide.”1132  Simpson claims to be 
witness to an ancient, but ongoing, war of the Old Testament between the forces of 
good and evil, fought as a type of “pest control,” policing action, or an effort at 
religious purification.1133  When they make such remarks these critically-orientated 
scholars raise intriguing questions about the nature and scope of ICL and the extent to 
which it is shaped by religious traditions.  Hypothetical scenarios, such as an ICL 
emerging from sacral contexts reflecting Islam, Buddhism, Hindu, Shinto, Tao, or 
even Zoroastrianism, beg a further set of questions that, perhaps, cannot yet be 
answered.  It is entirely possible that modernity shaped by sacral traditions other than 
Judaeo-Christianity would provide a very different set of rules proscribing certain 
acts of politico-cruelty, perhaps one less myopically wedded to individualism and 
more focused on broader social groups or one less abstractly ahistorical and one more 
practically attuned to underlying material and ideational inequalities.  These scholars 
are, however, in the minority, serving as the exception that proves the rule.  As with 
the relationship between ICL and the liberal movement, the relationship between ICL 
and the Judaeo-Christian sacral context deserves wider attention within mainstream 
ICL scholarship. 
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  Clarke, above n 27, at 7. 
1129
  Koskenniemi, above n 24, at 361 
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  At 232. 
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  At 126. 
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  Orford, above n 138, at 7. 
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In an important sense, modernist world politics are part of, and flow from, the 
unfinished wars of religion that so marked the seventeenth century and which gave 
rise to the Westphalian settlement.  Yet while Gray argues that the faith placed in 
those utopian movements masquerading as secular versions of apocalyptic myth is 
largely moribund, replaced by the re-emergence of old-time religion strife at the core 
of global conflict,1134 he is correct only insofar that those religions engender 
modernist politico-cultural projects.  McKinley also draws a parallel between 
economic globalisation and religious war.1135  While this thesis recognises the sacral 
traces pervading modernity it stops short of describing the politico-cultural civil war 
as a religious war or describing international prosecutors as holy “law-rriors.”1136  It 
does so because the prosecutors’ attachment to modernity—and, in particular, its 
politico-cultural practice of using reason as an end in and of itself, its state-based 
system of diplomacy, capitalism, and penchant for individualism, and its strongly-
held belief in the perfectibility of humanity through civilising instruction and the 
power of knowledge to progress humanity—is stronger than it is to the Judaeo-
Christian traditions, with its faith-based claims of knowledge and a belief in the 
afterlife.  Even though international prosecutors use ICL to confront humanity’s worst 
excesses and seek to curb modernity’s most violent pathologies, represent the 
vanguard in the quest for international criminal justice and might be regarded by 
                                                          
1134
  Gray, above n 35, at 184. 
1135
  McKinley, above n 74, at 217.  In particular, McKinley asserts the following: “That a form of 
religious war is underway is affirmed, but the type of war has revealed itself, too.  It is a 
crusade which, in every aspect affecting strategic competence, recalls the original adventure in 
recklessness given the name in the eleventh century.  As historians of the period advise us, the 
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vult (“as God Will it”).  In the end, failure: the costs were ruinous, not least for the rulers 
themselves, and the reigning theology of the day was unable to provide the basis for any 
relevant and lasting political organisation.”    
1136
  The term is found in Luban, above n 58, at 458. 
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many as featuring among humanity’s better angels, if not chief amongst the angels, 
these politico-legal actors must also be recognised as auxiliary combatants for those 
seeking to maintain their control over the modernist project through an ongoing 
politico-cultural civil war.   
By highlighting this war thread, the thesis challenges critical ICL scholars to 
enlarge their concepts of war to be more than a clash of arms or series of clashes of 
arms.  More than armed conflict, politico-cultural civil war represents a 
transformation of war’s routine conduct because it involves all the means available, 
including but not restricted to the use of coercive force, to defeat one’s enemies, 
rivals or opponents.  It is fought for control over the key institutional architecture 
governing the politico-strategic, politico-economic and politico-social dimensions of 
international life.  It involves policing international society’s norms and related rules 
of behaviour.  It can, and often does, take the form of a war of pacification fought 
beyond the zones of privilege and prosperity.  This war is waged not only through the 
reconstruction of local politico-strategic and politico-economic institutions in the 
aftermath of armed conflict, but also through the enforcement of ICL in the aftermath 
of mass atrocity.  Politico-cultural civil war also represents a broadening of war’s 
province as the battleground is no longer some geographically-bound territory; it is, 
instead, the entire politico-cultural project of modernity.  
Finally, then, this thesis offers a unique analysis of three successive generations 
of prosecutors of serious international crimes, which, firstly, argues that prosecutorial 
mandates are a concrete manifestation of the discourse against politico-cruelty and, 
secondly, that prosecutorial efforts serve the interests of the liberal utopia which itself 
is not merely analogous to war in its destructive consequences, but rather, constitutes 
a form of war in and of itself.  The novel notions of the discourse against politico-
cruelty and politico-cultural civil war—both of which mediate the relationship 
between the international prosecutor and the modernist project—may go some of the 
way towards mitigating the ever-present risk that both mainstream and critical ICL 
scholars, especially those who are fellow travellers with the international prosecutor, 
could easily adore devils as though they were deities. 
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